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COSMIC AND META-COSMIC THEOLOGY IN ARISTOTLE'S LOST DIALOGUES

BY

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PREFACE

The foundation for this study was laid during the year 1986-87, when I enjoyed the hospitality of the Netherlands Institute of Advanced Study (N.I.A.S.) in Wassenaar. I would like to express my warm thanks to the Board of the Institute for the privilege of spending that precious period in their midst.

The task which I set myself in writing this book was to reevaluate a complex of problems which have given rise to much scholarly dispute on points of detail, but in which on the larger issues scholars have generally taken as their point of departure a number of fundamental dogmas proposed more than sixty years ago by Werner Jaeger, namely that the lost works of Aristotle were early products of a primarily popularizing nature, and that Aristotle himself underwent a radical change of philosophical position before he wrote the treatises of his which we still possess. These standard views were also a part of the scholarly baggage that I had carried with me since my student days.

In light of the fact that in this study I wish to undermine seemingly impregnable scholarly positions, the reactions of fellow-scholars to my efforts have proved most valuable. I would like to record my indebtedness to Prof. A. H. Armstrong (Liverpool), Prof. J. Dillon (Dublin), and Prof. G. Reale (Milan) for their comments on a provisional version of my study. Also I thank Prof. M. Baltes (Münster), my brother Dr. C. A. Bos, my friend and colleague Dr. D. T. Runia, and the members of the Research Group on 'Zinsperspectief en rationaliteit' in the Faculty of Philosophy of the Free University, Amsterdam, for making diverse critical remarks which I have been able to put to good use.

Finally I would like to express my gratitude to Drs. A. P. Runia, who translated the text from my original Dutch, and to Mrs. M. A. A. Runia-Deenick, who prepared the text for publication.

Heemstede
March 1989

ABBREVIATIONS

A&A	Antike und Abendland
AC	L'Antiquité classique
AGPh	Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie
AIPhO	Annuaire de l'Institut de Philologie et d'Histoire Orientales
AIV	Atti del Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti
AJA	American Journal of Archeology
A&R	Atene e Roma
BAGB	Bulletin de l'Association G. Budé
BICS	Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies
CHLGEMPh	Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy
CPh	Classical Philology
CQ	Classical Quarterly
Et. Class.	Etudes classiques
GBRS	Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies
JHI	Journal of the History of Ideas
JHP	Journal of the History of Philosophy
JHS	Journal of Hellenic Studies
JNES	Journal of Near Eastern Studies
KNakad. W	Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen
MH	Museum Helveticum
MS	The Modern Schoolman
NJKA	Neue Jahrbücher für das klassische Altertum
PI	Philosophical Inquiry
PP	La Parola del Passato
PRef	Philosophia Reformata
PWRE	Pauly-Wissowa, Real Enzyklopädie
RCCM	Rivista di Cultura Classica e Medioevale
REA	Revue des Etudes Anciennes
REG	Revue des Etudes Grecques
RFIC	Rivista di Filologia e d'Istruzione classica
Rhein. M	Rheinisches Museum
RIPh	Revue Internationale de Philosophie
RPh	Revue de Philologie
RPFE	Revue philosophique de la France et de l'Etranger
RPhilos	Revue philosophique
RPhL	Revue philosophique de Louvain
RSC	Rivista di Studi Classici
SBPreusz. AW	Sitzungs Berichte der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften
SIFC	Studi Italiani di Filologia Classica
VC	Vigiliae Christianae
WS	Wiener Studien

INTRODUCTION

The present book is viewed by its author as a product of historical research reflecting the tension between what a deficient tradition allows us to know about classical culture and what we wish to know about it. As the great German classicist W. Jaeger stated in 1914:¹

Die Lückenhaftigkeit der Überlieferung der antiken Literatur, von deren unzähligen Werken nur wenige Tausende erhalten sind, macht die gewissenhafte Durchführung (der) rekonstruktiven Methode, die Ausnützung jedes kleinsten Fragmentes, jedes Titelchens der Überlieferung zum fundamentalen Lebensgesetz der Philologie.

We must indeed make careful use of every available piece of information in order to increase our knowledge. But even then large questions remain about parts of the puzzle where the pieces seem to be entirely lacking.

From the wish to gain more insight into Aristotle's philosophy, particularly into how it developed after a long and intensive interaction with Plato, and from dissatisfaction with standard views on the remains of Aristotle's lost works, I have tried to apply an 'imaginative' approach to various undervalued indications found in the classical tradition, and to work out new, alternative hypotheses. The standard views generally suffer from two defects. On the one hand they dismiss large parts of the tradition about Aristotle, attributing them to confusion or incomprehension. On the other hand they trivialize writings with which Aristotle acquired a solid philosophical reputation in antiquity, considering them 'juvenile' or 'incidental' works without philosophical relevance or importance for our knowledge of the real Aristotle. Other interpretations, based on the apparent incompatibility of various Aristotelian positions, do not try or are not able to provide convincing explanations for the change of views which they assign to Aristotle. For instance, they accept that Aristotle initially held a purely immanentist philosophy, on which the doctrine of a transcendent Prime Unmoved Mover was later superimposed. Or, more extremely, they hold with B. Dumoulin, that within the *Metaphysics* nine different stages are to be distinguished.

I recognize that the strictly philological interpretation of the available material might be thought insufficient to give solid support to my conclusions. Nevertheless I believe that this study offers a serious contribution to the reconstruction of the content of Aristotle's lost work, which he released for publication during his life. The basis of this reconstruction is a philosophical consideration of the problems which confronted Aristotle as

¹ W. Jaeger, 'Philologie und Historie' in *Humanistische Reden und Vorträge*, 2nd edition (Berlin 1960) 8.

a member of the Old Academy, and of the contradictions to which the scholarly discussion of his development has led. Use is made of indications contained in the many classical testimonies about Aristotle's work, which are put in a new, more productive context.

In the main part of our study, chapters 1 to 11, an alternative is developed to the view of W. Jaeger, *Aristotle* (1923), who held that the lost work was Platonizing and not yet really Aristotelian, and that it should be assigned to the first and (early) middle stages of Aristotle's development. The main drawback of this view is its assumption that for almost three hundred years antiquity had no knowledge of the real Aristotle, the Aristotle familiar to us from the *Corpus Aristotelicum* (which was not in circulation until about 50 BC).

Our view also differs radically from that of J. Pépin, *Théologie cosmique et théologie chrétienne* (Paris 1964), who does see Aristotle's lost work as a product of independent philosophizing, but believes it differed profoundly from the preserved *Corpus*. Pépin is unable to explain satisfactorily why it was philosophically necessary for Aristotle to develop from his first independent phase to his later one, but neither can he explain why Aristotle's position in his first phase differed from that of Plato.

According to the alternative view set out in our study, Aristotle's lost writings had already developed, in an ongoing debate with Plato, all the important doctrines familiar to us from the *Corpus*. These doctrines are the double theology of a transcendent Prime Unmoved Mover and divine cosmic beings; the theory of the fifth element as the substance of the celestial beings and the pure rational souls; the sharp distinction of the mind from the functions of the *psyche*; and the emphasis on the distinction between contemplation and action or production. However, the presentation of these insights in the lost writings was quite different from that in the *Corpus*. In his dialogues Aristotle, like Plato, alternated discussions on the basis of common human experience and rational argumentation with *mythical* narratives, in which the reality of human experience is discussed from a meta-position, from a transcendent perspective. In the treatises of the *Corpus Aristotelicum*, on the other hand, Aristotle consistently limits himself to the 'common human', 'natural' perspective and tries to work out a coherent view on this basis. In the same *Corpus*, however, the double perspective of man (i.e. the perspective of mortal man, with his blindness and lack of freedom, and that of the divine being which man is able to become) is certainly presupposed and the published writings are also frequently referred to for further clarification and exposition of certain matters. The philosophy of Aristotle's lost works, it is thus concluded, was in fact *not replaced by but presupposed* in the *Corpus Aristotelicum* which we still possess.

The *philosophical* reason for the loss of Aristotle's published work is

the same as in the case of Heraclides Ponticus and Xenocrates, namely that from the time of Epicurus professional philosophers no longer considered the use of philosophical myths acceptable, because their verifiability was held to be inferior to that of rational argumentation on the basis of generally accessible human experience.

On account of the parallel which we assume between Aristotle's published works and the *Corpus*, the record of his teaching activities, we think it possible that the term ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι (*exoterikoi logoi*), by which the *Corpus* repeatedly refers to extant writings, should be interpreted as a name for writings largely relating to τὰ ἔξω, i.e. the reality which in Aristotle's view transcends *Physis*. In the same way the reference to ἐγκύκλιοι λόγοι (*enkyklioi logoi*) may be interpreted as the collective name for writings dealing with all that belongs to the natural reality around us.

In that case it is natural to suppose that Aristotle set an order of priority according to which the man pursuing *sophia* must first study everything relating to the reality of *ta enkyklia*, before being able to concentrate usefully on *ta exoterika*. The study of *ta enkyklia* must have been presented as something of only relative, even little value in comparison with the study of *ta chorista*. Thus *ta enkyklia* were presumably regarded as forming a level which must be passed as soon as the seeker of truth is ready for it. Otherwise one would run the risk of remaining 'confined' in the propedeutic phase.

The starting point of our inquiry, presented in Chapter 1, is a statement made by Tertullian in his work *On the soul*. This Father of the Church says there that Aristotle spoke about a dreaming Kronos. In two articles (1947 and 1950) J. H. Waszink made a first attempt to utilize this information for our knowledge of Aristotle's lost dialogues.

Before embarking on this trail, however, we first look in Chapter 2 at the Greek mythical tradition about the god Kronos. Kronos robs his father Ouranos of power and is punished by imprisonment at the hands of his own son Zeus, but he is also presented by Hesiod as the god who rules over the people of the golden race. This curious fact brings us to examine the background of these stories. We think that the old historical explanation is superseded, according to which an ancient natural religion, in which the Titans played a role, was ousted by the followers of the Olympic religion of culture. Instead we have sought an explanation with the help of the Ugaritic myth of Ba'lu, the god who brings the fertilizing autumnal rains and then descends to the underworld. In Greek tradition Kronos is a divine figure who suffers a change in his condition in that he is robbed of his divine splendour, as a punishment for guilt incurred. From Hesiod onwards, the theme of crime and penance was strictly connected with the name 'Titan' given to Kronos by his father.

In our third chapter we follow the trail set out by J. H. Waszink. First we examine the links which he established between Tertullian's evidence on Aristotle and other testimonies about Aristotle's lost work. Unlike Waszink, we prefer to relate the dreaming Kronos to Aristotle's *Eudemus* or *On the Soul*. A myth about the 'isles of the blessed' is appropriate to this dialogue as part of the 'revelation by the daemon Silenus' to king Midas. The 'isles of the blessed' have always been closely associated with the figure of Kronos. Against the background of the myth in Plutarch's *De facie in orbe lunae*, we further think that Kronos must be seen as the figure who in his dreams participates in the omniscience of Zeus and who, as a dream oracle, mediates this knowledge to daemons for use in their government of the world.

Because Tertullian's statement supplies so few details, we are forced in Chapter 4 to make an extensive analysis of the myth in Plutarch's *De facie in orbe lunae*, where the author introduces a god Kronos who has been bound with the chains of sleep by Zeus and who in his sleep functions as a mediator between Zeus and the cosmic daemons. Part of the myth is an exposition on the fate of the souls of the dead. This occurs in the context of a sharp distinction between the soul and the *nous*, which leads to the distinction between a 'first death', the separation of the soul from the earthly material body, and a 'second death', the process in which man's *nous* is liberated from the soul, and thus from the *pathe* located in the soul. It is remarkable that the final myth of the *De facie* hardly seems integrated with the rest of the work, which appears to be a purely scientific discussion of the material composition of the moon.

We next pay attention, in Chapter 5, to a text in *Corpus Hermeticum* 10 which also mentions a 'dreaming Kronos', who 'often passes in sleep from the body and thus achieves the most beautiful vision'. In our interpretation of this text, Kronos is here numbered among the cosmic gods, whose contemplative faculty is actualized when it is no longer constrained by its conjunction to an ethereal, (psychic) divine body. The occurrence of this conception in the treatise can only be explained by assuming either that its author was strikingly original or that he drew on a source of mythical-philosophical material. We opt for the latter possibility and argue that this Hermetic treatise goes back to a philosophical myth in one of Aristotle's lost writings. Sections are also devoted to texts in Tatian and Philo of Byblos mentioning the figure of Kronos. And we briefly look at the word puzzle SATOR TENET ROTAS.

In Chapter 6 we resume our analysis of the final myth in Plutarch's *De facie*. Because we want to know more about the origin of the themes used by Plutarch, we try to clarify the philosophical relevance of the main components of his mythical narrative. Plutarch is concerned to draw a sharp distinction between man's psychic and intellectual functions. He derives the substance of the soul from the Moon and the substance of the mind from the Sun. Yet the importance attributed to a transcendent principle, which is the

object of love and desire for all Nature, seems to rule out the possibility of a materialistic conception. We conclude that the opposition between the Transcendent and the non-Transcendent is all-important, and that subsequently degrees of materiality ('density') are distinguished within the sphere of Nature, correlate with degrees of cognitive ability.

Plutarch describes the stay of the souls on the Moon as an easy, toilless existence. But it is emphatically not a condition of supreme bliss. This theme was first developed in the Old Academy to indicate the distinction between the intrinsic quality of the theoretical life and the much inferior glory of being free from the cares attending the mortal condition. Closely related to this is the location of the 'Kronos island', halfway between our reality and another reality, the 'Great continent' lying beyond the Kronos island. Kronos' 'sleep' is also an indication of the inferior quality of his condition with regard to the perfect divinity and perfect knowledge of Zeus. By comparing the description of Kronos' 'Cave' and the Platonic myth about the ascent of the souls to the pinnacle of the celestial roof, we conclude that in the conception used by Plutarch the furthest celestial sphere is the enclosure which separates all material beings from the perfect, transcendent reality. In this view Kronos is a cosmic deity, symbol of the furthest celestial sphere or World-soul.

It also seemed necessary to pay attention to the modern scholarly debate on Plutarch's treatise and the sources which he used. The diverse views, presented in Chapter 7, turn out to be quite contradictory. R. Heinze (1892) argued that the psychology of 943c ff. is materialistic and Stoic by origin, but that the rest of the *De facie* myth must derive from Xenocrates. H. von Arnim disagreed entirely (1921) and wrote a devastating critique of Heinze's study. He sees Plutarch's source as an eclectic Platonist from the first century BC or AD without much philosophical importance. K. Reinhardt (1926) strongly urged Posidonius as the source of inspiration for Plutarch's *De facie* myth. In more recent times J. Dillon (1977) has drawn attention to elements of the Old Academy in Plutarch. In the latter's discussion of the Transcendent, Dillon clearly sees the influence of Aristotle's theology. He points out that Plutarch's notion of an irrational 'World-soul' originates in Plato's *Timaeus*, although he also assumes the influence of Persian dualism here. Dillon's failure to account for the theme of the 'sleeping World-soul' in Plutarch and Albinus is to be regretted. In our view he might have usefully related this theme to the motif of the 'dreaming Kronos'. Finally, we discuss an important contribution by P. Donini, who explains the apparent division between the scientific first part and the mythical second part of Plutarch's *De facie* as a 'difference in perspective'. Donini relates this difference to the question of the relation between 'natural science' and 'first science' or 'science of principles', which were held to be structurally distinct in Middle Platonism. He regards this problem as being due to the combination of Platonic and Aristotelian

traditions of thought.

In our own analysis we establish that the myth of the *De facie* has much more quality and coherence than earlier scholars assumed, and that nothing points to decisive Stoic influence. In our view the 'dreaming Kronos' motif must be seen against the background of the debate in the Old Academy over the relationship of *theoria* and *praxis*. We propose to interpret this figure as constituting a correction of Plato's divine creator in the *Timaeus* and his world archon Kronos in the *Politicus*, in particular a correction of the *dialectical* nature of these divine figures. Aristotle rejected any kind of dialectic on the level of the highest god (the *Nous*), but accepted it for a secondary divine being, the World-soul, which he may have symbolized by the figure of the dreaming Kronos.

In Chapter 8 we list a series of details in Plutarch's *De facie* myth which in one way or another can be related to Aristotle's preserved work and, more frequently, to his lost work. The result is a remarkable number of connections pertaining to both form and content. This lends support to our assumption that in some measure Plutarch's myth can give us an impression of the tenor of Aristotle's discourse in his lost writings.

In this search we believe we have found ways of providing a meaningful framework for various hitherto unrelated fragments of information about Aristotle's lost works. This particularly applies to texts showing that Aristotle talked about 'imprisonment', 'bondage', 'lack of freedom' and 'liberation', and about 'penance for guilt incurred'.

In the next part of our study, Chapter 9, we attempt to draw conclusions from our enquiry relevant to the reconstruction of Aristotle's lost work, in particular of the 'Kronology' which must have played a part in it. We establish that this 'Kronology' can only have formed part of a 'double theology' concerning a purely contemplative, transcendent supreme deity (Zeus) and a subordinate, cosmic, and world-organizing god Kronos. This theology implicitly rejects the creation of the world by a divine Demiurge. We view the 'Kronology' and the related doctrine of the fifth, celestial element, with its psychic nature, as Aristotle's alternative to the Platonic doctrine of the World-soul. In Aristotle's account, the intellectual faculty of the World-soul is physically 'bound' to a fine-material substance with psychic characteristics.

This Kronology is part of a work in which the fundamental differences between Plato and Aristotle are elaborated in terms of differences concerning the doctrine of the soul in microcosmos and macrocosmos. It implies a rejection and correction of the views on the soul set out in Plato's *Phaedo*, *Republic*, *Phaedrus*, and *Timaeus*. Finally, we link this Kronology to the evidence on Aristotle's theory of cosmic catastrophes.

On the basis of these conclusions, we next address in the tenth chapter the problem of the relationship between the lost work and the *Corpus Aristotelicum*, a problem much debated by scholars since W. Jaeger. We

conclude that Jaeger's view, according to which the lost work was largely Platonic, cannot be maintained. The lost work contained an independent Aristotelian philosophy in which all the main features of Aristotle's philosophy as expressed in the *Corpus* seem to have been present.

The most characteristic distinction between the lost work and the *Corpus*, we believe, is a 'difference in perspective', a difference between speaking on the basis of generally accessible human experience and speaking in *mythical* terms on the basis of divine revelation and mantic dreams. This raises the crucial question: did Aristotle fundamentally reject the latter mode of discourse at any point in his development? Or did he at all times recognize the legitimacy of both kinds, albeit that in his teaching activities recorded in the *Corpus* he based himself on 'natural reason' only? We opt for this second possibility.

We advance the hypothesis that a *philosophical* reason for the loss of Aristotle's published works may lie in the very fact that they contained mythical discussions. From the time of Epicurus, it seems, professional philosophers radically criticized the use of this supernatural mode of discourse and rejected it as philosophically unacceptable.

In Chapter 11, finally, we discuss the problem of the references in the *Corpus Aristotelicum* to *exoterikoi* and *enkyklioi logoi*. Given our conclusions in the previous chapters, we are not convinced by the current view that these references are to 'popular', not strictly scientific works. It is unclear why Aristotle would cite with approval and recommend such writings if they were 'merely' popularizing or expressed superseded views. After an analysis of the subjects apparently dealt with in these writings, we put forward the theory that *enkyklios* and *exoterikos* refer to the content of two kinds of *logoi*, discussions of the surrounding reality of everyday experience and expositions more related to the reality 'outside' or above *Physis*.

In the remaining four chapters we use the results of our enquiry to interpret a number of brief texts. In Chapter 12 we argue that the passage in *De caelo* 2.1 about τῇ μαντείᾳ τῇ περὶ τὸν θεόν has been wholly misunderstood in the tradition. In this text, according to us, Aristotle allows for the possibility of mantic knowledge which is not actively communicated by the supreme transcendent deity, but does originate 'in the environment of the deity', and for an enlightenment resulting from the influence of the transcendent *Nous* on beings with inferior powers of cognition.

In the next part, Chapter 13, we take a brief look at a text in Cicero which ascribes to Aristotle a story about 'people in a cave' and the effects of their ascent from this enclosed but luxurious accommodation.

We also examine, in Chapter 14, whether our study of Aristotle's 'Kronology' can throw further light on a notorious fragment (26 Ross) of the *De philosophia*. An interpretation is proposed in which the '*alius quidam*' that '*replicatione quadam mundi motum regat atque tueatur*' refers to 'another' deity, who is inferior to the highest *Nous*. This '*alius quidam*',

in our view, should again be identified with the figure of Kronos.

The fifteenth and final chapter offers a discussion of fragment 11 of the *Eudemus*, in which we hypothesize that the 'anonymous king', of whom an ecstatic experience is mentioned there, may be identified with Endymion of Elis. This favourite of the Moon goddess plays a role in both Plato's *Phaedo* and Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* as well as in Plutarch's *De facie*.²

² Various sections of this study were incorporated in previous publications. Chapter 2 was incorporated in the article 'Het grondmotief van de Griekse cultuur en het Titanische zin-perspectief', *PRef* 51 (1986) 117-137. Chapter 10 was published in *PRef* 52 (1987) 24-40. Chapter 12 has appeared in *Apeiron* 21 (1988) 29-54. Chapter 14 has been published in *Prudentia* 20 (1988) and chapter 15 in *MS* 65 (1988) 75-96. A shortened version of chapter 11 is going to appear in *JHI* (1989). An article outlining the main points of this study, 'A "dreaming Kronos" in a lost work by Aristotle' has been accepted by the editors of *AC* for publication in the 1989 volume.

CHAPTER ONE

A 'DREAMING KRONOS' IN A LOST WORK BY ARISTOTLE

In the following study we shall be concerned with the interpretation of dreams. Our position, however, will not be the relatively comfortable one enjoyed by Joseph in the prison of the Egyptian Pharaoh; rather we shall be in the more precarious position of Daniel, living in exile at the court of the Babylonian king Nebuchadnezzar. Joseph the Jewish slave was first told in detail about the dreams of the disgraced butler and baker whom the Pharaoh had also thrown into prison; subsequently, with God's help, he was able to explain them. Daniel, on the other hand, was told that he would lose not only his position but his life, if he did not succeed in revealing both Nebuchadnezzar's dream and its meaning in the presence of the tyrant.

The interpreter of texts is at times faced by similar, well nigh impossible tasks. And for him, too, it is necessary to keep his head rather than indulge in flights of fancy. That will also be our aim now that we have become fascinated by a dream, like the butler and the baker in the Egyptian prison, and like king Nebuchadnezzar in Babylon. The dream which interests us is the dream of a god, the god Kronos or Saturnus. And our concern here is not to reconsider the iconological studies of E. Panofsky *c.s.* on Albrecht Dürer's famous etching *Melencolia I*,¹ or Frances A. Yates's supplementary critique of them.² But we do think these studies would gain in depth if more was known about the remark of an ancient Father of the Church that one of Aristotle's writings discussed a dreaming Kronos.

This remark is puzzling in that it suggests that the god Kronos was depicted as a sleeping and, specifically, dreaming god. Although sleeping and dreaming are common subjects in both Plato and Aristotle as well as elsewhere,³ an account of a sleeping and dreaming god is remarkable, and

¹ R. Klibansky, E. Panofsky, F. Saxl, *Saturn and melancholy* (London 1964).

² F. A. Yates, 'The occult philosophy and melancholy: Dürer and Agrippa' in *The occult philosophy in the Elizabethan age* (London 1979) 49-58.

³ For Plato, see R. G. A. van Lieshout, *Greeks on dreams* (Utrecht 1980), in particular section 5, 'Plato on dreams', which successively discusses Plato, *Apol.* 33c; *Cri.* 44a-b; *Phd.* 60e-61c; *Symp.* 203a; *Rep.* 5 476c-d; 9 571c-572c; 574d-576b; *Tht.* 157e-158e; 173d; 190b; *Soph.* 226b-c; *Phlb.* 20b; *Tim.* 45b-46a; 70d-72c; *Laws* 7 800a; 10 904c-d; 909e-910e; *Epin.* 984d-986a. Cf. E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the irrational* (1951, repr. Berkeley 1963) 184-185: 'We should not forget that he took both dreams and oracles very seriously'. For Aristotle, see *Somn. Vig.* and *Div. Somn.* See further H. Wijsenbeek-Wijler, *Aristotle's concept of soul, dreams and sleep* (Amsterdam 1976); A. H. Chroust, 'Aristotle's *Protrepticus* versus Aristotle's *On philosophy*: a controversy on

sounds as strange to us as when the priests of Baal were told by the prophet Elijah at Mount Carmel: 'Cry aloud, for he is a god; either he is musing, or he has gone aside, or he is on a journey, or perhaps he is asleep and must be awakened.'⁴

It was Professor J. H. Waszink of Leiden who, in two separate articles, drew attention to this intriguing bit of information which he had chanced upon while studying Tertullian.⁵ The passage referred to forms part of two chapters (45 and 46) in Tertullian's *De anima* on the subject of dreaming. By presenting several significant instances of fulfilled dream prophecies, Tertullian's immediate aim is to refute Epicurus, who had denied dreams any meaning whatsoever.⁶ He goes on to invoke a number of Greek and Latin authors in defence of his own position. This survey is concluded with the following words: 'How many commentators have not testified to this phenomenon! Artemon, Antiphon, Strato, Philochorus, Epicharmus, Serapion, Cratippus and Dionysius of Rhodes, Hermippus, the entire body of secular literature. I shall only laugh, perchance, at whoever fancied persuading us that Saturnus was the first dreamer, unless he was also the first to have lived. Forgive me, Aristotle, for having to laugh'.⁷

In two ways Waszink has helped to clarify this text, which he had previously discussed in his impressive commentary on Tertullian's *De anima*.⁸ Firstly, by asking from which Aristotelian work this information may ultimately have derived. Secondly, by attempting to explain the motif of the 'dreaming god'. As Waszink has pointed out, there is a very detailed

the nature of dreams', *Thêta-Pi* 3 (1974) 168-178. Cf. also A. J. Festugière, *La révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste* (Paris 1943, 1950²) 1.51: 'Dans l'antiquité .. le fait de voir la divinité était tenu pour la récompense normale et habituelle d'un certain genre de vie. Tout le monde croit aux songes, aux visions divines dont on peut être gratifié en songe'.

⁴ 1 Kings 18:27.

⁵ J. H. Waszink, 'Traces of Aristotle's lost dialogues in Tertullian', *VC* (1947) 137-149, esp. 149; *id.*, 'The dreaming Kronos in the Corpus Hermeticum' in *Mélanges H. Grégoire* (Brussels 1950) = *AIPhO* 10 (1950) 639-651.

⁶ Tert., *An.* 46.3: 'Pauca de insignioribus perstringens Epicuro pudorem imperabo'.

⁷ *Op. cit.* 46.10: 'Quanti autem commentatores et affirmatores in hanc rem? Artemon Antiphon Strato Philochorus Epicharmus Serapion Cratippus Dionysius Rhodius Hermippus, tota saeculi litteratura. Solum, si forte, ridebo qui se existimavit persuasurum, quod prior omnibus Saturnus somniarit, nisi si et prior omnibus vixit, Aristoteles ignosce ridenti'. We follow the interpunction which makes *Saturnus*, and not *Aristoteles*, the subject of *vixit*. Cf. the translation in J. H. Waszink, *Tertullianus De anima mit Einl. Übers. und Komm.* (Amsterdam 1933) 161 and *Tertullian Über die Seele*, introd., transl., and comm. by J. H. Waszink (Zurich 1980) 156: 'Nur über den werde ich allerdings lachen, der uns einreden zu können vermeinte, dass Saturn früher als alle anderen geträumt habe; es sei denn, dass er auch früher als alle anderen gelebt hat'. Cf. also J. H. Waszink, *art. cit.* (1947) 145 n.2.

⁸ J. H. Waszink, *Q.S.F. Tertulliani De anima ed. with introd. and comm.* (Amsterdam 1947) 496.

account of a dreaming Kronos in Plutarch's *De facie*.⁹ We shall find occasion to say more about it later.

As far as origins are concerned, Waszink notes that Kronos was traditionally associated with the 'isles of the blessed', and that we know of a text in which Aristotle appears to have talked about this idyllic abode. Since the latter text is found in Iamblichus' *Protrepticus*, it has been assigned to the fragments of Aristotle's *Protrepticus*.¹⁰ On the basis of these data, Waszink proposes to assign the text from Tertullian's *De anima* to Aristotle's *Protrepticus* too. This passage has not yet been incorporated in the fragments collected by V. Rose. W. D. Ross, on the other hand, has given it a place among the remnants of the *Protrepticus*.¹¹

According to I. Düring, however, whose edition of the *Protrepticus* examines all passages scholars have assigned to this work, our text does not belong to the *Protrepticus*. He considers Waszink's construction to be an 'extraordinary *tour de force*'.¹²

Even if the arguments advanced by Düring are hardly convincing, we must begin by observing that Tertullian's text itself gives no clear indication of origins in any particular work of Aristotle. And although it is quite legitimate to consider a relation with the text from Iamblichus on 'the isles of the blessed', we must also realize that we cannot simply assign Aristotelian passages in Iamblichus to Aristotle's work of the same name. Quite possibly Iamblichus used material from a number of Aristotle's writings,¹³ as he did when borrowing from Plato. Here it is relevant that

⁹ Plu., *De facie* 26 941a ff.

¹⁰ Iamb., *Protr.* 9 (52.16-54.5 Pistelli) = W. D. Ross, *Aristotelis Fragmenta selecta*, *Protr.* fr. 12; I. Düring, *Aristotle's Protrepticus. An attempt at reconstruction* (Göteborg 1961) fr. B 43.

¹¹ Arist., *Protr.* 20 Ross.

¹² I. Düring, *op. cit.* (n.10), Appendix no. 72, 168. This is of course not to say that Düring would deny that in some or other context Aristotle spoke about a 'dreaming Kronos'.

¹³ Cf. H. Flashar, 'Platon und Aristoteles im *Protreptikos* des Iamblichos', *AGPh* 47 (1965) 53-79. Observing that Iamblichus fits passages from various Platonic dialogues rather literally into his own *Protr.*, Flashar concludes that texts with Aristotelian characteristics may well derive from more than one writing too. Besides sections from the Aristotelian *Protr.*, Flashar suggests that passages from the *Eudemus*, the *Politicus*, and the *De philos.* come into consideration as well. J. Brunschwig, 'Aristote et les pirates Tyrrhéniens (à propos des fragments 60 Rose du *Protreptique*)', *RPFE* 88 (1963) 171-190 had previously pointed to important connections between texts which were usually assigned to either the *Protr.* or the *Eudemus*; he thus likewise undermined the hypothesis that Iamblichus had drawn exclusively on Aristotle's *Protr.*. Cf. also H. J. Drossaart Lulofs, *De ogen van Lynkeus* (Leiden 1967). For a more detailed discussion, see A. P. Bos, 'Aristotle's *Eudemus* and *Protrepticus*: are they really two different works?', *Dionysius* 8 (1984) 34-39.

We can add that Plutarch used a great deal of material from Aristotle's lost works. That he may have been acquainted with Aristotle's *Eudemus* appears from his biography of Dion, 22.3 (= Arist., *Eudemus* 1b Ross), his *Qu. Conv.* 8 (= *Eudemus* 9 Ross), and *Is.*

Tertullian's text occurs in his treatise *On the soul* and, more precisely, in the context of a discussion of dreams. It is therefore natural to start by looking for links with Aristotelian writings on those topics. It is evident, for instance, that Aristotle's dialogue 'On the soul', also called *Eudemus*, contained much material which would have been of interest to Tertullian while writing his *De anima*. Indeed, the topic of dreaming seems to have been one of the work's main themes.¹⁴ Likewise, dreaming, as a condition in which mortals acquire superhuman knowledge, is mentioned in two texts commonly associated with Aristotle's *De philosophia*.¹⁵

To understand what Tertullian finds so ridiculous in the text referred to, we should realize that, following Euhemerus, for whom the mythical gods were deified historical figures, he considered Saturnus to be a man who had lived nine hundred years after Moses.¹⁶ As such Saturnus would have been one of the ancestors of the Egyptian Mercury (Hermes).¹⁷ On the basis of this chronology, of course, Saturnus/Kronos could hardly be the first prophetic dreamer. The fact remains, however, that Tertullian attaches Aristotle's name to a story about a sleeping and dreaming Kronos. And the question which arises is in what way Aristotle related Kronos to existing ancient traditions and to Hesiod's mythology of the primal gods, with among them Kronos and the other 'Titans', who were the first to be punished by incarceration in the nether world. At the same time we also want to know more about the connection between Aristotle's story of a 'dreaming Kronos' and the philosophical myth in Plato's *Politicus*, where Plato connects a situation of perfectly harmonious world government with the reign of the vigilant god Kronos.

et Os. 382d-e (= *Eudemus* 10 Ross); it also appears from *Consolatio ad Apoll.* 115b-e (= *Eudemus* 6 Ross, a lengthy literal quotation!), if indeed that writing belongs to Plutarch. If, therefore, Waszink rightly supposes that the Kronos myth in the *De facie* was inspired by Aristotle, an origin in the *Eudemus* cannot be ruled out.

¹⁴ Cf. H. J. Drossaart Lulofs, *op. cit.* 33, n.55.

¹⁵ Sextus Emp., *Math.* 3 (*Phys.* 1) 20-23 = Arist., *Philos.* 12a Ross.

¹⁶ Tert., *An.* 28.1: 'Multo antiquior Moyses etiam Saturno, nongentis circiter annis, nedum pronepotibus eius.' This remark seems to imply acquaintance with *C.H.* 10.5, where Hermes calls Ouranos and Kronos his forefathers! See further *Adv.Marc.* 1.8.2: 'Ne Saturnum quidem tanta hodie antiquitas deum probabit, quia et illum novitas aliquando produxerit cum primum consecravit.'

¹⁷ Hermes, whom the Greeks identified with the Egyptian god Thoth or Theuth, was regarded in the Hellenistic period as the author of a number of the revelations collected in the *C.H.* Cf. the edition by A. D. Nock, A. J. Festugière (Paris 1972³) i. Tertullian refers a few times to these writings, which he may have read himself; cf. J. H. Waszink, *op. cit.* (n.8) 47* with n.1. Tertullian's chronology follows Theophilus, *Autol.* 3.29, where it is argued at length that Moses was older than Kronos, whom many nations identified with Bel or Baal. Cf. Waszink, *op. cit.* 354.

CHAPTER TWO

THE MULTIFORMITY OF THE MYTHICAL TRADITION ABOUT KRONOS

Before taking a further look at the role that may have been played by a 'dreaming Kronos' in Aristotle's lost works, we must consider various aspects of the mythical stories about the figure of Kronos.¹ On the one hand, Kronos is the scion of the second generation of gods, also called the 'Titans'. At the request of his mother Gaia, he robs his father Ouranos of strength and power. On the other hand, the name Kronos is also connected with the 'golden age', in which a race of mortals lived in perfect bliss, and with the 'isles of the blessed'. It seems that the intriguing question how these two traditions are related has not yet been satisfactorily solved.

1. *Kronos' crime and punishment according to Hesiod*

The information on which we shall have to proceed is found in Hesiod's two principal works, the *Theogony* and the *Works and Days*, which must be dated around 700 BC.² The former work describes at length the drastic coup by which Kronos (temporarily) gains supremacy over the gods and the world. It also describes how he and the other Titans go on to wage a cosmic war against the Olympians led by Zeus, until they are bitterly defeated and imprisoned in the caverns of the Tartarus.³ In the second poem we find, in the context of the myth of the successive human generations (ages), the

¹ For the older literature, cf. M. Pohlenz, 'Kronos und die Titanen', *NJKA* 37 (1916) 549-594; *id.*, 'Kronos' in *PWRE* 11.2 (Stuttgart 1922) 1982-2018; U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, 'Kronos und die Titanen', *SBPreusz.AW*, phil. hist. Klasse 1929, 35-53; repr. (Darmstadt 1964) 7-26.

² Cf. M. L. West, *Hesiod Theogony*; ed. with *Prolegomena and Comm.* (Oxford 1966) 45; W. Schadewaldt, *Die Anfänge der Philosophie bei den Griechen* (Frankfurt 1978) 82. For Hesiod's *Works and Days*, see M. L. West, *Hesiod, Works and Days* (Oxford 1978) and W. J. Verdenius, *A Commentary on Hesiod, Works and Days vv. 1-382* (Leiden 1985). The content of what follows has been previously published in A. P. Bos, 'Het grondmotief van de Griekse cultuur en het Titanische zin-perspectief', *PRef* 51 (1986) 117-137. An English version of that paper appeared in *Tydskrif vir Christelike Wetenskap* (S.Africa) 24 (1988) 94-123.

³ In Homer, too, Zeus is repeatedly called 'son of Kronos'. The family relationship between both gods, including the tradition about a change of power, may therefore go back to a more ancient tradition; *Il.* 8.462, 470 and *passim*. For the imprisonment of Kronos in the Tartarus, cf. *Il.* 8.477-481, 5.898, 14.203-204, 279, 15.224.

reference to the golden race that lived on earth during the rule of Kronos. We shall first briefly review these data, and then consider whether a connection between the two traditions can be established.

After Hesiod has summed up the first generation of gods,⁴ and has mentioned how Mother Earth gave birth to the god Ouranos, we read that Ouranos fathered twelve children on Gaia, six boys and six girls, of whom Kronos is the youngest.⁵ We are told at once that he hated his father. That is because Ouranos abuses Gaia and her children by depriving the children of daylight and imprisoning them in the bowels of Mother Earth. At the request of his mother, Kronos brings this tense situation to an end by cutting off Ouranos' genitals with a sharp-toothed, steel sickle⁶ and casting them into the sea. Aphrodite comes into being in this way, and young grass and plants spring up where blood has splashed on the earth. But the reader is directly informed that this is by no means the end of the story. The dynamic history of the gods surges on to a new revolution. Ouranos gives a significant name to the offspring which has treated him so grossly: from now on they will be called 'Titans', the great 'Seizers', who have seized his power. But this name, according to Hesiod, also intentionally includes a reference to the *tisis*, the penalty which they will have to pay for their offence.⁷ In the single appellation 'Titan' the reader should pick up the reference to both crime and punishment. He will thus expect the history of Kronos to have a fatal outcome. Whatever Kronos may do to avoid his predestined fate, nothing will avail him. He nevertheless makes frantic attempts. Each time his spouse Rhea begets a child, he devours it.⁸ But this mother cannot bear to see her children injured either. Finally, therefore, she gives him a stone swaddled in clothes, while secretly giving birth to her youngest son Zeus on the island of Crete.⁹ In the course of the year¹⁰ Kronos disgorges his offspring, outdone by the shrewd schemes of Gaia,

⁴ *Th.* 116 f.

⁵ *Th.* 137.

⁶ *Th.* 175-182. M. L. West, *op. cit.* 217-218, thinks that the reference is to a 'simple agricultural sickle'. But because in Greek mythology the situations in which this kind of weapon is used are so widely divergent, we are not allowed to conclude, according to West, that Kronos was originally a harvest God. G. S. Schwartz, '*Theogony* 175 ἄρπην καρχαρόδοντα. Why a sickle?', *RSC* 27 (1979) 177-180 offers the rather obscure statement: 'Uranos, who prevents the natural growth of Gaia's produce, is himself ultimately reaped like grain'.

⁷ *Th.* 207-210. 'Wretches' would seem to be the approximate English equivalent.

⁸ *Th.* 459-460, 467. The use (twice) of κατέπινε is remarkable, since this verb usually denotes the swilling down of a drink.

⁹ Typical of the way these texts used to be dealt with is M. Pohlenz's argument (1922, cols. 1990-1991) that Zeus was originally the only child of Kronos and Rhea, and that the story was later expanded because Hesiod wished to 'accommodate' the deities who were known in his day as brothers and sisters of Zeus. In Homer Zeus seems to be older than his brothers (*Il.* 15.187), but younger than Hera (*Il.* 4.59-61).

¹⁰ *Th.* 493 ἐπιπλομένου δ' ἐνιαυτοῦ.

who now supports the struggle of Zeus. Zeus is then given thunder and lightning, the signs of his majesty as king of the gods.¹¹ In the subsequent Titanomachy, Kronos and the other Titans are worsted and locked up for ever in the underworld, the realm of the dead.

It certainly may seem surprising that Hesiod goes on in his second work to describe the tyrannic and child-devouring Kronos as the god who ruled during the golden age of man.¹² But in the case of the mortals, too, there is a great difference between the earlier and present generations. The present generation of man is permanently engaged in a struggle for survival. In contrast, Hesiod imagines another age of man during the rule of Kronos, in which the people lived 'like gods', carefree, exempt from physical toil and suffering, unacquainted with the pains of old age, and continually gathered together in joy, without misfortune. They died as if overcome by sleep. All good things were abundantly available. Of its own accord the earth produced large and rich fruits, and man carried out his work in peace and quiet. Since their deaths, the people of that generation are *daimones*, noble daemons who ward off evil and look after the mortal human race.¹³

2. Problems around Hesiod's Kronos

Two urgent questions arise in relation to these myths about Kronos. In the first place: what lies behind the idea of a change of power in the pantheon? How does society or an individual poet arrive at such a theme? In the second place: is there a connection between the Kronos of the succession and the Kronos of the golden age? It is necessary to raise this question, even if one postulates an entirely different background and date for both stories. For we must assume that Hesiod himself saw a connection between the two myths, since he recounts both in relation to the single figure of Kronos.

A great deal of historical research has been carried out with regard to the possible origin of Hesiod's narrations. Various theories have been advanced to explain the theme of succession among the gods. A historical explanation regards the struggle between Kronos and Zeus as a reflection of the struggle in which the followers of older religions were defeated by the invading nations that worshipped Zeus as their supreme god.¹⁴ Although this

¹¹ *Th.* 503-505.

¹² *Op.* 109 f.

¹³ *Op.* 122-3: δαίμονες ... επιχθόνιοι, φύλακες θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων.

¹⁴ See L. R. Farnell, *The cults of the Greek states* (Oxford 1896) 1.27. M. Pohlenz (*art. cit.* 1922) 1986: 'ein Gott der vorgriechischen Bevölkerung .. dessen Verehrung sich hie und da in einfachster Form erhalten hat'; *ibid.* 1990. Obviously, this kind of explanation of the myth has difficulty in accounting for the role played by various brothers and sisters of Zeus. And equally for Hesiod's description of both Kronos and Zeus as the youngest god. And for the fact that the struggle between Zeus and Kronos is preceded by a struggle between Ouranos and Kronos. And of course there cannot possibly have been an

historical explanation of the succession myth was dominant during the last and the beginning of the present century, it has now been completely abandoned. Thus a quite different approach to the traditional stories has become possible.

In a study published in 1950, F. M. Cornford considers derivation from other, non-Greek cultures. He refers to the religious ritual performed each year at the New Year celebrations in Babylon.¹⁵ But while Cornford was inclined to look for remote connections, later scholars conducted their search in a more proximate sphere of culture, that of the Hittites and the Hurrians. In particular, H. G. Güterbock argued that Hesiod had used themes found in the Hurrian myth of Kumarbi and Ullikummi, which has been handed down in the Hittite language.¹⁶ However, this derivation has in turn been contested by more recent authors, who have shown that the differences between these Hittite texts and Hesiod's poems are much more fundamental than the similarities.¹⁷

All these enquiries have continually brought new aspects of Hesiod's oeuvre out into the open. While doing so, they have often adopted the assumption that Hesiod used material derived from other cultures, but that he used it without understanding its meaning. In our view, however, such an assumption can only be accepted as a last resort, certainly when a poet of Hesiod's calibre is involved. We shall therefore continue to search for a meaning of the mythical themes which concern us within the overall context of Hesiod's poetic works.

3. *The god Baʿlu of Ugarit*

In our search we have been inspired by the work which the Dutch

original relationship between the criminal Kronos and a region of bliss; cf. M. Pohlenz (1922) 2006 f. Such details were readily discounted as the results of 'systematization' by Hesiod or as 'duplications of motifs'. For variants of this theory, see also F. Nietzsche, *Die Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik* (1872), repr. in *Werke* (Munich 1966) 1.30 ff.; F. M. Cornford, *From religion to philosophy; a study in the origins of Western speculation* (Cambridge 1912); W. K. C. Guthrie, *The Greeks and their gods* (London 1950) 51-52.

¹⁵ F. M. Cornford, 'A ritual basis for Hesiod's *Theogony*' in *The unwritten philosophy and other essays* (Cambridge 1950; repr. 1967) 95-116.

¹⁶ H. G. Güterbock, *Kumarbi* (Zürich-New York 1946); *id.*, 'The Hittite version of the Hurrian Kumarbi myths: oriental forerunners of Hesiod', *AJA* 52 (1948) 123-134; *id.*, *The song of Ullikummi* (New Haven 1952). Similar views are found in L. Schmidt, *Gestalttheiligkeit im bäuerlichen Arbeitsmythos; Studien zu den Ernteschnittgeräten und ihre Stellung im europäischen Volksglauben und Volksbrauch* (Vienna 1952) 113, M. L. West, *op. cit.* (1966) 29-30, and W. Burkert, *op. cit.* 46, 196.

¹⁷ Cf. P. Walcot, *Hesiod and the Near East* (Cardiff 1966) and W. Burkert, *Structure and history in Greek mythology* (London 1979) 18 f.

Semitist J. C. de Moor has carried out on texts from North Syria.¹⁸ These texts, written on clay tablets, were found during the period 1930-1933 in Raš Šjamra in the ruins of the coastal town of Ugarit, which must have been an important commercial centre around 1400 BC, connected with the entire Near East but also with Crete. The available material also contains a large number of religious texts. A discrete group of these, in which a myth about the adventures of the god Baʿlu is recounted, has been dealt with by de Moor in an extensive monograph.

De Moor explains that the myth of Baʿlu was recited during the exuberant New Year festivities which were celebrated in the month September, around the autumnal equinox. This myth tells us about warring gods; about a god of the second generation who, by causing the arrival of the autumn rains, fertilizes the earth. And we are told that this god was forced to descend to the underworld. According to de Moor, the myth as a whole accurately expresses *the changing of the seasons* during the year in the Mediterranean part of Syria.

In the Ugaritic pantheon, Ilu or El is the oldest deity. He is the great creator god, whose capacity manifests itself in procreation and formation. In recognition of his creative potency he is also invested with the honorary title of 'Bull' (tr).¹⁹ Among other things, he is the creator of heaven and earth ('arš wšmm). The god Baʿlu is properly speaking not a son of Ilu but of Daganu. Baʿlu is, however, the husband of one of Ilu's daughters.²⁰ The myth celebrates the return of Baʿlu, the god of thunder and of autumn rains essential to the growth of grass for the cattle and to successful cultivation of the land. We are told how Baʿlu's rule ends when he descends to the underworld, after being challenged by Motû, the god of death. During this period the world is governed by Attaru, the 'tyrant', whose epithet indicates the hard labour which he imposes on the people as they irrigate the fields. Baʿlu's descent into the underworld and the rise to power of Motû, the god of death, coincide with the arrival of the scorching desert wind, the sirocco. Presumably, the ritual of the New Year festivities, which occupied an entire week, expresses the belief that the order of the world is permanent. At the same time the ritual clearly serves to perpetuate that order. That is why some parts of the celebration carry the typical features of rain dances and

¹⁸ J. C. de Moor, *The seasonal pattern in the Ugaritic myth of Baʿlu according to the version of Ilimilku* (Neukirchen 1971); *id.*, *New Year with Canaanites and Israelites*, 2 vols. (Kampen 1972), esp. 1.4-12; *id.*, *Uw God is mijn God; Over de oorsprong van het geloof in de ene God* (Kampen 1983); *id.*, 'El, the Creator' in G. Rendsburg *et. al.* (eds.), *The Bible World. Essays in honor of C. H. Gordon* (New York 1980) 171-187; *id.*, 'The crisis of polytheism in late bronze Ugarit', *Oudtestamentische Studiën* 24 (1986) 1-20. M. P. Nilsson, *op. cit.* 1.486 n.2 already suspected the importance of the finds in Ugarit.

¹⁹ Cf. J. C. de Moor, *op. cit.* (1983) 30; *op. cit.* (1986) 2.

²⁰ J. C. de Moor, *art. cit.* (1980) 174.

rain magic. Central, therefore, is the renewal of the earth's fertility by the arrival of the autumn rains, prompted by Ba^clu's return from the underworld.

Now in the Ugaritic texts the relations between Ba^clu and Ilu are strained. However, there are no clear indications that Ba^clu uses physical violence against Ilu. We do find Ilu presented as a creator god in the shape of a Bull. The highest god in Egypt, Amon Re, is also depicted as a Bull.²¹ The same image appears to have played an important role in Cretan religiosity. The 'bull dances' performed on that island also seem designed to further the fertilizing labours of the celestial god.²² One may even suspect this motive to be involved in the Tauroktony of the Mithras cult in the Roman Empire.²³ At any rate, however widely the representations in the various cultures may have diverged, we can assume that there was a festival which occupied an important place in the religions concerned and which was wholly aimed at ensuring the renewed fertility of the earth by the arrival of the rains.²⁴ In several representations the arrival of these autumn rains is brought about by a 'young god'. Thus in these versions there need not be much discontinuity between a form of religion centred around the Great Mother goddess, as appears to have been the case in Crete, and one in which male deities are given a more prominent position.

4. *Similarities between Ba^clu and Kronos*

Against the background of these widespread representations we would like to interpret Hesiod's succession myth too. We started out by asking two questions: what lies behind the idea of a change of power in the realm of the gods? And is there a connection between the Kronos of the succession and the Kronos of the golden age? We propose the following answers: the notion of a revolution in the kingship over the gods is ultimately based on the awareness of the necessity of seasonal change. And the theme which connects the stories about Kronos in the *Theogony* and the *Works and Days* is that of the *abundance* offered by nature's fertility, in combination with

²¹ J. C. de Moor, *op. cit.* (1983) 16: 'Because procreation and creation were not opposite concepts for the Oriental, Amon Re can assume the honorary title of 'Bull', the symbol of the potent creator-god'.

²² Cf. J. Hawkes, *Dawn of the Gods* 121 f. W. K. C. Guthrie, 'Early Greek religion in the light of the decipherment of Linear-B' in *BICS* 6 (1959) 37 thinks it is possible, though the utmost caution is called for, 'that there was, at least in outline, some sort of Near Eastern and Aegean religious pattern to which the Myceneans were not immune'.

²³ For the Mithras cult, see M. J. Vermaseren, *Mithras, de geheimzinnige god* (Amsterdam 1959) 53 f.

²⁴ For the central significance of the changing of the seasons in religious representations of the Near East, cf. Th. Gaster, *Thespis, Ritual, Myth and Drama in the ancient Near East* (Garden City 1950, 1961²).

the absence of toil.

We can begin by establishing that, among the names of the three supreme gods, the name of the first, Ouranos, is recognizable as a designation of the firmament. On the other hand, the etymology of the Indo-European name of Zeus, the third supreme god, explicitly refers to the clear, radiant, cloudless sky.²⁵ This is an indication, we think, that the succession of gods expresses the changing of the seasons as brought about by figures of divine stature. So construed, the *Theogony* contains as it were the macrocosmic *Works and Days*! In that case the figure of Kronos must be connected with the fertility brought by the autumn rains,²⁶ preceded by the lightning which opens the floodgates of heaven and ends the oppressiveness of late summer. Kronos represents the germination of seeds in autumn and winter. It is the time of the year in which the stores built up during the harvest give people a sense of security and make them feel happy and incite them to express their joy in song and dance. It is also the time in which the weather leaves relatively few tasks for the farmers. It is a time of rest and winter sleep that contrasts sharply with the period of hard and continuous labour in which archaic man, by the sweat of his brow and under a copper sky, carries out his work on the land. The time of Kronos is a time in which, after a close and sultry late summer, everything starts to breathe again as the first rains fall, so that all kinds of seeds germinate and the grass of the field regains its green colour.²⁷ It is the time in which man stands back to watch the work of

²⁵ Cf. E. Simon, *Die Götter der Griechen* (Munich 1969) 14: 'Der Name Zeus / Dios ist indogermanisch, der Stamm di- begegnet wieder im Namen der obersten römischen Gottes, Juppiter oder Diespiter, im lateinischen Wort für Tag, *dies* und in dem griechischen Wort für schönes Wetter, *eudia*. Es handelt sich um den einzigen olympischen Götternamen, dessen Etymologie durchsichtig und nicht umstritten ist. Zeus ist ursprünglich, wie seine Name sagt, der Gott des hellen Himmels'. See also the epithet νεφεληγερέτα, 'cloud-gatherer' connected with Zeus, *Il.* 1.511, 517, 560 *et passim*.

²⁶ H. J. Rose, *A handbook of Greek mythology* (London 1928) 43 observes, as M. Pohlenz (*art. cit.* 1916) 557 had done earlier, that attempts to give the name 'Kronos' a Greek etymology have hitherto failed. There can be no relation to *chronos* (time). Nor does Rose think that the name can be connected with *krainoo* and interpreted as 'completener', 'ripenner'. We would like to consider whether the Semitic stem *q r n* might be connected with the name Kronos. In Ugaritic *q r n* stands for 'flash of lightning' and for 'horn'. This hypothesis comes close to views put forward earlier by H. Lewy, *Die semitischen Fremdwörter im Griechischen* (Berlin 1895) 216, who pointed to the Assyrian *qarnu* and the cult of Ba'al *Qarnajim*, 'Lord of the height,' for the explanation of the name Kronos. As far as a Kronos cult existed, it seems to have been practised 'on the heights'. L. Schmidt, *op. cit.* 112 also tries to explain the name of Kronos by way of a stem *k r n*, *k e r*, 'horn'. The question whether there is a connection with *keraunos* (Gr. 'lightning') deserves to be studied more closely.

²⁷ The castration of Ouranos, according to us, should be interpreted in this light: it is when the rain-water floods the earth, *Th.* 180 f. Cf. U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *op. cit.* (1928) 18: 'Zugrunde liegt natürlich die Erfahrung dass der befruchtende Regen von Himmel auf die Erde herabströmt'. It seems evident that this aspect of Kronos' activity led in antiquity to the identification of Kronos with the Semitic Baal. Cf.

nature, confident that the rainy season too must end; for if the rains were to go on for ever, all things would be washed away by the force and suction of the water, as in a deluge.

Only when the rainy season ends, and the earth becomes visible again because the pools of water have dried up, does the period of cultivation start for man. This is the time for all those tasks of which the Greeks created exemplars in the gods of Zeus' generation. It is the period of man's great achievements, which are attended by great effort and toil, but also by disappointment and adversity.

If such an interpretation of Hesiod's work may be considered, various interesting consequences follow. (1) In the first place, it means that Hesiod distinguished between gods and powers representing the work of nature and another group representing man's cultivating labours. But we find them in an overall view which vigorously expresses the sense that both groups *belong together*! That is why the generation of gods associated with Kronos cannot be seen as a group belonging to an older natural religion which in the history of Greece's inhabitation was driven out by a group of culture gods. Nowhere in the Mediterranean world do we find a mythical world view which paid exclusive attention to one of both kinds of divine powers. (2) In the second place, it is in this way much easier to explain the unity of the *Theogony* and the *Works and Days* as poems written by the countryman and shepherd Hesiod.

However, if we are to assume that the themes of succession and Titanomachy are rooted in the stories about the 'cosmic year' and the agricultural cyclus of sowing, growing, cultivating, reaping, and dying, then two things stand out clearly. In the first place, that we find in Hesiod a 'justification' of the fall of Kronos in the hate and violence which Kronos directed against his father Ouranos. Just as Hesiod attaches great importance in his *Works and Days* to the legal order of society and with it confronts his roguish brother Perses, so the *Theogony* already has the notion of a legal order to which the gods are subject. In the second place, it is highly significant that Hesiod describes the imprisonment of the Titans in the

Theophilus, *Autol.* 3.29: ἔνιοι μὲν σέβονται τὸν Κρόνον καὶ τοῦτον αὐτὸν ὀνομάζουσι Βῆλ καὶ Βᾶλ, μάλιστα οἱ οἰκοῦντες τὰ ἀνατολικά κλίματα. Servius, *Aen.* 1.729: 'Saturnus .. lingua punica Bal deus dicitur' and 'apud Assyrios autem Bel dicitur .. et Saturnus et Sol'. Isidorus, *apud* Damasc. (*Photius* 343b21): ὅτι Φοῖνικες καὶ Σύροι τὸν Κρόνον Ἦλ καὶ Βῆλ καὶ Φολάθην ... ἐπονομάζουσι. The cult of Kronos, including the offering of human sacrifices, was often attributed by the Greeks to the Carthaginians too; see M. Pohlenz *art. cit.* (1916) 565 and (1922) 1993 and Plutarch, *De facie* 942c. That Baal was at times also identified with Zeus (e.g. in Philo of Byblos) may be explained by the fact that the importance of Baal in the Semitic religion was eventually equivalent in a large area to that of Zeus in Greek religion. In a recent study, however, A. I. Baumgarten, *The Phoenician History of Philo of Byblos* (Leiden 1981) has shown convincingly that Philo of Byblos' history does not go back to ancient Ugaritic sources, but is a Hellenistic construction.

Tartarus as permanent, and not as an annually recurring event. And in his account of the degeneration of the human race this radical change, too, is linked to an ethical discourse. The human race under the rule of Zeus is more evil and criminal than the first generations of man. Perhaps Hesiod wished to make the return to the 'easy life' belonging to the rule of Kronos conditional on man's relation to the ordinances of *Dike*, the goddess of Justice. That might suggest that the figure of Kronos who is expelled from his glorious divine state on account of his crimes was seen by Hesiod as a model of 'man', in the sense that he wished to remind man of a prior state of glory which was coupled with the practice of righteousness and piety. In that case it was Hesiod who extended the cycle of the year to the cosmic cycle of world ages.

For the mortals who have observed the ordinances of justice, the tradition of Greek popular belief offers since Hesiod the attractive prospect of accommodation on the 'isles of the blessed', which also appears to be the place where Kronos resides.²⁸ It seems quite possible that Kronos, as the god who descends to the underworld, can be related to the realm of the dead.²⁹

5. *The Titans in later tradition*

As far as the further tradition about Kronos and the Titans is concerned, we note that the transformation in the direction of an ethical interpretation is continued and elaborated both by Orphism and the poet-philosopher Parmenides of Elea.

In Orphism the imprisonment of the Titans seems to be transposed onto the human beings on earth as such, who are presented as participating in the criminal nature of the Titans.³⁰ But in the introduction to his poem about the Ways of the Truth and of the *Doxa*, Parmenides of Elea too describes the deluded mortals in terms which would have reminded the Greek reader of

²⁸ Cf. Pindarus, *Olymp.* 2.126-130.

²⁹ J. Harrison, *Themis; a study in the social origins of Greek religion* (Cambridge 1912) 17 claims that 'titan' designates the plaster-covered individuals who represented the ancestors during initiation rites.

³⁰ Cf. W. K. C. Guthrie, *Orpheus and Greek religion* (1935; repr. New York 1966) 107 f. and P. Boyancé, 'Incantations Orphiques et pythagoriciennes', part 1 of *Le culte des muses chez les philosophes Grecs* (Paris 1936; enlarged edition 1972) 7-148. L. J. Alderink, *Creation and Salvation in ancient Orphism* (Chico 1981) makes use of the important Derveni papyrus discovered in 1962, which contains an Orphic poem plus commentary dating from 400 BC. For this papyrus, see also H. Kapsomenos, *Gnomon* 35 (1963) 222-223; *id.*, *Deltion Archaiologikon* 19 (1964) 17-25; W. Burkert, 'Orpheus und die Vorsokratiker; Bemerkungen zum Derveni-Papyrus und zur Pythagoreischen Zahlen-Lehre', *A&A* 14 (1968) 103-114; P. Boyancé, 'Remarques sur le papyrus de Derveni', *REG* 87 (1974) 91-110.

Hesiod's description of the obscure Tartarus to which Kronos *cum suis* were confined. A crucial difference, however, is that Parmenides' poem offers the salutary prospect of a possible escape!³¹

The next intriguing piece of information is that Plato introduces Kronos in his *Politicus* myth and relates him once again to a periodicity: Kronos is here the world archon who sometimes actively involves himself in the affairs of the cosmos and brings about a perfect, painless world order, and at other times withdraws, with disastrous consequences for the course of events in the cosmos, which slowly but surely reverts to chaos.³² Kronos here seems to be the cosmic version of the philosopher-king whom Plato had sketched in his *Republic*, a 'citizen of two worlds', who performs his social duty in 'the Cave' of earthly society, but whose real citizenship lies in the world of Ideas, called the 'upper world' by Plato in his famous allegory. In different contexts, Plato also appears to be acquainted with the 'bonds of Kronos'³³ and with an 'old Titan nature'.³⁴

The Old Academy retained an interest in these themes, witness Xenocrates' explanation of the 'custody' (*phroura*) discussed by Plato in *Phaedo* 62b. According to Xenocrates, this custody embraced the whole cosmos and was related to the atrocious crime of the Titans, who had torn Dionysus to pieces.³⁵ And in later Platonic tradition there is the motif of the 'sleeping World-soul', which has been seen as a development of the Kronos myth in Plato's *Politicus*.³⁶ The Neoplatonists too are interested in a philosophical exegesis of the ancient Orphic themes.³⁷ In the mythical tradition of Gnosticism, finally, the motif of the evil world archon can, according to some scholars, also be traced back to the Kronos myth in Plato's *Politicus*.³⁸ And in what follows we shall draw attention to the

³¹ Cf. A. P. Bos, 'Parmenides' onthullingen over denken en spreken', *PRef* 47 (1982) 160-161. According to F. Solmsen, *Hesiodi Theogonia Opera et Dies Scutum* (Oxford 1970) 56 the indication in Hesiod's text (*Op.* 173a-e) that Kronos was liberated by Zeus is a later addition, a view with which we concur. But for an opposite view, see M. van de Valk, 'On the god Cronus', *GRBS* 26 (1985) 5-11.

³² Pl., *Pol.* 269 f. Cf. *Laws* 4 713 f. See also Proclus, *In Tim.* 1.103.25 3.309.24 Diehl.

³³ Pl., *Cra.* 404a5.

³⁴ Pl., *Laws* 3 701c.

³⁵ Damascius, *In Pl. Phd.* 1 par. 2 (ed. L.G. Westerink) = Xenocrates fr. 20 Heinze; fr. 219 M. Isnardi Parente. On this text, cf. P. Boyancé, 'Xénocrate et les Orphiques', *REA* 50 (1948) 218-231; *id.*, 'Note sur la *phroura* platonicienne', *RPh* 37 (1963) 7-11.

³⁶ Plu., *Pocr. an.* 28 1026e-f; Albinus/Alcinous, *Didaskalikos* 10.2-3 and 14.3. Cf. J. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists. A study of Platonism 80 BC - AD 220* (London 1977) 206. On this theme see chapter 9.3 below.

³⁷ Cf. P. Hadot, 'Ouranos, Kronos and Zeus in Plotinus' treatise against the Gnostics' in *Neoplatonism and early Christian thought*, Essays in honour of A. H. Armstrong (London 1981) 124; J. Pépin, 'Plotin et le miroir de Dionysos', *RIPh* 92 (1970) 304-320; F. Solmsen, 'Plotinus V 5. 3. 21 ff, a passage on Zeus', *MH* 43 (1986) 68-73.

³⁸ Cf. P. Boyancé, 'Dieu cosmique et dualisme: les archontes et Platon' in *Le origini*

appearance of Kronos and Ouranos in the *Corpus Hermeticum*.³⁹ Besides a trend of philosophical demythologization by means of allegorical interpretation, there also seems to be a tendency here and there to remythologize the old themes.

In view of the fact that, apart from Plato, Aristotle had the greatest influence on the development of Greek thought, it is important to gain a clearer idea of Aristotle's attitude to this old tradition. Our method in doing so will be as follows. We cannot be sure about the sources on which Plutarch drew when he wrote the final myth of the *De facie*. It is certainly remarkable that he emphatically mentions Xenocrates as the inspirer of one of its main sections: Xenocrates, Plato's second successor with whom Aristotle long maintained close relations.⁴⁰ And recently, P. Donini has argued in an impressive study that the curious structure of the *De facie*, in which a scientific discussion is capped by a philosophical myth, should be explained against the background of Aristotle's sharp distinction between the human knowledge of physical reality and the transcending knowledge of the principles of this reality.⁴¹

Nevertheless, there are no explicit indications that Tertullian's remark about a 'dreaming Kronos' goes back to an Aristotelian description of Kronos such as we find in Plutarch. Only indirectly can such a hypothesis be made plausible. We therefore propose to argue this theory by showing that various aspects of Plutarch's Kronos myth are in striking agreement with information supplied by other sources on Aristotle's lost works.

dello Gnosticismo, ed. U. Bianchi (Leiden 1967) 340-358.

³⁹ C.H. 10.5.

⁴⁰ Plu., *De facie* 943f, where it is said that Xenocrates developed his theory of three gradations of materiality in the cosmos '.. taking his start from Plato, .. by a kind of superhuman reasoning' (transl. H. Cherniss).

⁴¹ P. Donini, 'Science and Metaphysics: Platonism, Aristotelianism and Stoicism in Plutarch's, *On the Face in the Moon*' in J. M. Dillon, A. A. Long, (eds.) *The Question of "Eclecticism"* (Los Angeles 1988) 126-144; cf., by the same author, 'Lo scetticismo academico, Aristotele e l'unità della tradizione platonica secondo Plutarco' in *Storiografia e dossografia nella filosofia antica*, ed. G. Cambiano (Turin 1986) 214 f.

CHAPTER THREE

J. H. WASZINK ON THE FIGURE OF THE 'DREAMING KRONOS'

First we shall follow the trail set out by Waszink in the forementioned articles. In the first of these he indicates various passages in Tertullian's writings possibly related to Aristotle's lost works. One passage states that, according to Theopompus, the demigod Silenus had described to king Midas the land of the Meropians.¹ Waszink sees a link here with Aristotle's *Eudemus*, in the sense that 'the story of Meropis was undoubtedly invented by Theopompus, but he borrowed the feature of a revelation by Silenus from Aristotle's *Eudemus*.'² Waszink goes on to consider the 'dreaming Kronos' item and proposes to assign it to Aristotle's *Protrepticus*, because in that work Aristotle apparently discussed the 'isles of the blessed' too.³

We must be grateful to Prof. Waszink for the clear way in which he has related texts from the later tradition to Aristotle's lost works. At the same time one may doubt whether the items cited derive from different Aristotelian writings. For, taken by themselves, they may well be connected with each other. It is easy to trace a line from the Meropians to the inhabitants of the 'isles of the blessed'; and likewise from Silenus, the companion of Dionysus, to Kronos. Theopompus' story about the Meropians⁴ is typically a story about a culture which differs radically from that of miserable, earthly mortals. The name 'Meropis' seems in fact to have been chosen by Theopompus in order to remind his readers of the passage where Hesiod describes the golden race of the *meropes anthropoi*, living in the time that Kronos was king of gods and men.⁵ And the figure of the

¹ Tert., *Adv. Herm.* 25: 'nisi si et Sileno illi apud Midam regem adseveranti de alio orbe credendum est auctore Theopompo'; this can be linked to *Pall.* 2.1: 'viderit si quis alius [sc. plures esse mundos putat], ad Meropas, ut Silenus penes aures Midae blatt aptas sane grandioribus fabulis'. In *An.* 2.3 Tertullian likewise mentions the Phrygian Silenus among a number of divine beings whose revelations have been consigned to writing and subsequently used by philosophy.

² J. H. Waszink, 'Traces of Aristotle's lost dialogues in Tertullian', *VC* 1 (1947) 139-140.

³ J. H. Waszink, *art. cit.* 145 ff., with reference to Arist., *Protr.* fr. 12 Walzer; Ross; B 43-44 Düring.

⁴ *FGH* 115 fr. 74. Cf. G. J. D. Aalders, 'Die Meropes des Theopomp', *Historia* 27 (1978) 317-327; *id.*, *Political thought in Hellenistic times* (Amsterdam 1975) 69; K. Gaiser, 'Ein Gespräch mit König Phillip. Zum 'Eudemos' des Aristoteles' in *Aristoteles, Werk und Wirkung*, vol. 1 (Berlin 1985) 475.

⁵ Hes., *Op.* 109; cf. G. J. D. Aalders, *art. cit.* 320.

daemon Silenus, traditional companion and helper of the liberating god Dionysus, can be easily related to the figure of Kronos the Titan through the Orphic tradition in which the Titans are held responsible for the death of Dionysus.

Let us review the facts. a) In Theopompus the demigod Silenus relates a story about the idyllic life of the Meropians; b) in Aristotle's dialogue *Eudemos* or *On the soul* Silenus explains to king Midas the lamentable condition of earthly mortals, in response to the question: what is most desirable for man?; c) somewhere Aristotle told his readers about the possibility of achieving the same happiness as the inhabitants of the 'isles of the blessed', but we do not know precisely where. We shall thus have to consider the possibility, on account of the cross-connections between Silenus and Kronos on the one hand, and the 'isles of the blessed' and Kronos on the other hand, that the evidence on Silenus' revelation, the dreaming Kronos, and the isles of the blessed may well go back to a single Aristotelian source, i.e. the dialogue *Eudemos*. For it has proved difficult to validate Düring's strongly held view that the Aristotelian texts in Iamblichus' *Protrepticus* can only be assigned to Aristotle's work of the same name. Various scholars have adduced arguments showing that certain parts of Iamblichus' text do go back to Aristotle, but rather to his dialogue the *Eudemos*.⁶ They have therefore concluded that Iamblichus borrowed material from various Aristotelian writings. I myself have proposed a further step, namely the assumption that the traditional titles *Eudemos* or *On the soul* and *Protrepticus* do not indicate two different writings by the Stagirite, but are the title plus generic name of one and the same writing.⁷

The content of the *Eudemos*, at least as far as it can be reconstructed, could well allow a combination of the above data. A philosophical exposition of what is most desirable for man, as apparently contained in the *Eudemos*, would have been more complete if it also allowed for traditional ideas about happiness, for instance the Hesiodic notion of an existence free from material needs and physical toil.⁸ Later we shall point out that the motif of the 'dreaming Kronos' moreover corresponds with various elements of the *Eudemos* in that it evokes the themes of 'dreaming', 'sleeping', and 'bondage'.

⁶ A. Grilli, 'Cicerone e l'*Eudemo*', *PP* 17 (1962) 96-128; J. Brunschwig, 'Aristote et les pirates Tyrrhéniens (à propos des fragments 60 Rose du *Protreptique*)', *RPFE* 88 (1963) 171-190; H. Flashar, 'Platon und Aristoteles im *Protreptikos* des Jamblichos', *AGPh* 47 (1965) 53-79; K. Gaiser, *art. cit.* (n.4) 469 n.22 finds insufficient grounds for their conclusions with regard to *Protr.* 10a-c.

⁷ A. P. Bos, 'Aristotle's *Eudemos* and *Protrepticus*: are they really two different works?', *Dionysius* 8 (1984) 19-51.

⁸ For the way Plato deals with Hesiod's rustic views on happiness, cf. *Rep.* 2 363a6 ff. Plato makes it clear there that his conception of happiness entails a sublimation not only of Hesiod's ideas, but also of the Orphic view, which had come to put great emphasis on the condition in the hereafter in discussions of human happiness.

Now as far as the passage about the 'dreaming Kronos' itself is concerned, this is linked by Waszink to the myth at the end of Plutarch's *De facie in orbe lunae*.⁹ His overall discussion of the subject, however, suffers from a wrong interpretation of the relationship between Kronos and Zeus in this writing. According to Waszink, Kronos is visited in his dreams by thoughts which daemons convey to Zeus, who uses them for his government of the world.¹⁰ H. Cherniss has rightly pointed out that Plutarch means quite the opposite: first there is a process of cogitation in Zeus, next this knowledge is acquired by Kronos, then Kronos conveys it in his capacity of dream oracle to daemons and, indirectly, to mortals.¹¹ Waszink's different interpretation of the passage enables him to relate it to Orphic texts in which Zeus is said to be dependent on Kronos.¹²

Some years later Waszink discussed another text mentioning a sleeping Kronos who receives visions. The text is from the *Corpus Hermeticum*¹³

⁹ J. H. Waszink, *art. cit.* (n.2) 145.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 146: 'In his dreams thoughts arise in him, which special demons convey to Zeus who makes use of them for his government of the universe'. The same view was already propounded by M. Pohlenz, *PWRE* 11.2 (1922) 2013: 'Im Traum steigen ihm da die wichtigsten Gedanken auf, und diese werden durch Dämonen Zeus übermittelt'. Waszink, *art. cit.* 146 n.34 surmises further that Plutarch means that Kronos is eventually freed from his bondage. In his later article, 'The dreaming Kronos in the *Corpus Hermeticum*', *Mélanges H. Grégoire* (Brussels 1950) = *AIPHO* 10 (1950) 651 n.4 he corrects this view and observes that Plutarch leaves no margin for a reconciliation between Zeus and Kronos.

¹¹ H. Cherniss, *Plutarch, Moralia* vol. 12 (London 1957, 1968²) 188, with reference to *De facie* 942a: ὅσα γὰρ ὁ Ζεὺς προδιανοεῖται, ταῦτ' ὄνειροπολεῖν τὸν Κρόνον. B. Effe, *Studien zur Kosmologie und Theologie der Aristotelischen Schrift "Über die Philosophie"* (Munich 1970) 85 fails to profit from this more correct interpretation.

¹² J. H. Waszink, *art. cit.* 148 mentions Procl., *In Remp.* 388: οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν τῆδε βουλευόμενος (sc. ὁ Ζεὺς) κατὰ τὴν ἄγρυπνον πρόνοιαν τῶν ὅλων, ἀλλ' ἐξηρημένος τῶν αἰσθητῶν κατὰ τὸν θεῖον ὕπνον, καὶ ταύτῃ τὸν πατέρα ζηλῶν· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος καθεύδων πρῶτιστος παραδέδοται τῶν θεῶν: "Ενθα Κρόνος μὲν ἔπειτα φαγὼν δολόεσσαν ἔδωδ' / κεῖτο μέγα ῥέγκων (= O. Kern, *Orphicorum Fragm.* 148). Procl., *In Crat.* 391a: καὶ γὰρ ὁ μέγιστος Κρόνος ἄνωθεν τὰς τῶν νοήσεων ἀρχὰς ἐνδίδωσι τῷ δημιουργῷ, καὶ ἐπιστατεῖ τῆς ὅλης δημιουργίας. διὸ καὶ δαίμονα αὐτὸν ὁ Ζεὺς καλεῖ παρ' Ὀρφεῖ ... καὶ ἔοικε τῶν συναγωγῶν καὶ τῶν διαιρέσεων τὰς ἀκροτάτας αἰτίας ἔχειν παρ' ἑαυτῷ ὁ Κρόνος - ἐπεὶ καὶ ὁ δημιουργὸς Ζεὺς παρ' αὐτοῦ προσεχῶς ὑποδέχεται τὴν ἀλήθειαν τῶν ὄντων (= Kern, *O.F.* 155). Procl., *In Crat.* 396b: Ὡς δ' Ὀρφεὺς ἐνθέῳ στόματι λέγει, ... καὶ ὁ Κρόνος πάσης τῆς δημιουργίας ἐνδίδωσι τῷ Διὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τῆς εἰς τὰ αἰσθητὰ προνοίας, καὶ ἑαυτὸν νοῶν ἡνῶται τοῖς πρῶτιστοις νοητοῖς (= Kern, *O.F.* 129). For the motif of the sleeping Kronos, cf. also Clem. Al., *Strom.* 6.2.26.2 (= *O.F.* 149) and Porphyry, *Antr.* ch. 16, quoted by J. P. Vernant, 'L'union avec Mêtis et la royauté du Ciel' in *Mélanges H. Ch. Puech* (Paris 1974) 108.

¹³ *Corp. Herm.*, ed. by A. D. Nock, A. J. Festugière (Paris 1946, 1972³) 10.5: ἦς οἱ δυνάμενοι πλέον τι ἀρύσασθαι τῆς θεᾶς κατακοιμίζονται πολλάκις [δὲ] ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος εἰς τὴν καλλίστην ὧσιν ὅπερ Οὐρανὸς καὶ Κρόνος, οἱ ἡμέτεροι πρόγονοι, ἐντετυχήκασιν. For this passage, see ch. 5 below.

and has been translated as follows by A. J. Festugière: 'Ceux qui peuvent s'abreuver un peu plus de cette vision, souvent, tombant en sommeil et se détachant du corps, parviennent à la vision la plus belle, comme il est arrivé à Ouranos et à Kronos nos ancêtres'. First Waszink considers and rejects the possibility of finding an explanation in Egyptian theology.¹⁴ In his view, the Hermetic text must be seen against the background of the tradition of Greek philosophy and, in particular, Orphic literature.¹⁵ He concludes his enquiry with the following words: 'I thus venture to suppose that in *Herm.* 10.5 the reference to the visions received during sleep by Uranos and Kronos eventually derives from Orphic theology which, firstly, possessed a myth concerning the dreams of Kronos and, secondly, connected Uranos with Kronos more closely than is done anywhere else. About the origin of the idea that Uranos, too, received such visions, our material does not admit of any definite statement, but, since the condition of the two fallen kings of the gods was very similar, a transferring of Kronos' visions to Uranos could easily take place'.¹⁶ According to Waszink, we can make the connection with Aristotle's text about a dreaming Kronos by assuming that it formed a link in the chain through which Orphic thought was passed on to the Neoplatonists.¹⁷

Waszink has demonstrated convincingly that there are good reasons for assigning the theme of a 'dreaming Kronos' to Aristotle. And by relating it to various other motifs in Aristotle's lost works he has shown that we cannot, on the basis of what we know about the *Corpus Aristotelicum*, simply brush this theme aside. The atmosphere and setting of Aristotle's dialogues was no doubt very different from that of the works which have come down to us. Nevertheless, Waszink may have been premature in concluding his enquiry. If the way he interprets Plutarch's description of the 'dreaming Kronos' is wrong, as Cherniss has shown, then we must ask whether Cherniss's correction has consequences for the explanation of the 'dreaming Kronos' motif in Aristotle. Therefore we propose to take up Waszink's enquiry where he left off, in order to see if it can help us penetrate further into the labyrinth of the fragments of Aristotle's lost works.

We begin by establishing that Plutarch's myth of the *De facie* does not make Zeus dependent on Kronos, but Kronos dependent on Zeus.¹⁸ Kronos, imprisoned in a cave glittering like gold and bound by the chains of sleep, participates in his dreams in the divine counsel thought out by Zeus. The knowledge thus acquired is relayed by Kronos to the daemons around

¹⁴ *Art. cit.* (1950) 643.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 648 ff.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 652.

¹⁷ *Ibid.* 653.

¹⁸ *Plu., De facie* 941f-942a.

him.¹⁹ Kronos is therefore the dethroned god, inferior in power, rank, and knowledge to the ever-vigilant monarch Zeus. In Plutarch's divine hierarchy he is subordinated to Zeus and can only supply information to the daemons involved in world government so far as he himself participates in the counsel of Zeus and is not prevented by his Titanic passions. In his *De facie* myth, therefore, Plutarch uses an elaboration of the Kronos motif which departs from the Neoplatonist tradition. In that tradition Zeus was held to symbolize the hypostasis of the World-soul, which depends for its life and intellectuality on the hypostasis of the *Nous* (= Kronos) and, indirectly, on the hypostasis of the One (= Ouranos).²⁰

¹⁹ Cf. A. P. Bos, *art. cit.* (n.7) 46 ff.

²⁰ See Plotinus, *Enn.* 5.1 (10) 7.33 ff. For his philosophical use of the divine triad, Plotinus is able to link up with Plato's *Phdr* 246e4, where in the myth of the soul Zeus is introduced as the 'great leader' of the celestial regions. In his playful series of etymologies in the *Cratylus*, Plato connects Kronos with the status of the *nous* (396b) and in the myth of the *Politicus* he makes Kronos the vigilant and energetic world archon. From this one might infer that Plato paralleled Hesiod's chronological series of supreme gods with his own range of ontological levels. In doing so, he appears to have avoided any suggestion of atrocities committed among the gods themselves. Cf. P. Hadot, 'Ouranos, Kronos and Zeus in Plotinus' treatise against the Gnostics' in *Neoplatonism and early Christian thought; essays in honour of A. H. Armstrong* (London 1981) 124: 'The shocking and horrifying tale told by Hesiod in the *Theogony* of Ouranos, Kronos and Zeus, roused Plato's deepest aversion. Such a tale, he thought, should either be left buried forever in the deepest silence, or at least kept strictly for a close circle of initiates', with reference to *Rep.* 2.378.

CHAPTER FOUR

KRONOS AS AN ORACULAR GOD IN PLUTARCH'S *DE FACIE IN ORBE LUNAE*

We shall now have to investigate the information which various authors in antiquity provide about a dreaming god Kronos. We shall start with an analysis of the information found in the Middle Platonist Plutarch,¹ in the myth which concludes his treatise *De facie in orbe lunae*.² We are thus following the link which J. H. Waszink established between this work and Tertullian's statement about a dreaming Saturn in Aristotle. It seems legitimate to search in Plutarch, too, for material with an Aristotelian origin. Plutarch was an author of wide reading and broad interests. We frequently find explicit or implicit references to and quotations of older philosophers in his work. Nor are these confined to representatives of the Platonic tradition. As we noted before,³ his work repeatedly refers to Aristotle's lost works. Understandably, therefore, O. Gigon has predicted that a study of the *De facie* myth in the context of Plutarch's entire oeuvre will produce results relevant to the reconstruction of Aristotle's *Eudemus*.⁴

¹ On Plutarch, see J. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists; a study of Platonism 80 BC to AD 220* (London 1977) 184-230. He dates Plutarch's life at around 45-125 AD (*op. cit.* 185-186).

² See *Plutarchi Chaeronensis Moralia*, ed. by G. N. Bernardakis, vol. 5 (Leipzig 1893); *Plutarch's Moralia* with an English transl., vol. 12 of Loeb Class. Lib., ed. by H. Cherniss and W. C. Helmbold (London 1968); *Plutarch, Das Mondgesicht*, introd., transl. and comm. by H. Görgemanns (Zurich 1968). See further H. von Arnim, *Plutarch über Dämonen und Mantik*, Verh. KNAkad.W afd. Letterk. (Amsterdam 1921); W. Hamilton, 'The myth in Plutarch's *De facie* (940f-945d)', *CQ* 24 (1934) 24-30; G. Soury, 'Mort et initiation; sur quelques sources de Plutarque, *De facie* 943cd', *REG* 53 (1940) 51-58; H. Görgemanns, *Untersuchungen zu Plutarch's Dialog De facie in orbe lunae* (Heidelberg 1970); P. Donini, 'Science and metaphysics: Platonism, Aristotelianism and Stoicism in Plutarch's, *On the Face in the Moon*', in J. M. Dillon, A. A. Long (eds.), *The Question of 'Eclecticism'* (Los Angeles 1988) 126-144.

³ Chapter 1 n.13 above.

⁴ O. Gigon, 'Prolegomena to an edition of the *Eudemus*' in I. Düring, G. E. L. Owen (eds.), *Aristotle and Plato in the mid-fourth century* (Göteborg 1960) 26 and *id.*, 'Die Theologie des Aristotelischen Ethik und Politik' in *Hellenische Poleis*, vol. 3 (Darmstadt 1974) 1172. This author also wishes to take other 'transcendent' myths in Plutarch into consideration, for instance those in *Def.Orac.* (420a) and *Gen.Socr.*

1. *Summary of the treatise*

The treatise in question is a dialogue between eight people.⁵ The subject of their discussion is the possible value of current scientific and philosophical theories about the dark parts of the surface of the moon.⁶ A large variety of opinions on the moon's material composition passes under review. Then the question is asked whether the moon is inhabited by living beings. Finally, a myth is told about the moon as the abode of non-incarnated souls. This abode, it seems, is not a 'terminus', but rather a temporary stop, a sorting-place and clearing-house for the souls who have been freed of their earthly bodies.

2. *The theory about living beings on the moon*

For us the most interesting part of Plutarch's treatise starts at chapter 25 with a monologue by Lamprias,⁷ the main speaker, who to a large extent seems to represent the views of Plutarch and the Platonists. He argues that the moon is inhabited by living beings of a higher order than earthly mortals. The introduction to his speech is a typical 'reversal of perspective'⁸ linked to a 'reversal of values'. The reader is as it were transported to a place from where he enjoys a quite unfamiliar, superhuman view of the condition of earthly mortals, including himself. This 'reversal of perspective' is a motif which has been developed and avidly exploited in the philosophical tradition. It is also typical of philosophy as such. For it is the pretension of philosophy to offer man the true perspective to which he has hitherto been blind. Such a perspective obviously has much to offer: it beckons us with the promise of unknown, surprising, eminently appealing vistas. But it also poses a structural problem inasmuch as it pretends to give a *god's-eye point of view*, to mere mortals.

This same motif now is used by Plutarch in his *De facie in orbe lunae*. In his imagination, the reader is put in the position of the moon-beings; from this point of view, his own earthly existence seems devaluated to an existence in Hades and Tartarus, the caverns of the underworld as described by Homer and Hesiod.

From the point of view of the moon-beings, the moon is the 'real earth', occupying an intermediate position between the home of the gods and what for them is the 'underworld'.⁹ 'Sublunary' life is in this perspective

⁵ For a detailed analysis of the contents, see H. Görgemanns, *op. cit.* (1970) 149-156.

⁶ Plu., *De facie* 920b and 920c. Cf. H. Görgemanns, *op. cit.* (1970) 24. The expression 'the face of the moon' already occurs in Arist., *Cael.* 2.8 290a27.

⁷ Plu., *De facie* 938c.

⁸ Plu., *De facie* 940d f.

⁹ *Ibid.* 940e-f.

'subterranean' life, a life in the 'basement', sinister and infernal. In order to indicate the nature of this 'sublunary' existence and the difference in level between life on the moon and life on earth, Lamprias aptly quotes the verses in which the ancient poets described the horrors of Tartarus¹⁰ and the distance between the earth and Tartarus.¹¹ Presumably, the Greek reader will have caught an allusion to the themes of blind arrogance and imprisonment in the dark caverns of the underworld, as befell Kronos and the Titans in the text of Hesiod which these verses recall. According to Lamprias, the view that no life is possible on the moon may be due to the fact that our mortal condition prevents us from seeing that much higher forms of life than our own are possible in the universe.

3. *The myth of the dreaming Kronos and the non-incarnated souls*

At this point, however, Lamprias is suddenly interrupted by Sulla,¹² who, as was announced at the beginning of the treatise, will recount a myth.¹³ Sulla has noticed a clear resemblance between Lamprias' train of thought and his own projected story and he does not wish to have the ground taken from under his feet. This fear may seem unwarranted at first sight, since Sulla is going to talk about islands lying beyond the pillars of Hercules and beyond Britannia, and about a large continent lying even further. But the reader will readily see that, regardless of whether a vertical or horizontal displacement is concerned, the result is a comparable change of perspective: from both points of view it is possible to spy the flaws and defects of existence on earth.

Sulla does not, of course, possess the knowledge of these exotic regions at first hand. He is only transmitting what was revealed to him by a stranger from those parts, whom curiosity had driven to our world.¹⁴ Sulla guides his audience across the Mediterranean, through the Straits of Gibraltar, and beyond Britannia, to the legendary Ogygia mentioned by Homer.¹⁵ Besides Ogygia there are three other islands, at a distance of five days' travelling from Britannia. On one of these, according to the ancient traditions of the beings who live there,¹⁶ Kronos was imprisoned by Zeus and put into the

¹⁰ *Ibid.* 940f: σμερδαλέ', εὐρώεντα, τά τε στυγέουσι θεοί περ. Cf. Hom., *Il.* 20.65 and Hes., *Th.* 739.

¹¹ Plu., *De facie* 940f: τόσσον ἔνερθε' Αἰδέω ὅσον οὐρανός ἐστ' ἀπὸ γαίης. Cf. Hom., *Il.* 8.16 (in the passage with the 'golden chain' motif!) and Hes., *Th.* 720.

¹² Plu., *De facie* 26 940f.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 1 920b.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 26 941a and 942b f.

¹⁵ We see here a very current procedure in Greek literature: the author takes up a 'well-known' item and embroiders upon it a new and imaginative fiction.

¹⁶ Plu., *De facie* 941a: βάρβαροι, translated as 'natives' by H. Cherniss.

custody of Briareus, the primeval giant.¹⁷ To gain a proper idea of the location of these islands, however, it is necessary to know that there is an even remoter region: the real 'continent', compared to which the whole Mediterranean area, which the Greeks regarded as the inhabited world, is merely an island.¹⁸

Sulla goes on to talk about a custom observed by the inhabitants of this 'continent': every thirty years they send an expedition to the Kronos island.¹⁹ The members of this expedition are selected by drawing lots and are given all sorts of things which they may need during their stay 'abroad'.²⁰ We are not told more about the why and wherefore of the expedition. But in any case we are not given the impression that the inhabitants of yonder 'continent' are so keen on the trip that they volunteer in large numbers. Drawing by lots here is not a means of selecting a limited crew from a crowd of enthusiasts, but of meeting the quota. From the entire population a few individuals are chosen to fulfil the community's duty to maintain the cult of Kronos. The voyage to the Kronos island is a kind of military service for which one can be drafted, but from which everyone would wish to be exempted.

The expedition leaves on an astronomically determined date: as soon as the 'star of Kronos' has entered the sign of Taurus.²¹ And again a

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 941a: τὸν δ' ὀργύγιον (Βριάρεων) ἔχοντα φρουρὰν τῶν τε νήσων ἐκείνων καὶ τῆς θαλάττης. No doubt the terminology used here quite intentionally recalls Pl., *Phd.* 62b, where man is supposed to be ἐν τινι φρουρᾷ here on earth. The name of Briareus in the text is based on a conjecture of H. Cherniss, *op. cit.* 180 and 182. He refers in this connection to Aelianus, *Var. Hist.* 5.3, who says that Aristotle τὰς νῦν Ἡρακλείους στήλας καλούμενας πρὶν ἢ κληθῆναι τοῦτο φησι Βριάρεω καλεῖσθαι αὐτάς = V. Rose³ fr. 678 (there assigned to the 'Dubia'). B. Effe, *Studien zur Kosmologie und Theologie der Aristotelischen Schrift "Über die Philosophie"* (Munich 1970) 86 n.52 is prepared to accept this text as an indication of the Aristotelian origin of Plutarch's Kronos story. But he regards the story as an example of a theory about oneiromancy given in the *De philos.* which cannot have been held by Aristotle himself (*ibid.*, 86, 88). He still sees Kronos as the supreme god and even observes: 'Die Erkenntnis, dass Gott ein mit höchster geistiger Aktivität ausgestattetes Wesen ist, ist in der Kronos-Geschichte noch ἐν μύθου σχήματι greifbar'. Also interesting is Euphorion's remark (*F.G.H.* 103 fr. 35) that the pillars of Hercules are sometimes also called the 'pillars of Kronos'. The 'pillars of Hercules' are also mentioned in Iamblichus, *Protr.* 6.37.22-41.5 (Pistelli) = Arist., *Protr.* fr. 5b Ross, B 53 Düring, and in *Mu.* 3 393a18, a24, and b10. The latter passage also mentions islands (Britannia and Ireland) beyond the pillars of Hercules.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 941c. The same idea is found in *Mu.* 3 392b25-29.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 941c. The figure of thirty probably refers to the revolution of the planet Saturn, the 'star of Kronos'. It also implicitly indicates that in the period of one human generation only a few beings from 'beyond' find their way to the regions of the earthly mortals.

²⁰ Plu., *De facie* 941d: κλήρῳ λαχόντας and ἐπὶ ξένης βιοτεύειν.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 941c. According to H. Cherniss *a.l.* 'Taurus is the sign of the moon's exaltation ... and it is for this reason that the expedition begins when Saturn enters this sign'. On the basis of what we have discussed in chapter 2 I would like to suppose that there is another

remarkable detail is added. The 'star of Kronos' is said to be the star 'which we call Phaenon, but they call the Nightwatchman'. The planet Saturn is here referred to by the name belonging to the series of 'light-names' apparently introduced for the planets at a certain moment in a certain context.²² But at the same time this reference again aims at contrasting the perspective of mortals with the overview and insight possessed by those other beings: for them the planet is merely a 'nightwatchman', a kind of street lamp in the dark. It suggests that the light we know and love is far less bright than what these higher beings are used to.

After a difficult voyage, including a delay of ninety days, the envoys arrive at the island of Kronos, where they are the sole residents (for thirty years) besides the members of earlier delegations who decided to stay. It is remarkable that most of the latter apparently prefer to stay, although they are allowed to return after their period of service has elapsed. The reason for this choice is stated as follows: 'without toil or trouble they have all things in abundance, while they are employed with sacrifices and celebrations, or with various discourse and philosophy'.²³ Later we shall have to reconsider, in the context of the whole myth, the meaning of this change in the envoys' attitude.

Sulla goes on to describe Kronos, asleep in a deep cave that glitters like gold. He has been bound by Zeus, but not with ropes or chains: *sleep* is the bond with which Zeus has shackled Kronos for good.²⁴ Zeus, who rules eternally over gods and men and is therefore never overcome by sleep himself, has subordinated and degraded Kronos by fettering him with the bonds of sleep. However, like the cave which Plato described in his allegory of the human condition, the cave which is Kronos' prison has an opening in its roof. In this way there is still a measure of contact with superior divine reality. Birds fly into the cave through the opening and bring Kronos ambrosia, the exquisite fragrance of which pervades the cave and the entire

explanation for the connection of Kronos and the bull.

²² Some of these names are also used by Plutarch in 9 925a, 13 927c. On the problem of the date at which these names became current, see A. P. Bos, 'Notes on Aristotle's *Mu.* concerning the discussion of its authenticity', *PI* (Athens) 1 (1979) 142-147, with reference to the occurrence of this series of names in *Mu.* 2 392a23 ff. We concluded there that these names were probably used by Heraclides Ponticus or someone in his circle. The sequence supposedly reflects a decreasing luminosity, indicating that the action of the supreme god's power diminishes towards the centre of the universe. It should be observed that the sequence of the planets in *De facie* 925a is the same as in *Mu.* 2 392a23 ff., and that this sequence is exceptional for Plutarch's time.

²³ Plu., *De facie* 941e.

²⁴ Plu., *De facie* 941f. One may wonder to what extent this motif of the 'bonds of sleep' echoes Hesiod's description of the people of the golden race who 'died as if overcome by sleep', *Op.* 116. Death and Sleep both live, like brothers, in the darkness of Tartarus, where Kronos was imprisoned according to the account in *Th.* 758.

island.²⁵

Kronos is surrounded and served by daemons, his companions from the time when Kronos himself ruled over gods and men.²⁶ Of these daemons it is said: 'because they have knowledge of the future, they make predictions. But when knowledge of the most important matters is concerned, they can only pass it down as the dream oracles of Kronos. For in his dream Kronos tells all that Zeus has thought out previously'.²⁷ The prophetic powers of the daemons are understood here in the traditional sense: they function as intermediaries between the supreme divine level and the world of mortals.²⁸ Inasmuch as mortals possess knowledge of the future, they owe it to the mediation of the daemons. This traditional view of the role of the daemons is another reason for rejecting the hypothesis that the daemons convey to Zeus information which they receive from Kronos.²⁹

The passage immediately following the statement about Kronos' oracular activities has unfortunately come down to us in a corrupt state. Various editors have proposed different reconstructions.³⁰ In the text proposed by H. Cherniss, the author introduces two different states of being to which Kronos is subject. These states alternate periodically during Kronos' never ending sleep: during one period, his royal and divine potential is pure and unmixed; during the other, a reflux of Titanic passions and emotions clouds his higher powers. Quite typically, Kronos does not appear to belong to the divine beings whose nature is always identical and immutable; he is prone to the influence of negative factors traditionally associated with 'the Titanic nature'. This raises the question in which of both phases Kronos' oracular activity takes place. One might suppose that when the Titanic passions and emotions hold Kronos in thrall, they disturb his sleep and cause a kind of delirium, in which he more or less chaotically utters what is going on in his

²⁵ It is certainly legitimate to see a link between the birds that bring Kronos food and the dreams which Kronos receives. A remarkable detail here is that the divine food is given and brought. In Plato's myth about the journey of the souls to the crest of the celestial roof (*Phdr.* 247a8-e6), the consumption of the divine food on which the soul depends for its rationality and mental health is preceded by a laborious ascent. Perhaps there is also an allusion here to the aviary in *Pl., Tht.* 197c f., with which Plato illustrates the difference between the *ἔξις* and *χρήσις* of *episteme*.

²⁶ *Plu., De facie* 942a. Cf. *Hesiod, Op.* 122.

²⁷ *Plu., De facie* 942a.

²⁸ Cf. *Pl., Symp.* 202e.

²⁹ As was assumed by J. H. Waszink, *art. cit.* (1947 and 1950).

³⁰ H. Cherniss reads: ταῦτ' ὄνειροπολεῖν τὸν Κρόνον, εἶναι δ' ἀνάτασιν τὰ τιτανικά πάθη καὶ κινήματα τῆς ψυχῆς (ἔως) ἂν αὐτῷ πάλιν ἀνάπαυσιν ὁ ὕπνος (καταστήσῃ) καὶ γένηται τὸ βασιλικὸν καὶ θεῖον αὐτὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸ καθαρόν καὶ ἀκήρατον. Partly following M. Adler, *WS* 31 (1909) 307, M. Pohlenz, *NJKA* 19 (1916) 594 n. read: ὅσα γὰρ ὁ Ζεὺς προδιανοεῖται, ταῦτ' ὄνειροπολεῖν τὸν Κρόνον, ἐπειδὴν στασιάσαντα τὰ Τιτανικά πάθη καὶ κινήματα τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν αὐτῷ παντάπασιν ὁ ὕπνος (καθησυχάσῃ) καὶ γένηται τὸ βασιλικὸν καὶ θεῖον αὐτὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸ καθαρόν καὶ ἀκήρατον.

mind. On the other hand we might suppose that the Titanic passions cause so much disruption and interference that the inspiration of Kronos by Zeus is disturbed and that his activity as an oracular deity is temporarily impossible.

The narrative goes on to explain how Sulla possesses knowledge about the island of Kronos. It was given to him by one of the beings who had accomplished the expedition from the large continent to the island of Kronos. This stranger had fulfilled his duties to the god and in the meanwhile had made an intensive study of astronomy and the philosophy of visible reality.³¹ (The cult of Kronos is apparently presented as a form of cosmic religion.) But afterwards he was overcome by a 'kind of desire and passion'³² to see the world of the people living on 'the large island'. This is strikingly at odds with his motive for the earlier journey: there is now no question of loyally fulfilling a duty to society; mere personal desire and individual passion are involved. Interest in natural philosophy and science seems to have made way for a touristic kind of curiosity. One might suppose that, during his period of service on the Kronos island, the stranger has been infected by the virus of the Titanic nature.

Nevertheless, on landing in the world known and inhabited by the Greeks, this stranger possesses a vaster knowledge than any of the people he encounters. Because of his exotic origin and because he is initiated in many matters unknown to ordinary mortals, the information which he supplies is of the utmost importance. And since this information also entails a proper view of the gods and the condition of human beings after death, what follows in the narration is to be regarded as 'the revelation of the stranger concerning the celestial gods and the fate of the souls of the dead'.

4. *The revelation of the stranger*

In particular the stranger reveals the special position of the Moon among the visible (celestial) gods, owing to her sovereignty over mortal life.

The moon is identified with Persephone. Together with Demeter, the Earth, she belongs to the realm of Hades, god of the underworld. But Persephone, the Moon, is situated at the edge of Hades' realm³³ and is a clearing-house for the souls allowed to escape Hades' jurisdiction. This is emphatically not granted to evil and impure souls. Only the virtuous enter the sphere of the moon after their death on earth.³⁴ Life on the moon is of a much higher quality than existence on earth; it is called an 'easy life'. At the

³¹ Plu., *De facie* 942b: θεραπεύων ... χρώμενος.

³² *Ibid.*, 942b: ἐπιθυμίαν δέ τινα καὶ πόθον ἔχων γενέσθαι τῆς μεγάλης νήσου θεατῆς ...

³³ *Ibid.*, 942f.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 942f.

same time we are told that it is not the perfectly happy and divine life, which is achieved only after the 'second death'.³⁵

The theme of the 'second death' appears to follow from a further development of anthropological dualism. The narrator praises the distinction between a bodily and a non-bodily component in man. Within the latter component, however, another dichotomy must be assumed, namely between 'soul' and 'intellect'. This anthropology with its double dichotomy thus leads to a tripartition of man into 'body', 'soul', and 'intellect'. And just as the soul is superior to the body, the intellect is superior to the soul. These components of man each have a different origin, namely the earth, the moon, and the sun respectively.

The process in which the *nous* is detached from the soul is also the liberating deposition of a heterogeneous integument. But it is a process which requires time.³⁶ During this phase of psychic cleansing some of the souls again function as transmitters of oracles to man and as avengers of injustice or saviours of the distressed. And if they make mistakes while performing these tasks, their punishment is a new earthly existence.³⁷ The perfect souls belong to the category of Kronos' companions, and to the Dactyls and Corybants. They have finally achieved the liberation of their *nous*, owing to their 'love for the image manifested in the Sun through which shines forth the desirable and beautiful and divine and blessed towards which all nature in one way or another yearns'.³⁸

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 942f: ῥᾶστον ... διατελοῦσιν.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 943b. This striking idea is also found in St Augustine's early work, e.g. *De Ordine* 2.9.26., which is often thought still to show traces of his enthusiasm for Cicero's *Hortensius*, a writing which is supposed to have been strongly influenced by lost works of Aristotle.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 944d.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 30 944e.

CHAPTER FIVE

A DREAMING OR SLEEPING GOD KRONOS IN THE *CORPUS HERMETICUM* AND OTHER HELLENISTIC TEXTS

1. *Kronos and Ouranos in Corpus Hermeticum 10.5*

We shall now also have to deal with the passage in the *Corpus Hermeticum* mentioning a 'dreaming Kronos'. This passage occurs in the tenth treatise, a disquisition by Hermes Trismegistus to Asclepius entitled 'The key'.¹ The text was pointed out to J. H. Waszink by A. J. Festugière, who had produced a valuable edition of the *Corpus Hermeticum* together with A. D. Nock and later sketched the background of the texts in his impressive study *La révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste*.² In his article written in 1950,³ Waszink had tried to link up this passage with the data he had previously related to Tertullian's remark about a 'dreaming Kronos' in Aristotle.

The *Corpus Hermeticum*, as we know, is a remarkable collection of Greek treatises which cannot be dated with precision but which in any case started to leave traces of its presence at the end of the second century A.D. In most of these writings, Hermes reveals to mortal humans who have not yet become 'enlightened' what this 'enlightenment' involves and how it can be acquired by mortals. In the opening treatise of the collection, the *Poimandres*, we are told how Hermes himself was 'initiated' and 'enlightened' by the absolute Intellect, the *Poimandres*. It emerges that Hermes can act as an intermediary of *gnosis* because, though his status and condition are human, he has arrived through divine help at the consciousness of and reactualization of his inner, divine being. In this,

¹ *Corpus Hermeticum*, ed. by A. D. Nock, A. J. Festugière (Paris 1946, 1972?) 1.113 ff. See also *Hermetica*, ed. by W. Scott (Oxford 1924) 1.186 ff. For an introduction to the world of the *Corp. Herm.*, see H. Jonas, *The Gnostic religion; the message of the alien God and the beginnings of Christianity* (Boston 1958, 1963?) 147-173. For a *status quaestionis* of modern research, cf. K. W. Tröger, 'Die hermetische Gnosis' in *Gnosis und Neues Testament; Studien aus Religionswissenschaft und Theologie*, ed. by K. W. Tröger (Berlin 1973) 97-119.

² A. J. Festugière, *La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste*; vol. 1 *L'astrologie et les sciences occultes* (Paris 1943, 1950?); vol. 2 *Le Dieu cosmique* (1949); vol. 3 *Les doctrines de l'âme* (1953).

³ J. H. Waszink, 'The dreaming Kronos in the *Corpus Hermeticum*' in *Mélanges H. Grégoire: ALPhO* 10 (1950) 639-653.

Hermes seems to represent the human ideal drawn by Plato in his famous allegory of 'the Cave', namely the man who has first climbed the difficult road of 'liberation' from the prison of the earthly condition and who subsequently, after having contemplated the intelligible Light and the Source of this Light, redescends in order to act as a messenger and interpreter of the Light for those who have stayed behind in the Cave.

Hermes announces in the treatise that god is identical with the Father and the Good.⁴ His action is to will the existence of all things.⁵ But god also desires that the beings come to understand that the ground of their existence is the divine will. The perfect form of *gnosis* is the insight that the divine will is the effect of (the *energeia* of) the knowledge of the Good of itself.⁶ Asclepius responds with the words: 'You have filled us, o Father, with the good and most beautiful vision'. After this Hermes continues his revelation by describing the large difference between this intelligible light and the visible light of the sun: it reaches much farther than the light of the sun, without harmful effects, and full of immortality.⁷ And he goes on:⁸

'Those who are able to drink more than others of this vision often pass in sleep from the body and thus achieve the most beautiful vision, as befell our ancestors Ouranos and Kronos.'

In this text the words κατακοιμίζονται πολλάκις [δὲ] ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος, which we have translated as 'often pass in sleep from the body', have caused some problems. However, the same words can be seen to show a remarkable similarity to the details of the Kronos myth in Plutarch's *De facie*. And we can also establish that they are strikingly related to themes from Aristotle's lost works.

⁴ *C.H.* 10.1.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 10.2. Hermes adds that 'producing' is not an suitable term for the divine action, for 'production' presupposes a condition of 'want' (ἐλλειπής ἐστι). The existence of the substances is explained here by way of the 'will to exist' of the divine Source alone. On the nature of this theology, cf. A. J. Festugière *ad C.H.* 10.3 (1.118-119): 'le Premier Noûs reste cause suprême de la création puisqu'il la veut: mais il agit par son fils, le 2e Noûs. Cette notion d'un Dieu-Bien n'agissant que par son vouloir, c'est-à-dire sa pensée, paraît dériver assez directement d'Aristote, *Métaph.* A 6-7'.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 10.4.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 10.4.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 10.5: (ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ θέα) ... ἥς οἱ δυνάμενοι πλέον τι ἀρύσασθαι τῆς θεάς κατακοιμίζονται πολλάκις [δὲ] ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος εἰς τὴν καλλίστην ὄψιν ὥπερ Οὐρανὸς καὶ Κρόνος, οἱ ἡμέτεροι πρόγονοι, ἐντετυχήκασιν (text A. D. Nock). A. J. Festugière translates: 'ceux qui peuvent s'abreuver un peu plus de cette vision, souvent, tombant en sommeil et se détachant du corps, parviennent à la vision la plus belle, comme il est arrivé à Ouranos et à Kronos nos ancêtres'.

2. Proposed interpretations of the text

The emendations introduced in our text by W. Scott reflect an utterly erroneous idea of its intent: κατακοιμίζονται πολλάκις δὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος, (ἀπολυθέντες δὲ τοῦ σώματος) εἰς τὴν καλλίστην ὄψιν (ἐνέτυχον) ὥσπερ ... ἐντετυχήκασιν. He adds the following translation: 'Even those who are able to draw "somewhat larger draughts" of the vision than others, are often made torpid by the body'.⁹ The body is thus conceived as the entity which obstructs the vision, because it puts the mind to sleep as it were. According to Scott, the perfect vision is only possible after the mind has been freed from the body.

Waszink rightly rejected this gross treatment of the text. With reference to Plotinus' ecstatic experiences *during* his life, he claimed that the text could certainly mean that Ouranos and Kronos achieved their visions while remaining in their bodies.¹⁰ But Waszink adds that the Hermetic texts regarded Ouranos and Kronos as human beings who subsequently acquired a divine status. And he concludes that our text, too, assumes that Ouranos and Kronos were human beings, in view of the reference to their *soma*.¹¹

But in the interpretation of this text we should not conclude too readily that *soma* stands for a material body such as earthly, mortal beings possess. For we are told that Ouranos and Kronos received the 'most beautiful vision'. We shall have to see this against the background of the method employed in this treatise. The treatise deals with the highly divergent conditions to which souls may be subject. It may happen that they revert to the vital principles of animals, in sea or on land. A very special category is that of the human souls. These souls possess a 'principle of immortality' because they have been transformed into *daimones*.¹² And they can develop until they belong to the ranks of the gods.¹³ But of the gods (the rest of the work makes clear that the cosmic gods are meant, i.e. the gods with the exception of the transcendent god or the Good) it is then said: 'There are two choirs of gods, one of the erring and one of the non-erring.'¹⁴ As Festugière indicates in his translation, the distinction referred to is that between the planets and the sphere of the fixed stars. The text goes on: 'And this is the most perfect glory of a soul'.¹⁵ This must refer to the (cognitive) level of the divine beings included in the exterior celestial sphere. On its

⁹ W. Scott, *Hermetica* (Oxford 1934) 2.239-240.

¹⁰ J. H. Waszink, *art. cit.* (1950) 640.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 640 and 642.

¹² *C.H.* 10.7.

¹³ *Loc. cit.*

¹⁴ *C.H.* 10.7: χοροὶ δὲ δύο θεῶν, ὁ μὲν τῶν πλανωμένων, ὁ δὲ τῶν ἀπλανῶν. Translation by A. J. Festugière: 'il y a deux chœurs de dieux, celui des astres errants et celui des fixes'.

¹⁵ *C.H.* 10.8: καὶ αὕτη ψυχῆς ἡ τελειοτάτη δόξα.

climb toward contemplation and knowledge, the soul cannot proceed further than the level of the gods belonging to the outside sphere. Now if Ouranos and Kronos received the 'most beautiful vision', as we read earlier, then they must belong to the gods of the 'choir of the non-erring'!

In this connection it is important to remember that, according to members of the Old Academy, the 'erring' of the planets was caused by a 'clouding' of their rational faculties. Xenocrates is known to have identified the planets with the *Titans*, the degraded gods who were deprived of supreme perfection and the intelligible light on account of their passions and violent crimes.¹⁶ In the conception of *C.H.* 10, the planets, like the stars of the fixed sphere, belong to the (cosmic) gods. But the difference in quality between the two categories must be explained by a difference in the level of knowledge.

Now all these cosmic gods, like the cosmos as a whole, are 'hylic'.¹⁷ Although they are characterized by the possession of *nous*, this *nous* in them is always connected with *soma*. But this *soma* must not be thought of in terms of the sublunary, perishable *soma*. For in the 'metabletics' of the soul described by *C.H.* 10, man's death releases his *nous* from the soul in which it resided and from the *pneuma* belonging to the soul. Once the *nous* has been purged of its old 'coverings' (*endymata*), it acquires a 'fiery *soma* and roams thus through all (celestial) space'.¹⁸

The *nous* of mortals, therefore, acquires the condition of the cosmic gods when it has deposed its psychic coverings and has assumed a celestial, fiery

¹⁶ Xenocrates fr. 19 and 20 (R. Heinze), fr. 218 and 219 (M. Isnardi Parente).

¹⁷ Cf. *C.H.* 10.10.

¹⁸ *C.H.* 10.16: τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ συμβαίνει καὶ τοῖς τοῦ σώματος ἐξιοῦσιν. ἀναδραμοῦσα γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ εἰς ἑαυτήν, συστέλλεται τὸ πνεῦμα εἰς τὸ αἷμα, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ εἰς τὸ πνεῦμα, ὁ δὲ νοῦς καθαρὸς γενόμενος τῶν ἐνδυμάτων, θεῖος ὢν φύσει, σώματος πυρίνου λαβόμενος περιπολεῖ πάντα τόπον, καταλιπὼν τὴν ψυχὴν κρίσει καὶ τῇ κατ' ἀξίαν δίκῃ. K. W. Tröger, *art. cit.* 106 is fundamentally confusing Hermetic ontology when he says: "'Wahr" is allein "das Unkörperliche" (*C.H.* XIII, 6). In Kapitel 3 sagt Hermes Trismegistos (von sich) dasz er aus sich selbst in einen unsterblichen Körper gegangen sei (ein Paradox, denn dieser unsterbliche Körper ist natürlich unkörperlich!)'. It is clear from *C.H.* 1.5, 10, and 17 that Earth, Water, and Air have a merely physical status, whereas Fire and Pneuma are psychic-physical entities. The *Logos* is connected with the latter two, so that in 1.5 the 'pneumatic Logos' can be spoken of as the principle active in the cosmos and in 1.10 the *Logos* of God is said to leap up to the pure part of Nature, far from the lower elements, and to unite with the demiurgic intellect. When the genesis of the individual human beings is described in 1.17, '*Pneuma* derived from Ether' turns out to play an important role in this process. For the interpretation of the 'coverings' of the *Nous*, we have to go back to *C.H.* 1.13, where it is explained that the *Anthropos*, when he has descended from the Transcendent to the sphere of the demiurgic *Nous* and goes on to explore the sphere of the seven celestial rulers, participates in the nature and condition of these celestial archons. We further point out that the anthropology here, with its double 'division' between body and soul on the one hand, and between soul and *nous* on the other, corresponds entirely with the anthropology of Plutarch's myth in the *De facie*.

(or immortal, as is stated in *C.H.* 13¹⁹) *soma*. And this is also, of course, the *soma* which causes the celestial gods to remain 'hylic'. In the action of this celestial *soma*, it seems, we must locate the cause of the difference in quality and cognitive level between the planetary gods and the gods of the furthest sphere of stars. Apparently the heavenly *soma* still brings about a measure of 'error' in the planets. Since this does not seem to occur in the beings of the fixed sphere, it must be assumed that in them the effects of the conjunction to the celestial *soma* have been reduced to nil. Just as the soul of mortals is freed from the body during sleep, so the *nous* of the supreme cosmic gods is free of the effects of their heavenly bodies as if it were asleep.²⁰ This condition makes it possible for their *nous* to be wholly absorbed by the 'perfect vision' of the Good. That is the blissful fate of Ouranos and Kronos. That is also the condition which Hermes in *C.H.* 13 wishes Tat to enjoy, when Tat has been 'reborn' into an immortal body. Hermes expresses the hope that he will succeed in leaving his body 'like people who dream in their sleep without sleeping'.²¹

The above analysis, if valid, entails some important secondary conclusions as well. There can be no doubt that the entire train of thought in this passage from the *C.H.* is determined by cosmological and anthropological debates within the Greek philosophy of Plato and the Old Academy. At no point are we forced to search for an explanation in religious or other data from non-Greek sources.

Once that has been established, we are faced by the urgent question: what has induced the author of *C.H.* to present the Greek gods Ouranos and Kronos as divine beings of the highest category, but to link their 'perfect vision' with the notion of 'passing from the body in sleep' in the sense of being liberated from the prohibitive effects of their celestial, fiery bodies? Reference to a 'fable d'origine orientale' is in our opinion an objectionable stopgap solution.²² Nor can we appeal to Plato, as Festugière has (rightly)

¹⁹ *C.H.* 13.3. Cf. W. C. Grese, *Corpus Hermeticum XIII and early Christian literature* (Leiden 1979) 71 ff.

²⁰ For this motif of the soul's liberation during the sleep of the body, cf. *C.H.* 1.1, where the speaker (Hermes) describes how Poimandres revealed himself to him when the action of his senses had been brought to a complete standstill, καθάπερ οἱ ὕπνῳ βεβαρημένοι. The highest part of mixed beings is said in 1.15 to be ἄνυκνος ἀπὸ ἀύπνου. The fact that Hermes was later able to write an account of his ecstasy is explained by him in 1.30 as follows: ἐγένετο γὰρ ὁ τοῦ σώματος ὕπνος τῆς ψυχῆς νῆψις, καὶ ἡ κάμνυσις τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ἀληθινὴ ὄρασις ...

²¹ *C.H.* 13.4: εἴθε ὃ τέκνον, καὶ σὺ σεαυτὸν διεξέλῃλυθας, ὥς οἱ ἐν ὕπνῳ ὄνειροπολοῦμενοι χωρὶς ὕπνου.

²² A. J. Festugière, *ad loc.* (1.122). Equally improbable, in our opinion, is the view proposed by B. H. Stricker, 'The Corpus Hermeticum', *Mnemosyne* IV Ser. 2 (1949) 79-80. He states: 'The hermetic doctrine is the esoteric doctrine of the Egyptian priesthood'.

done for the origin of many motifs in the *Corpus Hermeticum*. We are therefore forced to assume a flash of originality on the part of the author of *C.H.*, or to suppose that he has drawn on a source of mythical-philosophical material that is no longer at our disposal. In the latter case, the only eligible authors are Xenocrates and Aristotle. Of these two, the latter enjoys a clear preference on account of Tertullian's assertion that he discussed a 'dreaming Kronos'.

If we turn for a moment from the *Corpus Hermeticum* back to Plutarch's Kronos myth, a number of important similarities stand out at once. In the text of Plutarch's *De facie* it is also clear that Kronos does not belong to the sphere of mortals but to the sphere of the *daimones* and the blessed, i.e. those who are exempt from the pains and limitations inherent in the perishable, mortal condition. Plutarch says that Kronos has a pathetic nature, and that he transmits his dream oracles to the *daimones* around him when (or because) his *pathe* have subsided. Once sleep has released Kronos from the grasp of his *pathe*, he makes contact with the perfect knowledge of Zeus. As we hope to explain in more detail further on, this is to be understood as meaning that Kronos' *nous* only starts to function when all the irrational influences of his psychic nature have been cancelled.

That is to say, in Plutarch's text we are concerned with the notion that the pure activity of the highest faculty becomes possible only when the prohibitive influence of the lower faculties has been annulled. The mind awakes when everything else has been silenced. But since there is no question of a perishable, earthly body in the case of Kronos, the body referred to in Plutarch's *De facie*, as in *C.H.* 10, must be the psychic or ethereal *soma* which constitutes all cosmic celestial beings.

It was Aristotle who employed the notion that the sleep of the lower faculties is a condition for the arousal of the higher faculties; this emerges from the texts in Sextus Empiricus and Cicero which are usually included as fragments of Aristotle's *De philosophia*.²³ In his *Eudemus* the same author appears to have provided various examples of this idea, witness the story about the dream of Eudemus, the ecstatic experience of the anonymous Greek king, and of the dreaming Kronos mentioned by Tertullian.²⁴

3. The motif of 'the key'

We would like to pay attention here to the remarkable title of treatise *C.H.* 10: 'The key'. The treatise itself gives no explanation of this title.²⁵ It

²³ Sextus Emp., *Math.* 3 (*Phys.* 1) 20-23; Cic. *Div. ad Brutum* 1.30.63 (= Arist. *Philos.* 12a).

²⁴ Arist. *Eudemus* fr. 1; fr. 11 Ross; *Protr.* fr. 20 Ross. The latter fragment had already been assigned to the *Eudemus* by O. Gigon, *art. cit.* (1960) 26.

²⁵ The explanation given by A. J. Festugière (*ad. loc.* 1.107) seems to us improbable. In

might be considered obvious, however, that the central theme of the whole argument, *gnosis*, was regarded as the key which opens doors closed to others. But which door can be meant? The door of the prison of the cosmic condition, naturally! For the condition of belonging to the cosmos brings about the 'ontologische Differenz' between all beings and the Source. In Hermetic Gnosticism, not only the mortal condition, but *Physis* in its entirety, in all its beauty and glory, is regarded as a 'Cave', an 'underworld', a penitentiary abode where man, but also the celestial beings, reside at a distance from the transcendent Source.²⁶ It is the Poimandres who reveals himself as ὁ τῆς αὐθεντίας νοῦς,²⁷ and who as pure *Nous* is even superior to the 'demiurgic *Nous*'²⁸ who forms the boundary between all hylic reality and the absolutely transcendent source. That is why he can present himself as gatekeeper and keybearer.²⁹

4. *Hermes as a descendant of Kronos*

Finally, we wish to linger over a detail in our text, according to which Hermes, who reveals the key of knowledge to Asclepius, designates Kronos and Ouranos as his 'ancestors' (πρόγονοι). Since the highest degree of participation in the perfect vision is attributed to them too, it is implied that Hermes himself, in his role of 'transmitter' of *gnosis*, does not stand on an equal level with them. Perhaps we should even assume that Hermes owes his own degree of insight to what he received from these 'superiors' in the realm of *gnosis*. In that case the 'transmission scheme' of *C.H.* 10 is entirely in line with that of Plutarch's *De facie*, where *daemones* act as conveyors of divine knowledge to mortals, but depend for the most comprehensive insights on what Kronos tells them in his dream oracles.

We are obliged to return here to texts mentioned in chapter 1. We observed there that Tertullian thought it important to point out that Moses

his view, the title merely serves to indicate that the treatise is 'a comprehensible summary' of a more extensive revelation.

²⁶ Cf. *C.H.* 8.3: τῶν ιδεῶν τὰ ποιά ὁ πατήρ ἐγκατασπείρας τῇ σφαίρᾳ ὥσπερ ἐν ἄντρῳ κατέκλεισε; cf. K. W. Tröger, *art. cit.* 105. According to P. Boyancé, 'Xénocrate et les Orphiques', *REA* 50 (1948) 222, Xenocrates had already identified the *phroua* in *Pl., Phd.* 62b with the cosmos as a whole! See also Empedocles, *DK* 33B112 and 120. This view is also familiar to Plotinus, *Enn.* 4.8 (6) 1 and 3; Proclus, in *Pl.Tim.* 101f-102a. H. Jonas, *Gnosis und spätantiker Geist* (Göttingen 1934, 1964³) 1.163 points out that it is characteristic of the Gnostic view to regard the cosmos as 'Höhle'.


²⁷ Cf. *C.H.* 1.2; and 1.22: αὐτὸς ὁ Νοῦς.

²⁸ *C.H.* 1.9: ὁ δὲ Νοῦς ὁ θεός, ἀρρενόθηλυσ ὢν, ζωὴ καὶ φῶς ὑπάρχων, ἀπεκύησε λόγῳ ἕτερον Νοῦν δημιουργόν ...

²⁹ *C.H.* 1.22: οὐκ ἔασω αὐτὸς ὁ Νοῦς τὰ προσπίπτοντα ἐνεργήματα τοῦ σώματος ἐκτελεσθῆναι, πυλωρὸς ὢν ἀποκλείσω τὰς εἰσόδους τῶν κακῶν καὶ αἰσχροῶν ἐνεργημάτων, τὰς ἐνθυμήσεις ἐκκόπτων.

was 900 years older than Saturn, 'not to mention his progeny'.³⁰ This remark cannot but entail a claim for the priority (and hence the higher degree of truthfulness) of Moses' works above the writings assigned to the descendents of Kronos, i.e. the writings of the *Corpus Hermeticum*! Indeed, Tertullian may well have derived the genealogical relation between Kronos and Hermes Trismegistus from the passage in our text in which Hermes calls himself a descendant of Kronos.

Now the *Corpus Hermeticum* presents some of its revelations as revelations to king Ammon; other as revelations by Hermes to either Tat or Asclepius. Hermes' remark about Kronos and Ouranos can be taken to mean that their knowledge is of an even higher order than his. Moreover, the first treatise of the *Corpus Hermeticum* presents itself as Hermes' description of the revelation given to him by 'Poimandres',³¹ i.e. the perfect, pure *Nous*. We are also told there that this *Nous* produces another *Nous* who is creator of the world.³² The result is the following hierarchy:



The intriguing question, next, is whether Ouranos and Kronos can somehow be fitted into this hierarchy. They will certainly have to be given pride of place above Hermes. And the statement that they participate in the supreme vision suggests a ranking with the demiurgic *Nous*, the highest deity in the cosmos and supervisor of the seven cosmic archons. The all-important

³⁰ Tert., *An.* 28.1: 'Multo antiquior Moyses etiam Saturno, nongentis circiter annis, nedum pronepotibus eius'; other texts in which Tertullian shows acquaintance with a *Corp. Herm.* are: *Adv. Val.* 15; *An.* 2.28 and 33.

³¹ The name 'Poimandres' of the first treatise has given rise to much speculation. Cf. R. Marcus, 'The name Poimandres', *JNES* 8 (1949) 40-43. The name was quite soon taken to mean ποιμήν ἀνδρῶν 'shepherd of men'. Cf. *C.H.* 13.19: Λόγον γὰρ τὸν σὸν ποιμαίνει ὁ Νοῦς. However, others tried to find a non-Greek derivation for the name; from (Sahidic) Coptic, 'the witness' (F. Granger); from Egyptian, 'the mind of the Sovereign Power' (F. Ll. Griffith); again from Coptic, 'the reason of sovereignty' (R. Marcus). Because no early non-Greek versions of the *C.H.* are known, we prefer derivation of the name from Greek traditions, as did E. Haenchen, 'Aufbau und Theologie des Poimandres' in *id.*, *Gott und Mensch* (Tübingen 1965) 338-339. In this connection the significance of Plato's *Politicus* should not be neglected. There the government of the mortals is assigned to beings of superhuman stature, i.e. *daimones* and, ultimately, Kronos, as *Nous*, whose supervising activity is compared at length to that of a shepherd over his flock (271d3 f.; 275b f.).

³² *C.H.* 1.9.

distinction in this entire divine hierarchy is that between the pure transcendent Source, the absolute *Nous*, the perfect intelligible Light or Poimandres, and the cosmic divine beings who create and govern the world. In any case it is clear that the *Corpus Hermeticum* presents Poimandres, Ouranos and Kronos, and Hermes as beings whose glory surpasses that of mortal man through the superior level of their knowledge. That is why they can be qualified as divine beings³³ who 'mediate' the all-embracing knowledge to beings of inferior status.

In the *Corpus Hermeticum*, then, we find many elements of the Kronology which we encountered in Plutarch: Kronos is a cosmic divine being who at a high level possesses and mediates knowledge to inferior beings; he acquires this knowledge when he 'has passed in sleep from his corporeality', that is to say, when the interfering action of his body (which must be conceived as a supralunary, psychically qualified, 'pathetic' body) has been cancelled by the sleep of this body, enabling the undisturbed action of his higher faculties. And the Kronology in both writings gives Kronos a role which is on a par with the Hesiodic conception of Kronos as subjected, imprisoned, and 'bound'.

By recalling violent crimes among the gods, this tradition distinguishes itself from the tradition in Plato, and from the tradition current with the Neoplatonists under Plotinus. There Ouranos and Kronos represent metaphysical beings, the first and second hypostasis respectively, and both are superior to Zeus, the representative of the World- soul.³⁴

5. *Kronos as the ruler of Heimarmene in Tatian*

In connection with the Hermetic tradition about Ouranos and Kronos, we also wish to mention a striking passage in Tatian's *Oratio ad Graecos*, which dates from the second half of the second century A.D. Part of this work consists in a sharp attack on Greek mythology and astrology. While summing up a series of incongruities and absurdities, Tatian poses the question: 'How did the fettered Kronos, who was thrown out of his kingdom, become established as a disposer of fate? How can kingdoms be assigned by one who has no kingdom himself?' (transl. M. Whittaker).³⁵

M. Whittaker's explanation, which identifies Kronos with the planet

³³ Cf. Tert., *An.* 2, where Mercury, Silenus, Hermotimos, Orpheus, Musaeus, and Pherecydes are cited as gods or divine beings whose writings have played a large role in the philosophical tradition.

³⁴ Cf. P. Hadot, 'Ouranos, Kronos and Zeus in Plotinus' treatise against the Gnostics', *Neoplatonism and early Christian thought*, Essays in honour of A. H. Armstrong (London 1981) 124-137; and chapter 3 above.

³⁵ Tatian, *Orat.*, ed. and transl. by M. Whittaker (Oxford 1982) 9.10.23-26: πῶς τε ὁ πεδηθεὶς Κρόνος καὶ τῆς βασιλείας ἐκβλητὸς γενόμενος τῆς εἰμαρμένης οἰκονόμος καθίσταται; πῶς τε βασιλείας ὁ μηκέτι βασιλεύων δίδωσιν;

Saturn, is perhaps somewhat precipitate.³⁶ There are no grounds for regarding the planet Saturn as the exclusive disposer of *heimarmene*. Nor is there, as far as we know, a special connection between the planet Saturn and earthly kings. The planet Jupiter is more eligible for such a role.³⁷ Kronos as the 'disposer of *heimarmene*' must be understood here to be the deity who governs and dominates the entire planetary system.³⁸ And *heimarmene* stands here for the cosmic powers that govern the somatic and psychic vicissitudes of all sublunary beings.

We are confronted in Tatian by a conception which shows close similarities with that of the *Corpus Hermeticum* discussed before. There, in *C.H.* 1.9, we encountered a divine cosmic demiurge who is the lord of *heimarmene*, but the subordinate of a meta-cosmic, perfectly pure *Nous*. And in *C.H.* 10.5 we encountered a 'sleeping Kronos' to whom the most perfect vision was given. But in the *Corpus Hermeticum* as we have it, the 'dreaming Kronos' is nowhere explicitly identified with the cosmic demiurge. Moreover, Tatian talks about a 'fettered Kronos', and this is not mentioned in the *Corpus Hermeticum* either. The big question is how we should explain Tatian's conception of the 'shackled world archon Kronos'. It seems impossible that he himself imaginatively combined old mythical themes at this point, since his whole aim was to demonstrate the confusions and internal contradictions of the pagan-Greek conceptions of god. We might consider the possibility that he knew a Hermetic treatise which we no longer possess. In that case, at any rate, this passage in Tatian is one of the earliest testimonies of Hermetic literature.

However, if Aristotle also introduced a world archon Kronos in one of his lost works, in a polemic against the myth of Plato's *Politicus*, and if this work presented Kronos as shackled by the bonds of sleep, then it is more natural to see the passage in Tatian as a reminiscence of this Aristotelian work. In that case it would even be advisable to include this text, together with the text in Tertullian, *De anima* 46, in collections of the fragments of Aristotle's lost works.

Another reason for tracing back Tatian's remark about Kronos to Orphic traditions and mythical-philosophical traditions inspired by Orphism, as we were able to do in the case of Aristotle's *Eudemus*, is a short remark made by Tatian in chapter 9: 'Dionysus ruled over the Thebans as a tyrant, Kronos killed the tyrant'.³⁹ The second part of this passage must refer to the

³⁶ *Op. cit.* 19 note d.

³⁷ Cf. Pl., *Phdr.* 252e-253b.

³⁸ For this meaning of εἰμαρμένη, cf. *C.H.* 1.9, where it is said of the demiurgic *Nous*: ἐδημιούργησε διοικητὰς τινὰς ἑπτὰ, ἐν κύκλοις περιέχοντας τὸν αἰσθητὸν κόσμον, καὶ ἡ διοίκησις αὐτῶν εἰμαρμένη καλεῖται. Of man it is said in 1.15: ἀθάνατος γὰρ ὢν καὶ πάντων τὴν ἐξουσίαν ἔχων, τὰ θνητὰ πάσχει ὑποκείμενος τῇ εἰμαρμένῃ. For εἰμαρμένη the *C.H.* also uses the term ἀρμονία as synonymy; 1.14, 15, 19.

³⁹ Tatian, *Orat.* 9.8.10: Θηβαῖοις Διόνυσος τυραννεῖ, Κρόνος τυραννοκτονεῖ.

crime which Kronos perpetrated against Dionysus Zagreus rather than to the crime against his father Ouranos, whose castration is nowhere said to have caused his death.

Finally, we note that Tatian introduces the figure of Kronos in a context of astrological determinism and fatalism. From here a link is easily established with the province of astrology, prophecy, and divination.

6. *SATOR TENET ROTAS*

We allow ourselves a digression here on a matter of which we cannot be sure that is really connected with our subject. Nevertheless, it is too interesting to pass over. We are referring to the magic square made up of five words of five letters each, with the following text:

S	A	T	O	R
A	R	E	P	O
T	E	N	E	T
O	P	E	R	A
R	O	T	A	S

In 1959 the Latinist D. Kuijper devoted his inaugural lecture to this text, which has been found in a large number of locations and in any case dates back to the Roman period. For the locations and for previous attempts at interpretation, we refer to Kuijper's lecture.⁴⁰ An explanation first proposed in 1924 argued that the square was a crypto-Christian identification code which could be rearranged in the form of a cross, so that the words PATER NOSTER appeared on the two crossbeams, supplemented with the letters A and O. It is interesting to see how this theory exploded in 1936, when the same text turned up under the volcanic ash of the ruins in Pompeii. Scholars agreed on the virtual impossibility of a Latin text functioning as a Christian identification code in 79 AD, the year that the Vesuvius erupted.⁴¹

After having examined a large number of comparable riddles, Prof. Kuijper ended his oration with the following, rather negative conclusion: 'Any search for a meaning in the ROTAS square is built on quicksand and is a waste of time'.⁴²

Although we can sympathize with this attitude, we also think that the popularity of the riddle could to some extent be explained if it were possible

Whittaker's translation 'Dionysus lords it over the Thebans, Cronus kills tyrants' seems not to recognize that the tyrant killed by Kronos is Dionysus.

⁴⁰ D. Kuijper, *Het magisch vierkant in Pompeii* (Amsterdam, V.U. 1959).

⁴¹ *Op. cit.* 7-10.

⁴² *Op. cit.* 25.

to show a link with religious or cosmological notions current in the first centuries A.D. Now that would seem to be the case, in our view, if the name of Saturn was heard in the word SATOR and if this divine figure was considered the Lord of all the celestial spheres and of *Heimarmene*. In that case one might suspect that the riddle was intended as a border document for the soul seeking its way through the realm of the cosmic archons. The words SATOR TENET ROTAS are then easily understood to mean 'Saturn governs the celestial spheres', just as the Hermetic treatise the *Poimandres* says of the demiurgic *Nous*, the ruler of the seven heavenly sovereigns, that he 'encompasses the circles'.⁴³

The very fact that the words SATOR and ROTAS themselves form a circle, as it were, must have been highly intriguing for people with astronomical and astrological interests, such as the circle of the Hermetics. Next, we cannot rule out the possibility that the words OPERA and AREPO were accommodated by being heard as 'by his effort' and 'unshakably' (Greek *arrepos*) respectively. The fact is that in such a word game aesthetic interests prevail over linguistic or grammatical ones.

Although we would not gladly stake our life on the above conjectures, we can establish that if such an explanation for the popularity of the riddle may be considered, this implies that in 79 A.D Saturn or Kronos was already acknowledged as a supreme cosmic deity.

7. A sleeping Kronos in Philo of Byblos

Finally, we would like to mention a passage in the 'Phoenician history' written by Philo of Byblos and recently published in a new edition with a commentary by A. I. Baumgarten.⁴⁴ This is a Greek text of which large parts have been preserved in the first book of Eusebius' *Praeparatio Evangelica*. Appreciation of its value has fluctuated considerably. For Philo pretends that his text derives from the Phoenician Sanchuniaton and that it dates back to the period before the Trojan war. Prior to 1930 experts unanimously assumed that Philo had drawn on later sources, but this opinion was drastically revised after the discoveries of ancient Semitic texts in Ugarit. Because of the many striking similarities between Philo's chronicle and these texts, scholars started to take Philo's account much more seriously and began to allow for the possibility that his information was in fact very old.⁴⁵ Baumgarten points out that yet another reaction has taken place since 1968. Since then various authors have argued that Philo lived in the first and second centuries AD and that in this Hellenistic period the

⁴³ C.H. 1.11: ὁ δὲ δημιουργὸς Νοῦς σὺν τῷ Λόγῳ, ὁ περίσχων τοὺς κύκλους ...

⁴⁴ A. I. Baumgarten, *The Phoenician History of Philo of Byblos; a commentary* (Leiden 1981).

⁴⁵ Cf. A. I. Baumgarten, *op. cit.* 1 ff.

Greek mythological and philosophical tradition was frequently presented as younger than and depending on traditions from non-Greek cultures.⁴⁶

In his new study Baumgarten has re-examined the whole discussion. And on the basis of an extensive analysis of the text, he concludes that Philo's 'Phoenician history' cannot possibly be of ancient origin. The extent to which the work is pervaded by a Euhemeristic theology is such that it must have been produced by Philo himself.

In Philo's text the description of Kronos' fortunes occupies an important place. After a series of violent events, Kronos accedes to power and allots dominions (the various parts of Phoenicia) to the other gods. In this context we are told that the god Tautos (i.e. Toth, or Hermes Trismegistus) designs four eyes for Kronos, at the back and at the front, as a sign of his royal dignity. Of these, two are open and two are closed. Philo explains the symbolical meaning of this: 'Kronos sees while sleeping, and sleeps while awake.'⁴⁷

It is disappointing for us that Baumgarten says little about the possible origin of this motif. All he provides is a reference to the four eyes and ears of Marduk in the *Enuma Elish*.⁴⁸ In particular the combination of waking and sleeping seems to lack parallels in mythical literature. Hesiod located Kronos in the darkness of Tartarus. The Orphic writers depicted Kronos as snoring away in a deep sleep. If we may follow Baumgarten in assuming that the whole 'Phoenician history' is a product of the Hellenistic period, then we shall have to allow for the possibility that Philo was acquainted with a philosophical explanation of old Kronos traditions, in which a condition of 'sleep' was assigned to Kronos' lower faculties in combination with activity on the highest level of his royal, i.e. intellectual, faculties.⁴⁹

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 5-6.

⁴⁷ Eusebius, *P.E.* 1.10.36-37; A. I. Baumgarten, *op. cit.* 18 ll. 18-23: ἐπενόησε δὲ καὶ τῷ Κρόνῳ παράσημα βασιλείας ὄμματα τέσσαρα ἐκ τῶν ἐμπροσθίων καὶ ὀπισθίων μερῶν, (δύο μὲν ἐγρηγορότα), δύο δὲ ἡσυχῇ μύοντα ... τὸ δὲ σύμβολον ἦν, ἐπειδὴ Κρόνος κοιμώμενος ἔβλεπε καὶ ἐγρηγορῶς ἐκοιμᾶτο.

⁴⁸ A. I. Baumgarten, *op. cit.* 226.

⁴⁹ Cf. *C.H.* 1.30.

CHAPTER SIX

FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THE MYTH IN PLUTARCH, *DE FACIE IN ORBE LUNAE*

1. *Introduction*

The interpretation of a text like that at the end of Plutarch's *De facie* is a highly complex matter. If it is to do more than skim the surface, it will have to involve the entire tradition of classical philology and the scientific study of the history of ancient philosophy.

The interdependence of all things is a well-known phenomenon in other branches of science too. Thus the science of biology, in its entirety and all its parts, including all subdisciplines and ancillary disciplines, is engaged in studying at a high level even a small and insignificant part of living nature, such as the water snail. But in the historical sciences it is equally striking how increased knowledge of all parts and all aspects of cultural history is reflected in the scientific disclosure of one certain period of time or product of culture. J. Pépin has given an interesting demonstration of this in his analysis of a page from the introduction of Ambrose's *Hexaëmeron*.¹ But while the text dealt with by Pépin is doxographical in character, the final passage of *De facie* with which we are concerned has the additional complication of being a mythical text in which it is hard to distinguish between the contributions of artistic creativity and possible philosophical intentions.

The following problems pose themselves:

- (1) Is there any point in searching for a philosophical purport in such a text?
- (2) Next, how are we to establish the relationship between such a philosophical intent and its mythical expression?
- (3) Moreover, are we concerned with an original creation by Plutarch, or
- (4) did he use material from other sources? In that case there is the problem
- (5) that Plutarch may have manipulated older material with various degrees of artistic freedom.

The fact is that a literary text operating on a diversity of levels requires a corresponding method of exegesis. Because the text itself in *De facie* provides no direct indications as to how these questions should be answered, we shall have to start by considering it against the background of the philosophical tradition.

¹ J. Pépin, *Théologie cosmique et théologie chrétienne* (Ambroise, *Exam. I 1,1-4*) (Paris 1964).

For a further analysis it seems useful to distinguish a number of themes within the myth of the *De facie*. A first division can be made between (A) the story about the Kronos island and (B) the revelation of the Stranger. Within these the following subdivisions can be made:

(A1) the theme of the relationship between Kronos and Zeus;

(A2) the meaning of the description of Kronos' accommodation and surroundings;

(B1) the dualistic anthropology and the refinement to a trichotomy;

(B2) the implied ontology. Have we do to with a Platonic or a non-Platonic, perhaps even materialistic, ontology?

(B3) The theme of the sojourn on the Moon.

For purposes of exposition, we shall first discuss the themes in part (B). We shall then deal with the themes of section (A).

2. *The dualistic anthropology and the refinement to a trichotomy*

Chapter 28 of the *De facie* starts with a passage such as one might also find in a philosophical exposition on human nature and the human condition or 'on the soul'.² Agreement is expressed with the view that man is a *composite being*. But this is followed by sharp criticism of the widespread misconception that man can be sufficiently classified according to a duality of 'body and soul'. The criticism is aimed at the view of the 'mind' or 'intellect' held by those who consider a dichotomy adequate. The point is not that the opponents refuse to make a distinction between *psyche* and *nous*. For them too, apparently, there is an evident difference in function between 'intellectuality' and 'emotionality'. But these opponents are prepared to include man's mind as 'part' of his soul, in distinction to other parts. The speaker in our text reacts scathingly to this: such a view is no more acceptable than a conception in which the soul is described as 'part of the body'.

According to the speaker, the opponents are making an error of category: if something 'is part of' something else, then it belongs to the category of that other thing. But the Stranger speaking here makes it clear that the *nous* is heterogeneous with regard to the *psyche*, just as the *soma* belongs to another *genus* of being than the *psyche*. From this passage we can deduce that the main thrust of the Stranger's attack is not directed at materialists who presuppose only one genus of beings, namely that of *somata*. The debate is between parties which both assume a fundamental distinction between a genus of somatic entities and a category of *psychika*, i.e. between groups that accept the main thesis of Platonism (from the *Phaedo* onwards). The criticized party appears to accept a qualitative, but not an essential distinction between the *nous* and the other parts of the soul. The Stranger,

² Plu., *De facie* 28 943a ff. Cf. J. Dillon, *op. cit.* (1977) 211: 'The passage ... is not spoken by Plutarch, but there is no reason to doubt that he regarded it as philosophically correct'.

on the other hand, underlines the generic distinction between *psyche* and *nous* and infers the existence of three genera of beings: *soma*, *psyche*, and *nous*. The problem under discussion here can be seen as the result of further reflection on the consequences of the anthropological dualism. This dualism of 'body' and 'soul' is certainly older³ than the tripartition of 'body', 'soul', and 'mind'. In this dual scheme it was natural to qualify the soul as belonging to the category of the *non-somatic* (*asomaton*). The further distinction between *nous* and *psyche* could be conceived by the opponents as a differentiation between *species* within the genus of the *asomaton*.

However, the view that the *nous* and the *psyche* belong to different genera makes it necessary to distinguish three genera in all. In this scheme it is natural to expect that *soma* and *nous* are each other's opposite, while the *psyche* occupies an intermediate position. This intermediate position can be expressed by qualifying the *psyche* as both 'non-*soma*' and 'non-*nous*', but also as both 'more *soma* than the *nous*' and 'more *nous* than the *soma*' or as both 'non-sublunary *soma*' and 'non-pure *nous*'.

Precisely the contrast between a visible body on the one hand and a pure *nous* on the other easily leads to a situation in which the *psyche* is discussed in ambivalent terms, either as a special *soma*, a kind of 'matière immatérielle', or as a degeneration of the *nous*, a *nous* admixed with an inferior alloy. This terminological problem emerges clearly for the first time in Plato's *Timaeus* 35a, which discusses the genesis of the soul as a product of 'mixing'. In a different way this problem was brought up by Aristotle in his theory of the *proton soma*, which is heterogeneous with regard to the earthly *somata* and is not part of the *hyle* which constitutes the earthly *somata*.

In the context of this anthropological theme B1, one may wonder whether Plutarch himself had a philosophical reason for unmasking so emphatically the category mistake mentioned above. But we shall have to consider that in any case such a discussion can also be located in the circle of Plato and his followers. For it is a *natural consequence* of the principle of Platonism: the assumption of a reality of Ideas which can only be known by the mind necessitates an increasingly pure definition of the corresponding cognitive function and the expurgation of whatever is not identical with that function. Thus the dialogues of Plato's late period always use the term *nous* for the supreme divine cognitive faculty. As far as the beings of inferior order are concerned, Plato holds that, inasmuch as they possess a *soma*, they are also psychically qualified. From the *Republic* and the *Phaedrus* onwards, this raises the problem of the relationship between the psychic qualification of the rational living beings and their intellectuality. Aristotle's dissident position on this point makes clear that it must have been an important topic

³ I.e. in the Orphic and Pythagorean opposition between the 'musical' soul and the 'amusal' body, an opposition which Plato deliberately linked up with in *Phd.* 61e ff., but which he at the same time transformed by conceiving the soul as orientated to the intelligible instead of to 'the musical'.

of debate in the Old Academy.⁴

Those who easily recognize a Platonic anthropology in the first part of chapter 28 may be somewhat surprised by what follows: 'In the composition of these three factors earth furnishes the body, the moon the soul, and the sun furnishes mind <to man> for the purpose of his generation' (H. Cherniss).⁵

This passage, to say the least, raises the question of whether a physicalistic or even materialistic psychology is involved here. For the Sun and the Moon belong emphatically to *Physis*, the visible cosmos, i.e. to a somatically qualified reality. There seems to be a problem of how the origins of soul and mind, which have been defined as heterogeneous with regard to the human body, can now be explained with reference to the Moon and the Sun respectively. We want to know what view is held of the planets and the stars, since that part of the cosmology appears to be decisive for the anthropology. If the celestial beings were conceived only in materialistic terms, that would entail that the human soul and the human mind also have to be interpreted materialistically. If the Moon and the Sun were represented only as 'fine-material' beings, consisting for instance of creative fire or a fifth element (ether), then a form of hylozoism would have to be assumed. The least one can say is that both variants would be surprising against the background of the previous distinctions in the anthropology.

The solution is supplied by Plutarch in the continuation of the text, where he also mentions its originator, Plato's pupil and second successor Xenocrates.⁶ He adds that Xenocrates, in devising his theory, was able to link up with Plato's own ideas.⁷ Plato himself had posited in the *Timaeus*

⁴ Cf. J. Dillon, *op. cit.* (1977) 213, who points to early signs of the doctrine of the division of mind and soul in Plato's *Tim.* 30b and 41d ff. At the same time he observes that Plutarch went further in formalizing this notion than Plato. Dillon assumes that this is partly due to the influence of Aristotle's theory of the independence and immortality of the *nous* in *An.* 3.5. We note in this connection that only the *nous poietikos* is called immortal and independent in *An.* 3.5. V. Kal, *On intuition and discursive reasoning in Aristotle* (Leiden 1988) 91ff. argues that this *nous* is not a human *nous* (the νοῦς τῆς ψυχῆς), but the universal, divine *nous*. Nevertheless, we agree with J. Dillon that Aristotle contributed in large measure to the development of the doctrine of the division of *nous* and *psyche*, particularly in his *Protr.* fr. 6; 14 and 15 Ross. Also worth mentioning is Ps. Pl., *Alc. I* 129 f. (this dialogue was written shortly after Plato's death, according to C. A. Bos, *Interpretatie, vaderschap en datering van de Alcibiades Maior* (Culemborg 1970) 112). Cf. H. Dörrie, 'Gnostische Spuren bei Plutarch' in *Studies in Gnosticism and Hellenistic Religions presented to G. Quispel*, ed. by R. van de Broek, M. J. Vermaseren (Leiden 1981) 109 with n. 70. In our view, Dillon's remark: 'Of course, such a distinction had always been present in some form in philosophic speculation, but never before had such an unequivocal distinction of them as separate entities been made' (*op. cit.* 211) takes insufficient account of the intra-Academic tradition of which many testimonies have not reached us, and probably gives too much credit to Plutarch.

⁵ Plu., *De facie* 28 943a: τριῶν δὲ τούτων συμπαγόντων, τὸ μὲν σῶμα ἡ γῆ τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν ἡ σελήνη, τὸν δὲ νοῦν ὁ ἥλιος παρέσχευεν εἰς τὴν γένεσιν ...**

⁶ *Ibid.*, 29 943f.

⁷ *Ibid.*: τὴν ἀρχὴν λαβὼν παρὰ Πλάτωνος.

that all celestial beings necessarily consisted of a mixture of fire and earth.⁸ Xenocrates reached a modified position, in which all *Physis* was divided into three separate parts, the sublunary, subsolar, and suprasolar realms. Their physical qualities are different, inasmuch as they possess different degrees of density. Xenocrates puts it like this:

- (1) The stars and the sun consist of a conjunction of Fire and first-degree density;
- (2) the moon consists of an Air peculiar to it and second-degree density;
- (3) the earth consists of Water and third-degree density.⁹

For the background of this remarkable theory, we must remember that for Xenocrates the cosmological debate had been determined by Plato's *Timaeus*. Just as Plato had presented the genesis of the World-soul and the celestial beings as the result of a process of *mixing*, so Xenocrates conceived all celestial beings and the earth as the results of mixing. However, mixing presupposes components possessing a simple character. In the tradition of Greek philosophy, the products of mixing always refer to previous, more original entities. The 'mixed' character of the soul in Plato's *Timaeus* is presented as dependent on the divine Demiurge who is himself unmixed.

We can therefore ask: did Xenocrates assign the highest place in his ontology to beings of mixed composition? Is a cosmic religion or a natural theology concerned in which the Sun is the supreme deity? Or did he recognize an even higher principle? Apart from what we know about Xenocrates from other sources, we can observe that the 'revelation of the Stranger', in which Xenocrates' view is cited with approval, discusses a higher principle. For the Stranger speaks of a principle which is 'the desirable and fair and divine and blessed towards which all nature in one way or another yearns' (H. Cherniss).¹⁰ The Sun shows a resemblance to this principle. And the separation of *nous* and *psyche* in what Plutarch calls 'the second death' is the result of a desire orientated toward it.¹¹ Thus although the Sun may occupy the highest position within the sphere of the heavenly regions, this does not detract from the sharp distinction which must be drawn between *Physis* and all it contains on the one hand, and the principle transcending *Physis* on the other hand, a principle which is for all things in Nature the object of *eros* and the motivator of desire. Within *Physis*, the Sun shows the nearest resemblance to this transcendent principle.

Remarkable is the way in which this conception connects central themes in Plato's philosophy with *Aristotelian* terminology. The Sun as image of a transcendent, metaphysical principle is a theme which Plato developed in

⁸ *Ibid.*, 943f; cf. Pl., *Tim.* 40a and 31b-32c.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 943f-944a.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 944e: τὸ ἐφετὸν καὶ καλὸν καὶ θεῖον καὶ μακάριον οὗ πάντα φύσις, ἄλλη δ' ἄλλως, ὁρέγεται. See the comments of H. Cherniss, *ad. loc.*

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 944e: ἀποκρίνεται δ' ἔρωτι τῆς περὶ τὸν ἥλιον εἰκόνοσ, δι' ἧς ἐπιλάμπει τὸ ἐφετὸν ...

the central part of his *Republic*.¹² At the same time the terms used here directly call to mind Aristotle's theory of the metaphysical principle of all natural motion.¹³

That we have rightly assumed a reference in this text to a metaphysical or transcendent principle is made clear by a comparison with Plutarch's *De E apud Delphos* 21 393d. This text speaks with approval of people who pay divine tribute to the Sun in the belief that it holds the highest rank in the reality known to them. But at the same time it is stated that such people merely possess knowledge about the divine as people who dream. They must be incited to climb higher and grasp god's essence lucidly and wakefully: they will then see that the Sun is only an image of god.¹⁴ In the *De facie* too, therefore, we shall have to consider the cosmic theology against the background of a metaphysical theology. The whole of Nature is seen as dependent on a principle which transcends it.

But returning from the theology to the anthropology, we might ask whether man is a being that belongs entirely to the realm of *Physis* and remains enclosed in it, or whether there is a transcendent principle in man, either actually or potentially. We can establish that man's body, soul, and *nous*, with their respective origins in the earth, moon, and sun, must be included in the realm of Nature. At the same time the terminology used by Plutarch in relation to the transcendent principle raises the question of whether this transcendent principle, which as object of *eros* motivates all things in Nature, should be conceived as a transcendent *Nous*, such as we find in Aristotle. If this may be considered, we are consequently concerned with a *nous* that belongs to the realm of *Physis*, a mind that is connected with a soul,¹⁵ in contrast to a 'pure' *Nous*, the perfect transcendent, metaphysical intellect.¹⁶

We conclude at the end of this section that the anthropology and the

¹² Cf. Pl., *Rep.* 6 507-509.

¹³ Cf. Arist., *Phys.* 1.9 192a16-19 and *Metaph.* A 7. See also J. Dillon, *op. cit.* 199.

¹⁴ Plu., *De E apud Delphos* 21 393d: ὡς δὲ νῦν ἐν τῷ καλλίστῳ τῶν ἐνυπνίων τὸν θεὸν ὄνειροπολοῦντας ἐγείρωμεν καὶ παρακαλῶμεν ἀνωτέρῳ προάγειν καὶ θεᾶσθαι τὸ ὕπαρ αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, τιμᾶν δὲ καὶ τὴν εἰκόνα τήνδε καὶ σέβεσθαι τὸ περὶ αὐτὴν γόνιμον ... On this passage, see also J. Dillon, *op. cit.* 190 f., who remarks that it clearly expresses the notion of a cosmic demiurge inferior in rank to the highest divine principle.

¹⁵ Cf. Arist., *An.* 3.4 429a22-23 on the τῆς ψυχῆς νοῦς; and also *Metaph.* α 1 993b10-11; A 3, 1070a26.

¹⁶ Cf. the so-called νοῦς ποιητικός in Arist., *An.* 3.5. See also the study by V. Kal, *On Intuition and discursive reasoning in Aristotle* (Leiden 1988) 84-90; H. J. Krämer, *Der Ursprung der Geistmetaphysik* 98 n. 250; and J. Dillon, *op. cit.* 215. The latter author argues that the highest principle is both *Monas* and Mind and is to be distinguished from the world-organizing intellectual principle: 'The Monad is therefore a transcendent, self-contemplating Mind, the ultimate principle of all Being, including that of the Demiurge'. In this he sees 'the basic Xenocratean three-way division of reality'. We can add that, just as Aristotelian influence is apparent in the sharp distinction of *nous* and *psyche* (cf. J. Dillon, *op. cit.* 213), so the theology shows departures from Plato's position which seem remarkably in line with Aristotelian theology.

cosmology in the 'revelation of the Stranger' can be regarded as consistent and systematic, if we assume that the main distinction in this system of thought lies between the Transcendent and a dependent *Physis*. Within *Physis* there is next a sharp distinction between the levels of the rational, the psychic-emotional, and the wholly physical. The entire exposition of the Stranger aims at demonstrating the superiority of non-sublunary materiality over earthly materiality. Nature as a whole is presented as showing an increase in density (materiality) in proportion to the distance to the transcendent principle. This increase in density moreover involves a decrease in cognitive power. The 'density' is as it were a 'cloud' which covers the perfect cognition and becomes thicker and more impenetrable as the action of the transcendent light source, which could lift the cloud, becomes weaker.

3. *The theme of the sojourn on the moon*

However, the whole point of the 'revelation of the Stranger' from yonder was his illuminating instruction about the important place of the moon in the entire system of Nature.¹⁷ That is the point which connects the myth of the *De facie* with the dialogue's preceding reflections. And because the significance of the moon is elucidated from a non-earthly point of view, the entire digression on the Stranger's origin was necessary: an ordinary human being, as earthly mortal, would not be able to reveal such a superhuman perspective.

The Moon appears to be located on the border of two spheres. And the Moon itself, as a heavenly, divine figure, has authority over the crossing of this border. The condition of earthly mortals is such that they are confined to the sublunary region. But it is clear that this condition is cancelled by the deposition of the sublunary, earthly body.

After the deposition of this body, what remains of man, i.e. his soul with its various 'parts', may climb up to the highest regions, in the first place to the Moon. However, this is merely a *possibility*. It is not granted to all souls. No impure soul will succeed in climbing up to the moon.¹⁸ Again there is a remarkable similarity and difference with regard to Plato's *Phaedrus*. Whereas the *Phaedrus* discusses the struggle of the soul to climb up to the pinnacle of the heavenly roof, the decisive conflict has here been relegated to a lower level: ethical rather than intellectual categories form the crucial criterion. The souls that do not 'make it' are called 'evil' and 'impure'. They remain in the region of Air beneath the realm of the Moon to await a new

¹⁷ Plu., *De facie* 26 942c: τῶν τε φαινομένων θεῶν ἔφη χρῆναι καὶ μοι παρεκελεύετο τιμᾶν διαφερόντως τὴν σελήνην ὡς τοῦ βίου κυριατάτην οὖσαν ... But the expression τῶν φαινομένων θεῶν again refers emphatically to a higher (metaphysical) divine level.

¹⁸ Plu., *op. cit.* 27 942f: εἰς δὲ τοῦτο φαῦλος μὲν οὐδεὶς οὐδ' ἀκάθαρτος ἄνεισιν. Cf. Pl., *Phd.* 67a-b.

incarnation in an earthly body. They do not - as this is apparently understood - leave the realm of Hades! Only those who reach the moon reach the boundary of the kingdom of Hades.¹⁹ In contrast, the souls that are qualified as ethically 'good'²⁰ do reach the Moon and thus the possibility of passing from death into life.

But this is followed by a further qualification to the effect that such souls have not yet reached the highest good. For the life they live on the moon is 'easy', without toil. But it is not the perfectly blessed and divine life.²¹ To achieve that, they will have to pass another border. Again, therefore, we are given the description of a condition which is intermediate between the 'misery' of earthly mortals and the perfection of the pure divine beings. It is an existence free of the effort of caring for the earthly body, a condition which the Greeks described as a land of plenty, a place where food and drink are always abundantly available. It is also akin to the way of life enjoyed by the golden race during the reign of Kronos. In the agrarian culture of Hesiod's day, this was the image of the perfect life. In Plutarch, however, the notion appears to have suffered a devaluation. It is still a desirable way of life compared to existence on earth. But it is no longer the *highest* possible condition! There is a life which experiences and affords an even more perfect joy than life in a land of plenty.

The notion of this life was developed by Plato and kept alive by many of his followers. They described the bliss of the *theoretical life* as being infinitely more glorious than a comfortable life surrounded by an abundance of consumer goods. And they contrasted this ideal of the theoretical life with the kind of life lead by king Midas,²² by the Persian sovereign Sardanapalus,²³ by the inhabitants of the isles of the blessed around Kronos,²⁴ and with an existence like that of Endymion.²⁵ What these lives lack is perfect knowledge, the highest attainable insight. A life in a land of plenty without insight is like a perfect bliss that is enjoyed while *asleep*. This condition would be infinitely more valuable if one were aroused from one's sleep.

In his reflection on the condition of the beings on the Moon, Plutarch employs a distinction which is best summarized as the distinction between

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 27 942f: αὐτὴν τοῦ "Αἰδου πέρ(α)ς οὖσαν (The conjecture is proposed by Turnebus.)

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 942f: οἱ δὲ χρηστοί.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 942f: ῥᾶστον μὲν οὕτως βίον οὐ μὴν μακάριον οὐδὲ θεῖον ἔχοντες ἄχρι τοῦ δευτέρου θανάτου διατελοῦσι. On the philosophical transformation of the myth of the 'golden race', cf. M. Detienne, *La notion de Daîmôn dans le Pythagorisme ancien* (Paris 1963) 93 f.

²² For king Midas, cf. Arist., *Protr.* fr. 16 Ross.

²³ For Sardanapalus, cf. Arist., *Protr.* fr. 16 Ross.

²⁴ For the 'isles of the blessed' around Kronos, cf. Arist., *Protr.* fr. 12 Ross; B 43 Düring, and Plu., *De facie* 941e-f.

²⁵ For Endymion, cf. Arist. *EN* 10.8 1178b20 and Plu. *De facie* 30 945b. On these texts and the meaning of this mythical theme, in which sleep again plays a role, cf. ch. 15 below.

beings characterized as *psychikoi*, beings who, in distinction to the *somatikoi* on the one hand and the *theoretikoi* on the other, have left the ills of earthly existence behind them, so that this existence no longer affects the peace of their soul and their psychic activity, but who at the same time have not yet tasted the enlightenment which brings true bliss.

4. *Kronos and Zeus*

We shall now pay further attention to the first part of Sulla's speech, namely his description of the origin and the voyage of the Stranger. The stranger comes from a place beyond Ogygia, which itself lies at a distance of five days beyond the island Britannia. For H. von Arnim, this detail is a reason to suspect that Plutarch based his myth on a fantastic travel story.²⁶ The latter form of literature was in fact cultivated intensively after the expeditions of Alexander the Great and the journeys of Pytheas of Marseilles.²⁷ But precisely the details typical of such literature are lacking. The reader's attention is nowhere distracted by fantastic tales without further function in the Stranger's story. We must in fact bear in mind that there is another side to stories about the Far West beyond Britannia. From the time in which the earth was still conceived as a flat disk, the idea derives that the place to which the dead travel on their post-mortal journey lies in the far West. Where the Sun goes down and where the Gates of Day and Night are,²⁸ that is also where the passage lies to the realm of the dead, both for those who are doomed to reside in the horrible darkness of Tartarus and for those who are allowed to stay on the 'isles of the blessed'. It is above all in this perspective – *pace* Von Arnim – that the story of the Stranger's voyage will have to be seen. While in (B3) our attention was focused on man's passage from the human condition, via the condition of the Moon-dwellers, to the highest bliss, we are now concerned with a journey in a different dimension and in a different direction. Here the world of earthly mortals is not the point of departure, but the finishing point! Opposite the *anabasis* in two stages sketched in part (B3), we find in part (A1) a *katabasis* in two stages, a mythical story about the counter-movement in the traffic between gods and men. Thus construed, this section fits in superbly with the rest of the narrative and contributes to the elaboration of the various aspects of a coherent 'eschatology'. At the same time it also develops the overall perspective governing the myth of the *De facie*. And that includes the *theology* and *demonology* sketched in this section.

²⁶ H. von Arnim, *Plutarch über Dämonen und Mantik*, (Amsterdam 1921) 44.

²⁷ On Pytheas of Marseilles, cf. G. E. Broche, *Pythéas le Massaliote* (Paris 1935); P. Fabre, 'Étude sur Pythéas le Massaliote et l'époque de ses travaux', *Ét. Class.* 43 (1975) 25-44 and 147-165.

²⁸ Cf. Hes., *Th.* 741-757. See W. Burkert, 'Das Proömium des Parmenides und die Katabasis des Pythagoras', *Phronesis* 14 (1969) 11-16 on the 'gates of Day and Night' in Parmenides B 1.11 (D.K.).

It is significant in this connection that Sulla presents himself as the interpreter of a story composed by someone else. Sulla introduces this author with a preamble in which he cites a verse used by Homer to begin a long tale: 'Ogygia is an island far away in the ocean'.²⁹

Because the island of Kronos is situated in the vicinity of the island Ogygia, it is marked as an abode which lies halfway between the home of the gods and the home of human beings. All kinds of details in the description of the Kronos island show that a correspondence is intended with the condition of the Moon-dwellers portrayed in (B3). Life on the Kronos island is easy too, for everything is abundantly available for sacrifices and celebrations, without having to be procured by toil and strenuous activity.³⁰ And the faces and voices of daemons, unlike in the existence of earthly mortals, are seen and heard daily and directly. Whereas in life on earth only a few people now and then receive assistance from beings of superhuman, i.e. daemonic nature, such help is generally available on the island of Kronos.

Precisely this last aspect of the Kronos island implies that it is not the abode of *gods*. The only god of whose presence on the island we are told is Kronos: a *demoted* god, a god dethroned and deprived of his supreme divine dignity, a fallen, imprisoned, shackled god. This time the author is not linking up with Homer, but with Hesiod's *Theogony*, where, as we have seen, Kronos, the leader of the Titans, was locked up in the underworld, in the darkness of Tartarus. In this way Hesiod showed that Kronos had been deprived of the glory of the divine life. The author of the *De facie* myth takes up this theme and tells us that Kronos is deprived of his glory by *sleep*. Sleep is the bond with which Zeus has shackled his prisoner Kronos. The life of Kronos is vastly inferior to the truly divine life because he has been robbed of perfect consciousness and perfect knowledge. To the extent that all life of an inferior order depends on Kronos, this obviously has drastic consequences. It means that life on these inferior levels reflects the lack of lucidity and focus of Kronos' cognition.

There is a remarkable parallel between the way in which earthly mortals are in touch with the daemonic and the way in which Kronos has contact with the divine true knowledge. In their dreams, mortals receive visions and voices of daemonic origin which, after waking, they can try to interpret and use in their earthly existence. Much the same applies to Kronos. Although he himself has been deprived of the knowledge and insight possessed by Zeus, he can participate in this knowledge while sleeping, as in a dream. The division between the various levels of life, which also involves a division between the levels of knowledge, is essential, but not absolute. At the lower

²⁹ Plu., *De facie* 941a: ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ὑποκριτής εἰμι, πρότερον δ' αὐτοῦ φράσω τὸν ποιητὴν ὑμῖν εἰ μὴ τι κωλύει καθ' Ὅμηρον ἀρξάμενον· Ὠγυγίη ... (We read ὑμῖν following Stephanus, though the mss. A B read ἡμῖν). The quotation which Sulla borrows from Homer is found in *Od.* 7.244. There Odysseus tells the story of his adventures to the king of Phæacia and starts with the sentence about Ogygia. It is the island of Calypso, with whom neither gods nor men consort.

³⁰ Plu., *De facie* 941e-f.

level the influence of the superior level still operates, but dimly, darkly, without focus. And just as man's contact with the daemonic is interrupted when his bodily functions reassert their interfering and obfuscating influence and take possession of his soul, so Kronos' contact with the true divine knowledge is intermittently interrupted by what are called 'the titanic affections and motions of his soul' (H. Cherniss).³¹ Because man is composed of body and soul, the freedom of his soul is obstructed and attacked by the body. Because Kronos is also a being with a composite nature, the freedom and perfection of his mind is in jeopardy too. Precedence may be taken by either component of his nature. And that is the cause of Kronos' changeability, as of that of mortals.

In Zeus there is no such changeability, no such dialectic. It is curious, actually, that we are told so little about Zeus and that so many details are supplied about Kronos. For that matter the same applies to the inhabitants of 'the large continent'. No further particulars of them and their existence are given either. Of Zeus we are only told that he is engaged in theoretical activity, and that Kronos and indirectly all other levels of reality depend on his knowledge. The narrative makes no mention of periodicity or changeability on the part of Zeus. This must be related to the fact that there is no compositeness in Zeus' being, as there is in Kronos or the earthlings.

Only at one point does the narrative seem to infringe this notion of the immutability of Zeus. Since the story links up with Hesiod's myth about the audacity of Kronos and the Titans and their subjection by Zeus, it seems necessarily to presuppose a once-only action on the part of Zeus, i.e. when he imprisoned Kronos. The myth of the *De facie* avoids any reference to this action, however, and merely proceeds from a 'given situation' in which Zeus is the highest, omnipotent god, the source of all life and cognition. Besides him there is the demoted or fallen god Kronos, whose keen divine intellect is prevented from functioning perfectly because Zeus keeps him shackled in the bonds of sleep, but also because his Titanic passions and emotions cloud his intellect.³²

5. The cave in which Kronos is imprisoned

Of course it is important to know how the author related this mythical theology of a supreme god Zeus and a subordinate god Kronos to his

³¹ *Ibid.*, 942a.

³² We must consider the possibility that the clouding of Kronos' mind is a punishment which automatically results from his Titanic passions. This would underline the perfection of the divine order thought out by Zeus, in which evil brings about its own punishment. This transformation of Hesiod's myth of the gods would make it possible to maintain the absolute immutability of Zeus and his ἀντάρκεια and to present Kronos' condition as self-inflicted, the result of *tolma* or *hybris*. However, to decide whether the myth of the *De facie* must be interpreted in this way, we need the reconstruction of the corrupt passage in 942a.

cosmology. We saw that the author drew several distinct boundaries in his cosmology. In the first place a boundary was drawn between the sublunary and the supralunary. This appeared to correspond with the distinction between body and soul in the anthropology. But within the sphere of the heavenly regions a second boundary was drawn at the sphere of the sun. This appeared to correspond with the distinction between soul and mind in the anthropology. Finally, we established in our discussion of the second part of the Stranger's exposition (B2) that a boundary was drawn between the whole of *Physis* and the Transcendent. This results in the following scheme.

3 Transcendent							
2	<table> <tr> <td>b. suprasolar</td><td>human intellect</td></tr> <tr> <td>a. supralunary</td><td>soul</td></tr> <tr> <td>1 sublunary</td><td>body</td></tr> </table>	b. suprasolar	human intellect	a. supralunary	soul	1 sublunary	body
b. suprasolar	human intellect						
a. supralunary	soul						
1 sublunary	body						

Now our text provides no indication that a superior deity must be assumed above Zeus. That seems necessarily to imply that Zeus is identical with the Transcendent. He must have been conceived as the metaphysical, transcendent source of all levels of life and all levels of cognition.

Kronos, on the other hand, must be held to belong to one of the lower levels, either to the entire suprasolar area (corresponding with human intellectuality) or to the entire supralunary area (corresponding with man's psychic and intellectual activity).

In deciding between these two levels, we must take into account the fact that Kronos is described as being surrounded by a deep cave in a rock that glitters like gold.³³ We already pointed out the connections between this part of the *De facie* myth and the myth in Plato's *Phaedrus*. There the cosmos is conceived as being bounded by the exterior celestial sphere, which can only be passed after an arduous ascent by the soul, and specifically the mind of the soul. It alone is capable of climbing through the aperture in the celestial roof and contemplating there, immobile, the eternal immutable reality of the *hyperouranios topos*. In this conception the furthest sphere has been given the function of a wall which encloses the imperfect souls. It seems natural to view the cave of Kronos too as the symbol of all cosmic reality³⁴ in its sublunary and supralunary duality. In that case Kronos symbolizes the entire celestial region, or the power which

³³ Cf. 941f: ἐν ἄντρῳ βαθεῖ περιέχεσθαι πέτρας χρυσοειδοῦς.

³⁴ On the notion of reality as a 'Cave', cf. an early reference in Empedocles, *D.K.* 33 B 112 and 120; Xenocrates fr. 20 (R. Heize); *Corp. Herm.* 8.3; and Plot., *Enn.* 4.8 (6) 1 and 3. In Arist. *Mu.* 6 398a13 ff., in the comparison of the supreme deity and the Persian sovereign, the furthest sphere and the sphere of the planets are designated as 'walls', 'enclosures' (περίβολοι). See also chapter 5.3 above.

rules over that region. He must stand for a *cosmic* deity who is as such inferior to the transcendence of Zeus. This inferior status is expressed by his 'imprisonment' and by his 'sleep'.

We are thus entitled to conclude that Kronos is the *symbol of the exterior celestial sphere* or *of the World-soul in its entirety* as the dynamic principle which pervades all the celestial spheres.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE ORIGIN OF THE VIEWS VOICED IN THE *DE FACIE*

We analyzed in detail the myth of Plutarch's *De facie* because it contained a story about a dreaming Kronos. And we had become interested in a dreaming Kronos because of a remark in Tertullian, who related this theme to Aristotle. It now seems natural to wonder whether we can say more about the backgrounds of the themes dealt with in the *De facie* myth. For as the quotations from Homer, Xenocrates, and Heraclitus already suggest, this narrative is not entirely the product of Plutarch's own creative efforts. In particular it is clear that he used mythical themes derived from Hesiod and concepts that played a role in the philosophical debate since Plato and the Old Academy.

Although we shall never be able to achieve here the hard precision and complete certainty currently desired of scientific research, we think it is a legitimate part of our enquiry to attempt to establish the relation between our passage and the preceding tradition. In doing so, we shall of course make use of what has emerged from the scholarly debate hitherto.

1. R. Heinze (1892)

In his monograph on Xenocrates, R. Heinze drew a great deal of information from Plutarch.¹ Chapter 3, entitled 'Psychologie und Ethik',² consists largely in an analysis of the myth of Plutarch's *De facie*. In his discussion of this myth Heinze shows himself a typical representative of nineteenth-century *Quellenforschung*, which tracks down contradictions in a text on the basis of a microscopic textual analysis and then distinguishes various 'sources' on the assumption that contradictions cannot be imputed to the original author.

On account of differences in the treatment of the beings living on the Moon and in the terminology used of the soul, Heinze sees ch. 28 943c πᾶσαν ψυχὴν through ch. 29 as a separate section, which he calls 'Source II'.³ In it Heinze discerns a materialistic psychology, according to which the

¹ R. Heinze, *Xenokrates Darstellung der Lehre und Sammlung der Fragmente* (Leipzig 1892; repr. Hildesheim 1965).

² *Op. cit.* 123-156.

³ *Op. cit.* 125-126.

souls are nourished by a kind of 'evaporation'.⁴ Such a psychology cannot be ascribed to a Platonist, let alone to Xenocrates, in Heinze's view. A Stoic text must therefore be concerned, presumably deriving from Posidonius.⁵

It is important to note that, according to Heinze, the entire myth of the *De facie* is ultimately recounted by the daemons around Kronos, and that he is surprised that it contains references to earthly beings like Plato, Xenocrates, and Heraclitus.⁶ Heinze creates an unnecessary problem here, however. Our text gives the entire speech to Sulla, whose source is said to be the Stranger from the Large Continent, who in fact received part of his knowledge from the daemons around Kronos.⁷

The main section of the text (Source I) is quite a different matter. This Heinze regards as a typically Platonic argument, without a trace of Aristotelian or Stoic influences. Hence the author used by Plutarch should be sought in the Old Academy.⁸ On the basis of demonological and psychological elements, Heinze concludes that the section must be assigned to Xenocrates.⁹

Heinze notes further that, in his second Source, the punishment of the souls after their death on earth, during their stay in the region of the Air, cannot go back to Posidonius. Therefore it must in turn have been interpolated into this part of the *De facie*.¹⁰ He was confronted by a similar problem in his discussion of the Timarchus myth in *De Genio Socratis*.¹¹

2. H. von Arnim on Plutarch's demonology (1921)

Heinze's attempt to determine the sources used by Plutarch in his *De facie* myth was torpedoed in a study by H. von Arnim a few decades later.¹² According to the latter, neither Posidonius nor Xenocrates can be considered a possible source. Von Arnim does think that Plutarch used the work of another author. But he concludes that this earlier author must have been an eclectic Platonist from the first century BC or AD, and that his philosophical stature was negligible.¹³ One of the reasons adduced by Von Arnim to support his critical conclusions is the consideration that there is no

⁴ Plu., *De facie* 28 943a.

⁵ R. Heinze, *op. cit.* 126-127 with n. 1. Heinze also considers the closely related myth in the *Gen. Socr.* to be essentially Posidonian, *op. cit.* 130-131.

⁶ *Op. cit.* 123, 125, and 127 n. 2.

⁷ Plu., *De facie* 945d.

⁸ *Op. cit.* 137.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 138 f.

¹⁰ R. Heinze, *op. cit.* 134-136. This may again derive from Xenocrates, according to p. 140.

¹¹ *Op. cit.* 131 n. 4. The problem regards Timarchus' use of the principles of *Monas*, *Nous*, and *Physis*.

¹² H. von Arnim, *Plutarch über Dämonen und Mantik*, *Verh.KNAkad.W*, afd. Letterk. (Amsterdam 1921).

¹³ *Op. cit.* 67.

indisputable tradition that Xenocrates and Posidonius, following Plato's example, employed mythical themes in their writings.¹⁴ As long as this has not been established, it cannot be assumed, according to him, that they inspired Plutarch in his mythical texts in the *De Genio Socratis* and *De facie*.

For Von Arnim too the similarity between the texts of the *De Genio* and the *De facie* is a reason to assume that Plutarch appropriated an older mythical system of thought. That seems to have been done more skilfully in the *De facie* than in the other treatise. From this, Von Arnim infers that the *De Genio* is possibly of a later date than the *De facie*.¹⁵

Von Arnim regards the story about the Stranger's adventures in the *De facie* as a free adaptation of a fantastic travel story from the first century AD.¹⁶

He notes that Platonists include the Sun and the Moon in the same region and cosmological category as the planets. If, therefore, a text with a clearly Platonic purport associates the soul and the mind with the Moon and the Sun respectively, then the introduction of these celestial beings must be seen as having a merely symbolic intention.¹⁷

According to Von Arnim, the link between chapter 30 and the rest of the mythical narrative is very weak. And because it is this chapter which mentions Xenocrates' theory, he concludes that there is no solid reason for tracing Plutarch's source back to Xenocrates.¹⁸

A striking detail in Von Arnim's study, incidentally, is that he holds that Kronos is not always asleep, but only now and then.¹⁹ This is not supported by the text of the *De facie*. Clearly by way of punishment and retribution, Zeus has bound Kronos with the bond of sleep.²⁰ There is no indication that this bond is periodically loosened.

In our own analysis of the *De facie* myth, we hope to have shown that the various elements of the mythical narration are much more closely connected than Von Arnim has recognized. It seems to have escaped him,

¹⁴ *Op. cit.* 16.

¹⁵ *Op. cit.* 24, 32.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 43-44.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 57-58.

¹⁸ *Op. cit.* 59-64.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 46: 'Kronos selbst müsste nach der philosophischen Daemonologie Plutarchs, wie wir sie aus *de Defectu* kennen, zu den Dämonen, nicht zu den Göttern gerechnet werden. Denn er hat die τιτανικά πάθη καὶ κινήματα τῆς ψυχῆς noch nicht abgelegt; nur wenn er schlummert, wird das Göttliche in seiner Seele frei, sodass er die Gedanken des Zeus träumt'. In this, Von Arnim again takes his cue from M. Adler, *WS* 31 (1909) 307. The latter argues as follows: 'Er iszt ja die Ambrosia, die ihm die Vögel bringen, und verkehrt doch mit seinen Pflegern, den Dämonen'. One might add that Von Arnim's interpretation here of the relationship between Zeus and Kronos is an improvement on the articles from (1916) 146 and (1922) col. 2013, and on J. H. Waszink in his (1947) and (1950) articles. The relationship is here seen as one in which Kronos is dependent on Zeus, and not the other way round.

²⁰ Plu., *De facie* 941f. Ontologically speaking, the clouding of Kronos' *nous* by sleep will have to be interpreted as the mind's connection with (psychic) materiality, *hyle*, or 'density'.

for instance, that Plutarch, by situating the Kronos island beyond Ogygia, may have intended to present it as an abode for beings with an ontological status intermediate between that of gods and men. Nor does he appear to be aware of the structural reasons for assigning an existence free of toil and care to the beings around Kronos.²¹ This theme, which we already find in Hesiod, was used in the philosophical anthropology of the Old Academy to characterize an existence more glorious than that of mortals, but inferior to that of the perfectly blessed gods.

3. *Did Posidonius inspire the myth of the De facie?*

In searching for traces of the Stoic philosopher he so admired, Posidonius, K. Reinhardt also occupied himself with the myth in Plutarch's *De facie*.²² He observes with approval Von Arnim's earlier claim that Xenocrates cannot be Plutarch's source.²³ And he then goes to great lengths to show how heterogeneous and incongruous the various parts of the myth are. He concludes that they must have been brought together by Plutarch, whose source of inspiration was usually Plato.²⁴ For Reinhardt, it is quite clear that the anthropology of the *De facie*, with its correlation of the *nous* with the Sun, the *psyche* with the Moon, and the perishable body with the Earth, cannot possibly derive from Xenocrates or another Platonist.²⁵ To the idea in Plutarch's myth that the Sun 'sows' the *nous* thanks to its vital energy, Reinhardt responds as follows:²⁶

Als Quell aller "Lebenskraft, ζωτική δύναμις", erschien die Sonne in der Poseidonischen Beschreibung von Arabien ... Welchen Philosophen gibt es ausser Poseidonios, für den eine solche Lehre von der "Lebenskraft" mit einer solchen Lehre von der "Sonnenkraft" auf eine solche Art vereinigt sich nachweisen liesse?

Here he might at least have considered that according to Aristotle, too, the Sun plays a crucial role in the genesis of the individual.²⁷

²¹ H. von Arnim, *op. cit.* 43-44. The author suggests here that Plutarch incorporated the theme of the easy life into a fantastic account of an adventurous journey to remote islands.

²² K. Reinhardt, *Kosmos und Sympathie; Neue Untersuchungen über Poseidonios* (Munich 1926; repr. Hildesheim 1976) 313-353. Cf. his conclusion on p. 353: 'Und wenn man noch immer leugnen will, dass dies die Eschatologie des Poseidonios sei, so frage ich, von wem ist sie sonst?'.

²³ K. Reinhardt, *op. cit.* 314 n. 1.

²⁴ *Op. cit.* 317.

²⁵ *Op. cit.* 320. Reinhardt smooths over the fact that no Stoic can be the author of this anthropology either, namely by substituting such terms as 'Wachstumsringe' (p. 320) and 'Durchdringungen', 'Verstofflichungen' (321) for the notions of 'separation' and 'death'. He thinks this is legitimate because he assumes that the Platonizing author Plutarch naturally had to transform a blatantly Stoic materialism.

²⁶ *Op. cit.* 329, 351.

²⁷ Arist. *Metaph.* A 5 1071a13-15: ... ανθρώπου αίτιον τά τε στοιχεία, πῦρ καὶ γῆ ὡς ὕλη καὶ τὸ ἴδιον εἶδος, καὶ ἔτι τι ἄλλο ἔξω οἷον ὁ πατήρ, καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα ὁ ἥλιος καὶ ὁ λοξὸς κύκλος. Cf. *GA* 1.2 716a16; *Phys.* 2.2 194b13: ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ καὶ ἥλιος (with a reference to 'first philosophy' for the discussion of

Employing the well-known method of 'source-criticism', Reinhardt continually tries to demonstrate that motifs occurring in Plutarch's *De facie* were also present in Posidonius, or presumably so. But at no point is he able to show convincingly that Plutarch follows Posidonius. Reinhardt neglects to investigate traces which seem to lead to pre-Posidonian authors upon whom both Posidonius and Plutarch may have depended.

4. J. Dillon's assessment of Plutarch's philosophical position (1977)

There can be no doubt that an important role in modern discussions on the tradition of Platonism has been played by renewed attention for what Plato's pupils tell us about the development of his thought, i.e. for what is nowadays called 'Plato's unwritten doctrine' or 'Plato's theory of the *ultima principia*'. In particular, H. J. Krämer and other members of the so-called Tübinger school have contributed strongly toward this.²⁸ One of the most important consequences has been a renewed interest in the discussions within the Old Academy.

The result of this development is that modern studies on the history of Platonism and also on Plutarch's philosophy differ quite radically from those written fifty years ago. This is plainly demonstrated by J. Dillon's treatment of Plutarch in his recent book on Middle Platonism.²⁹ According to Dillon, Plutarch belongs to the philosophical tradition of Platonism, but also shows links with Xenocrates, Aristotle, and Iranian dualism. Dillon attaches great importance to Plutarch's distinction between a transcendent, supreme divine principle, not subject to any deviation from its essence or change, and another deity which rules over nature and its processes of generation and dissolution.³⁰ The desire of all nature for the being of the highest principle, a desire we also saw expressed in the *De facie*, reflects,

the 'separately existing' and its 'essence', since these do not strictly belong to the physicist's field of enquiry.

²⁸ H. J. Krämer, *Arete bei Platon und Aristoteles; Zum Wesen und zur Geschichte der platonischen Ontologie* (Heidelberg 1959); *idem*, *Der Ursprung der Geistmetaphysik; Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des Platonismus zwischen Plato und Plotin* (Amsterdam 1964); K. Gaiser, *Platons Ungeschriebene Lehre; Studien zur systematischen und geschichtlichen Begründung der Wissenschaften in der platonischen Schule* (Stuttgart 1963). Cf. also Ph. Merlan, *From Platonism to neo-Platonism* (The Hague 1953; repr. 1969³).

²⁹ J. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists; a Study of Platonism 80 B.C. to A.D. 220* (London 1977) 184 ff.

³⁰ J. Dillon, *op. cit.* 191, with reference to *De E apud Delphos* 21 393a ff. We think that Dillon is mistaken in identifying the 'other god, or rather daemon, whose office is concerned with Nature in dissolution and generation' with the sublunary realm. The text in 394a reads: ἑτέρῳ τινὶ θεῷ, μᾶλλον δὲ δαίμονι τεταγμένῳ περὶ τὴν ἐν φθορᾷ καὶ γενέσει φύσιν. The primary opposition, in our view, is between the highest principle in its absolute immutability and the rest of reality, the ruler of which is said to be another, inferior deity, or rather daemon. The ruler is superior in ontological status to what he rules, just as a shepherd belongs to a higher category of living beings than the sheep which he grazes. Cf. Pl., *Plt.* 271e.

according to Dillon, the Aristotelian doctrine of the Prime Unmoved Mover.³¹

Important is Dillon's discussion of the 'irrational World-soul' in Plutarch.³² He sees here a departure from Plato's *Timaeus* which brings Plutarch close to Gnostic beliefs. Plutarch's World-soul is not only an unordered principle, but also, it seems, a 'maleficent' one. Although Dillon acknowledges that there are hints of this in Plato, he thinks that Plutarch must have been influenced by something else as well, in particular by his own study of the Persian, dualistic religion.³³

We can sympathize to a certain extent with Dillon's point of view. But we also wish to point out that too often, and on less than solid grounds, non-Greek influences are postulated to explain certain phenomena. Scholars have talked about the influence of Zoroastrianism or Persian dualism in Plato and in Plotinus, but also in various kinds of Gnosticism, frequently without strong indications that there was an intensive contact with this culture. Later it has often proved possible to reconstruct an internal philosophical development which renders superfluous the hypothesis of a sudden and strong foreign influence.³⁴ We would like to suggest that the new and striking elements in Plutarch's doctrine of the World-soul, too, can be understood as the consequence of a problem within Platonism; and that precisely the adjustment of the theory about the supreme deity necessarily involved a change in the way that the immediately inferior level was conceived. We suggest, that is to say, that the need to exempt the highest principle from any kind of dialectic or internal tension had to lead to a much stronger internal conflict in the theory of the World-soul. The change in the theology of the highest god was decisive for the change on the dependent level.

Perhaps Dillon's comments on the theme of the 'sleeping World-soul' in Plutarch also hint in this direction.³⁵ He writes: 'This image of the sleeping World Soul (the 'Sleeping Beauty' myth, one might call it) is rather mysterious in origin'.³⁶ But it also occurs in Albinus.³⁷ And that could indicate an origin in a source older than both Plutarch and Albinus. Dillon does leave open the possibility that the theme merely embroiders on Plato's myth in the *Politicus*. We find it curious that he does not draw the 'sleeping

³¹ J. Dillon, *op. cit.* 199, with reference to *De facie* 944e and Arist., *Metaph.* A 7 and *Phys.* 1.9.

³² *Op. cit.* 202 f.

³³ *Ibid.*, 203; cf. 223. On p. 191 Dillon suggests that it was particularly through his teacher Ammonius that Plutarch came into contact with Persian dualism.

³⁴ Oriental influences in Plotinus were assumed by E. Bréhier, *La philosophie de Plotin* (Paris 1928; repr. 1968) 107-135. Against this vogue, see E. R. Dodds, 'The *Parmenides* of Plato and the origin of the Neoplatonic One', *CQ* 22 (1928) 129-143. H. J. Krämer, *Der Ursprung der Geistmetaphysik* 12 has pointed out that the need to explain Plotinus' position by way of non-Greek influences was caused by the increasing tendency to see Platonism in the light of a 'klassizistisch verengtes, klischeehaftes Platonbild'.

³⁵ J. Dillon, *op. cit.* 205.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 206.

³⁷ Alb., *Didaskalikos* 14 169.30 ff. Hermann.

Kronos' of the *De facie* myth into his analysis. In what follows we wish to develop the hypothesis that there is in fact a connection between both images. And because we know for a fact that Aristotle discussed a 'dreaming Kronos', we shall propose that the entire notion of the 'sleeping World-soul' is to be understood as flowing from Aristotle's critique of Plato's theology.

As far as Plutarch's anthropology is concerned, we noted earlier Dillon's assumption that Plutarch's sharp distinction between 'soul and 'mind' was influenced by Aristotle's *De anima*.³⁸ There is a strict connection between this and the division of the cosmos into three spheres which we also found in the *De facie*. The parallel with and influence of Xenocrates on this point is beyond dispute, in Dillon's opinion.³⁹ The same applies to Plutarch's demonology.⁴⁰

Finally, it is noteworthy that Dillon sees in Plutarch's ethical thought a clear Aristotelian trend which distinguishes him from Alexandrian Platonism.⁴¹

5. *New light on the compositional unity and philosophical relevance of the De facie*

The doctrinal position of the *De facie* was significantly clarified by P. Donini in his contribution to the F.I.E.C. conference at Dublin in 1984.⁴² He observes that, owing to the contradictions between the different parts of the *De facie*, either one part or the other tends to be neglected, while only the remaining part is seriously investigated.⁴³ But a truly satisfactory interpretation will have to indicate the purpose of both the 'scientific discussion' on the substance of the moon and the great myth which follows this discussion. Moreover, the heterogeneity of the material used will have to be explained.⁴⁴ It is beyond doubt, according to Donini, that Plutarch's main source of inspiration for this work was Plato.⁴⁵ That is particularly evident in chapters 12-15 and in the final myth. On the other hand, there are clearly notions which cannot be traced back to Plato, such as the themes of the 'double death' and the corporeality of the soul.⁴⁶

³⁸ Cf. J. Dillon, *op. cit.* 211-214.

³⁹ *Op. cit.* 214-215.

⁴⁰ *Op. cit.* 216.

⁴¹ *Op. cit.* 195.

⁴² P. Donini, 'Il concetto di eclettismo nella storiografia sul pensiero antico (con un saggio di interpretazione di Plutarco, *De facie in orbe lunae*)'; lecture held in Dublin 1984 and published as 'Science and metaphysics: Platonism, Aristotelianism and Stoicism in Plutarch's *On the Face in the Moon*' in J. M. Dillon, A. A. Long (eds.), *The Question of 'Eclecticism'* (Los Angeles 1988) 128-144.

⁴³ *Art. cit.* 127. S. Samburski, *The physical world of the Greeks* (London 1956) devotes an entire chapter to Plutarch's treatise, but confines itself to the 'scientific' part (204-221). R. Heinze and H. von Arnim, on the other hand, paid attention to the final myth only.

⁴⁴ P. Donini, *art. cit.* 127.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 128.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 128-129.

Next, Donini points to the important development which led to the adoption of the Aristotelian tripartition of the theoretical sciences.⁴⁷ Partly as a result of this, discussions on physics became legitimate and current in Platonic circles too. According to Donini, however, the Aristotelian system of theoretical sciences (which set theology over physics and mathematics) is also the key to the correct interpretation of the treatise *De facie* as a whole.⁴⁸ This system is symbolically referred to in the final myth when it is said that the inhabitants of the Large Continent, during their service to Kronos, occupy themselves with astronomy, geometry, and the rest of natural philosophy.⁴⁹ Donini notes that the adoption of this system raises problems for Platonists, for whom physical reality is not an independent phenomenon, but is always related to higher principles.⁵⁰ And in the final myth, in fact, the entire scientific debate which preceded it is fundamentally qualified by the awareness of a higher, theological point of view.⁵¹ It is not, however, so qualified in order to undermine the importance and value of physics, but in order to emphasize the existence of an even higher, more comprehensive Truth.

Indeed, the striking conclusion of Donini's analysis is that Plutarch's *De facie* is not meant as an instruction about the composition of the Moon, but deals with *the relation between physics and metaphysics*, or between the various branches of science and theology.⁵² From this it can in turn be inferred that Aristotelian conceptions had a much larger impact on Plutarch's Platonism than has often been realized.

Where the final myth talks about the human *nous* which deposes the covering of the soul, we can recognize, according to Donini, a variant of Plato's doctrine in the *Timaeus* of a perishable and an imperishable part of the soul.⁵³

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 130.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 131.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 131. Cf. Plu. *De facie* 942b.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 133.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 135. An apt parallel for this, in our view, is the relation between the theologically orientated chapter 6 of the *De mundo* and the preceding 5 chapters which deal with physics.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 139. This explanation by Donini is well in line with D. Babut's recent discussion of Plu. *Gen. Socr.* in 'Le dialogue de Plutarque "Sur le démon de Socrate"; Essai d'interprétation', *BAGB*(1984) 51-76. According to Babut, the central theme in this treatise is the problem of the relationship between *theoria* and *praxis*, between philosophy and politics, which played such a dominant role in the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle (p. 74). While Plato had advocated a personal union between both lifestyles, a union which Aristotle rejected, Plutarch demonstrates in this work an unbridgeable gap between the two (72). Babut also notes that Socrates and Epaminondas, who represent the philosophical life in this work, take their decisions unerringly, whereas the others depend on the obscure signs provided by ordinary mantic techniques (60-65). His penetrating analysis moreover succeeds in showing that the treatise is characterized by 'une composition subtilement calculée dont tous les thèmes se révèlent en définitive convergents et complémentaires' (76), the thematic centre being a profound difference of opinion between Plato and Aristotle.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 143. Donini thinks that in particular a Stoic influence may be involved. It is not

Finally, with regard to the problem of what 'eclecticism' is, Donini notes that we must recognize that the debate between the philosophical views of Plato and Aristotle was of essential importance for all those who later considered themselves followers of either tradition.⁵⁴

We conclude that Donini, on the basis of entirely new considerations, arrives at the view that Aristotelian insights were an important component of Plutarch's Platonism. We can also be grateful to Donini for drawing attention to the relationship between physics and metaphysics as an important theme in the *De facie*. On one point, however, we have reservations about his analysis, namely where he seems to regard the problem of physics and metaphysics as resulting from the incorporation of physics as a science in a Platonic framework of thought. Donini ignores the fact that the 'cult of Kronos' must be qualified as the cult of the god of the cosmos and *Physis*. It is not the cult of the supreme god, Zeus. To this extent the reference to the study of astronomy, geometry, and the rest of natural philosophy is quite in place. From Donini's point of view, it is far more obvious to ask why the servants of Kronos do *not* seem to study the principles underlying Nature, that is to say, metaphysics and transcendent theology. The dialogue certainly gives an answer to this question: this supreme intellectual activity is to be associated with life on the 'Large Continent'. The beings living there must be conceived as worshippers of Zeus in the truest and purest sense. They are not worshippers of a *sleeping* god. The subordination of physics to metaphysics in the *De facie* must be seen in the light of the fact that physics is presented as the cult of a *sleeping* god. This clearly suggests that another, higher form of cognition is occupied with that which binds and holds nature together.⁵⁵ One might even take a further step by stating that the servants of a god must be held to resemble that god. In the story of the expedition to the Kronos island we are concerned with a reversal of this *homoiosis theoi* motif. The beings who have descended from the splendour of their existence on the Large Continent have undergone a 'clouding' of their cognitive faculties similar to the sleep with which Zeus has bound Kronos. In this view, the central problem of the *De facie* does not result from the incorporation of an Aristotelian theme in a comprehensive Platonic framework. Rather we should see that the Platonic framework has been replaced by the Aristotelian division between physics and metaphysics; between discursive reasoning and intuition.

Donini's paper throws a novel light on the *De facie*. His analysis suggests that Plutarch, in writing the treatise, was deeply convinced of the fundamental distinction between a cognition underlying physics and a superior order of knowledge which transcends the condition of earthly, perishable man, but for which man has been given a structural propensity. It

clear to us why he fails to think of the doctrine of Aristotle's lost works.

⁵⁴ *Art. cit.* 144.

⁵⁵ Similarly, the *De mundo*, after discussing *Physis*, in ch. 6 397b9 goes on to talk about τῆς τῶν ὅλων συνεκτικῆς αἰτίας.

is this knowledge which is indicated in the myth by the condition of the inhabitants of the 'Large Continent', a condition which is not explained further, however. The specific nature of this knowledge must be that it typifies the existence of the highest divine beings, who are exempt from all potentiality and materiality and whose cognition is not a discursive, procedural cognition, but a timeless intuition of Truth. This mode of cognition must also be structurally distinguished from any discursive attempt to arrive, on the basis of empirical, scientific knowledge of *Physis*, at the principles of this physical reality. That kind of discursive 'theology' remains within the limits of 'natural theology' and the kind of theologizing which characterizes the condition of rational beings enclosed within *Physis*.

It is significant that Donini relates this conception to Aristotle. For in Aristotle the activity of pure intuition (*noesis*) is exclusively characteristic of the highest, transcendent *Nous*. On the other hand, he repeatedly stresses the limited power of the *nous* of the soul, the mind which is connected with *psyche* and *soma* and is therefore less capable of comprehending the unreflected light of Truth.⁵⁶

Although Aristotle indicated the science of the divine or theology as the highest of the three theoretical sciences distinguished by him,⁵⁷ we cannot disregard the information implying that he indicated an even higher, transcendent mode of cognition, a cognition which can only be achieved by man when he has deposed his earthly, mortal condition, but which is always perfectly actualized by god. Aristotle presumably referred to it by the term *epopteia*, derived from the mysteries,⁵⁸ and by the metaphor of 'enlightenment'.⁵⁹ To reach this stage, however, the 'cloud' will have to be removed which hangs over man's intellect as long as he forms part of material and changeable reality.⁶⁰ The myth of the *De facie* itself seems to constitute an 'indication' of the transcendent reality and the dependence of all *Physis* upon it. For the myth in Plutarch's treatise is a means of opening up a transcendent perspective to man's scientific, discursive knowledge of Nature, a perspective of which discursive science can demonstrate the necessity, but which it cannot itself realize.

It is remarkable that in one of the writings of the *Corpus Aristotelicum*, the highly controversial *De mundo*, this difference in perspective is also

⁵⁶ Cf. Arist., *Metaph.* α 1 993b9-11 and A2 982b29-30.

⁵⁷ Arist. *Metaph.* E 1 1026a18-19.

⁵⁸ Cf. Arist. *Eudemus* fr. 10: Πλάτων καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐποπτικὸν τοῦτο τὸ μέρος τῆς φιλοσοφίας καλοῦσιν. See also Clem. Al., *Strom.* 1.28.176.

⁵⁹ Cf. Arist. *Philos.* 15a Ross: καθάπερ Ἀριστοτέλης ἀξιοῖ τοὺς τελουμένους οὐ μαθεῖν τι δεῖν ἀλλὰ παθεῖν καὶ διατεθῆναι, δηλονότι γενομένους ἐπιτηδείους, and 15b: παθόντος τοῦ νοῦ τὴν ἔλλαμψιν· ὃ δὴ καὶ μυστηριῶδες Ἀριστοτέλης ὠνόμασε καὶ εἰκὸς ταῖς Ἑλευσινίαις (ἐν ἐκείναις γὰρ τυπούμενος ὁ τελούμενος τὰς θεωρίας ἦν, ἀλλ' οὐ διδασκόμενος. Cf. also Pl., *Ep.* 7 341c7-8.

⁶⁰ Arist. *Philos.* 8 Ross: τὰ νοητὰ καὶ θεῖα, ὥς ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης φησὶν, εἰ καὶ φανότατά ἐστι κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν οὐσίαν, ἡμῖν διὰ τὴν ἐπικεκειμένην τοῦ σώματος ἀχλὺν σκοτεινὰ δοκεῖ καὶ ἀμυδρά ...

touched upon.⁶¹ Our own study of the subjects and content of Aristotle's lost works, as opposed to the material preserved in the *Corpus*, likewise suggests that Aristotle employed revelations by beings of superhuman stature in order to indicate his belief in a supra-discursive knowledge as the highest form of knowledge.

6. *The position of the De facie myth in the tradition of Greek philosophy*

We shall now have to wind up our analysis of the *De facie* myth, using the data we collected above.

We start by establishing that there are insufficient grounds for the claim that Plutarch, in composing the end of the *De facie*, brought together highly heterogeneous elements in a poor and inconsistent manner. On the contrary, the total result is a consistent, well-meditated philosophical conception which easily fits into the tradition of Greek philosophy as a whole.

In the second place, there is no evidence that Plutarch was radically influenced by Stoic philosophy. His fundamental assumption is that of a principle transcending *Physis*. Criticism is therefore not primarily aimed at a form of materialism or physicalism, but at a development of Platonic anthropology which seems to entail unacceptable consequences for a Platonist.

Crucial, we think, is the difference between the explicit and implied theology of the *De facie* and the well-known views expressed in Plato's dialogues. We already pointed out in our analysis that Plutarch, in speaking about the highest, transcendent god, uses terms in which Aristotle's Prime Mover and Plato's Idea of the Good seem to coincide. We are thus far removed from the Demiurge of Plato's *Timaeus* or the figure of Kronos in the myth of the *Politikus*.

On the other hand, the 'dreaming Kronos' in Plutarch, like his 'sleeping World-soul', is an ambivalent image implying both a positive and negative condition. In this respect, both models used by Plutarch to symbolize the highest non-transcendent god show a notable similarity to the ambivalence of Plato's demiurge and the Kronos figure in the myth of the *Politikus*.

In our view, the theme of an ambivalent deity ranking second in the ontology is likely to be a result of fundamental debates within the Old Academy focusing on the relationship between *theoria* and *praxis*.⁶² There

⁶¹ Arist. *Mu.* 1 391b3: λέγωμεν δὴ ἡμεῖς καί, καθ' ὅσον ἐφικτόν, θεολογῶμεν περὶ τούτων συμπάντων, ὡς ἕκαστον ἔχει φύσεως καὶ θεσεως καὶ κινήσεως.

⁶² On this subject, cf. E. Kapp, 'Theorie und Praxis bei Aristoteles und Platon', *Mnemosyne* 3.6 (1938) 178-191 and A. W. H. Adkins, 'Theoria versus praxis in the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Republic*', *CPh* 73 (1978) 297-313. The latter notes in relation to Aristotle: 'The whole of active life is set on a lower level than the theoretic' (300), and he holds that the Stagirite 'does not satisfactorily integrate the life of *theoria* with the life in accordance with practical *arete*' (307). The underlying reason for this, according to Adkins, is the enthusiasm in the 4th century about 'the powers of the human intellect, so suddenly come to flower in Greece at this time ...' (311).

are clear signs that various pupils of the first generation, in thinking through Plato's theology and doctrine of *principia*, refused to allow for an internal antinomy or dialectic within the highest ontological principle and therefore assigned the activity of contemplation (*theoria*) as exclusive and sole activity to the supreme deity. An involvement of the supreme divine principle in the practice of changeable reality is unacceptable in this line of thought, both because it admits a form of dialectic and thus a form of changeability in this principle, as we said before, and also because it makes the divine *Nous* in a certain sense dependent on changeable reality for the actualization of its own being.

Plato, in contrast, had accepted the notion of dialectic within the divine and had incorporated it in various ways in his oeuvre. After first working it out on the level of human *theoria* and *praxis* in his description of the personal union between the philosopher and the ruler in the *Republic*, he then employed it in his cosmic theology in the figure of the Demiurge; and in the figure of Kronos as the divine *Nous* or world archon in the myth of the *Politicus*. In the 'allegory of the Cave'⁶³ and his explanation of it, Plato had portrayed the philosopher as the person who achieves true humanity by devoting himself to the contemplation of the unchangeable and eternal reality of the purely intelligible, after a laborious ascent from the obstructions of all changeable, sense-perceptible reality. But the philosopher is also indicated by Plato as the only suitable archon for the 'cave society' of man. The philosopher will in fact be *forced* to redescend, in order to rule over the society of the remaining cave-dwellers, who know nothing better than their cavernous and shadowy reality.⁶⁴

Likewise, Plato presents in the *Timaeus* a god whom he qualifies as *Nous*, but who at the same time is the Demiurge,⁶⁵ the god who generates and orders all concrete, changeable reality, as if he were a versatile practitioner of many crafts. Plato brings out the double orientation of this Demiurge figure by speaking on the one hand of his contemplation of the eternal Model and on the other of his generation of the visible world, which resembles that Model as much as possible.⁶⁶

Finally, we also find a myth in Plato about Kronos as a world archon, but one whose periodical involvement with the running of the cosmos alternates with a periodical abstention from involvement, with all the disastrous consequences which this entails. Though carrying out the action of the *Nous*, Kronos possesses a changeability which deprives the heart of the cosmos of stability.⁶⁷

It is clear that these three themes from Plato's philosophy were rejected by Aristotle and vigorously contested with a variety of arguments. On the one hand he extended the ideal of *theoria* to the absolute idea of the self-

⁶³ Pl., *Rep.* 7 514 ff.

⁶⁴ Cf. Pl., *Rep.* 7 519b7-520a5.

⁶⁵ Pl., *Tim.* 27d5 ff. and 47e4.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 30d4-31a1.

⁶⁷ Pl., *Plt.* 268e8 ff.

contained, self-sufficient cognition of the divine *Nous*. On the other hand he radicalized the doctrine of the *immutability of god* and consequently demonstrated the impossibility of creative initiative on the part of god. Both in the *De philosophia*⁶⁸ and the *De caelo*⁶⁹ he hence inferred that *Physis* as a whole must be considered ungenerated and imperishable. And Aristotle replaced the ideal of the philosopher-king by the more 'realistic' proposal of close cooperation between the king of a state and a philosopher as his personal advisor.⁷⁰

The intriguing question is what moved Aristotle to reject these essential elements of Plato's philosophy. We think it is possible that his main motive was an *epistemological* one. In this connection the revaluation of *dialektike*, for Plato the highest form of science,⁷¹ probably played an important role. Plato had regarded dialectic as the means of approaching the first principle in the world of Ideas, the Idea of the Good. He had moreover postulated the divine *Nous* as the agent which, by its dialectical alternation between affirmation and negation, differentiates Being into a variety of beings and in this process produces a variety of ontological levels.

Aristotle, on the other hand, described human cognition as a process in which the individual, by experience and scientific education, climbs up to knowledge of the universal. But in order to reach the highest level of scientific knowledge, which is man's ultimate goal in Aristotle's view, he postulated that it was necessary for the universal *Nous* to act upon man's potential *nous*.

The gulf between the divine *Nous* and the *Physis* dependent upon it is seen by Aristotle as the division between the absolutely immutable and the world of motion and change.

Nevertheless, Aristotle also recognizes the divinity of the stars and planets, the sun and moon, and the fifth element, all of which belong to *Physis*. Like Plato, therefore, he distinguishes between a primary and a secondary level of divinity. While raised far above the destitution and cares of man's existential level, the activity of these 'secondary' gods is not exclusively that of *noesis*; it is also a form of *praxis*,⁷² which clearly influences the spheres of nature subordinate to them, in particular the sublunary.

Obviously, to see the highest degree of divinity as the condition of a being that is not 'enclosed' (imprisoned) within the sphere of the stars, implies, conversely, that whatever is in that sphere is 'enclosed', confined within the boundary of *Physis*. In this view, the celestial beings, however glorious their condition may be, are prisoners, albeit prisoners with a special, high-ranking status. If seen as guides and governors, they are at the same time regarded as 'prison leaders' in a prison camp: they too belong to the prison

⁶⁸ Arist., *Philos.* fr. 18, 19 Ross.

⁶⁹ Arist., *Cael.* 1.10-12.

⁷⁰ Themistius, *Or.* 107c-d = Arist. *Peri basileias* fr. 2 Ross.

⁷¹ Cf. Pl., *Rep.* 6 511b.

⁷² Cf. Arist., *Cael.* 2.12 292a22-25.

community. In this train of thought, the vault of heaven may be conceived as the vault of the cave which Plato described in the seventh book of the *Republic*, and the heavenly bodies in it as being bound (*endedemena*) to their spheres, while the condition of mortals is conceived as being even more miserable, namely that of prisoners bound alive to corpses.⁷³

In creatively elaborating these themes, Greek writers were able to draw on the ancient mythical material in Hesiod about the degraded god Kronos, extended and supplemented in the Orphic tradition by the story of the subsequent degradation of the Titans, after their attempt to mangle Dionysus. First we wish to point out the various aspects of these traditions which in any case played a role in the philosophical debate.

(1) The degradation of Kronos and his brothers is presented in Hesiod as their *own* fault, a consequence of their own audacity and recklessness. They are exposed and subjected to the cosmic legal order, and in such a way that they bring their own punishment upon their heads. The Orphic transformation of this myth already contains the idea that their guilt coincides with their punishment, and this is also stressed by Plato. Blindness, the fall from glory, is both the reason for and the execution of their punishment! And if in this way the *tolma* and *hybris* of these divine figures can be indicated as the cause of their degradation, the supreme deity remains uninvolved. Here too the dictum applies: 'The chooser is to blame; god is blameless'.⁷⁴

(2) In this way of looking at cosmic reality, the radiance of the celestials, too, will tend to be seen as a mere vestige of their original glory, as a result of the extinction of a higher kind of light, the *lumen intelligibile*. We encountered this motif in the *De facie*, where it is observed that the planet which mortals call 'Phaenon' ('the shining') is called 'lamp-post' or 'night-watchman' (*Nyktouros*) by beings of superior stature.⁷⁵ We have already suggested elsewhere that all the alternative 'light-names' coined for the planets are connected with this motif of 'reverse illumination'.⁷⁶

(3) The motif of being bound and imprisoned may also have been elaborated into the motif of the *aurea catena*, the chain of being in which all the spheres of being are seen as links in a continuous chain, the beginning of which is held in the hands of the supreme, sovereign deity Zeus.⁷⁷

(4) It is also easy to see why precisely a demoted god like Kronos should

⁷³ This image was used by Aristotle; cf. *Protr.* 10b Ross = B 106-107 Düring.

⁷⁴ Pl., *Rep.* 10 617e4: αἰτία ἐλομένου· θεὸς ἀναίτιος. It is interesting to observe that the notion of *tolma* plays an important role both in the Gnostic systems, e.g. that of Valentinus, where *Sophia* is described as being in the grip of *tolma* (Irenaeus *Haer.* 1.2.2 ff.) and in the philosophical system of Plotinus (*Enn.* 3.8.8.32-6; 6.9.5.29; 5.1.1.3-5; 3.7.11). On these two variants, see A. H. Armstrong, 'Plotinus' in *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy* (Cambridge 1967) 242-245 and P. Hadot (*art. cit.* 1981) 134.

⁷⁵ Pl., *De facie* 941c.

⁷⁶ Cf. A. P. Bos, 'Notes on Aristotle's *De Mundo*' *PI* 1(1979) 142-147 and chapter 8.10 below.

⁷⁷ Cf. A. P. Bos, *art. cit.* (1979) 149-152.

be presented as the world archon, surrounded by subalterns who assist him. For the activity of government is a form of *praktike energeia*, which Aristotle's praxeological writings emphatically distinguished from the activity of contemplation. The ambivalent position of Kronos can be worked out in two ways:

(a) he possesses divinity and immortality. He is exempt from the toil and care besetting mortals who must provide for their living. Kronos (and all beings existing on his level) is quite free of *ponoi* and of pain, fear, and sorrow.

(b) But it is equally true that Kronos is not *absolutely free*, like Zeus, who has robbed him of supreme glory. Kronos' happiness is limited, and comparable to the happiness brought by material abundance and lack of toil. In Aristotle's axiology, that is not the highest perfection. Next, it is possible to connect the theme of the *pathe* with the exercise of rule over the inferior spheres of reality: the government of the world as experienced by a mortal human being (to the extent that he is not raised above *Physis* on the wings of philosophy!) so often shows *tyrannical* features.⁷⁸ The world archon alternately manifests himself as a tyrannical fiend and a good ruler. To assign such ambivalence to the highest god would be quite impious. Therefore the sleep which binds Kronos will have to be interpreted as a cloud which has spread over his intellectual powers and prevents him from acquiring perfect insight into the eternal order of being.

(5) The motif of the 'sleeping Kronos' may also be a significant expression of the basic Aristotelian tenet: 'the activity of the *Nous* is life'.⁷⁹ In the pregnant sense intended by Aristotle, this statement means: every other mode of existence is a form of death, an existence in the underworld. Within this category, to be sure, it is possible to distinguish various degrees of horridness: life in a land of plenty, provided with all that man can desire, is, if not devoted to the acquisition of insight and knowledge, a 'mild death' similar to the existence of Endymion and the dreaming Kronos. But from the above point of view it is nevertheless a kind of 'euthanasia'. How much more 'hellish' and death-like is the existence of needy and care-ridden mortals, when not aroused to the intellectual life by shining examples.

In the way we have sketched above, Kronos may have been mythically conceived as the representative of the intermediate ontic level, the level of the *soul*. That is to say: the soul with its ambivalence of *psyche logike* and *psyche alogos*; the soul which in value far transcends the body and uses the

⁷⁸ For this opposition, cf. Philo, *Prov.*2.15: οὐ τύραννος ὁ θεός, ὠμότητα καὶ βίαν καὶ ὅσα δεσπότης ἀνημέρου ἀρχῆς ἔργα ἐπιτετηδευκώς, ἀλλὰ βασιλεὺς ἡμερον καὶ νόμιμον ἀνημμένος ἡγεμονίαν μετὰ δικαιοσύνης τὸν σύμπαντα οὐρανόν τε καὶ κόσμον βραβεύει. Likewise, Clem. Al., *Protr.*92.2 asks his pagan readers: οὐκ ἄτοπον ὑμῖν δοκεῖ ... ἐτέρῳ δουλεύειν δεσπότη, πρὸς δὲ καὶ θεραπεύειν ἀντὶ μὲν τοῦ βασιλέως τὸν τύραννον, ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τὸν πονηρόν ... τίς δὲ ὅστις τὸν θεὸν ἀποφεύγων δαιμονίοις συμβιοῖ.

⁷⁹ Arist., *Metaph.* Λ 7 1072b24-25.

body as an instrument and rules over it, so that it may achieve its fulfilment; the soul which achieves perfection only in being orientated toward the superior level of the *Nous* and noetic activity, made possible by a continual regulation of its pathetic (Titanic) nature through application of the 'right rule' for the *praxis* of life.

CHAPTER EIGHT

ARISTOTELIAN ELEMENTS IN THE MYTH OF PLUTARCH'S *DE FACIE*

As the material dealt with in chapter 7 showed, recovery of the sources of Plutarch's myth in the *De facie* is a perilous undertaking. Like Plato, Plutarch is first and foremost a creative author of great literary talent who is quite capable of developing and using entirely new motifs in his writings to further his philosophical or literary aims. Where he does not expressly mention his sources, certainty about older authors which he may have used cannot be gained. At the same time it is to be assumed that Plutarch made repeated use of themes and stories found in the literature of his time, which he collected and studied assiduously. As far as Plato's work is concerned, this is borne out by almost every page of Plutarch's writings. Influence is likely in the case of other writers, but difficult to determine because their works have been lost. One thinks of such figures as Speusippus, Xenocrates, Heraclides Ponticus, and Stoics like Posidonius.

Matters are even more complicated as far as Aristotle is concerned. Although passages in Plutarch's writings often recall texts from the *Corpus Aristotelicum*, it cannot be established conclusively that Plutarch drew on them. F. H. Sandbach, on the other hand, has argued strongly that Plutarch had no knowledge of the *Corpus* and was only acquainted with Aristotle's published work, now lost.¹ Where Plutarch does not name his source, however, it is difficult to ascertain what he derived from these published works. Nevertheless it may be useful to list any elements in the myth of the *De facie* which can be connected with matters traditionally attributed to Aristotle. In this way we may be able to reinforce the assumption that Aristotelian motifs were also incorporated in the *De facie* myth. After that we could try to decide whether any other author contributed more to the genesis of the *De facie* myth than Aristotle.

1. *The motif of the revelation by a Stranger*

Plutarch puts the entire description of the Kronos island and the myth about the fate of the souls on the moon in the mouth of a 'Stranger' who is said to come from the 'Great continent'. After his period of service on the

¹ Cf. F. H. Sandbach, 'Plutarch and Aristotle', *ICS* 7 (1982) 207-232. See also his *Aristotle and the Stoics* (Cambridge 1985). And see further P. Moraux, *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen* (Berlin 1973) 1 42 f.

Kronos island, we are told, he was overcome by a curious desire and longing to see the 'Great island' (i.e. the world of ordinary mortals).² His background and the knowledge which he passes on mark this Stranger as a being of more than ordinary human status.

We know that in his dialogue the *Eudemus* or *On the Soul* Aristotle used the motif of the 'revelation by the daemon Silenus',³ a being who, through his daemonic status and close relationship to Dionysus, is also characterized as a being of more than ordinary human quality and insight.

2. The theme of the dreaming god Kronos

According to Plutarch's narrative, it is the stranger from the Great continent who has provided knowledge unattainable for ordinary mortals about the 'island of Kronos', home of the god Kronos, whom Zeus has put to sleep eternally, but who in this very capacity functions as a transmitter of Zeus' divine ordinances to beings of daemonic stature.⁴

This motif immediately recalls the myth in Plato's *Politicus* about the government of the world by Kronos and the daemons around him, and we would take it to be a strikingly creative elaboration on Plutarch's part, were it not for Tertullian's assertion that Aristotle too talked about a Kronos figure, and that he too presented Kronos as a dreaming Kronos.⁵ This forces us to conclude that the figure of the dreaming Kronos was introduced by Aristotle in his polemic against Plato's theory of world government and that in this debate Plutarch chooses Aristotle's side. Aristotle's criticism must be understood in the sense that he exempted the highest deity from any form of changeability or dialectic and that he assigned the government of the world to the world archon Kronos, but gave him a distinctly lower ontic status and level of knowledge than Zeus. The relationship between Zeus and Kronos must have been presented by Aristotle as the ideal (dependent) relationship between the philosopher (the representative of the contemplative life) and the statesman (the representative of the practical life). The dependence and lower status of the practical life was expressed by depicting Kronos as asleep when participating in the counsel of Zeus.

In the myth of the *De facie* Plutarch accepts Aristotle's criticism of the dialectical theology in Plato's *Timaeus* and *Politicus* and opts for the Aristotelian double theology of the Transcendent Unmoved Mover and the subordinate cosmic gods.

² Plu., *De facie* 941a; 942b-c; 945d.

³ Plu., *Consol. ad Apoll.* 115c-d = Arist., *Eudemus* fr. 6 Ross.

⁴ Plu., *De facie* 941a and 941f-942a.

⁵ Tert., *An.* 46 = Arist., *Protr.* fr. 20 Ross.

3. *An abode of bliss*

In Plutarch's description, the island of Kronos lying beyond the pillars of Hercules and Britannia assumes the traditional and well-known features of a land of plenty and ease. Without toil and effort everything is abundantly available for sacrifices and celebrations or for continued discussions and philosophizing. There is moreover an open and free association with *daimones*, who in turn associate with Kronos.⁶

Aristotle too seems to have employed the theme of a land without want, abundantly provided with all the necessities of life, in a context in which he indicated that the only meaningful occupation on these 'isles of the blessed' is the activity of the mind and contemplation, that is to say the truly 'free' life.⁷

4. *Briareus as the custodian of Kronos*

Plutarch described Kronos as having been put in custody, and also talked about a figure charged with the duty of guarding him. H. Cherniss has proposed to reconstruct the relevant text in such a way that it mentions the giant Briareus as Kronos' guard.⁸

Aristotle talked about the figure of Briareus too, namely when he reported that the 'pillars of Hercules' (the rock of Gibraltar, for ancient Greeks the end of the civilized world) used to be called the 'pillars of Briareus'.⁹ According to other authors, the name 'pillars of Kronos' was also current.¹⁰

Plutarch also points out that the islands of Briareus and Kronos lie west of Britannia at a distance of five days' travel. The latter island is mentioned in the *Corpus Aristotelicum* in *De mundo* 3.¹¹

⁶ Plu., *De facie* 941e-f.

⁷ Iamb., *Protr.* 9 (52.16-54.5 Pistelli) = Arist., *Protr.* 12b Ross; B 43 Düring: μόνον δὲ καταλείπεται τὸ διανοεῖσθαι καὶ θεωρεῖν, ὅνπερ καὶ νῦν ἐλεύθερόν φαμεν βίον εἶναι. Attribution of this passage to Aristotle is confirmed by the fact that Augustine, *Trin.* 14.9.12 ascribes the same idea to Cicero's dialogue the *Hortensius*.

⁸ Plu., *De facie* 941a: τὸν δ' ὠγύγιον (Βριάρεων) ἔχοντα φρουρὰν τῶν τε νήσων ἐκείνων καὶ τῆς θαλάττης, ἣν Κρονίων πέλαγος ὀνομάζουσι, παρακαταρκίσθαι. Ed. H. Cherniss, 180 and 182 note a, with reference to Hes., *Th.* 729-735.

⁹ Aelianus, *Var. Hist.* 5.3: τὰς νῦν Ἡρακλείους στήλας καλούμενας πρὶν ἢ κληθῆναι τοῦτο φησι Βριάρεω καλεῖσθαι αὐτάς = V. Rose³, *Aristoteles, Fragm.* 678 (there included among the *Dubia*).

¹⁰ Cf. Charax, fr. 16 (= *FGH* 3.640); also Clearchus, fr. 56 (= *FGH* 2.320) and Parthenius, fr. 21 (Diehl) = fragm. 31 (Martin), cited by H. Cherniss, *ad loc.*

¹¹ Arist., *Mu.* 3 393b12; b17: 'the British isles', namely Albion and Ireland. The 'pillars of Hercules' are also mentioned, 393a18; a24 and b10. See also Iamb., *Protr.* 6.37.22-41.5 (Pistelli) = Arist., *Protr.* fr. 5b Ross; B 53 Düring.

5. *The distinction between Hades and the home of the purged souls*

In the myth about the fate of souls after death, Plutarch draws a sharp distinction between the souls in the realm of Hades and the souls who have passed beyond it. In doing so, he evidently sees the area between the Earth and the Moon as the realm of Hades.¹² The Elysian plain is sharply distinguished from it. And Plutarch also announces that no evil, impure soul can ascend to the Elysium.

In a text usually assigned to Aristotle's *Protrepticus*, a similar distinction is made between Hades and the isles of the blessed.¹³

6. *The motif of Kronos' imprisonment*

In his myth Plutarch emphatically presents the dreaming god Kronos as 'imprisoned', held in custody, and shackled.¹⁴ There is no parallel for this in Aristotelian texts. Nonetheless the motif of the sleeping Kronos must be an Aristotelian innovation. And it is legitimate to study the implications of this new motif.

Inasmuch as sleep is characteristic for Kronos, an immediate implication seems to be that there is another deity who is characterized by being awake. This other deity can be no other than Zeus. If these two gods were so contrasted, this can then be related to Aristotle's frequent use of the opposition between 'sleeping' and 'waking' to distinguish between the (potential) *possession* of the theoretical faculty and its actual *use*.¹⁵ This leads to the assumption that, in contrast to an always actually contemplative god Zeus, Kronos was presented as a rational being who is not engaged in contemplation, but in another kind of intellectual activity. This other kind of activity will have to be a 'productive' or 'practical' activity, in view of the well-known Aristotelian tripartition of human (and divine) activities.¹⁶ If only given the inferior value and ontic status of *praxis* and *poiesis* compared with the ideal of the theoretical life, the condition of Kronos may have been presented as *less (perfectly) happy* than that of Zeus.

If Kronos' activity might be called 'practical' or 'productive', then this implies in the context of Aristotelian philosophy that it is concerned with

¹² Plu., *De facie* 942f; cf. H. Cherniss, *ad loc.* note d; 943c; 943e; 944c.

¹³ Iamb., *Protr.* 9.52.16-54.5 (Pistelli) = Arist., *Protr.* 12b Ross; B 43 Düring: ὥσπερ γὰρ τῆς δικαιοσύνης, ὡς φασιν οἱ σοφοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν, ἐν "Αἰδου κομιζόμεθα τὰς δωρεάς, οὕτω τῆς φρονήσεως ἐν μακάρων νήσοις, ὡς ἔοικεν.

¹⁴ Plu., *De facie* 941a: τὸν Κρόνον ... καθεῖρχθαι ... ὑπὸ τοῦ Διός, τὸν δ' ὠγύγιον (Βριάρεων) ἔχοντα φρουρὰν ... παρακατωκίσθαι and 941f: αὐτὸν μὲν γὰρ τὸν Κρόνον ἐν ἄνθρω β�θεῖ περιέχεσθαι πέτρας χρυσοειδοῦς καθεύδοντα. τὸν γὰρ ὕπνον αὐτῷ μεμηχανῆσθαι δεσμὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ Διός ...

¹⁵ Cf. Arist., *An.* 2.1 412a25-26; *Metaph.* Θ 6 1048a30-b2; *EN* 10.8 1178b18-20; *MM* 2.6 1201b12-20. Cf. *D.L.* 5.34 and A. P. Bos, 'Greek philosophical theology and the *De mundo*' in *On and off the beaten track: Studies in Platonism* (Nijmegen 1986) 18.

¹⁶ Cf. Arist., *EN* 10.8 1178b20.

visible, changeable reality and not with what is wholly 'separate', free of matter. To this extent practical and productive activity is 'bound' to matter. In this sense Aristotle can also call a being engaged in practical or productive activity 'unfree', not engaged in the only activity through which a rational being can be called truly 'free'.¹⁷ In his lost writings, with their higher literary quality and pretensions, Aristotle may well have expressed the notion of 'lack of freedom' and 'bondage' to the somatic, to visible, material reality, by speaking of 'shackles' and 'imprisonment'. Certainly it is clear that in his dialogue the *Eudemus* or *On the soul* the motif of 'imprisonment' and its correlate 'liberation' was used in various ways.¹⁸ This was also the guiding motif of Plato's *Phaedo*, the writing which Aristotle's *Eudemus* apparently seeks to replace. In the *Phaedo* Plato describes the death of Socrates in prison (the *desmoterion*) after a day of discussions with his friends, who are free to go where they please. During their conversation they talk about the Orphic view of life on earth as a 'life in custody'. And the result of their discussion is a revaluation of death as a 'liberation' of the soul from the bonds of the perishable body. Against the background of the new, Platonic perspective, the dissolution of the body is reinterpreted as the road leading to the 'dissolution' or release of the soul. Now in the *Eudemus* Aristotle subtly played with the same motifs. He seems to have accentuated the galling bond of earthly materiality by comparing the human condition to the fate of 'prisoners' tied onto corpses by Etrurian pirates.¹⁹ The daemon Silenus is introduced as the prisoner of greedy king Midas, who is unaware how much he himself is a slave to his own animal craving for *bona externa*, and who thinks that by using violence he can force Silenus to speak.²⁰ Silenus, however, is presented as one who is much 'freer' than Midas,²¹ as is appropriate for the companion of Dionysus Lyseus, who already as a child had cast off the shackles with which he had been bound by the Etrurian mafia.²² And Silenus reveals to Midas that man is an exile on earth, involved in a process of expiation, and that this exile does not end until death. Silenus thus provides the background to the story about

¹⁷ Cf. *Metaph.* A 2 982b24-30, where *sophia* is called 'the only free science', as distinct from physics and any intellectual activity aiming at a practical result. Aristotle significantly adds: διὸ καὶ δικαίως ἂν οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνη νομίζοιτο αὐτῆς ἡ κτήσις. πολλαχῇ γὰρ ἡ φύσις δούλη τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐστίν ...

¹⁸ See also ch. 13 below.

¹⁹ Cf. *Iamb.*, *Protr.* 8.47.21-48.9 (Pistelli) = Arist., *Protr.* 10b Ross; B 106-107 Düring. Attribution of this text to the *Eudemus* has been urged by O. Gigon, 'Prolegomena to an edition of the *Eudemus*' (1960) 28; J. Brunschwig, 'Aristote et les pirates tyrrhéniens', *RPFE* 88 (1963) 189; H. Flashar, 'Platon und Aristoteles im Protrepitikon des Iamblichos' *AGPh* (1965) 71; H. J. Drossaart Lulofs, *De ogen van Lynkeus* (Leiden 1967) 17 f.

²⁰ *Plu.*, *Consol. ad Apoll.* 115c-d = Arist., *Eudemus* fr. 6 Ross.

²¹ *Ibid.* This would be further underlined if we can accept the conjecture of J. Bernays, who proposed to read ἀνακαγχάζοντα instead of ἀναγκαζόμενον (*Rhein. M.* 16 (1861) 238). Cf. H. J. Drossaart Lulofs, *op. cit.* 31 n.38.

²² Cf. *Hymn. Hom.* 7 (to Dionysus) 8-14 and J. Brunschwig, *art. cit.* 187.

Eudemus' sojourn abroad, far from Cyprus, and about his longing to return home.²³

A description of the god Kronos, the Titan, robbed of supreme divine glory and held in custody, fits naturally into this context.

We leave out of consideration that in a lost work Aristotle also talked about the inhabitants of a subterranean abode, who at a certain point in time climb up out of their underground home.²⁴

We do have to consider the fact that in a lost work Aristotle explained the phenomenon of mantic dreams, like that of Eudemus, as a result of the detachment of the soul from the body, by which the soul regains its 'own nature'.²⁵ Here too the 'bondage' of the soul to the body is assumed. In the *Timaeus* Plato had also talked about the conjunction of the heavenly gods to their 'heavenly' bodies,²⁶ but in a way that, according to Aristotle, made the heavenly souls subject to a fate as miserable as that of the prisoners of Etrurian pirates or of Ixion, bound to his wheel.²⁷ Aristotle himself, on the other hand, seems to have made a sharp distinction between rational beings whose rational faculty is bound to a perishable body and the heavenly rational beings whose condition is toilless and easy,²⁸ but whose intellectual capacity is still in a certain sense 'bound' to materiality, namely inasmuch as they revolve eternally and are engaged in *praxis*,²⁹ and so are not constantly and perfectly active in contemplation.

7. The motif of crime and penance

In his *De facie* myth Plutarch emphatically related the 'binding' of Kronos in the chains of sleep to his Titanic nature, that is, his 'Titanic passions'.³⁰ These are contrasted with Kronos' pure, undiluted divine and royal nature.³¹ In his account of the fate of souls, we find time and again the idea that 'bondage' is a result of a crime for which penance must be done. The reason for this, Plutarch frequently indicates, is that certain beings have been too enthralled by the *alogon kai pathetikon*. The only road to liberation is that of the *katharsis ton pathon*.³²

²³ Cic., *Div. ad Brutum* 1.25.53 = Arist., *Eudemus* fr. 1 Ross.

²⁴ Cic., *N.D.* 2.37.95-96 = Arist., *Philos.* 13 Ross. Cf. ch. 13 below.

²⁵ Cf. Sextus Emp., *Math.* 3 (*Phys.* 1) 20-23 = Arist., *Philos.* 12a Ross. Cf. also *Philos.* 27d Ross, where the divine mind is called a 'mens soluta quaedam et libera'.

²⁶ Pl., *Tim.* 36d8-e2.

²⁷ Cf. Arist., *Cael.* 2.1 284a27-35. Cf. ch. 12 below.

²⁸ Cf. Arist., *Cael.* 2.1 284a14-15; cf. a31-32.

²⁹ Cf. Arist., *Cael.* 2.12 292a20-b25.

³⁰ Plu., *De facie* 942a, which talks about τὰ τιτανικά πάθη καὶ κινήματα τῆς ψυχῆς. Cf. *De esu carnis* 996.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² Cf. 942f: οὐδεὶς ... ἀκάθαρτος ἄνεισιν (943d: τὸ ἄλογον καὶ τὸ παθητικόν and 943a Bernardakis); 943c: αἱ μὲν ἄδικοι καὶ ἀκόλαστοι δίκας τῶν ἀδικημάτων τίνουσι 944c; 945a: αἱ ... φιλόσοφον στέρξασαι βίον (sc. ψυχαί) ... πρὸς οὐδὲν ἔτι

This motif is not entirely absent in the surviving works of Aristotle. Inasmuch as Aristotle holds that human nature is in many respects 'unfree',³³ he implies that man's condition should be otherwise. And when he notes that man's capacity to grasp the Truth resembles the susceptibility of bats to daylight,³⁴ he evokes the traditional image of beings imprisoned in darkness, for which the Titans were the pattern since Hesiod.³⁵ Likewise, when he approves of tragedy in the *Poetics* because it brings about a *katharsis* of the human *pathemata*, it is natural to see these human *pathe* as part of man's 'Titanic nature'.³⁶

But certainly Aristotle must have deployed this motif in his lost writings, seeing that it plays a role in two fragments known to us. The fragment about Midas and Silenus which we have mentioned so often is introduced by the remark that for ages the human condition has been lamented as a form of punishment (*timoria*).³⁷ And the testimony about the 'prisoners of Etrurian pirates' reflects the insight, expressed in the mysteries, that from birth men by nature lead an existence of penance.³⁸ Since Hesiod the notion of penance and punishment is directly related to atrocities like those committed by the Titans.³⁹

8. The theme of *manteia* through dreams

An essential point in the myth of Plutarch's *De facie* is that Kronos acquires knowledge of Zeus' divine counsel in his sleep and that his dreams are the source of information from which the *daimones* who surround him

χρώμεναι τοῖς πάθεσιν. 945b: ψυχῶν ... ἐρήμων λόγου καὶ τύφῳ πλανηθέντι τῷ παθητικῷ χρησαμένων.

³³ *Metaph.* A 2 982b29-30.

³⁴ *Metaph.* α 1 993b9-11.

³⁵ Cf. the early allusion in Parmenides, fr. B 1 (*D.K.*) and A. P. Bos, 'Parmenides' onthullingen over denken en spreken', *PRef.* 47 (1982) 160-161.

³⁶ Arist., *Po.* 6 1449b28. Cf. Pl., *Laws* 3 701c on τὴν λεγομένην παλαιὰν Τιτανικὴν φύσιν. For Plato, cf. also the passage *Ep.* 7 334e-335c, which G. Méautis, 'L'Orphisme dans l'Eudème d'Aristote', *REA* 57 (1955) 256 characterizes as follows: 'Nous y avons vraiment l'essentiel de l'enseignement platonicien et l'affirmation solennelle: ma doctrine, au point de vue religieux, est basée sur l'Orphisme'.

³⁷ Plu., *Moralia* (*Consol. ad Apoll.*) 115b-e = Arist., *Eudemus* fr. 6 Ross: πάλαι κέκλυσται τ' ἀνθρώπινα τιμωρίαν ἡγουμένοις εἶναι τὸν βίον ...

³⁸ Iamb., *Protr.* 8.47.21-48.9 (Pistelli) = Arist., *Protr.* 10b Ross; B 106-107 Düring: φύσει συνέσταμεν, καθάπερ φασιν οἱ τὰς τελετὰς λέγοντες, ὥσπερ ἂν ἐπὶ τιμωρίᾳ πάντες. τοῦτο γὰρ θεῖως οἱ τὰς ἀρχαιότεροι λέγουσι τὸ φάναι διδόναι τὴν ψυχὴν τιμωρίαν καὶ ζῆν ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ κολάσει μεγάλων τινῶν ἁμαρτημάτων. Cf. Iamb., *Protr.* 60.10-15 (Pistelli) = Arist., *Protr.* 15 Ross (first accepted by Düring but later rejected on inadequate grounds; cf. A. P. Bos, *art. cit.* (1984) 35 f.) and Iamb., *Protr.* 9 (49.3-52.16) = Arist., *Protr.* 11 Ross; B 16 Düring; Düring translates the latter passage incorrectly, in our view.

³⁹ Cf. Hes., *Th.* 207-210.

draw their mantic knowledge of the most important matters.⁴⁰ In turn these *daimones* act as executors and transmitters of this information.⁴¹

In the description of Kronos' sleep, a further distinction seems to have been made between two conditions, namely one in which his Titanic passions have the upper hand, and another in which Kronos' royal and divine nature is pure and unmixed and 'by itself' as a result of the subsiding of these passions.⁴²

It is clear that by mantic knowledge Plutarch means: knowledge of a superhuman order regarding the future development of the cosmos as a whole and of its parts.

It is true that Tertullian says no more about Aristotle than that he spoke about a dreaming Kronos, but the context of Tertullian's remark, a discussion of the reliability of prophetic dreams, warrants the conclusion that Aristotle too introduced Kronos as a dream oracle. That is to say, that Aristotle assigned the government of the world to cosmic beings whose activity ultimately depends on information derived from the dreaming Kronos, whose knowledge of the cosmic order forms an imperfect reflection of the divine counsel of the transcendent god Zeus.

We think it possible that a significant trace of this conception is to be found in the remarkable chapter 2.1 of the preserved treatise *De caelo*. However, this theory entails a radical reinterpretation of that passage, which we hope to set out in a later chapter.⁴³ Here it suffices to point out that in any case the acquisition of mantic knowledge in dreams is a theme which occurs in Aristotle's lost works. An important part was played in the *Eudemus* by the prophetic dream which Eudemus of Cyprus received shortly after the crisis of an almost fatal illness.⁴⁴ Significant, too, is Sextus Empiricus' statement that Aristotle partly explained man's notion of the existence of gods by referring to the phenomenon of mantic dreams.⁴⁵ That man possesses this potential is moreover explained by the remark that during sleep, as when near death, the soul is as it were separated from the body, and is pure and unmixed and 'by itself'.

These facts in combination with the statement about Kronos' oracular activity while dreaming justify the conclusion, in our view, that Aristotle presented man's sleep as the condition in which man's soul can become active on a higher (daemonic) level; and that by analogy he presented the sleep of the divine Kronos as the condition in which the *nous* of psychic beings can become active on a higher, namely transcendent, level. A condition for man's possession of mantic knowledge is that the bondage of the soul to the perishable body be cancelled. A condition for participation in

⁴⁰ Plu., *De facie* 942a.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 942a and 944c-d.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 942a.

⁴³ See ch. 12 below.

⁴⁴ Cic., *Div. ad Brutum* 1.25.53 = Arist., *Eudemus* fr. 1 Ross.

⁴⁵ Sextus Emp., *Math.* 3 (*Phys.* 1) 20-23 = Arist., *Philos.* fr. 12a Ross. Cf. Cic., *Div. ad Brutum* 1.30.63.

the eternal knowledge of Zeus is that the bondage of the divine part of the soul to the irrational part of the soul be cancelled.

We add that the story about the ecstatic experience of the anonymous Greek king recounted by Al-kindī supposes a similar train of thought.⁴⁶

The assertion in the *De divinatione per somnum* that dreams 'are not sent by God but are daemonic'⁴⁷ is not in conflict with the above and cannot therefore be taken to show a change of view on Aristotle's part. Both the lost works and the *Corpus* deny any involvement of the transcendent deity in changeable reality, while at the same time all knowledge of truth is said to originate in him.⁴⁸

9. The 'reversal of perspective'

In chapter 4.2 we already pointed out that Plutarch employs a typical 'reversal of perspective' to introduce his mythical narrative. He not only contrasts the civilization of earthly mortals 'horizontally' as 'the great island' with the 'great continent' which seems to lie outside the reach of ordinary mortals, but also 'vertically' by describing the Moon as a celestial Earth, so that the Earth assumes the position of 'under-world' and realm of Hades.

This motif has been a basic component of the philosophical myths of countless authors. But certainly Aristotle too made ready use of it. The 'revelation of Silenus' is a case in point.⁴⁹ And the mantic dream of Eudemus, too, only proves to contain truth at a 'higher level', namely when dying is perceived to be a 'return home'. Something similar underlies the motif of the 'eyes of Lynkeus',⁵⁰ and the comparison of man's earthly existence to that of a mayfly.⁵¹ The story about the 'affluent cave-dwellers' uses the same reversal motif.⁵² And finally we mention Aristotle's discussion of the 'isles of the blessed',⁵³ which we can in turn connect with the Kronos island.

10. The 'light-names' of the planets

In the *De facie* myth we also come across a remarkable statement about

⁴⁶ Al-kindī, cod. Taimuriyye Falsafa 55 = Arist., *Eudemus* fr. 11 Ross. On this, see ch. 15 below.

⁴⁷ Arist., *Div.Somn.* 2 463b13.

⁴⁸ For a detailed discussion we refer to ch. 12.5 below.

⁴⁹ Plu., *Consol. ad Apoll.* 115c-d = Arist., *Eudemus* fr. 6 Ross.

⁵⁰ Iamb., *Protr.* 8 (47.5-21 Pistelli) = Arist., *Protr.* fr. 10a Ross; Düring B 105; Boethius, *Consol.* 3.8.

⁵¹ Cic., *Tusc.* 1.39.94 = Arist., *Protr.* 10a Ross, assigned to the *Eudemus* by A. Grilli, 'Cicerone e l'*Eudemo*', *PP* 17 (1962) 111.

⁵² Cic., *N.D.* 2.37.95-96 = Arist., *Philos.* fr. 13 Ross. Cf. ch. 13 below.

⁵³ Iamb., *Protr.* 9 (52.16-54.5 Pistelli) = Arist., *Protr.* fr. 12 Ross; B 43 Düring.

the planet Saturn, designated by Plutarch as the planet 'which we call Phainon, but which they [sc. the inhabitants of the Great Continent on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean] call "Nightwatchman"'.⁵⁴ Earlier on in the dialogue he mentions two other planets by the names Phosphoros (= Venus) and Stilbon (= Mercury).⁵⁵ There he moreover places the Sun lower than these two planets. That is to say that he retains the old Pythagorean, Platonic, or Egyptian order of the planets⁵⁶ and does not connect these planets with the names of gods, but uses a series of names suggesting the varying luminous intensity of the planets, namely Phainon, Phaethon, Pyroeis, Stilbon, and Phosphoros.

There is a great deal of uncertainty about the origin of these names and the date at which they were introduced.⁵⁷ One of them, Phainon, seems to have been used by Heraclides Ponticus, though to indicate the planet Jupiter.⁵⁸

Elsewhere we have suggested that the introduction of these names can only be understood against the background of a theory in which the varying luminous intensity of the planets is explained to be a result of their distance from the origin of all light, the transcendent divine Source.⁵⁹ Such a train of thought can easily be connected with the theme which we found both in Heraclides Ponticus and Aristotle, i.e. the identification of the planets, as cosmic gods, with the Titans who have been robbed of their divine splendour.

In Aristotle's oeuvre, curiously, we find these planetary 'light-names' in the highly controversial *De mundo*.⁶⁰ If G. Reale is right in claiming that this writing is authentically Aristotelian,⁶¹ then it contains to our knowledge the oldest passage where this series, in the old-Pythagorean order followed by Plutarch, is mentioned.

⁵⁴ Plu., *De facie* 941c.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 925a.

⁵⁶ Cf. H. Cherniss, *ad Plu., De facie* 925a, who refers to J.L.E. Dreyer, *History of the planetary systems* 168-170 and P. Boyancé, *Études sur le songe de Scipion* (Limoges 1936) 59-65. From the second century BC onwards, the Chaldean or 'late Pythagorean' order of the planets was current, according to which Venus and Mercury were located between the Moon and the Sun.

⁵⁷ Cf. F. Cumont, 'Les noms des planètes et l'astrolâtrie chez les Grecs', *AC* 4 (1935) 5-43 and A. P. Bos, 'Notes on Aristotle's *De mundo* concerning the discussion of its authenticity', *PI* 1 (1979) 142-147.

⁵⁸ Heraclides Ponticus, fr. 66b (ed. F. Wehrli).

⁵⁹ A. P. Bos, *art. cit.* 146.

⁶⁰ Arist., *Mu.* 2 392a23; cf. A.P. Bos, *art. cit.* 142.

⁶¹ G. Reale, *Aristotele Trattato sul cosmo per Alessandro* (Naples 1974). We tried to support his view in our *art. cit.* (1979) and in 'Greek philosophical theology and the *De mundo*' (1986) 1-30.

11. *The theme of the 'dissolution' of the soul*

Another remarkable passage in Plutarch's myth of *De facie* discusses the 'second death', the separation of mind and soul, as the final phase in the 'liberation' of man. This passage says that the soul remains behind on the moon and that it still shows traces, so to speak, of its earthly life and preserves a kind of memory of it as of a dream.⁶² This conception does not seem to go back to Plato. Nor does it appear to agree with the psychology of Aristotle's *De anima*. There, it is true, Aristotle states that if anything in man can be *choriston*, it is the mind.⁶³ But the soul, as entelechy of the body, is said to be necessarily connected with the body.⁶⁴

Nevertheless we should take into account the statements of Cicero according to which Aristotle considered the fifth element to be the substance of the stars *and* of the human souls/minds.⁶⁵ Moreover, Hippolytus says somewhere that Aristotle 'agreed with Plato on most matters, except on his theory of the soul. For Plato held it to be immortal, but Aristotle thought that the soul survives longer than the body, yet later it too disappears into the fifth element'.⁶⁶

12. *The dreams of Endymion*

There is a small detail in the *De facie* myth which also deserves mention. In the passage about the separation of soul and mind (the 'second death'), Plutarch says that the process of separation passes quickly for those who pursued the philosophical life, but less quickly for those who were ambitious, active in politics, or sensual by nature and irascible. Their souls survive longer, in a dreamlike state, like the soul of Endymion.⁶⁷ Cherniss comments that no other statement about Endymion's dreams is found in the classical tradition.⁶⁸

We cannot refute Cherniss; yet we wish to argue that Plutarch's description of Endymion is not original. Now the figure of Endymion also occurs in a remarkable context in the *Corpus Aristotelicum*. At the end of

⁶² Plu., *De facie* 944f ff.

⁶³ Arist., *An.* 1.1 403a3-12; 4 408b11-29; 2.2 413b25; 2.3 415a11-12; 3.4 429a10-13; a24-25; 3.5 430a22.

⁶⁴ Arist., *An.* 2.1 413a3-9.

⁶⁵ Cic., *Acad.* 1.7.26: 'quintum genus, e quo essent astra mentesque'; *Tusc.* 1.10.22: 'quintam quandam naturam .. e qua sit mens'; 1.26.65: 'Sin autem est quaedam natura, ab Aristotele inducta primum, haec et deorum est et animorum'.

⁶⁶ Hipp., *Ref.* 1.20.3: ... ὁ δὲ Ἄρ. ἐπιδιαμένειν καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα καὶ ταύτην ἐναφανίζεσθαι τῷ πέμπτῳ σώματι. Cf. also Hermias, *Irr.* 2.3. Olymp., *In Phd.* 124.18-20 (Norvin) also seems to point in this direction.

⁶⁷ Plu., *De facie* 945b: αἱ μὲν οἷον ἐν ὕπνῳ ταῖς τοῦ βίου μνημοσύναις ὀνειράσιν χρώμεναι διαφέρονται καθάπερ ἡ τοῦ Ἐνδυμίωνος. H. Cherniss translates: 'as did the soul of Endymion'.

⁶⁸ H. Cherniss, *ad loc.* note e.

the *Nicomachean Ethics*, where Aristotle draws his conclusions about 'the highest good' for man, he states that perfect happiness consists in theoretical, contemplative activity. He instances the gods as being blessed and happy in the highest degree. For they are not troubled by the necessity of or need for practical activity. Nor do they stop at the level of *merely potential* possession of *theoria*, without actualizing it.⁶⁹ However, there are beings whose condition is not as unmixed and pure as that of the gods; beings of an inferior order who do possess the *potential* for contemplation, but do not *achieve its actualization*. Endymion is then mentioned as an exemplar of this miserable fate: he possesses the potential, but never achieves real, actual contemplation, because he is imprisoned in a deep sleep.

Endymion functions in this connection as the type of a most splendid and desirable existence, raised far above the ills of sublunary existence, but nevertheless devoid of true happiness. In a following chapter we wish to discuss the figure of Endymion more extensively and to advance arguments for the claim that the brief mention of this figure in the *Nicomachean Ethics* supposes a more detailed discussion in one of Aristotle's lost works.⁷⁰ In view of the fact that Endymion is also mentioned in Plato's *Phaedo*⁷¹ and in view of the possible connection between Endymion, the king of Elis, and the anonymous king about whom an Arabian fragment says that Aristotle recounted an ecstatic experience of him and related him to Elis,⁷² we assume that the mythical figure of Endymion played a part in the *Eudemus*.

⁶⁹ Arist., *EN* 10.8 1178b7-19. Cf. O. Gigon, 'Prolegomena to an edition of the *Eudemus*' (1960) 28: 'It is an acknowledged fact that the description of the philosophical life in the tenth book of the *N.E.* is dependent on the *Protrepticus*'.

⁷⁰ See ch. 15.

⁷¹ Pl., *Phd.* 72c1.

⁷² Al-kindī, cod. Taimuriyye Falsafa 55 = Arist., *Eudemus* fr. 11 Ross.

CHAPTER NINE

ARISTOTLE'S 'KRONOLOGY': AN ATTEMPT AT RECONSTRUCTION

We shall now round off our investigation into the background of Tertullian's reference to an Aristotelian 'Kronology' by taking the first steps toward a reconstruction of the Aristotelian system of thought as it may have been expressed in (some of) his lost works. We have no illusions that our efforts will convince everyone. Our aim is only to offer a hypothetical reconstruction of which it can be argued that:

- (a) its elements were probably part of the debate held in the Old Academy around the middle of the 4th century BC;
- (b) its themes were probably important for the Aristotle we know from the *Corpus Aristotelicum*;
- (c) it gives a coherent and meaningful place to many elements of the classical tradition about Aristotle's writings and doctrine, so that the need to dismiss these elements as results of misunderstanding and corruption is minimized.

1. *Kronology and Diology*

In the first place we found that the only meaningful place for the 'dreaming Kronos' item was in the context of a 'double theology' governed by the oppositions between 'transcendent' and 'cosmic' and between 'contemplative' and 'practical'. Earlier we tried to show that this double theology resulted from Aristotle's critique of the Platonic theology embodied in the demiurgic creator of the *Timaeus* and the divine world ruler of the *Politicus*. Essential to Plato's theology is the combination of contemplative and ruling or productive activity. The divine creator of the world and the divine world ruler are characterized by a structural *dialectic* between dissociation from visible reality and active involvement in it.

In our view, the mythical dreaming Kronos figure which Tertullian ascribes to Aristotle can only be understood against the background of Aristotle's opposition to this dialectical theology. Aristotle reacted by postulating the complete *unchangeability* of the highest divine principle and by ascribing to this principle the perfect and constant realization of only one activity, contemplation. Because he exempted the supreme god from creative activity, it necessarily followed that non-divine reality as a whole is ungenerated and imperishable. And because he exempted the highest god

from organizing and ruling activities, it was also necessary to deny that this god is providentially involved in the world.

The characteristics of the dreaming god Kronos will have to be taken to indicate the difference between his condition and that of the supreme deity. Kronos has the potential for contemplation and intellectuality, but is also restrained by the periodical negative influence of his Titanic passions on his rational powers. To this extent it is clear that Kronos is not perfectly pure *Nous*, but a psychic being in whom the rational faculty (*to logikon*) and the irrational (*to alogon*) fight for priority.¹ The mantic nature of the knowledge acquired by Kronos in his sleep will have to be seen as an indication that all discursive activity is dependent on an *intuition* of principles which is itself supra-discursive. Both the characteristics of 'dreaming' and 'being bound' mark the ontically inferior status of Kronos with regard to Zeus. Kronos is therefore not only characterized as 'psychic', but also as cosmic and 'physical', that is to say, as belonging to the whole of *Physis*. Here it is important to remember that for Aristotle *Physis* is not only physically but also psychically (daemonically) qualified. The crucial question, then, is how Aristotle could talk about a cosmic divine being who is 'bound' and 'imprisoned'.

In the foregoing we proposed to see the 'binding of Kronos' in relation to and as an alternative to the bondage of the World-soul in Plato. Statements in *De caelo* 2.1 show that Aristotle criticized the Platonic doctrine of the World-soul by claiming that it condemned the World-soul to an eternal unnatural conjunction with changeable *somata* and thus to a fate like that of the criminal Ixion on his revolving wheel. As an alternative to this Platonic psychology, Aristotle presents in the same chapter his own theory of the fifth element, which by nature moves in a circle and must therefore be considered eternal, imperishable, and divine. Aristotle thus presented the divine cosmic beings as consisting of this very special substance, the fifth element. In these cosmic gods, however, he must also have postulated a duality of *psyche* and *nous*, analogous to the duality of *soma* and *psyche* in mortals. The ontological difference with regard to the transcendent, meta-cosmic deity must have been that the latter is perfectly pure *Nous*, whereas the cosmic gods are souls with intellectual potential.

In this way Aristotle may have conceived the celestials as being just as *composite* as sublunary mortals, but on a higher level. The connection

¹ Cf. for this opposition *EN* 1.13 1102a23-28. Aristotle observes there that the scientific study of politics also requires insight into the nature of the soul. Adequate for this purpose, he continues, is what is said in the *exoterikoi logoi*; these must be made use of: οἷον τὸ μὲν ἄλογον αὐτῆς εἶναι, τὸ δὲ λόγον ἔχον. For the difference between the psychology followed in the *EN* and that of the *De anima*, cf. R. Gauthier, J. Y. Jolif, *Aristote, L'Éthique à Nicomaque* 1 (Louvain 1958) 8* and 35* (repr. 1970²) 27* and 60*. According to these authors, therefore, Aristotle held a non-hylomorphic psychology for most of his life (until 330 BC), p. 33* (1970, 58*).

between body and soul which in mortals involves the bondage of an imperishable psychic substance to a perishable body is analogous to the connection between a perfectly rational principle and a heavenly, divinely ethereal body in the celestials. Only in this way can we explain the passage in which Aëtius says: 'Aristotle presents the supreme divinity as transcendent Form, enthroned on the sphere of the Universe, which consists of the ethereal element, called the fifth element by him. This fifth element is divided into spheres which are actually continuous, but conceptually distinct; he considers each of these spheres to be a living being, composed of a body and a soul. Their body consists of circularly moving ether, their soul is an unmoving *logos* which is the cause of their actual movement'.²

The 'bondage of Kronos' and the bond of the divine celestial beings is not, therefore, the conjunction of a soul to a perishable earthly body, as Plato had suggested, but the conjunction of a noeric principle to a psychic body. The fifth element is the substance of the souls (with their rational and irrational powers), but not of the *pure noës*. This entire conception can be seen as resulting from a refinement and further consideration of the principles of Plato's psychology, which from the *Phaedo* onwards, via the *Republic* and *Phaedrus* to the *Sophistes* and the *Timaeus*, tended toward an increasingly sharp distinction between *nous* and *psyche*.

Apparently, the ancient Orphic motif of the degradation of the Titans, which Plato had used in his *Phaedo* to denote the bondage of the soul to a perishable body, was transposed by Aristotle to a higher level, in that he used it as an image of the 'bondage' of a noeric principle to a psychic substance. This means that the cosmic gods are beings with a noeric potential, but one which is restrained by its conjunction to a (psychic) ethereal body and by their enclosure within *Physis*. None of this alters the fact that their mode of existence, since they are divine, eternal beings who do not suffer from the toils of a perishable condition, is infinitely more glorious than that of earthly mortals.

In sum, we think that the tendency toward increasing intellectualization and spiritualization which Aristotle's philosophy shows in comparison with Plato's³ contributed to a situation where the cosmic gods, in spite of their splendour from an earthly point of view, are also regarded as subaltern gods, inferior in rank and status and level of cognition to the meta-cosmic deity. In this sense the lost works of Aristotle probably made an incalculable

² Aëtius (Pseudo-Plutarch), *De Plac. Phil.* 1 881e-f: 'Ἀρ. τὸν μὲν ἀνώτατον θεὸν εἶδος χωριστὸν ἐπιβεβηκότα τῇ σφαίρᾳ τοῦ παντός ἥτις ἐστὶν αἰθέριον σῶμα, τὸ πέμπτον ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καλούμενον· διηρημένου δὲ τούτου κατὰ σφαίρας, τῇ μὲν φύσει συναφεῖς τῷ λόγῳ δὲ κεχωρισμένης, ἐκάστην οἶται τῶν σφαιρῶν ζῶον εἶναι σύνθετον ἐκ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς, ὃν τὸ μὲν σῶμά ἐστιν αἰθέριον κινούμενον κυκλοφορικῶς, ἡ ψυχὴ δὲ λόγος ἀκίνητος αἴτιος τῆς κινήσεως κατ' ἐνέργειαν.

³ Cf. H. J. Drossaart Lulofs, *De ogen van Lynkeus* (Leiden 1967) 19.

contribution to a development which assumed its most extreme forms in the Hermeticism and the Gnosticism of late Hellenism.

2. Aristotle's criticism of the Platonic theory of the soul as the centre of his polemic against Plato

In all this we do well to note how the various parts of Aristotle's thought outlined above form a coherent whole. They all belong to Aristotle's criticism of Plato's theory of the soul as distinct from the mind, with regard to both the individual soul and the World-soul. It was the criticism of Plato's theory of the World-soul which occasioned the development of Aristotle's new theory of the fifth element. And it was the criticism of Plato's inadequate distinction between the functions held to be specific to the soul and the mind which led Aristotle to his sharp distinction between a transcendent, purely contemplative deity as pure *Nous* on the one hand, and a cosmic, psychic, and noeric deity Kronos as World-soul (along Aristotelian lines) on the other.⁴

Especially when we remember that the information about a 'dreaming Kronos' in Aristotle is given by Tertullian in his treatise *On the soul*; when we see that the same 'dreaming Kronos' occurs in Plutarch in a context where the importance of distinguishing carefully between 'soul' and 'mind' is emphasized; when we see that various doxographical reports from antiquity posit general agreement between Plato and Aristotle with the exception of one subject, psychology;⁵ and, finally, when we recall how well the motif of the 'dreaming Kronos' seemed to fit in the context of elements which we can confidently assign to Aristotle's dialogue *Eudemus* or *On the soul*, then these considerations lend support to our belief in the great importance of this writing, the *Eudemus* or *On the soul*. This work can no longer be dismissed as a literary imitation of Plato's *Phaedo* without independent value, but certainly made a substantial contribution to the philosophical debate on all facets of the theory of the soul, and as such was an alternative to the *Phaedo*, the *Republic*, the *Phaedrus*, and the *Timaeus*.⁶

⁴ Cf. Cic., *N.D.* 1.13.33 = Arist., *Philos.* fr. 26 Ross: '... tum caeli ardorem deum dicit esse ...'. W. Jaeger's apodictic claim (*Aristotle* 139) that 'Aristotle described the ether as a divine body, or as a more divine body, as he does in the treatises; he certainly did not call it God' misses the mark completely. Equally lacking in balance is his assertion that 'even after he had abandoned the theory of Ideas, [Aristotle] still retained for some time Plato's conception of the soul, and no doubt his doctrine of immortality also' (*Aristotle* 162).

⁵ Cf. Hipp., *Haer.* 1.20.3: καὶ σχεδὸν τὰ πλεῖστα τῷ Πλάτῳνι σύμφωνός ἐστιν πλὴν τοῦ περὶ ψυχῆς δόγματος. Cf. also Cic., *N.D.* 1.13.33 = Arist., *Philos.* fr. 26 Ross, where mss. A B read: 'Aristotelesque in tertio de philosophia libro multo turbat a magistro uno Platone dissentiens'. On this text see Ch.14.4.2 below.

⁶ In an earlier study we argued that the titles *Eudemus* and *Protrepticus* should be

3. The 'dreaming Kronos' and the 'sleeping World-soul' in Middle Platonism

On the basis of the above considerations, we must disagree with J. Dillon's view of the developments in the philosophical debates of Middle Platonism, as set out in his important study of that period. Dillon holds that the emerging distinction in Middle Platonism between a supreme, first god and an inferior, secondary deity is due to the influence of Stoic philosophy. The Middle Platonists supposedly accepted the Stoic notion of the creative World *Logos* and subsequently accepted a wholly transcendent, immaterial principle.⁷

In our opinion, the distinction between a first and second deity should rather be assigned to Aristotle, and results specifically from his criticism of Plato's noölogy and psychology. Both the views of the Stoics and the Middle Platonists show the effect of the debate between Plato and Aristotle. The Stoics, in their rejection of metaphysical and immaterial reality, follow Aristotle's theory of the divine ether as the ruling and organizing principle of the world in the elaboration of their *Logos* concept. The Middle Platonists, on the other hand, in maintaining a transcendent, immaterial *Nous*, accept the utter unchangeability of this highest principle which Aristotle had argued so forcibly. This also explains why they assign the demiurgic function to another, inferior and cosmic principle. In Philo of Alexandria, who does his utmost to avoid the suggestion of a ditheistic doctrine, this demiurgic entity is called 'the *Logos* of God in his world-creating activity'.⁸ However, in the comparison with which he clarifies the relation between the *Nous* and the *Logos*, he emphatically distinguishes the *Nous* (the king) from the *Logos* (the architect) by making the latter the one who works out and executes the divine plan in detail. He also describes the intelligible world as the content of the *Logos*; this world was produced by God on the first day of creation recounted in Genesis 1.⁹

Quite remarkable is the conception found in Plutarch and Albinus, where besides a transcendent, immaterial Mind a 'sleeping World-soul' is

regarded as different names for one and the same Aristotelian writing, i.e. the *Eudemus*, dealing with the subject of 'The Soul' and belonging to the genre of the *protreptikos logos*; *Dionysius* 8 (1984) 19-51. The considerations set out above incline us to go a step further and to ask whether the *Eudemus*, with its overriding theme of 'the soul' and its strong defence of the philosophical, contemplative life, is the same writing as the work which in antiquity was also referred to as 'On philosophy'. Cf. in this connection the curious title προτρεπτικός φιλοσοφίας γ' in Ptolemy el-Garib, whose text mentions no π. ψυχῆς.

⁷ J. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists; A Study of Platonism 80 B.C.-A.D. 220* (London 1977) 46.

⁸ Philo, *Opif.* 24. Cf. J. C. M. van Winden, 'The World of Ideas in Philo of Alexandria; an interpretation of *De Opif. M.* 24-25', *VC* 37 (1983) 209-217.

⁹ Philo, *Opif.* 15-16.

introduced. In Plutarch this theme occurs in the *De procreatione animae* 28 1026e-f: 'From this dual association the nature of the heavens is not exempt either; but it inclines this way or that, at present being kept straight by the dominant revolution of sameness and piloting the universe, whereas there will be and often has already been a period of time in which its prudential part becomes dull and falls asleep, filled with forgetfulness of what is proper to it, while the part intimate with body and sensitive to it from the beginning puts a heavy drag upon the right-hand course of the sum of things and rolls it back without being able, however, to disrupt it entirely, but the better part recovers again and looks up at the pattern when god helps with the turning and the guidance'.¹⁰ Dillon is quite right to point out that this view of a World-soul whose periodical sleep has disastrous consequences for the government of the world is inspired by the myth of Plato's *Politicus*.¹¹ And he continues: 'This image of the sleeping World-Soul (the "Sleeping Beauty" myth, one might call it) is rather mysterious in origin. It is not a Platonic image in this form, though the image of our life as a sleep or dream is an old and respectable one. It may simply be an imaginative development of the *Politicus* myth, but the fact that it is found in both Plutarch and Albinus suggests that it is older than both - although it is chronologically quite possible for Albinus to have read Plutarch'.¹²

We add here that according to Plutarch the dialectic of the World-soul is related to the fact that the soul is at once *theoretike* and *praktike*,¹³ and that Plutarch touched upon the same problem in a different setting in his myth about the 'dreaming Kronos' at the end of the *De facie*. It is regrettable that Dillon fails to use the connection with the latter text. For the fact that it is possible to see Plutarch's myth of the 'dreaming Kronos' as inspired by what Aristotle said about a 'dreaming Kronos' in one of his lost writings makes it natural to assume traces of Aristotle's reflections on the World-soul in both Plutarch and Albinus.

The relevant texts of Alcinous/Albinus are found in his *Didaskalikos* 10.2-3 and 14.3. After claiming that the highest god is *Nous* actually and not potentially, and that his action does not prejudice his unchangeability, he posits that the transcendent *Nous* motivates the cosmic *nous*.¹⁴ The *Nous* does this by *waking* the World-soul and drawing it to itself, thus becoming the cause of its intellectuality.¹⁵ In 14.3 Alcinous/Albinus also emphatically

¹⁰ The translation is by H. Cherniss, *Plutarch's Moralia* 13.1 (London 1976) 259-261.

¹¹ J. Dillon, *op. cit.* 205.

¹² J. Dillon, *op. cit.* 206.

¹³ Plut., *Procr.an.* 26 1025d-e.

¹⁴ Alcinous/Albinus, *Didaskalikos*, ed. P. Louis (Paris 1945) 10.2

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 10.3: Πατήρ δέ ἐστι τῷ αἴτιος εἶναι πάντων καὶ κοσμεῖν τὸν οὐράνιον νοῦν καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ κόσμου πρὸς ἑαυτὸν καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἑαυτοῦ νοήσεις. κατὰ γὰρ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ βούλησιν ἐμπέπληκε πάντα ἑαυτοῦ, τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ κόσμου ἐπεγείρας καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἐπιστρέψας τοῦ νοῦ αὐτῆς αἴτιος ὑπάρχων. ὃς κοσμηθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς διακοσμεῖ σύμπασαν φύσιν ἐν τῷδε τῷ κόσμῳ.

denies that the creative activity of the transcendent *Nous* presupposes any beginning in time. It is not to be assumed that there was a time in which the cosmos did not exist. The same applies to the World-soul. It too is not created by God, but organized. 'To create' must be understood in the sense that the transcendent *Nous* wakes the *nous* of the World-soul and the World-soul itself and draws them to itself, as if from a deep lethargy and sleep.¹⁶

In his discussion of these passages, Dillon notes that the transcendent *Nous* 'is in fact the Aristotelian Prime Mover of *Metaphysics* XII'.¹⁷ This means that Alcinous/Albinus also recognizes the conclusiveness of Aristotle's arguments against any kind of dialectic in the highest principle and adjusts the Platonic conception accordingly. With reference to the text in 14.3, Dillon observes: 'He has said essentially this already in ch. 10, but the sleep of the soul is more explicitly stated here, and the interesting word *karos* is used, which suggests a mythic dimension to this doctrine, dredged up from somewhere in the underworld of Middle Platonism'.¹⁸ Dillon is right in saying that the term *karos* used by Alcinous/Albinus is characteristic of the language of myths. But instead of thinking of the 'underworld of Middle Platonism', we suggest that the term recalls the 'upper world' described in a philosophical myth by Aristotle. One might also mention that the word *karos* occurs in his *Problemata* to indicate an effect of the use of wine.¹⁹

4. The fifth element as substance of the soul in macrocosmos and microcosmos

In the foregoing we tried to reconstruct the content of Aristotle's lost work in such a way that Cicero's information about Aristotle's theory of a very special, fifth substance²⁰ can be given a meaningful place and can be

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 14.3: καὶ ταύτη λέγουι' ἂν καὶ ποιεῖν, ἐγείρων καὶ ἐπιστρέφων πρὸς αὐτὸν τὸν τε νοῦν αὐτῆς καὶ αὐτὴν ὥσπερ ἐκ κάρου τινὸς βαθέος ἢ ὕπνου ...

¹⁷ J. Dillon, *op. cit.* 283. P. Donini, 'Gli dei e il dio: la teologia greca' in *Il sapere degli antichi*, ed. M. Vegetti (Turin 1985) 314 also talks about 'l'aristotelizzante autore del *Didaskalikos*'.

¹⁸ J. Dillon, *op. cit.* 287, who mentions that the word also occurs in Maximus of Tyre, *Or.* 10.1, in the sense of the 'sleep' of the soul in the body.

¹⁹ Arist., *Pr.* 3.17 873b14.

²⁰ Cf. the texts classified under Arist., *Philos.* fr. 27 Ross. O. Gigon had already suggested in his articles (1959) 156 and (1960) 23 that these texts should be related to the *Eudemus*. Cf. also A. Grilli, 'Cicerone e l'*Eudemo*', *PP* 17 (1962) 98. On these texts, see further E. Berti, *La filosofia del primo Aristotele* (Padua 1962) 392-401; J. Bidez, *Un singulier naufrage littéraire dans l'Antiquité* (Brussels 1943) 33 ff.; P. Moraux, 'Quinta essentia', *P.W.-R.E.* (Stuttgart 1963) 47.1171-1266; M. Untersteiner, *Aristotele Della filosofia* (Rome 1963) 265-281; A. H. Chroust, 'The *akatanomaston* in Aristotle's *On Philosophy*', *Emerita* 40 (1972) 461-468; and Ch. Lefèvre, 'Quinta natura et psychologie aristotélécienne', *RPhL* 69 (1971) 5-43. Cf. also Arist., *Philos.* fr.26 Ross.

seen in close connection with the theory of the celestial element found in the *De caelo*. In this way we think we have provided a useful alternative to countless explanations of Cicero's statements about a fifth element or substance in Aristotle and the apparently physicalistic theory of *De caelo* 1.2-3.

In our view, there is no need to ascribe a materialistic psychology to Aristotle,²¹ but neither are we forced to assume two completely different versions of Aristotle's doctrine of a fifth substance.²²

Recently, however, D. E. Hahm has strongly argued against the soundness of the information provided by Cicero.²³ He concludes: 'The net result is that the testimony of Cicero and the Clementine *Recognitions* is all but useless as evidence for the presence of the theory of a fifth element in the lost *De philosophia*'.²⁴ Hahm's view is all the more remarkable since many modern scholars have claimed, if only because of the more elevated style of *De caelo* 2.1, that this chapter almost certainly used material from a lost work. Almost invariably they cite the *De philosophia* as the most likely source.²⁵

First of all, Hahm argues that it is not certain that *caeli ardor* in Cicero's

²¹ H. von Arnim, *Die Entstehung der Aristotelischen Gotteslehre* (Vienna 1931) 12. Similarly, W. K. C. Guthrie, 'The development of Aristotle's theology', *CQ* 27 (1933) 169, although in the same article he did sense the problem that 'whatever Aristotle's temperament may have been, it was not that of a materialist' (*loc. cit.*). Guthrie in fact played down the hypothesis of a materialistic phase in his edition and translation of *Arist., Cael.* (London 1939, repr. 1964⁴) xxxii-xxxv, but without offering any other satisfactory solution. In his preface to the French edition of F. Nuyens, *Ontwikkelingsmomenten in de zielkunde van Ar.* (Louvain 1948) xii f., A. Mansion also talks about 'materialism' in Aristotle's psychology, as do R. A. Gauthier, J. Y. Jolif, *Ar., L'Éthique à Nicom.* 1 (Louvain 1958) 10* (1970²) 28* n.70. For the question of 'materialism' and 'hylozoism' in Aristotle, cf. P. Moraux, 'Quinta essentia', *P.W.-R.E.* 47.1216-1224. See also Ph. Merlan in A. H. Armstrong (ed.), *CHLGMPH.* (Cambridge 1970) 40 ff. According to this author, 'the possibility cannot be discounted that at some phase of his philosophical career Aristotle identified the soul with ether, thus explaining why it is permanently moved ... Much in the history of the Peripatos can better be understood if we side with Kampe and Arnim and take into account that the materialistic interpretation of Aristotle was in antiquity very frequent and started very early' (*loc. cit.* n.9). And 'undoubtedly, ether was meant to replace the astral soul and be elevated to be the only cause of the circular movements of the celestial bodies, and it is reasonable to assume that at times, at least, it was also meant to replace (or to explain) the human soul' (41).

²² S. Mariotti, 'La "quinta essentia" nell' Aristotele perduto e nell' Accademia', *RFIC* n.s. 18 (1940) 179-180 and 'Testimonianze ed echi dell' Aristotele giovanile', *A&R* (3.8) 18 (1940) 48-60, and H. J. Easterling, 'Quinta natura', *MH* 21 (1964) 73-85.

²³ D. E. Hahm, 'The fifth element in Aristotle's *De philosophia*: a critical re-examination', *JHS* 102 (1982) 60-74. In this Hahm goes in the footsteps of D. J. Furley, 'Lucretius and the Stoics', *BICS* 18 (1966) 21-23.

²⁴ *Art. cit.* 67; cf. 70. He already expressed his doubts in his important study *The origins of Stoic cosmology* (Columbus, Ohio, 1977) 101 with n.27.

²⁵ For a more extensive discussion of *Cael.* 2.1, cf. ch. 12 below.

De natura deorum 1.13.33²⁶ must be taken to refer to a fifth element, as it usually has been since the last century.²⁷ According to him, it is possible that in an early phase, before writing the *De caelo*, Aristotle thought that the celestial bodies consisted of Fire, while recognizing their divinity.²⁸ It is besides uncertain, in Hahm's view, that doxographical information attributing a fifth element to Aristotle in a way that cannot be explained from the preserved works necessarily goes back to the *De philosophia*.²⁹ Finally, Hahm argues that the statements of Cicero according to which Aristotle assumed a 'fifth nature' as substance of the soul and the mind are hard to reconcile with Aristotle's philosophy as we know it. We are faced by the choice of interpreting this 'fifth nature' as 'corporeal', in which case there is the problem of a materialistic phase in Aristotle's psychology; or as 'immaterial', which leaves us with the problem of reconciling this with the theory of the *De caelo*.³⁰

Besides rejecting testimonies frequently regarded as evidence for the theory of a fifth element in the *De philosophia*, Hahm goes on to show that other texts argue against the presence of this theory. In particular he adduces one of Philo's proofs of the eternity of the world.³¹ Hahm concludes by proposing to distinguish three phases in Aristotle's cosmology, the first represented by *De caelo* 3 and 4, the second by *De caelo* 1 and 2, and a third attested to by the *Meteorologica*.³² Naturally, the *De philosophia*, which has his special attention, is included in the first phase.³³

In the first place we must make an objection to Hahm's method. If he claims that the theory of the fifth element in the *De caelo* does not imply that this theory played a role in earlier writings, he is turning things around. For the onus of proof lies with whoever argues that a certain authentic Aristotelian theory was absent in various early works.

We must also criticize the way he uses Philo's proof of the eternity of the world. For if its origin is agreed to be in the *De philosophia*, there can be no doubt that the proof forms part of an argument against the position of Plato's *Timaeus*. As in the case of the other proofs which Philo includes in his *De aeternitate mundi*, we must consider the possibility that Aristotle argues towards his conclusions *on the basis of positions accepted by his opponent*. Aristotle seems to want to show his partner in discussion that some of Plato's basic ideas lead to different conclusions from those presented in the *Timaeus*.

²⁶ Arist., *Philos.* fr. 26 Ross.

²⁷ *Art. cit.* 60-63.

²⁸ *Art. cit.* 63; cf. 70.

²⁹ *Art. cit.* 65. This particularly concerns the texts included in *Philos.* fr. 27 Ross; cf. n.20 above.

³⁰ *Art. cit.* 66. Cf. B. Effe, *Studien* 148-155.

³¹ *Art. cit.* 70 ff., where he discusses Philo, *Aet.* 28-34.

³² *Art. cit.* 73.

³³ *Ibid.*

To the main point of Hahm's argument, however, there is another, more serious objection. It is inconceivable that in his lost works Aristotle did not develop his theory of an eternal, divine fifth element. For the doctrine of the fifth element is a necessary component of Aristotle's opposition to Plato's *Timaeus*, a component which must have been central to his lost oeuvre. Aristotle's rejection of any kind of dialectic in the supreme deity leads him to reject Plato's Demiurge and the idea that the cosmos is generated. His conviction that the world is eternal, in the sense of ungenerated and imperishable, forces him to dismiss Plato's theory of the World-soul. The theory of the eternal, fifth element which by nature moves in a circle and which differs radically from the four 'earthly' material elements enables him to replace Plato's theory of the World-soul and to expose this theory as a view in which the celestial gods are unnaturally bound to a perishable body and thus condemned to a fate more miserable than that of Ixion. While maintaining his belief in the divinity of the celestials and their eternal existence, Aristotle bases this stance on his own new theory of the fifth element. The natural, circular course of the latter differs qualitatively from the finite movement of the 'earthly' elements. Like Plato, therefore, Aristotle distinguishes between two essentially different components of the universe. There is, however, a profound difference. For Plato, the cosmos is filled by the four elements, while the entire cosmos is pervaded by the World-soul. For Aristotle, the sublunary is the region of changeable and perishable life. From it he sharply distinguishes the region of the celestial spheres, consisting of the divine fifth element.

This new element is according to Aristotle a *soma* and can therefore be counted among the 'natural *somata*'. But it does not share in the *hyle* of the four earthly *corpora*. For this reason it is described as *ahylon*, as a kind of 'immaterial matter' ('matière immatérielle'). The opposition between 'corporeal' and 'incorporeal' used by Hahm does not apply to this *soma*.³⁴

As soon as it is recognized that in Aristotle's theory this fifth element takes the place of Plato's World-soul, we can assume, even without testimonies like that of Cicero, that it also played a part in Aristotle's anthropology. In his keen analysis of the various Aristotelian expositions of human psychology, Ch. Lefèvre has shown that the *hylomorphic* discussion of the *De anima* is inextricably bound up with an *instrumentistic* one.³⁵ To supplement his study, we shall have to talk about both modes of approach in

³⁴ Cf. J. Pépin, *Théologie cosmique* (Paris 1964) 243. P. Moraux, 'L'exposé de la philosophie d'Aristote chez Diogène Laërce (V 28-34)', *RPhL* 47 (1949) 37 also still accepted that in the *Philos.* Aristotle had presented the fifth element as 'une sorte de matière subtile douée de fonctions psychiques'. Moreover, he still believed in the influence of this Aristotelian theory in Heraclides, Critolaus, Diodorus of Tyre, Philo of Alexandria, Plutarch, Plotinus, Porphyry, and the *Corp. Herm.*

³⁵ Ch. Lefèvre, *Sur l'évolution d'Aristote en psychologie* (Louvain 1972) 282-284.

relation to Aristotle's theory of the fine-material substance of the soul.

In assessing Cicero's testimonies about Aristotle's *quinta natura*,³⁶ we must be sharply aware that he nowhere discusses purely contemplative activity in connection with this special component of the human constitution. Cicero talks exclusively about human (and divine) intellectual activity. Where he speaks of a *singularis natura atque vis animi*,³⁷ he is distinguishing the *psyche* from the components of the human body. And when speaking about *mentes*,³⁸ he means the νοῦς τῆς ψυχῆς³⁹ or the intellectual faculty of an animate being, as is evident from the activities which he assigns to it. Likewise, the god discussed by Cicero in one of the relevant texts appears to belong to the category of *cosmic* gods. When he is referred to as *mens soluta quaedam et libera, segregata ab omni concretione mortali, omnia sentiens et movens ipsaque praedita motu sempiterno*,⁴⁰ this seems to be a description, not of the transcendent Unmoved Mover, but of the celestial gods.⁴¹

Certainly Cicero's testimonies raise the question of why they refrain from mentioning the double theology of Aristotle, if this theology formed the basis of the writings which Cicero consulted. There are two possible answers: (a) he used a writing in which the metaphysical theology was not worked out in detail. In this connection one might note that Plato's *Timaeus* also avoids a discussion of the *ultima principia*. (In the same way we saw that the myth in Plutarch's *De facie* presupposes a Diology, but leaves it altogether undeveloped.) (b) It may also be that Cicero, in pursuing his own aims in the *Tusculanae disputationes*, thought it unnecessary to bring up the difficult and subtle subject of metaphysical theology for a philosophically untrained public. Since Cicero, in the notorious passage in *De natura deorum* 1,⁴² clearly shows familiarity with the two sides of Aristotle's double theology as expounded in the third book of the *De philosophia*, we

³⁶ See for this Ch. Lefèvre, 'Quinta natura et psychologie aristotélécienne', *RPhL* 69 (1971) 5-43 in his very careful refutation of P. Moraux, 'Quinta essentia', *P.W.-R.E.* (1963) 47.1171-1263 and 1430-1432. Lefèvre concludes there 'que les doxographies nominatives ne méritent pas ... la suspicion où les tiennent divers critiques' (39).

³⁷ Cic., *Tusc.* 1.27.66 = Arist., *Philos.* fr. 27d Ross.

³⁸ Cic., *Acad.* 1.7.26 = Arist., *Philos.* fr. 27a Ross; and *Tusc.* 1.10.22 = Arist., *Philos.* fr. 27b Ross.

³⁹ Cf. Arist., *An.* 3.4 429a22: ὁ ἄρα καλούμενος τῆς ψυχῆς νοῦς (λέγω δὲ νοῦν ὃ διανοεῖται καὶ ὑπολαμβάνει ἡ ψυχὴ); *Phys.* 4.14 223a25. *Metaph.* α 1 993b9-11 says that this *nous* has the same capacity for grasping things which are by nature most evident as bats have for seeing daylight.

⁴⁰ Cic., *Tusc.* 1.27.66 = Arist., *Philos.* fr. 27d Ross.

⁴¹ For the 'segregata ab omni concretione mortali', see the description of the exterior celestial sphere in *Cael.* 2.1 284a14 as ἀπαθὴς πάσης θνητῆς δυσχερείας. For the term *soluta*, cf. the κενωρισμένον used to describe the fifth element in *De caelo* 1.2 269a15. On the problems of this text, cf. P. Moraux, *P.W.-R.E.* 47.1215 ff. and, in opposition, Ch. Lefèvre, *art. cit.* (1971) 15-16.

⁴² Cic., *N.D.* 1.13.33 = Arist., *Philos.* fr. 26 Ross. See chapter 14 below.

think that the latter solution can and should be chosen.

We have now indicated our grounds for rejecting Hahn's hypothesis that the *De philosophia* did not necessarily discuss a fifth element. But we have not yet paid attention to the view of other modern scholars, who do accept the theory of the fifth element in Aristotle's lost work, but not a theory of a transcendent deity. According to these scholars, the early Aristotelian theology was a purely *cosmic* theology.⁴³ From our reconstruction of the debate between Aristotle and his teacher, it is clear that we cannot accept this position either. But one other point can be added to this.

It is impossible that Aristotle at any stage raised the fifth element to the highest principle, since he accepted *degrees of purity* within the sphere of this element. This is made very explicit in *Meteor.* 1.3, which also says that the purity of the celestial element particularly diminishes where it is near the sphere of air.⁴⁴ This gradation in purity also plays a role in *De caelo* 1.9 and is there related to a gradation in 'being' and 'life'.⁴⁵ The theory that the various celestial spheres are engaged in *praxis* in order to actualize 'their good', but that their *praxeis* have various degrees of complexity,⁴⁶ is on similar lines. The same gradation is referred to in the short treatise *De mundo*, where it is said that the influence of the divine source's power is stronger in the *soma* which is closest to it and increasingly weaker in the direction of the earth.⁴⁷ When *De caelo* 1.2 says that there must be a fifth element 'higher in value in proportion to its distance from this world of ours',⁴⁸ a distinction is being made between the fifth element and the four earthly elements by means of the same principle of spatial distance which Aristotle apparently applied within the sphere of the fifth element.

If now Aristotle ascribes degrees of purity to the fifth element, he implies that it possesses degrees of perfection. This means that the fifth element cannot possibly have functioned as the *arche* in his philosophical system. It also means, however, that he was able to distinguish within the sphere of the fifth element between beings with higher and lower degrees of rationality,

⁴³ Thus H. von Arnim, *Die Entstehung der Gotteslehre des Aristoteles* (Vienna 1931) 14 ff.: 'Ich behaupte daher, dass Aristoteles, als er *De caelo* schrieb, den unbewegten ersten Beweger noch gar nicht in seine Lehre eingeführt hatte' (16). W. K. C. Guthrie, 'The development of Aristotle's theology', *CQ* 27 (1933) 168; J. Moreau, *L'âme du monde de Platon aux Stoiciens* (Paris 1939) 119 n.1; M. Untersteiner, 'Il Π. φιλοσοφίας di Aristotele', *RFIC* 89 (1961) 150 ff.; J. Pépin, *Théologie cosmique* (Paris 1964) 161 ff. Against this position, see H. Cherniss, *Aristotle's criticism of Plato and the Old Academy* (1944; repr. New York 1972) 581 ff. and B. Effe, *Studien* 102 ff.

⁴⁴ *Meteor.* 1.3 340b6 ff.

⁴⁵ *Cael.* 1.9 279a28.

⁴⁶ *Cael.* 2.12 292a21.

⁴⁷ *Mu.* 6 397b27; cf. A. P. Bos, 'Greek philosophical theology and the *De mundo*' (1986) 21-28.

⁴⁸ *Cael.* 1.2 269b14. Cf. *GA* 3.11 761b14-15 (the passage followed by the statement about the fiery beings on the Moon!).

corresponding to the gradations between the λογική ψυχή on the one hand and the ἄλογος ψυχή on the other.

5. *Kronology and Aristotle's theory of cosmic catastrophes*

This also seems the right place to ask whether there may have been a relation between Aristotle's Kronology and his theory about periodically recurring cosmic catastrophes, in combination with the notion of a 'cosmic yearly cycle'. There are various indications that Aristotle entertained a theory of cosmic catastrophes.⁴⁹ It is often assumed that in it Aristotle closely followed his teacher Plato. In his dialogue the *Politicus*, the latter had related the occurrence of cosmic catastrophes to the periodic fluctuations in the relationship between the world archon Kronos and the cosmos: sometimes Kronos actively occupies himself with the course of affairs in the cosmos, so that a perfect order of things is realized; at other times Kronos withdraws, after which the cosmos changes its direction of rotation and revolves independently toward increasing chaos.⁵⁰ The regular alternation between a harmonic, idyllic world order and a laborious, chaotic cosmic era were therefore strikingly presented by Plato as being due to the influence of Kronos, by analogy with the seasons of the year as caused by the influence of the sun.

It is natural to assume that this theory of catastrophes, to which the *Corpus Aristotelicum* repeatedly alludes, was related by Aristotle, not to the perfectly unchangeable, transcendent deity, but to the god Kronos, who is himself subject to changeability and who can therefore be a cause of changeability.

The same Aristotle described the history of human culture, science, and philosophy as a process which in periods of equal length climbs up from a total loss of culture to the height of natural philosophy and even to the knowledge of eternal, immutable principles. We can now consider this theory, too, in relation to his Kronology.⁵¹ If Aristotle also thought that the culmination of a cultural period was caused by a single leading figure possessed of special wisdom, like Zoroaster or Plato,⁵² then one might even wonder whether Aristotle presented such figures as 'mediators' with a

⁴⁹ *Meteor.* 1.3 339b20 ff.; 1.14 352a28; *Cael.* 1.3 270b16 ff.; *MA.* 3 699a27; *Pol.* 2.8 1269a5; 7.10 1329b25; *Metaph.* A 8 1074a38; cf. also *Mu.* 6 399a25-34. See also W. Jaeger, *Aristotle* 128-138 and A. H. Chroust, "The Great Deluge" in Aristotle's *On philosophy*, *AC* 42 (1973) 113-122.

⁵⁰ *Pl.*, *Plt.* 269a; 270d; 273a; 273d; cf. also *Tim.* 22a; *Criti.* 109d; 112a; 111b; *Laws* 3 677a; 702a.

⁵¹ Cf. *D.L.* 1 (*Proem.*) 8 (6); Pliny, *N.H.* 30.3 = Arist., *Philos.* fr. 6 Ross, and Synes., *Calv.* 22.85c = Arist., *Philos.* fr. 8 Ross.

⁵² Cf. Pliny, *N.H.* 30.3 = Arist., *Philos.* fr. 6 Ross; W. Jaeger, *Aristotle* 133-138.

'daemonic' status, who mediate a supernatural order of knowledge to mortals in the way of the 'Stranger' in the myth of Plutarch's *De facie*.⁵³

⁵³ Cf. also what Aristotle says about Plato in his 'elegy to Eudemos' (W. D. Ross, *Ar. Fragm. Sel.* 146). On this, see K. Gaiser, 'Die Elegie des Aristoteles an Eudemos', *MH* 23 (1966) 84-106, with his excellent explanation of the last line of this poem in praise of Plato: 'Platon hat ... als Einziger oder als Erster unter den Sterblichen eine ihrem Ursprung nach übermenschliche Wahrheit sichtbar gemacht, indem er durch sein Leben und seine Lehre zeigte, dass der Gute zugleich glücklich wird. Diese Einsicht aber - so bekräftigt der letzte Vers - ist nicht im Blick auf die undeutlichen Erscheinungen der uns jetzt umgebenden Leben zu gewinnen, sondern stammt aus einem anderen, reineren Leben, und um so mehr darf das, was Platon aufgezeigt hat, als unerschütterlich wahr gelten' (92).

CHAPTER TEN

THE RELATION BETWEEN ARISTOTLE'S LOST WRITINGS AND THE SURVIVING *CORPUS ARISTOTELICUM*

1. *The demise of the Jaegerian paradigm*

In the previous chapters we tried to follow as far as possible an indication provided by Tertullian, without aligning ourselves to interpretations or positions already represented and defended in the literature on Aristotle. This led us to propose several hypotheses about the character and content of Aristotle's lost work, hypotheses which differ radically from all views on the subject of which we are aware. Therefore we shall now have to confront the main theories about Aristotle's lost work, and in particular the one held by W. Jaeger, whose work on the development of Aristotle's thought provided a generally accepted paradigm for many years.¹

Upon its publication, Jaeger's book on Aristotle made an overwhelming impact. His account of Aristotle's development in terms of three phases seemed so clear and well-founded as to appear unassailable and definitive. On Jaeger's account, Aristotle progressed from being a pupil and adherent of Plato who still preferred to present his views in a mythological form (first period), through a first independent, markedly speculative and theological phase (second period), to a final stage in which 'purely scientific', empirical research claimed his foremost attention (third period).² The general acceptance of Jaeger's view, as well as its apparent

¹ W. Jaeger, *Aristoteles. Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung* (Berlin 1923). English translation by R. Robinson, *Aristotle. Fundamentals of the history of his development* (Oxford 1934; 1948²). For the impact of this work, cf. J. Bidez, *Un singulier naufrage littéraire dans l'Antiquité* (Brussels 1943) 7-8: 'chez quelques spécialistes, à peine paru, l'ouvrage de M. Jäger provoqua aussitôt une émulation qui devait amener ensuite dans la recherche historique toute une révolution. En effet, depuis que la thèse de M. Jäger s'est fait connaître, de multiples découvertes en ont confirmé l'assertion fondamentale, et elles en ont brillamment illustré diverses conclusions'.

² For Plato's influence on Aristotle, see W. Jaeger, *Aristotle* 22-23: 'it was precisely the non-scientific element in Plato's philosophy, that is, the metaphysical and religious parts of it, that left the most lasting imprint on his mind'; on the difference between Plato and his pupil: 'Socratic thought always kept close to real life, and the early Plato was a reformer and an artist. In contrast to this, Aristotle's thought was abstract and his attitude was that of the pure scientist' (15). Cf. also Jaeger's views on the 'real Aristotle' and the 'pure Aristotle' (13), and the distinction between 'literary and truly productive work'

vindication in Nuyens's impressive book on the stages of Aristotle's psychology,³ had the effect of establishing it as a 'dominant paradigm': further studies of the subject matter produced arguments which tended to confirm the general framework, while apparently incongruous elements were ignored, forced to fit, or even violently suppressed.

Since the 1950s, however, further developments in Aristotelian scholarship (to which the many studies of I. Düring perhaps contributed most) have broken down the immunity system of the Jaegerian paradigm. And so it has become possible to see how limited and time-bound Jaeger's perspective was and how anachronistic the Aristotle is that emerges from his work. (In this connection it is curious to note that Jaeger, who was a powerful spokesman for the 'Third Humanism', was strongly influenced in his view of science and scholarship by Positivism and its law of the three stages of human culture.⁴)

Now that the limitations of Jaeger's perspective and its close relationship to ideas current in his time have gradually become clearer,⁵ it is difficult to

(24). It is possible that Jaeger was strongly influenced in this respect by J. Bernays, *Die Dialoge des Aristoteles in ihrem Verhältnis zu seinen übrigen Werken* (Berlin 1863), who was the first to emphasize the importance of Aristotle's dialogues, but who also took a fairly positivistic view of Aristotle, e.g. p. 81: 'Der wissenschaftliche Aristoteles wandelt im Licht der Natur, die er erforscht hat; und weil er dieses Licht nicht schwächen lassen will durch den trüben Schein des mythologischen Wahnglaubens, hat er seine Philosophie mit der kältesten Gleichgiltigkeit [sic] gegen die hellenischen Götter gewappnet; und seinen eigenen philosophisch erkannten Gott hat er zwar einen prächtigen Tempel errichtet in dem Theil seines Systems, den er Theologie nannte und wir jetzt Metaphysik nennen, aber seine Theologie durchdringt seine Philosophie so wenig wie sein Gott die Welt durchdringt'. Bernays is also the author of a new, mechanistic interpretation of the *katharsis* discussed in *Po.* 6 1449b28. He was also an uncle of Sigmund Freud's wife, Martha. Cf. the interesting study by G. H. E. Russelman, *Van James Watt tot Sigmund Freud; de opkomst van het stuwmodel van de zelfexpressie* (doctoral thesis, Free University, Amsterdam 1983) 164-170 on the affinities between the ideas of Bernays and Freud.

³ F. J. C. J. Nuyens, *Ontwikkelingsmomenten in de zielkunde van Aristoteles; een historisch-philosophische studie* (Nijmegen 1939); French edition, *L'évolution de la psychologie d'Aristote* (Louvain 1948).

⁴ In his book, *The theology of the early Greek philosophers* (Oxford 1948², repr. 1967), written in 1936 and published in 1947, Jaeger has a much keener eye for the tunnel vision of Positivism. There he discusses (in opposition to J. Burnet and Th. Gomperz) the 'religious intellectualism of the early Greeks', which in his view paved the way for 'the philosophical transformation and revival of religion in Plato's theology, in the systems of Aristotle and the Hellenistic schools ...' (9).

⁵ Cf. H. Flashar, 'Aristoteles' in *Die Philosophie der Antike* (Basel/Stuttgart 1983) 3.177: 'heute .. ein breiter Konsens darüber .., dass die Ergebnisse Jaegers im Gesamtkonzept wie in vielen Einzelheiten als verfehlt anzusehen sind'. The same applies to the results of Nuyens's research, which were also generally accepted for many years. They were thoroughly refuted by Ch. Lefèvre, *Sur l'évolution d'Aristote en psychologie* (Louvain 1972).

avoid the impression that Jaeger treated Aristotle as an Etrurian Procrustes might treat his prisoners or as the Queen of Hearts in *Alice in Wonderland* treated courtiers who incurred her displeasure. Recognition of the time-bound character of Jaeger's works, however, leaves us with the task of reconsidering the questions about the development of Aristotle's philosophy and its place in Greek philosophical thought. Specifically, the crucial question about the actual relation between Aristotle's published but now lost writings and the unpublished but still extant writings needs to be answered afresh. The differences between these two groups of writings are clearly so great that it even seems strange that one and the same author produced them.⁶ We do well to reflect, however, that if for example we possessed only the *Parmenides* and the *Laws* out of all Plato's dialogues, we would have difficulty in 'placing' testimonies about the final part of the *Republic* or about the myth of the *Phaedrus*. Moreover, in the reports about Plato's so-called 'unwritten doctrine', we are told that one of Plato's public lectures had the effect of a cold shower on people who attended it.

2. Problems connected with Jaeger's view

What are the most obvious problems attaching to Jaeger's conception?

(1) First of all, it is difficult to suppose that Aristotle published his philosophical insights in a carefully wrought, literary form only in his earliest period and at the beginning of his second period, and that he refrained from publicizing his views in this manner during the period of his philosophical maturity.⁷

(2) Next, it is surely odd, if Jaeger is right, that for three centuries discussions of Aristotle outside the well-defined group of pupils and successors were based on writings which do not contain the 'real' Aristotle,

⁶ On the problem of the relation of Aristotle's lost work to the extant treatises, see Jaeger, *Aristotle* 24-38, esp. 31: 'The understanding of the dialogues has had a curiously unfortunate destiny ever since the recovery of the treatises through Andronicus in the time of Sulla. At that time they were still much read and highly thought of; but they soon began to lose ground, when the learned Peripatetics undertook the exact interpretation of the long-neglected treatises and wrote commentary after commentary upon them'. On this, see now P. Moraux, *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen*, vol. 1 *Von Andronikos bis Alexander von Aphrodisias* (Berlin 1973) 3-96.

⁷ Cf. F. Dirlmeier, *Aristoteles, Nikomachische Ethik* (Darmstadt 1956) 275: 'Durch welche Argumente lässt sich beweisen, dass Aristoteles nur als Jüngling platonisierende Dialoge geschrieben hat? Haben auch die anderen, sekundären Philosophen, die nach Aristoteles schrieben, eine solche Phase durchgemacht?' B. Effe, *Studien* (Munich 1970) 5: 'Man wird sich der innere Wahrscheinlichkeit dieser Ansicht [i.e. that of Jaeger] nicht verschlieszen; andererseits musz jedoch festgestellt werden, dass wir kein Zeugnis besitzen, welches die Erstreckung der literarischen Tätigkeit des Aristoteles bis in seine letzten Lebensjahre ausschliesze'.

but reflect views that he himself later regarded as *passé*.⁸

(3) In the third place, there is the curious phenomenon that the entire oeuvre published by Aristotle during his lifetime has been lost, while the *Corpus Aristotelicum*, rediscovered much later, has been preserved, in spite of the fact that Aristotle repeatedly refers in the *Corpus* to his published writings for necessary clarification of various essential parts of his argument.⁹

(4) There is also the striking fact that Aristotle nowhere explicitly disavows his views as they were known to his contemporaries from the published works. Even in the *De anima*, a surviving treatise, he does not take the trouble to dissociate himself from his lost dialogue *Eudemus* or *On the soul*, which dealt with the same subject matter. Nor does he anywhere suggest that the treatment of mythical themes, as he employed them in his dialogues, is inappropriate for a philosopher of quality.¹⁰

(5) Finally, there are passages in the extant *Corpus Aristotelicum* which are hard, if not impossible, to reconcile with Jaeger's representation of Aristotle as a purely scientific, anti-metaphysical researcher. We are not primarily thinking of curiosities like the 'fiery beings' who live permanently on the Moon according to *De Generatione Anim.* 3.11 (for further details we are referred to an *allos logos*!).¹¹ Above all we mean passages like *Metaphysics* A 2, according to which human nature is in many respects 'unfree' (δουλή), so that the acquisition of truly free science is perhaps to be considered a non-human occupation.¹² We are also thinking of a passage like *Metaphysics* α 1, where the capacity of the *nous* of our souls to comprehend those matters which are by nature most clear is compared to the susceptibility of bats to daylight.¹³ When it comes to real knowledge, the

⁸ Cf. W. Jaeger, *Aristotle* 128: 'Until Andronicus published the *Metaphysics* this dialogue [the *De philosophia*] remained the chief source of information about Aristotle's general philosophical opinions in the ancient world, and from it the Stoics and Epicureans took their knowledge of him. It was, however, an undeveloped Aristotle with whom they had to content themselves'.

⁹ Cf. for example *EN* 1.13 1102a26; *Pol.* 7.6 1323a21: For the '*exoterikoi logoi*' mentioned there, see Chapter 11 below.

¹⁰ Cicero, who was acquainted with both categories of writings, though it cannot be shown that he made a thorough study of the *Corpus Aristotelicum* (cf. P. Moraux, *Der Aristotelismus* (Berlin 1984) 2.42-43), remarks that there were no essential differences between the two (*Fin.* 5.5.12).

¹¹ Arist., *GA* 3.11 761b15-23. On this text, see W. Lameere, 'Au temps où F. Cumont s'interrogeait sur Aristote', *AC* 18 (1949) 288 ff. and M. Detienne, *La notion de Daimon dans le Pythagorisme ancien* (Paris 1963) 146 ff. Cf. also Arist., *MA* 4 699b19.

¹² *Metaph.* A 2 982b29.

¹³ *Metaph.* α 1 993b9-11: 'just as it is with bats' eyes in respect of daylight, so it is with the intellect of our soul in respect of those things which are by nature most obvious'. For a recent defence of the authenticity of this book of the *Metaphysics*, see E. Berti, 'La fonction de *Métaph.* Alpha Elatton dans la philosophie d'Aristote' in *Zweifelhaftes im Corpus Aristotelicum*, ed. by P. Moraux and J. Wiesner (Berlin 1983) 260-294; J. Owens, 'The present status of Alpha elatton in the Aristotelian *Metaphysics*', *AGPh* 66

Aristotle of the extant *Corpus*, too, sees man not as 'eagle-eyed' but as a resident of the dark, as the chick of a night-owl, who can begin to fly only at dusk and in the night.¹⁴

Before immersing ourselves in these problems, we should like to refer to what was said before on a paper presented by P. Donini at the F.I.E.C. conference of 1984 in Dublin.¹⁵ What Donini says about the interpretation of Plutarch's *De facie in orbe lunae* seems to apply strikingly to our problem of the relationship between the two component parts of Aristotle's written output. At the very least we can say that the two parts of Plutarch's work resemble in character the extant *Corpus Aristotelicum* and Aristotle's lost work respectively. This raises the question as to whether there is also a connection that unifies the two parts of Aristotle's work.

(1984) 148-169. Compare also with the text cited above Philoponus, *In Nicom. Isagogen* 1.1 = Arist., *Philos.* fr. 8 Ross: ... ἐπεὶ τοίνυν τὰ νοητὰ καὶ θεῖα, ὡς ὁ Ἀρ. φησὶν, εἰ καὶ φανότατα ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν οὐσίαν, ἡμῖν διὰ τὴν ἐπικειμένην τοῦ σώματος ἀχλὺν σκοτεινὰ δοκεῖ καὶ ἀμυδρά, τὴν ταῦτα ἡμῖν εἰς φῶς ἄγουσαν ἐπιστήμην σοφίαν εἰκότως ὠνόμασαν. On this text, see also W. Haase, 'Ein vermeintliches Aristotelisches Fragment bei Joh. Philoponos' in *Synousia. Festgabe f. W. Schadewaldt* (Pfullingen 1965) 323-354, who disputes that there is sufficient ground to include this text as an independent fragment of one of Aristotle's lost writings. The part directly linked to Aristotle's name can be regarded as a paraphrase of the passage from *Metaph.* α 1 cited above (*art. cit.* 329-336). Haase's criticism is supported by Moraux, *Der Aristotelismus* (Berlin 1984) 2.95-103. Against Haase's negative verdict, however, it may be pointed out that Aristobulus, a Jewish writer of the 2nd century BC, cited by Eusebius, *PE* 13.12.10, comments as follows on 'wisdom' (*sophia*): 'For all light derives from her. And some of the Peripatetics have maintained that she has the position of a source of light' (cf. Clem., *Al., Strom.* 6.138). This text gives us a good reason to assume that Aristotle used the metaphor of light in one of his lost works, in the sense that the highest level of reality was correlated with the source of all light and all knowledge, and all that depends on this source was held to possess more or less light according to whether its distance to this source is smaller or greater. Here too the source of light and knowledge was no doubt represented as metaphysical and transcendent. Accordingly, the *nous* which is bound up with the soul-substance of the stars may have been represented as shrouded and obscured by this 'bond' and robbed of its perfect intellectuality.

¹⁴ Cf. also *EN* 1.2 1095a30-b4, where Aristotle praises Plato for asking 'whether the way led away from or towards the *archai*' (cf. *Pl., Rep.* 6 510b4-511d1). In his analogy of the 'Divided Line', Plato had distinguished sharply between the deductive method of mathematics and the contrasting 'upward' procedure of dialectic, which ascends to first principles. At b2 Aristotle continues: 'Now no doubt it is proper to start from the known. But 'the known' has two meanings - 'what is known to us' which is one thing, and 'what is knowable in itself' which is another. Perhaps then for us at all events it is proper to start from what is known to us'. *EE* 1.7 1217a20-24 states that what is sought is a determination of *eudaimonia* as the highest human good. This restriction is explained by the remark that there is also the *eudaimonia* of a being of higher order than man, i.e. god.

¹⁵ See Chapter 7.5 above.

3. *The character of Aristotle's lost work*

The best point of entry to Aristotle's lost work (in the way that the *Phaedo* is the best introduction to Plato) is his *Eudemus* or *On the soul*. In particular Prof. H. J. Drossaart Lulofs has shown that much more can be said about this work than was previously thought possible.¹⁶

We might begin by noting a remarkable statement made by Proclus in his commentary on the *Timaeus*, a statement about the relation of the dialogue *Eudemus* to the extant treatise *De anima*. Proclus reports that in the *De anima* Aristotle 'spoke *physikōs* about the soul, without discussing the soul's descent and its fortunes; on these subjects he spoke separately in his dialogues, where he presented τὸν προηγούμενον λόγον.¹⁷ The latter phrase has been translated by A. J. Festugière as 'la discussion préliminaire'.¹⁸ We would, however, prefer 'fundamental discussion' as a more accurate translation. In any event it is clear that Proclus' comparison of Aristotle's method with Plato's twofold discussion of the soul makes it impossible to dismiss Aristotle's expositions in his dialogues on the ground that they do not contain Aristotle's actual philosophical views.

The hard facts relating to the *Eudemus* are the following.¹⁹

(a) There is, first, the story about the prophetic dream which Eudemus receives when illness has brought him near the point of death. The dream predicts the death of the tyrant Alexander of Pherae as well as Eudemus' own recovery and his 'return home' five years later, which turns out to be a reference to his death in battle while fighting for the liberation of Syracuse from tyranny.²⁰

(b) There is, next, the 'revelation of Silenus', the daemon and constant companion of Dionysus, to the wealthy and miserly king Midas, who had taken him a prisoner. In this revelation Silenus unveils the utter misery which accompanies mortal existence in the world of generation and dissolution. This text represents such human misery as a penalty for guilt incurred.²¹ Earthly existence is a matter of *timoria*. (Curiously, Friedrich

¹⁶ H. J. Drossaart Lulofs, *De ogen van Lynkeus* (Leiden 1967).

¹⁷ Procl., *In Pl. Tim.* 338c (E. Diehl 323.16-324.4) = Arist., *Eudemus* fr. 4 Ross.

¹⁸ A. J. Festugière, *Proclus, Commentaire sur le Timée*, transl. and notes (Paris 1968) 5.205. Cf. also Procl., *In Pl. Remp.* (ed. Kroll) 1.133.5: *prohegoumenen pragmateian*.

¹⁹ An interesting recent contribution to the discussion about the structure of this dialogue is K. Gaiser, 'Ein Gespräch mit König Philipp. Zum "Eudemos" des Aristoteles' in *Aristoteles, Werk und Wirkung*, presented to P. Moraux (Berlin 1985) 1.457-484. See further A. P. Bos, 'Aristotle's *Eudemus* and *Protrepticus*: are they really two different works?', *Dionysius* 8 (1984) 19-51.

²⁰ Cic., *Div. ad Brutum* 1.25.53 = Arist., *Eudemus* fr. 1 Ross.

²¹ Plu., *Moralia (Consol. ad Apoll.)* 115b-e = Arist., *Eudemus* fr. 6 Ross. Cf. also Iamb., *Protr.* 8 (47.21-48.9 Pistelli) = Arist., *Protr.* fr. 10b Ross; B 106-107 Düring, a text which has been convincingly assigned to the *Eudemus* by J. Brunschwig, 'Aristote et les pirates tyrrhéniens (à propos des fragments 60 Rose du *Protreptique*)', *RPFE* 88

Nietzsche quotes this passage from Aristotle's dialogue in full in his *Geburt der Tragödie* as primary evidence of the 'Dionysian' impulse among the ancient Greeks. Aristotle, we recall, belongs to the Socratic tradition so maligned by Nietzsche!²²)

Less firm at first sight though plausible none the less if we are careful to note a number of striking connections, are the following points.

(c) Commentators have often remarked that the *Eudemus* must have been closely related to Plato's *Phaedo*. First of all there is a remarkable correspondence between the death of Socrates, keeping to his philosophical convictions, and the death of Eudemus, fighting against tyranny. But in addition we may suspect with O. Gigon that the *Eudemus*, like the *Phaedo*, contained a great eschatological myth.²³ The negative account given by Silenus (preserved in fr. 6 Ross) must have had a positive counterpart describing a realm of bliss.

(d) Gigon suggested the possibility of a myth about Kronos and the 'isles of the blessed', since Tertullian says in his *De anima* that Aristotle talked about a 'dreaming Kronos' somewhere.²⁴ And Tertullian says this in a passage defending the mantic value of dreams. This Kronos figure invites comparison with the Kronos of Plato's myth in the *Politicus* (and the *Laws*),²⁵ the world ruler whose active involvement brings about a golden age. But Kronos is also, since Hesiod, a type of the 'miserable outcast', a character who has incurred guilt and who must do penance, like his fellow Titans.²⁶ And as a Titan Kronos is directly associated with the Orphic tradition of the atrocities committed by the Titans against Dionysus (who is closely connected with Silenus). Here it is relevant to recall that Xenocrates explained the *phroua* of Plato's *Phaedo* (62b) as the place in which the Titans are held in custody under the surveillance of Dionysus.²⁷ The locus of this *phroua* must therefore have been identified with the entire cosmos.

Then there is the fact that Kronos 'dreams'. On the basis of the context in Tertullian, we may assume that Kronos' dreams, too, are prophetic dreams. This gives us a further connection with the prophetic dream of Eudemus, with a passage in Sextus Empiricus (fr. 12a Ross of the *De philosophia*), and

(1963) 187. Cf. H. J. Drossaart Lulofs, *op. cit.* 17-18.

²² Fr. Nietzsche, *Die Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik* (1872), *Werke* (Munich 1966) 1.29-30. This point is discussed more extensively in A. P. Bos, 'The ground motive of Greek culture and the Titanic Perspective on the Meaning of Reality' in *Tydskrif vir Christelike Wetenskap* (South Africa) 24 (1988) 100-103.

²³ O. Gigon, 'Prolegomena to an edition of the *Eudemus*' in I. Düring and G. E. L. Owen, *Aristotle and Plato in the mid-fourth century* (Göteborg 1960) 24-26.

²⁴ Tert., *An.* 46 = Arist., *Protr.* fr. 20 Ross. Cf. K. Gaiser, *art. cit.* (n.19) 459 with nn. 4-6 and 477-478 with nn. 40-41.

²⁵ Pl., *Plt.* 269a ff.; cf. *Laws* 4 713b ff.

²⁶ Cf. Hes., *Th.* 207-210.

²⁷ Xenocrates, fr. 20 (R. Heinze) = fr. 219 (M. Isnardi Parente 1982). Cf. P. Boyancé, *REA* 50 (1948) 218-231 and *RPh.* 37 (1963) 7-11.

with the statement about the ecstatic experience of an anonymous Greek king (*Eudemus* fr. 11 Ross).

From Plutarch's myth in the *De facie*, which was used by J. H. Waszink to illuminate the passage in Tertullian, we learn, finally, that Kronos' sleep is a result of his being bound with the bonds of sleep and that while sleeping he functions as a dream oracle. In this way he passes on to the daemons whatever the ever-vigilant Zeus has thought out.²⁸

Now Drossaart Lulofs already pointed out that in the *Eudemus* Aristotle plays in a striking fashion with themes derived from Plato's dialogues.²⁹ He even uses Platonic themes to carry on a polemic against Plato. The clearest instance of this concerns the motif of 'imprisonment' and its correlate, 'liberation', the guiding motif of Plato's *Phaedo*. In a subtle way Aristotle manipulated the same themes in the *Eudemus*, as we discussed earlier.³⁰ By comparing the human condition to that of the prisoners of Etrurian pirates, tied onto corpses, he seems to have emphasized the galling bond of earthly corporeality even more. The daemon Silenus is introduced as the prisoner of greedy king Midas, who is unaware how much he himself is a prisoner to his thirst for gold and who thinks he can force Silenus to speak by violence. In contrast, Silenus is presented as the one who is much more free,³¹ as is fitting for the companion of Dionysus Lyseus, who as a child had already broken the fetters with which he had been bound by the Etrurian mafia. It is Silenus who reveals to Midas that man is an exile on earth, involved in a process of expiation, and that his exile does not end until death. Silenus thus provides the backdrop to the story of Eudemus' sojourn abroad, far from Cyprus, and of his longing to return home.

Finally, there is the figure of the dreaming Kronos, who as a Titan is also a penitent, deprived of the highest heavenly light and bound with the bonds of sleep.

We should not fail to note the significant contrast with Plato's *Phaedo*. While in the *Phaedo* the idea of 'imprisonment' regards only the imprisonment of earthly man, Aristotle extends this idea to include the daemon Silenus and the god Kronos, i.e. beings not afflicted with human, perishable bodies. In our view, this can only be explained by supposing that in the *Eudemus* Aristotle represented the entire cosmos as a 'Cave' and extended the *phroua* of Plato's *Phaedo* to include all beings contained within the cosmos. In this conception the cosmic beings and the daemons also possess fine-material bodies which, however different in kind from human bodies, act as a constraint on their intellectual faculties (the *nous*). And insofar as they are not pure, free *nous*, their intellectual activity is

²⁸ Plu., *De facie* 26 942a: 'for all that Zeus premeditates Kronos sees in his dreams'. See on this Chapter 3 above.

²⁹ H. J. Drossaart Lulofs, *De ogen van Lynkeus* (Leiden 1967) 17-19.

³⁰ See Chapter 8.6 above.

³¹ See Chapter 8.5 above.

directed at material reality and at *praxis*.

Along the same lines, it is arguable that the doctrine of the fifth element as the substance of the divine celestials and human souls formed part of the discussions of the *Eudemus*. This fifth element is the bearer of the psychic and ratiocinative functions and has the potential for intellectual intuition as well. But it can also come under the control of irrational passions and thus form an obstruction to completely pure contemplative activity.

All these considerations force us to conclude that both the myth of the dreaming Kronos and the doctrine of the fifth element are products of Aristotle's radical debate with Plato, a debate which came to entail the rejection of fundamental Platonic doctrines such as that of the divine Demiurge and his providence, the World-soul, and the createdness of visible reality.

4. *The Eudemus: a non-Platonic work*

Once this is realized, it is no longer possible to speak of the 'Platonic' character of the *Eudemus*. Aristotle's philosophical position in the *Eudemus* was a new, independent position, in which a number of central notions of Aristotle's philosophy as we know it were already firmly established. These will have included the double theology of a transcendent highest god and a plurality of cosmic gods; the rejection of the generation of the cosmos; the doctrine of the fifth element; the distinction between theoretical and practical activity; and the notion that the human *nous* can exist separately. Aristotle came to develop this independent position in the course of a continual polemic against Plato (whose position may well have been represented in the dialogue by one of the main speakers) and apparently with continual reference to Plato's own words and the internal tensions present in them. And he gave shape to his own position by using and at the same time transforming Platonic themes.

Only in this way, it seems, can we dispose of the nonsensical view that Aristotle adopted a virtually reactionary stance in the *Eudemus* and defended a Platonic psychology which Plato himself had radically modified in the course of the thirty or more years since he first defended it.³² And we can also jettison an equally unenlightened solution to the (imaginary) problem, namely that Aristotle merely wished to erect a 'literary monument' for his friend *Eudemus* after the latter's premature death. As if Plato too had written the *Phaedo* merely in order to erect a literary monument for his teacher Socrates! On this view Aristotle thought that the outmoded psychology of the *Phaedo* offered an 'emotionally satisfying

³² This theory has recently been revived by A. H. Chroust, *Aristotle. New light on his life and on some of his lost works* (London 1973) 2.53-54, 70.

expression' suitable to the composition of a *consolatio mortis*.³³ And so the philosopher Aristotle suddenly allowed literary or emotional arguments to prevail over philosophical and logical ones, but miraculously gained part of his philosophical reputation on the strength of the resulting work. Although such makeshift solutions have been clutched at by many scholars, they are surely too improbable to be taken seriously.

If we are right in claiming that the *Eudemus* contained Aristotle's 'Kronology' as well as the doctrine of the divine fifth element with its fine-material constitution *and* noeric potential, then it is clear that in the *Eudemus* Aristotle set forth an alternative to the psychology and theology of the *Timaeus*, and that his Kronology was meant to replace Plato's doctrine of the World-soul, which in Aristotle's view could only be characterized in terms of the condition of Ixion.³⁴

Certainly there are Platonic themes in the *Eudemus*. One might even argue that the philosophies of both Plato and Aristotle are guided and controlled by the same pre-theoretical perspective. But the *Eudemus* cannot be regarded as an imitation of Plato's *Phaedo*. Rather it deserves to be seen as an alternative to and replacement of that work, written from a philosophical point of view which can be clearly distinguished from that of Plato.

5. The 'reversal of perspective' in Aristotle's lost work

There is a second distinctive feature to recall here. In the revelation of the daemon Silenus, Aristotle presents a 'reversal of perspective'. *Eudemus'* prophetic dream too, it turns out, only contains truth 'on a higher level', in that death must be seen as 'a return home'. In the Lynkeus motif (which we find in another fragment³⁵) the same idea is present, as in the comparison of man's earthly existence to that of a mayfly.³⁶ Something similar is found in the story of the affluent cavedwellers attributed to Aristotle by Cicero.³⁷

³³ A. H. Chroust, *op. cit.* 70. Cf. also F. L. Peccorini, 'Divinity and immortality in Aristotle; a de-mythologized myth?', *Thomist* 43 (1979) 225: '.. the dialogue *Eudemus*, one of his early writings which was written under the impact of the grief caused to him by the premature death of one of his [sic] beloved young disciples'; also: 'Characteristically, in this work, the mythological theories which could be found in Plato's books, .. had still the upper hand'. Jaeger had already distinguished between 'literary and truly productive work' (Aristotle 24), in order to dispose of writings like the *Eudemus*. J. Bernays, *Die Dialoge des Aristoteles* (Berlin 1863) 23 saw much more clearly that 'Arist. .. stiftet dem betraurten Freunde ein philosophisches Denkmal, wie Platon es dem Sokrates im Phädon errichtet hatte'.

³⁴ Cf. Arist., *Cael.* 2.1 284a27-35.

³⁵ Iamb., *Protr.* 8 (47.5-21 Pistelli) = Arist., *Protr.* fr. 10a Ross; B 105 Düring.

³⁶ Cic., *Tusc.* 1.39.94 = Arist., *Protr.* 10a Ross.

³⁷ Cic., *N.D.* 2.37.95-96 = Arist., *Philos.* fr. 13 Ross.

And finally, the account of the dreaming Kronos, as in Plutarch, will have been part of a myth about the isles of the blessed, compared with which man's toils and troubles and the limitations of human, earthly knowledge must have appeared pitiful.

This theme may in fact be taken to typify philosophy as such. For it is the pretension of philosophy to offer mankind the one true perspective to which he has hitherto been blind. Characteristically, such a representation compels us through the surprising and attractive vistas which it suggests. It presents a view of human reality as a whole from a perspective that transcends that reality.

On closer consideration, however, we always find ourselves confronted with the basic question: who among mortals is capable of acquiring such a perspective, in order to communicate it to others? What human being can ascend to such heights? That the Greek philosophers were aware of this question is evident from the fact that they always described this higher perspective in *myths*, and often attempted to 'prove' the superhuman provenance of a given narrative. In these philosophical myths the Greek philosophers gave expression to the assumptions and beliefs which they felt guided and transcended their everyday experience. P. M. Schuhl has rightly pointed out that a Platonic myth is not merely an 'exposition scientifique ou transposition vulgarisatrice; il est aussi .. incantation'.³⁸ Myths have this power to 'enchant' because they bring their hearers within the pale of a comprehensive, transcendent perspective.

6. *A first independent, mythical phase in Aristotle's work and a later anti-mythical one?*

Having rejected the scheme of Aristotle's development proposed by W. Jaeger, we have to choose a new position with regard to Aristotle's lost writings. Of primary importance is our conclusion that in these lost works we are concerned with the results of Aristotle's independent philosophical reflections, the product of an intensive polemic against basic Platonic ideas. We also argued that virtually all the important doctrines found in the *Corpus Aristotelicum* were held in the lost works as well.

But at the same time one major difference between the lost works and the *Corpus Aristotelicum* will have become apparent: besides the sophisticated style and form and dialogical genre of Aristotle's published works, these works were distinguished by the use of a mythical, transcendent perspective which rises above the world of human experience. Herein Aristotle followed, in an imaginative way, the example of his teacher Plato. But this feature is totally absent from the *Corpus Aristotelicum*.

³⁸ P. M. Schuhl, *Études sur la fabulation platonicienne* (Paris 1947) 22.

What can be the explanation of this difference? Does it suggest a fundamental change on Aristotle's part, a repudiation of mythical discourse on the ground that it has no place in purely scientific philosophy, as Jaeger claimed? In that case we would have to conclude after all that Aristotle's thought underwent an essential development, namely from a first independent phase involving mythical representations to a second independent stage in which mythical discourse was systematically rejected. For the rest both stages offered largely the same philosophical ideas, it is then to be supposed.

This view, should we wish to accept it, still leaves us with the following questions.

- (1) How is this radical change in Aristotle's appreciation of mythologizing to be explained?
- (2) Why did he stop publishing generally after this change of view?
- (3) Why was he disinclined to publish the non-mythical writings of the *Corpus*, if these were intended to replace his previously published work?
- (4) Why does he repeatedly and approvingly refer in the *Corpus* to his published works, without any hint of criticism?

7. *Did Aristotle accept a structural distinction between two levels of knowledge and hence two levels of discourse?*

We must in fact consider another possibility, namely that Aristotle, in his published dialogues, quite consciously included descriptions of the human world from a 'God's-eye point of view', a superhuman perspective or rather a perspective that transcends the everyday experience of mortals. In his teaching activities within the Peripatos, however, of which the surviving treatises are the record, he deliberately and systematically avoided such a perspective, though without intending to replace his published work with those treatises.

Of course we are not suggesting that Aristotle's dialogues contained nothing but mythical stories. Like Plato, Aristotle no doubt varied his compositions considerably, alternating sections of philosophical discussion or rational argument³⁹ with mythical stories, reports of prophetic dreams and ecstatic experiences, and descriptions of events relating to the setting of a particular discussion. But the phenomenon of the 'reversal of perspective' is so prominent and pervasive in the remains of his dialogues, that we are entitled to regard it as a structural element of those dialogues. There is reason to assume that in this respect Aristotle's dialogues not only

³⁹ Cicero explicitly claims to have followed this method. Cf. *Ep.* 4.16.2; W. D. Ross, *Aristotelis Fragmenta Selecta* 3. Proclus, *In Pl. Parm.* 1.659 (Cousin) reports that Theophrastus and Heraclides employed the same compositional method. Cf. Jaeger, *op. cit.* 127 n.3.

resembled the Platonic dialogues, but also those of Heraclides Ponticus and Xenocrates.

In the extant treatises, on the other hand, Aristotle systematically refrains from adopting such a 'meta-position'. This is very obvious in the *De anima*, where he appears to be discussing his subject *physikōs*.⁴⁰ But it is also striking in the collection of writings traditionally known as the '*Metaphysics*'. Although in this work Aristotle discusses principles which could be described as 'metaphysical', his methodological position here, too, can be called 'immanent'. Nowhere do the discussions of the *Metaphysics* pretend to attain the level of more than human insight and 'enlightenment' which, according to some sources, Aristotle referred to by the term *epopteia* ('contemplation'), a term derived from the mystery cults.⁴¹

It seems permissible, then, to suppose that Aristotle, as Plato's pupil, consciously and systematically distinguished between two levels of discourse. On the one hand there is a way of speaking and arguing on the basis of experience, accessible to each and every mortal, and on the basis of 'natural' reason (which also means reason 'confined' by *Physis*). On the other, there is a discourse which goes back to the old tradition of the divinely inspired *theologoi*, a mythical discourse expressing supra-rational convictions. This discourse reflects the awareness that the greatest mortals have intuited a Truth which rises above the limited vision of earthly mortals but nevertheless motivates them, and have intuited a condition of perfect knowledge which clearly differs from the miserable condition of earthly man, with its limitations and blindness.

Like Plato's dialogues, Aristotle's writings must have displayed a congruence between what can be said on the basis of man's earthly experience and the transcendent perspective expressed in myths. Aristotle's work, like that of his teacher, will have shown that philosophy should be viewed as the rational and retrospective 'demonstration' of that transcendent perspective in which the philosopher puts his *faith*.

8. A philosophical explanation of the disappearance of Aristotle's dialogues

If Aristotle's lost writings can be distinguished from the *Corpus* in the way indicated above, then we may have hit on a very different cause of the disappearance of these works from that proposed by Jaeger. It is then

⁴⁰ Arist., *An.* 1.1 403a28; cf. *Metaph.* E 1 1026a5. Cf. Procl. *In Pl.Tim.* 338c = Arist. *Eudemus* fr.4 Ross.

⁴¹ Cf. Plu., *Isid. et Os.* 382d-e = Arist., *Eudemus* fr. 10 Ross; Clem. Al., *Strom.* 1.176.2. Cf. also Synes., *Dion* 10.48a = Arist., *Philos.* fr. 15a Ross and Michael Psellus, *Schol. ad Joh. Climacum* 6.171 = Arist., *Philos.* fr. 15b Ross. Cf. J. Croissant, *Aristote et les mystères* (Liège 1932) 135 ff. and I. Düring, *Aristotle in the ancient biographical tradition* (Göteborg 1957) 429.

unnecessary to assume that they were no longer considered important because they contained a 'superseded' point of view, an assumption which no text in the treatises bears out. Instead we may suspect a *philosophical cause* for the disappearance of the lost works, and one to which Aristotle himself seems to have contributed. We might, that is, conclude that the narrow circle of professional scholars came to feel so huge a gap in terms of verifiability between mythical conceptions on the one hand and argued conceptions based on common experience on the other, that the use of myths, even in the form of philosophical myths, was gradually rejected as *philosophically unacceptable*, as part of a general rejection of any appeal to superhuman knowledge.

In particular the fierce attacks launched by Epicurus and others of his school against the *fabulae aniles*⁴² of people like Plato, Aristotle, and Heraclides Ponticus will have contributed powerfully to this rejection. But people in the Stoa, the Sceptical Academy, and the Peripatos also seem to have reached the view which Aristotle himself practised in his teaching: if mortals wish to preserve absolute rational certainty in their scientific and philosophical pursuits, then they have no choice but to work on the basis of their everyday experience, even though in doing so they are guided by the conviction that this experience does not provide the perfect and highest attainable view of reality and truth. Thus we suppose that the 'transcendental perspective' disappeared from view in early Hellenistic philosophy because 'natural reason' was raised to the sole source of knowledge, and awareness of the 'unnatural' condition of this reason was lost.

Something else is relevant at this point. Historians of philosophy concerned to trace Aristotle's influence are faced by the remarkable fact that in the first centuries following Aristotle's death his school shows a clear and continual decline in both quality and productivity. Not until the first century BC is it possible to speak of a 'renaissance'. Only then does the Peripatetic school awaken 'aus ihrer langen Lethargie'.⁴³ No satisfactory explanation for this highly remarkable state of affairs has yet been

⁴² Cf. Velleius' speech in Cic., *N.D.* 1.8.18: 'audite .. non futtilis commenticiasque sententias, non opificem aedificatoremque mundi Platonis de Timaeo deum, nec anum fatidicam Stoicorum Pronoeam, ... neque vero mundum ipsum animo et sensibus praeditum ..., portenta et miracula non disserentium philosophorum sed somniantium'; and 1.13.34, where there is mention of the 'pueriles fabulae' of Heraclides Ponticus; 1.16.42: 'Exposui fere non philosophorum iudicia sed delirantium somnia'. Tertullian, too, mentions the 'grandiores fabulae' paraded by Silenus before Midas, who became 'all ears'. Cf. also Macr., *Somn. Scip.* 1.2.4 on the Epicurean Colotes' critique: 'ait a philosophos fabulam non oportuisse confingi quoniam nullum figmenti genus veri professoribus conveniret'. Macrobius himself values *fabulae* because of their exhortative function (1.2.7). See also his comment: '[fabulis] uti solent cum vel de anima vel de aeriis aetheriisve potestatibus vel de ceteris dis loquuntur'.

⁴³ Cf. P. Moraux, *Der Aristotelismus* 1.xiv.

suggested. We must begin by realizing that the decline of the Peripatos took place during the period in which the dialogues, composed, ordered, and produced in a highly polished form by Aristotle himself, were in circulation, while the writings of the *Corpus* were not available as they are to us.

The revival of interest in Aristotle's philosophy, on the other hand, is strictly connected with the discovery of the unpublished treatises in the first century BC. Here too we should prefer a *philosophical* explanation. We suggest that Aristotle's philosophy, in the period when he was known on the basis of his published work only, fell into disrepute because the notion of 'genuine, serious scholarly philosophy' underwent a change at the hands of the professional philosophers, who no longer accepted an appeal to any experience other than common human experience. And to this shift in the idea of 'scientific philosophy' Aristotle's own activities within the school no doubt pointed the way.

If what we have advanced in the foregoing is acceptable, we have stumbled upon a remarkable instance of historical irony. Aristotle's real philosophical position has been obscured and rendered inaccessible by two events which, though occurring in two very different periods, are surprisingly akin to each other. In the first place we suppose that Aristotle's dialogues disappeared in the centuries after his death as a result of a shift of view in professional philosophy as to what constitutes genuine 'scientific philosophy' and the elevation of 'physics' (regarded by Plato and Aristotle as knowledge of the second rank) to the status of 'first and only philosophy'.

Secondly, after the rediscovery of the importance of the lost dialogues in the 19th century, their real meaning was obscured by Jaeger's work, based as it was on a positivistic overestimation of empirical knowledge. Jaeger refused to ascribe the strange elements of the dialogues to the real, scientific Aristotle, and instead referred these writings to the period of his youth, when he was still so 'naïve' as to think that he could and should connect his beliefs and theological speculations with science.⁴⁴ Jaeger was willing to

⁴⁴ Cf. W. Jaeger, *Aristotle* 13: 'Aristotle made himself out of the Platonic philosophy. The history of his development - and the order of the documents for this can be determined with certainty - represents a definite scale of graduate progress in this direction ... In these matters his pupils very often understood him better than he did himself; that is to say they excised the Platonic element in him and tried to retain only what was pure Aristotle. The specific Aristotle is, however, only half the real Aristotle. This his disciples failed to grasp, but he himself was always conscious of it'. What Jaeger means to say is that the purely scientific Aristotle, that is, the Aristotle who distinguishes himself most sharply from his teacher Plato, is only half the real Aristotle *seen in terms of his historical development*. Jaeger's conclusion, 'The specific Aristotle is .. only half the real Aristotle' is in our view quite acceptable, but only in the sense that during his *entire* philosophical career Aristotle worked in the awareness that earthly mortals can come no further than halfway in their quest for knowledge, and that he bore witness to this awareness in 'Platonizing' dialogues, without ever dissociating himself from their content.

accept that in Aristotle's early independent phase his dialectical analyses were inspired from within by a living religious faith. But for the later period, the truly Aristotelian phase, Jaeger accepted the conventional image of Aristotle as a 'purely intellectualistic metaphysician'.⁴⁵

Over against Epicureans from antiquity and 20th century positivists, it may be argued that Aristotle, like Plato,⁴⁶ held that all mortal science is guided by a transcendental perspective which is not as such subject to discursive or rational accountability, and that he held this as a matter of conviction throughout his life. Just as Ms. Yates has pointed out the interest of people like Bruno, Kepler, and Newton for Hermeticism and astrology and has thus clarified and corrected our image of the great Renaissance scientists and philosophers,⁴⁷ so our image of Aristotle also deserves to be adjusted through a new reconstruction of the fragmentary remains of the work by which he gained recognition during his lifetime. Only then will we be able to understand in a satisfactory manner his discussions with Plato and his role in the Old Academy and the Peripatos.

⁴⁵ W. Jaeger, *Aristotle* 156 and 159-161.

⁴⁶ For the position rejected here, cf. also W. K. C. Guthrie, *A history of Greek philosophy* (Cambridge 1975) 4.363-365, who states that 'unlike his greatest pupil he [i.e. Plato] would never deny that there are some truths, and those the greatest, which can never be demonstrated by the method of dialectical reasoning'.

⁴⁷ F. A. Yates, *Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic tradition* (London 1964; 1971²) and her *Collected Essays*, 3 vols (London 1979-1984).

CHAPTER ELEVEN

EXOTERIKOI LOGOI AND ENKYKLIOI LOGOI IN THE CORPUS ARISTOTELICUM AND THE ORIGIN OF THE IDEA OF THE ENKYKLIOS PAIDEIA

1. *Introduction*

From the hypotheses developed by us in the foregoing discussions, it followed that the *Corpus Aristotelicum* should be held to reflect Aristotle's teaching activities in the Peripatos; and that in general the Aristotelian doctrine which it contains was not meant as a *replacement* of the philosophy of his published works, but as a *counterpart and supplement*.¹ In this view, Aristotle put forward the same theories and explanations, in different forms, in his oral tuition and his published work. And in lectures on subjects dealt with earlier in writing, Aristotle, like teachers today, could easily refer to these publications, which at any rate must have been known and available to the circle of his pupils. In that case there may have been a measure of congruence between the groups of writings in the *Corpus* and various groups of published works.² For if our hypothesis is correct, these groups will have been based on the same systematic Aristotelian distinctions. In this way there is also a natural explanation for those passages in the *Corpus* which stand out stylistically from their immediate context. Scholars have drawn attention to a number of such passages.³ More than once it has been argued that, in such passages, Aristotle is more or less literally following the text of writings released for publication. Some of these passages have in fact been included in collections of fragments from

¹ See especially Chapter 10 above.

² To this extent we may well ask whether the titles found in the various bibliographical lists, when indicating a subject also dealt with in the writings of the *Corpus Aristotelicum*, refer to the latter writings or to works released for publication by Aristotle himself. For instance, the content of a treatise Περὶ φύσεως in three books (*D.L.* 5.25) may have largely corresponded with parts of the surviving *Physics*. Nevertheless, there is no certainty whatsoever about its actual identity. Precisely the large number of lost Aristotelian writings known only by name is an important argument in support of our assumption of a parallel between the published and the lost works. On the bibliographical lists, see P. Moraux, *Les listes anciennes des ouvrages d'Aristote* (Louvain 1951).

³ For instance, *Cael.* 1.9 279a19 ff. Cf. P. Moraux, *Aristote, Du ciel* (Paris 1965) lxxv; *Cael.* 2.1; cf. P. Moraux, *ibid.*, lxxxvi ff.

the Stagirite's lost writings.⁴

2. *Passages in the Corpus Aristotelicum referring to earlier discussions*

Below we list the passages in the *Corpus Aristotelicum* referring to earlier discussions which were assumed to be familiar, either because the same audience was present at the earlier discussions, or because these discussions were available to the audience in a written form. In the latter case, it seems natural to think of publications by the master himself. But nowhere is this actually confirmed.

'Εγκύκλιοι λόγοι are referred to in:

EN 1.3 1096a3.

'Εγκύκλια φιλοσοφήματα are cited in:

Cael. 1.9 279a30.

At a larger number of places Aristotle refers to 'Εξωτερικοί λόγοι:

EN 1.13 1102a26-28;

EN 6.4 1140a1-3;

Metaph. M 1 1076a28;

EE 2.1 1218b32;

EE 1.8 1217b20-23;

Pol. 3.6 1278b30-32;

Pol. 7.1 1323a19-23;

Phys. 4.10 217b30-31.

We shall also discuss:

Pol. 1.5 1254a33.

Οἱ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγοι occur at:

EE 1.8 1217b20-23; cf. *An.* 1.2 404b19 and *Phys.* 2.2 194a36 ἐν τοῖς περὶ φιλοσοφίας.

Οἱ ἐκδεδομένοι λόγοι are referred to:

Po. 15 1454b17.

Οἱ ἐν κοινῷ γιγνόμενοι λόγοι are cited in:

An. 1.4 407b27.

3. *The modern debate on the interpretation of the references in the Corpus Aristotelicum*

As far as the ancient commentaries talk about Aristotle's references to other discussions, they almost always try to identify one of Aristotle's lost

⁴ See R. Walzer, *Aristotelis dialogi fragmenta* fr. 29 (p. 95) and M. Untersteiner, *Aristotele, Della filosofia* (Rome 1963) fr. 29 and 30.

writings as the source referred to. Such unanimity is sorely lacking in our time. On the contrary, a heated debate has flared up over the meaning of the references. Two schools of thought may be distinguished in this debate. The first maintains that the references in the *Corpus* should be seen as citations of existing works published by Aristotle. The other school vigorously contests this assumption. Its supporters usually claim that the references are to 'general discussions', either non-philosophical in character, or philosophical but not specifically Peripatetic.

It was Jacob Bernays who in 1863 wrote one of the first detailed studies on the references in the *Corpus Aristotelicum*.⁵ In it he concludes that the references concern specific Aristotelian writings. But he is forced to defend this position against contemporary scholars with different views on the matter. In a commentary on Cicero's *De finibus*, J. N. Madvig had argued: 'unter ἐξωτερικοί λόγοι seien nicht Bücher zu verstehen, sondern die gewöhnlichen Gespräche und Begriffe ausserhalb der Schule'.⁶ And E. Zeller had interpreted 'exoterische Reden' as 'Erörterungen welche nicht in den Bereich der eben vorliegenden Untersuchung gehören'.⁷

In a careful analysis of the relevant passages, Bernays argues that the references cannot possibly be regarded as citations of discussions held by well-educated people outside the intimate circle of the school, since we are told more than once that these 'exoteric discussions' dealt with specifically Aristotelian doctrines. He likewise rejects the idea that the references might be to passages in writings from the *Corpus* not specifically concerned with the same subject as the treatise in which the citation occurs.

W. Jaeger also made an extensive analysis of the problem of the *exoterikoi logoi*.⁸ He notes that, while the *EE* was still regarded as a work by Eudemus of Rhodes and not by Aristotle, it was difficult to interpret its references to *exoterikoi logoi* as a reference to specific works written by a different author, i.e. Aristotle. His own, staunch defense of the *EE* as an

⁵ J. Bernays, *Die Dialoge des Aristoteles in ihrem Verhältniss zu seinen übrigen Werken* (Berlin 1863; repr. Darmstadt 1968). In passing the interesting article by M. J. Wilmott, 'Aristoteles exotericus, acroamaticus, mysticus', *Nouvelles de la République des Lettres* 1 (1985) 67-95 may be mentioned, that deals with the Renaissance discussion.

⁶ Cicero, *De finibus bonorum et malorum libri quinque*, ed. by J. N. Madvig (Copenhagen 1876³) 837-848, esp. 846. Also worth noting is the absurd etymology proposed by M. Zeidler for the word *exoterikon*: 'ἐξ ὧτων quod extra aures est, eorum scilicet qui mysteriis philosophorum iam sunt initiati'; cited by J. Bernays, *op. cit.* 35.

⁷ E. Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen*, vol. 2.2 (Leipzig, 2nd edition) 100. Zeller was constrained by his view that the *EE* was written by Eudemus of Rhodes and not by Aristotle, so that its references to *exoterikoi logoi* could hardly be taken as references to Aristotelian works. In the fourth edition (Leipzig 1921; repr. Hildesheim 1963⁵) 125 n.1 he corrects himself and accepts that *exoterikoi logoi* can also refer to works 'die ausserhalb eines bestimmten Kreises angestellt werden .. oder für Aussenstehenden bestimmt sind'.

⁸ W. Jaeger, *Aristotle* 246-258: 'The *EE* and the problem of the exoteric discussions'.

authentic Aristotelian writing had removed that obstacle. Jaeger thus concludes 'that the exoteric discussions were definite writings and in fact the literary works of Aristotle'.⁹

Jaeger warns against the identification of 'exoteric' with 'popular'. The distinction which Aristotle makes in *Eud. Eth.* 1.8 between exoteric *logoi* and the *logoi kata philosophian* is the distinction between the already published work *De philosophia* and his formal lectures on metaphysics, which he was busy composing during this period.¹⁰

For Jaeger the problem of the references had been solved conclusively. 'In the earliest period after his break with Plato's theory, when it became necessary completely to rewrite all the main branches of philosophy, he took from his early compositions whatever he could still use, and constructed the new with the help of the old ... Later on he discovered more serious consequences in his new ideas. They led him farther and farther away from the old.'¹¹ It is clear, however, that this view is dominated by Jaeger's conception of Aristotle's development, a conception which we found reason to criticize.

Without in any way aiming at completeness, we note support for the views of Bernays and Jaeger in the following authors: H. Bonitz,¹² J. Bidez,¹³ P. Moraux,¹⁴ R. A. Gauthier and J. Y. Jolif,¹⁵ D. J. Allan,¹⁶ W. K. C. Guthrie,¹⁷ and H. Flashar.¹⁸ P. Moraux holds that the references to *exoterikoi logoi* are best regarded as citations of a single writing.¹⁹ He takes the term 'exoteric' to mean 'superficial, not truly scientific, dialectical', even though the content of the work in question was not without value.²⁰ Only in the case of *Phys.* 4.10 217b30-31 does he refuse to accept, like Bernays, that a lost dialogue is being referred to.

⁹ *Op. cit.* 247.

¹⁰ *Op. cit.* 256.

¹¹ *Op. cit.* 258.

¹² H. Bonitz, *Index Aristotelicus* (Berlin 1870) 104b56.

¹³ J. Bidez, *Un singulier naufrage littéraire dans l'Antiquité; A la recherche des épaves de l'Aristote perdu* (Brussels 1943) 11.

¹⁴ P. Moraux, *Les listes anciennes* (1951) 167-172; *id.*, *A la recherche de l'Aristote perdu* (1957) 7 ff.; *id.*, *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen* (Berlin 1973) 1.6 n.10.

¹⁵ R. A. Gauthier, J. Y. Jolif, *Aristote, L'Éthique à Nicomaque* (Paris 1958) 1.36* ff.; (1970²) 63* ff.: 'Ce sont, assurément, des ouvrages de vulgarisation, et l'on peut maintenir que c'est là la meilleure manière de traduire 'ἐξωτερικοί. ...Mais ce sont des ouvrages de vulgarisation au sens où les dialogues de Platon en étaient eux aussi' (1958¹ 39*).

¹⁶ D. J. Allan, *The philosophy of Aristotle* (London 1952, 1970²) 6.

¹⁷ W. K. C. Guthrie, *A history of Greek philosophy* (Cambridge 1981) 6.54.

¹⁸ H. Flashar, 'Aristoteles' in Fr. Überweg, *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie*, revised edition (Basle 1983) 3.180-181.

¹⁹ P. Moraux, *op. cit.* (1957) 8; 52-53.

²⁰ P. Moraux, *op. cit.* 20 f. According to him, this can be inferred from *EE* 1.8 1217b20-23 and *Pol.* 1.5 1254a33.

R. A. Gauthier and J. Y. Jolif accept a variety of writings as 'exoteric' and consider them "'ouvrages de vulgarisation" (destinés à se répandre *en dehors* du cercle étroit de l'école)'. The 'popular' character of these writings, in their view, is a result of their literary form.

Allan says about the term 'exoteric': 'This Greek adjective means "external", and could mean here either (1) "outside philosophy" or (2) "addressed to those outside"'.²¹ Likewise, Guthrie opts for the meaning: 'not demonstrative nor addressed to his genuine disciples but to the public, and resting on (merely) persuasive premises'.²²

A quite different variant of this approach was defended in 1958 by W. Wieland. This author interprets the term *exoterikoi logoi* as a reference to specific writings resulting from Aristotle's work as a teacher of rhetoric during his first Athenian period. 'Εξ. λ. wäre dann für Aristoteles das, was in den Bereich der nichtphilosophischen Lehrtätigkeit fiel.'²³ Wieland rejects the idea that the term *exoterikoi logoi* might refer to Aristotle's dialogues by saying: 'Doch hatten diese wohl kaum die Bedeutung in der philosophischen Entwicklung des Aristoteles, die man ihnen oft zuzuschreiben geneigt ist'.²⁴ The group of *exoterikoi logoi* thus stands for a number of non-philosophical treatises possibly forming a subcategory of a more comprehensive group which Aristotle may have referred to by expressions such as: τὰ ἐγκύκλια, οἱ ἐκδεδομένοι λόγοι and οἱ ἐν κοινῷ γινόμενοι λόγοι.²⁵

As we said before, however, there is another group of scholars which does not accept that the *Corpus* refers to already existing writings by Aristotle. This position has been defended at length by, among others, the famous German scholar H. Diels.²⁶ He postulates that all passages containing the expression *exoterikoi logoi* require an identical explanation.²⁷ The entire theory of J. Bernays breaks down on this requirement, according to Diels, since Bernays himself had admitted that in *Phys* 4.10 no reference to Aristotle's dialogues could be assumed. It is moreover out of the question that the passages in the *EE*, which Diels holds to be a work by Eudemus of Rhodes, could refer to Aristotelian writings.²⁸

According to Diels, '[soll man] die ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι als τὰ ἔξωθεν λεγόμενα auffassen und darunter die nicht innerhalb der peripatetischen

²¹ D. J. Allan, *loc. cit.*

²² W. K. C. Guthrie, *loc. cit.*

²³ W. Wieland, 'Aristoteles als Rhetoriker und die exoterischen Schriften', *Hermes* 86 (1958) 323-346, esp. 337-338.

²⁴ *Art. cit.* 345.

²⁵ *Art. cit.* 344. See also K. Gaiser in *Hist. Wörterbuch der Philos.* Basel (1972) 2. 865-867 s.v. 'exoterisch'.

²⁶ H. Diels, 'Über die exoterischen Reden des Aristoteles', *SBBerlAW* (1883) 477-94.

²⁷ *Art. cit.* 478.

²⁸ *Art. cit.* 481 and 491.

Schule, sondern sonst z.B. in der Akademie üblichen, aber auch bei älteren, sei es Philosophen oder Laien ... vorgebrachten Erörterungen verstehen'.²⁹

Diels, too, is able to provide a reasonable argumentation for his position. But he also encounters problems, for instance in the passage *Pol.* 3.6 1278b20, where Aristotle uses the first person plural: καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις διοριζόμεθα περὶ αὐτῶν πολλάκις. Here Diels finds nothing better to say than: 'Die erste Person διοριζόμεθα, die vielleicht auffallen könnte, ist hier wie sonst im weiteren Sinne zu nehmen. Aristoteles stellt sich damit auf den Standpunkt der populären Auffassung. Man könnte an allen diesen Stellen unbedenklich "man" übersetzen ...'.³⁰

This view is shared by W. D. Ross,³¹ I. Düring,³² and F. Dirlmeier.³³ The problem has been approached from a somewhat different angle by A. Iannone. In his opinion, the *exoterikoi logoi* can be traced back to the introductory discussions with which Aristotle invariably begins his practical enquiries. Thus no reference is being made to previously published writings or earlier discussions, but simply to the initial section of the enquiry at hand.³⁴ This explanation has met with serious criticism, however, and will have to be considered a definite failure.³⁵

4. Is a new approach to the problem possible?

We note that, at first sight and taken by themselves, the passages concerned give the impression of referring to specific, familiar writings. Certainly if Aristotle made a personal appearance in his published dialogues as the spokesman of his own views, the citation of these writings seems completely normal and meaningful.

²⁹ *Art. cit.* 481.

³⁰ *Art. cit.* 487.

³¹ W. D. Ross, *Aristotle's Metaphysics* (Oxford 1924) 2.408-410; *id.*, *Ar.'s Physics* (Oxford 1936) 595.

³² I. Düring, *Aristotle in the ancient biographical tradition* (Göteborg 1957) 425 ff.

³³ F. Dirlmeier, *Ar. Nikom. Ethik.* (Darmstadt 1956; repr. 1974) 272-275: 'Zwingend scheint mir, dass Ar. nicht gesagt haben kann: "Ich verlasse mich (bei einem bestimmten Problem) auf meinen eigenen publizierten Dialogen", *EN* VI 4, 1140a3. Ar. kann doch nicht sprechen wie der Sokrates des Kriton'. But Dirlmeier proceeds here on the assumption that the published work was less serious and scientific than the treatises. He moreover seems to forget that Aristotle himself figured as a speaker in his dialogues, sometimes even as the main speaker.

³⁴ A. Iannone, 'I logoi essoterici di Aristotele', *AIV* 113 (1954-55) and *id.*, 'Les oeuvres de jeunesse d'Aristote et les Λόγοι ἐξωτερικοί', *RCCM* 1 (1959) 197-207: 'Les λόγοι ἐξωτερικοί désigneraient, à mon avis, certains développements qui figurent dans l'oeuvre même où se trouve la référence et, plus précisément, dans les premiers chapitres du premier livre' (p. 203).

³⁵ Cf. P. Moraux, *A la recherche de l'Aristote perdu* 18 n.10; *id.*, *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen* 1.6 n.10: 'A. Iannone, I logoi essoterici di Aristotele (1955) ist wertlos'.

Problems arise only when, on the basis of a certain reconstruction of the development of Aristotle's thought, the philosophical position of the published works is characterized as 'Platonic', 'early', and 'later superseded'. In that case a psychological problem arises, because it must be assumed that Aristotle was aware of the gap between his early work and his later views,³⁶ and that it is unlikely that he would refer to this early work without further qualification. A problem also arises if one follows the ancient commentators in characterizing the dialogues as merely 'introductory' or 'popularizing'. In that case it is also unlikely that such works would be cited in a technical discussion within a scientific, philosophical treatise.

We have come to the conclusion, however, that it cannot be true in general that Aristotle's published work was 'Platonic', or merely popular. Our enquiry has allowed us to establish that in particular the *Eudemus* must have conducted a profound and scientific philosophical discussion with Plato and that there is no reason for calling this work less profound or more popular (in intention) than for instance Plato's *Politicus* or *Timaeus*.

The question which now poses itself is whether this new point of view can also offer a different approach to the old problem of the references in the *Corpus Aristotelicum*. First we would like to make the following consideration. If it can be assumed that Aristotle's teaching activities (resulting in the *Corpus* published by others) ran parallel with his publishing activities, then it is likely that he referred in his lectures to these publications. Moreover, it can then be assumed that the systematic division of the published writings also showed a parallel with that of his lecture series. Hence we may suspect that in Aristotle's published work, too, one group will have dealt with matters pertaining to the realm of Nature, and another with matters not or not exclusively pertaining to the sphere of Nature.

In the second place, most of the traditional titles of Aristotle's writings indicate to some extent the content of these writings. We should therefore try to see whether the terms *exoterikoi logoi* and *enkyklioi logoi* can tell us something about the content of the works referred to. Surely it would be curious, to say the least, if these two distinctive terms, which at first sight seem opposite to one another, were to refer to the same thing, i.e. to the target group of the writings in question.³⁷ For in that case this group would emphatically not be the same group as the people already interested in philosophy, while for the latter group no set of writings would be available in a published form.

³⁶ J. Bernays, *op. cit.* 127 already thought it easy to see 'dasz Aristoteles von der Höhe seiner reifen Methode aus auf die Dialoge als auf Arbeiten unvollkommener Art herniedersah ...'.

³⁷ Cf. J. Bernays, *op. cit.* 86 who assumes that Aristotle used four different terms (*hoi ekdedomenoi*, *hoi en koinoi gignomenoi*, *exoterikoi logoi*, and *enkyklioi logoi*) to refer to the same writings. Remarkable, too, is a listing of ἐγκυκλίων α' β' in *D.L.* 5.26.

5. *Ta exo in Plato and Aristotle*

If we want to find out whether Aristotle used the terms *exoterikoi logoi* and *enkyklioi logoi* to refer to different categories of writings, we shall have to consider that it was Aristotle who introduced as a special new concept the doctrine of the *enkyklion soma*, which is characterized by *enkyklios phora* or *enkyklios kinesis*. He regarded the entire reality of *Physis* as enclosed by the furthest celestial sphere, which consists of this celestial, divine fifth element and achieves in the purest form and order this cyclical motion.

Aristotle besides talks a few times, like his great master, about *ta exo tou ouranou* as that which transcends the reality of *Physis* and belongs to a radically different order.

We would now first like to pay attention to the philosophical role of the term *ta exo* in Plato and Aristotle, specifically in Plato's *Phaedrus* and Aristotle's *De caelo* 1.9. The text in the *Phaedrus* forms part of the great myth about the journey of the souls to the summit of the celestial region. First we are told about the visions and journeys (*diexodoi*) which the heavenly gods, guided by their great leader Zeus, accomplish *within* the celestial vault.³⁸ But the text goes on to talk about the times at which the gods go to their banquet, for which they ascend to the pinnacle of the celestial roof. Once they have arrived there, they *go outside* and stand on the back of the celestial vault to contemplate the 'extra-celestial region'.³⁹ In this supremely elevated position, they contemplate being and true reality, which is the object of true science.⁴⁰ Only after a full revolution of the heavens has been completed do they redescend to the *intra*-celestial region and return.⁴¹

Of the souls in the retinue of the gods, the most perfect succeed in reaching up with their intellects to the extra-celestial region,⁴² while the others are less successful or not at all. But for the perfect souls this experience is equivalent to initiation in the perfect mysteries.⁴³ As a result, the man possessed of such a soul will stand aside from all human cares, in spite of the totally uncomprehending reaction of his fellow-men.⁴⁴

³⁸ Pl., *Phdr.* 247a5: πολλαὶ μὲν οὖν καὶ μακάριαι θεαί τε καὶ διέξοδοι ἐντὸς οὐρανοῦ...

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 247b6: ἡνίκ' ἂν πρὸς ἄκρῳ γένωνται, ἔξω πορευθεῖσαι ἔστησαν ἐπὶ τῷ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ νάτῳ, στάσας δὲ αὐτὰς περιάγει ἡ περιφορά, αἱ δὲ θεωροῦσι τὰ ἔξω τοῦ οὐρανοῦ.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 247c2-e2.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 247e2-4: καὶ τὰλλα ὡσαύτως τὰ ὄντα ὄντως θεασαμένη καὶ ἐστιαθεῖσα, δῶσα πάλιν εἰς τὸ εἶσω τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, οἴκαδε ἦλθεν.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 248a1-2: ἡ μὲν ἄριστα ... ὑπερῆρεν εἰς τὸν ἔξω τόπον τὴν τοῦ ἡνιόχου κεφαλὴν...

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 249c7: τελέους ἀεὶ τελετὰς τελούμενος, τέλος ὄντως μόνος γίγνεται.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 249c8: ἐξιστάμενος δὲ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων σπουδασμάτων...

In this mythical text, which contains many clear connections with other mythical passages in Plato's works, Plato again makes it clear that the acquisition of perfect *theoria* is a superhuman, divine ideal which can only be achieved by man when he has transcended his earthly and mortal condition and has become alike to the celestial beings. This ideal is set before man in a philosophical myth, metaphor being the most adequate way of talking about *ta exo*.

It is quite reasonable to see the ascent described by the myth as a pattern of cognitive levels as well, in the sense that Plato too, in talking about the *diexodoi* of the gods, subordinated the study of intra-physical reality to the knowledge of the supra-physical world, indicated as the knowledge of the Ideas and the absolute Source.

Here we should mention J. Pépin's comments on the distinction between a *merikos* and *epoptikos* contemplation of reality,⁴⁵ a distinction frequently made by Neoplatonic authors. Pépin points out that the source for this distinction is Plato's *Phaedrus* 249 ff., where the *anamnesis* of the Ideas is described in terms directly reminiscent of the Eleusinian mysteries. According to the interpretation of the Neoplatonists, Plato meant by *epopteia* 'a unifying vision', in which the soul regains its original unity in contrast to the divided condition which characterizes it while incarnated. Pépin even suggests that the 'divided' condition of the incarnated soul may have been alluded to in the story about the laceration of Dionysus.⁴⁶ An epistemological use of the term *epopteia* was also attributed by Plutarch to Aristotle.⁴⁷ When Clement of Alexandria states that what Plato referred to by *epopteia*, Aristotle called 'metaphysics',⁴⁸ we should perhaps take this to mean that the metaphor of gradual initiation not only involves a metaphysically qualified *object*, but that even more it indicates a metaphysical qualification of the cognitive *subject*.

Now, Aristotle, in his treatise *De caelo*, after arguing that the *ouranos* is one and perfect, states that what is *outside heaven* cannot be spoken of in terms of 'location' or 'empty space' or 'time'. For no *soma* can exist *outside heaven*.⁴⁹ Nevertheless, he does postulate the reality of τὰ κεῖ and of τὰ

⁴⁵ Cf. J. Pépin, 'Merikôteron - epoptikôteron, Proclus, *In Tim.* I 204, 24-27. Deux études exégétiques dans le Néoplatonisme', in *Mélanges H.Ch. Puech* (Paris 1974) 323-330.

⁴⁶ *Art. cit.* 329-330 and J. Pépin, 'Plotin et le miroir de Dionysos (*Enn.* IV 3 (27) 12. 1-2)' in *RIPh* 24 (1970) 304-320.

⁴⁷ Plu., *Is. et Os.* 77 382d (= Arist., *Eudemus* fr. 10; cf. *Philos.* fr. 15 Ross). Cf. Clem.Al., *Strom.* 1.28 176.2-3.

⁴⁸ Clem.Al., *loc. cit.*

⁴⁹ Arist. *Cael.* 1.9 279a11: οὐδὲ τόπος οὐδὲ κενὸν οὐδὲ χρόνος ἐστὶν ἔξω τοῦ οὐρανοῦ. ... ἔξω δὲ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ δέδεικται ὅτι οὔτ' ἔστιν οὔτ' ἐνδέχεται γενέσθαι σῶμα. For this notion of τό ἔξω, cf. also *Phys.* 3.4 203a7-8; 6, 206b23; *Cael.* 1.7

ὑπὲρ τὴν ἐξωτάτω τεταγμένα φoράν.⁵⁰

At this very point, where the reader of the *De caelo* would like to hear more about the condition of such divine beings who continuously lead the most perfect and most self-sufficient life, Aristotle again emphatically refrains from enlarging on the subject. But although he says little about this supreme reality, the fact remains that he assigns to it the highest place in his system, and also holds it to be related to the highest level of knowledge. For the knowledge possessed by the transcendent god is not a knowledge of the forms in their combination with matter, but of the pure forms. And his own cognitive faculty is not a *nous* bound to a *psychikon soma*, as possessed by the visible gods, but a pure and free *nous*.

The structural reason why it is not possible to speak or speak fittingly about the supreme deity is perhaps that, according to Aristotle, only beings who have deposed the obstruction of perishability can actually make contact with the thought of the truly free, sovereign *Nous*.⁵¹

We note further that, as F. Solmsen has rightly observed, there need be no contradiction for Aristotle between the claim that there is no 'location' outside the furthest celestial sphere and the fact that it is possible to speak about entities 'outside'. For 'arguments and doctrines that settle the fate of physical objects cannot extend to incorporeal eternal beings'.⁵² It seems useful also to keep this in mind in discussions of the highly controversial passage in *GA*, where it is said that only the *nous* enters the human body 'from outside' (*thyrathen*).⁵³

6. The term *exoterikoi logoi* after Aristotle

Before pursuing our enquiry, we note that Aristotle uses the term *exoterikoi logoi* as a term which is clear and familiar to his audience or readers, but that he gives no explanation of it; and that the term *esoterikoi logoi* does not occur in his work.

Attempts to explain the term *exoterikoi logoi* are not found until Cicero and later authors, that is to say *not before Andronicus' edition of the Corpus Aristotelicum became available*. And there is no evidence that these

275b8; 1.9 278b24; 25; 33; 35; 279a6. Compare also Philo, *Aet* 5.20-24 = Arist., *Philos.* fr. 19a Ross. In this way 'exoo' is still used in Plo., *Enn.* 5.1[10]10.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 279a18-20. Cf. F. Solmsen, 'Beyond the heavens', *MH* 33 (1976) 24-32, who rightly observes: 'that Aristotle should have conceived these ideas about *t'akei* independently of the "Phaedrus" is very hard to believe' (p. 30).

⁵¹ This already seems to be indicated in Pl., *Phdr.* 247c: οὔτε τις ὕμνησέ πω τῶν τῆδε ποιητῆς, which no doubt must be taken to refer to the human, mortal condition, comparable with that of bats existing in the darkness of 'visible' reality. Cf. F. Solmsen, *art. cit.* 24 n.1.

⁵² F. Solmsen, *art. cit.* 30.

⁵³ Arist., *GA* 2.3 736b28.

Hellenistic authors were in a better position to explain the term than we are today. It may well be that they, like us, were intrigued by the use of the term *exoterikoi logoi* in the rediscovered Aristotelian treatises, and that they subsequently gave the interpretation which they thought most likely to be correct.

In assessing their testimonies, we shall have to consider the possibility that their explanations of the term were influenced by the revaluation of Aristotle's philosophical heritage, as a result of a change in the view of what constitutes 'true, serious philosophy'.⁵⁴ If the philosophy of Aristotle's published works, like that of Plato and Heraclides Ponticus, had been criticized for employing a superhuman perspective, it was possible after the rediscovery of the *Corpus Aristotelicum* to see the writings preserved in it as the expression of Aristotle's true, serious philosophy, even if Aristotle himself had not considered this philosophy to be more serious and more relevant than that of his published works. The absence of a mythical perspective in the treatises made it possible to claim for Aristotle the status of a 'modern' and serious philosopher in an age that had come to make other demands on philosophy than Aristotle himself had done.

The Hellenistic interpretations of the term *exoterikoi logoi*, as a reference to Aristotelian writings, were systematically collocated by I. Düring in his study on Aristotle and the biographical tradition.⁵⁵

Eudemus of Rhodes' reference to an exoterike aporia

In his list of relevant texts, Düring also mentions the fact that Simplicius quotes Eudemus of Rhodes in his commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*. Eudemus is reported to have said that a problem dealt with by Aristotle was 'exoteric', because – according to Simplicius – it belonged more properly to the field of dialectics.⁵⁶ Düring remarks: 'Again we find that exoteric = (roughly speaking) "popular" as opposed to "scientific"'.⁵⁷ And he is probably right, as far as the meaning is concerned which Simplicius gave to the term *exoterikos*.⁵⁸

But the crucial question is whether Eudemus of Rhodes had the same meaning in mind. The least we can say is that the context concerned does not deal with a 'problem for beginners' or an issue with which a philosopher might win the esteem of the general public. The context is namely *Physics* 1.2, where Aristotle briefly asks whether the *physikos* should occupy

⁵⁴ See Chapter 10.8 above.

⁵⁵ I. Düring, *Aristotle in the ancient biographical tradition* (Göteborg 1957) 426–443.

⁵⁶ Simp., *In Ph.* (C.I.A.G. 9; Berlin 1882) 83.27, 85.26, and 86.1 = Eudemus of Rhodes, (ed. F. Wehrli, Basle 1969²) fr. 36.

⁵⁷ I. Düring, *op. cit.* 440.

⁵⁸ Düring also refers to Simp., *In Ph.* 695.28, where Simplicius explains 'exoteric' with the words: τὰ κοινὰ καὶ δι' ἐνδόξων περαινόμενα. Cf. also Simpl., *In Ph.* 8.16.

himself with the Eleatic question of whether being is one and unmoved.⁵⁹ Aristotle declares emphatically that the Eleatics are not talking about *Physis* in this problem, but admits that they raise *aporiae* relevant for the *physikos*. He therefore thinks it is useful to discuss the problem shortly. For such an enquiry does have philosophical relevance.⁶⁰ He first establishes that 'being' and 'one' can be used in different ways in various contexts. And in his discussion of the various categories in which 'one' can occur, he makes the following aside: 'There is a difficulty about [the relation between] the part and the whole, perhaps not relevant to our argument here, yet in itself deserving consideration, namely whether the part and the whole are one or more than one', etc.⁶¹ The words 'perhaps not relevant to our argument here' are explained by Simplicius as follows: 'Aristotle says this because the foregoing was already sufficient to refute those who consider being to be one in the way mentioned [in the sense of continuous]. But also perhaps because the problem of this relation was exoteric to the discussion at hand, as Eudemus claims, since it is more a problem of dialectics'.⁶² But slightly further on Simplicius quotes Eudemus literally, and it appears there that Eudemus did not say: 'exoteric to the argument at hand', but: 'This question contains an exoteric *aporia*'.⁶³ It is Simplicius who combines Aristotle's words 'perhaps not relevant to our argument' and Eudemus' remark that 'this question contains an exoteric *aporia*' into the phrase: 'a problem exoteric to the argument at hand'.

We should therefore seriously consider that Eudemus may have meant: the matter brought up by Aristotle here is an 'exoteric' problem in the sense that it does not belong to physics, but to a different enquiry which discusses at a fundamental level the possible existence of an Eleatic Being and in general the existence of ungenerated and motionless beings. In the *De caelo* too, Aristotle says that such a discussion does not belong to physics. It belongs rather to 'another and higher enquiry than physics'.⁶⁴ It is the discussion of whether non-physical beings exist, such as the Eleatic Being, the Platonic Ideas, or the Aristotelian Prime Unmoved Mover.

The statement of Eudemus of Rhodes does not, therefore, lend support to the view that 'exoteric' in the Peripatos meant 'aimed at a broader public', 'for the philosophically untutored', or 'non-scientific'. But it does lend plausibility to our hypothesis that 'exoteric discussions' was the name for discourses on subjects which Plato assigned to dialectics, and Aristotle to a science of non-physical being.

⁵⁹ Arist., *Phys.* 1.2 184b25-185a20.

⁶⁰ Arist., *Phys.* 1.2 184b26 and 185a17.

⁶¹ Arist., *Phys.* 1.2 185b11-16.

⁶² Simp., *In Ph.* 83.26-27: ἴσως δὲ καὶ ὅτι ἡ ἐφ' ἐκάτερα ἀπορία τοῦ λόγου ἐξωτερικὴ τις ἦν, ὡς καὶ Εὐδημὸς φησι, διαλεκτικὴ μᾶλλον οὐσα.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 85.26: ἔχει δὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀπορίαν ἐξωτερικὴν.

⁶⁴ Arist., *Cael.* 3.1 298b12-20.

Cicero

It is remarkable that the earliest reference to *exoterikoi logoi* occurs in one of Cicero's letters to Atticus. In it Cicero states his intention of adding new and separate introductions to the various books of his *Republic*, 'ut Aristoteles in iis quos *exoterikous* vocat'.⁶⁵ In the context it is clear that Cicero is talking about Aristotelian works which we no longer possess, written on a number of scrolls and in a polished style. (One wonders, incidentally, whether this means that Cicero knew of no 'exoteric writings' filling only a single scroll.)

In the second place it is important that Cicero knows that Aristotle himself used the term 'exoteric'. It is not natural to assume that the term 'exoteric' was used in the writings to which it refers. So we have to assume that Cicero is familiar with it from the references to *exoterikoi logoi* in the *Corpus Aristotelicum* published by Andronicus.

Ten years later, in his *De finibus*, Cicero again brings up the *exoterikoi logoi*.⁶⁶ In a speech about the Peripatetic school, Piso first argues that the philosophy in this tradition consisted of three parts: physics, rhetoric, and ethics. He goes on to state that two kinds of books have been written 'On the highest good', one written in a popular style, also called 'exoterical', the other in the form of treatises, and more refined.⁶⁷ This is why Aristotle and Theophrastus sometimes seem to have defended different views.

A striking detail in this passage is the fact that Cicero characterizes the treatises as *limatius scriptum*, 'written with more care and refinement'. For it is precisely the few literal fragments of Aristotle's dialogues that give the impression of being written with more care, at any rate from a literary point of view. We should not, in fact, make the error of believing that Cicero's judgement is based on his own comparison of Aristotelian writings from both categories. Cicero is here merely reporting an account by Antiochus of Ascalon.⁶⁸ The latter appears to have known the fact that Aristotle refers a few times to his *exoterikoi logoi* in connection with a discussion of the Good. He may well have inferred this from the passage in *EE* 1.8 1217b16-23. For there Aristotle claims to have talked about the theory of Ideas, including the Idea of the Good, both 'in the *exoterikoi logoi* and in the *logoi kata philosophian*'. We may assume that Antiochus, like many modern interpreters, held that Aristotle was thus referring to his published writings on the one hand and to his treatises on the other.⁶⁹

⁶⁵ Cic., *Ep.* 4.16.2. Düring, *op. cit.* 426 dates this letter to 54 BC.

⁶⁶ Cic., *Fin.* 5.5.12.

⁶⁷ Cic., *loc. cit.*: 'De summo autem bono quia duo genera librorum sunt, unum populariter scriptum quod ἐξωτερικόν appellabant, alterum limatius quod in commentariis reliquerunt'.

⁶⁸ Cf. I. Düring, *op. cit.* 427.

⁶⁹ Cf. I. Düring, *op. cit.* 428. See also our discussion of the passage from *EE* 1.8 in section 8 below.

But we shall later establish that there is no solid reason whatsoever for taking the *logoi kata philosophian* to refer to the unpublished treatises. Besides, precisely the context of *EE* 1.8 indicates that Aristotle does not consider the theory of Ideas a subject amenable to a popular treatment. Rather it requires a more *abstract* and strictly logical discussion, since it is a non-physical subject.

Strabo

In Strabo's *Geographics* (25 BC) we are told about the city of Scepsis in Asia Minor. Strabo mentions two of its inhabitants, Coriscus and his son Neleus, and this prompts him to recount the fate of Aristotle's library.⁷⁰ Neleus is said to have attended lectures by Aristotle and Theophrastus, and to him Theophrastus bequeathed his library, which included Aristotle's collection. Neleus took it with him to Scepsis, where his heirs kept the scrolls behind lock and key, in bad conditions. For some time they even concealed them underground, fearing the acquisitiveness of the kings of Pergamon. Damaged by damp and vermin, the scrolls were finally sold for a large sum of money to Apellicon. Apellicon was a bibliophile rather than a philosopher. He had new copies made and the corrupted parts restored, but the work was carried out negligently. Thus his edition was full of mistakes. The result of all this was that the ancient Peripatetics after Theophrastus possessed only a few written works, in particular the *exoterikoi*, and so were not able to philosophize seriously, but merely declaimed commonplaces.⁷¹ After the written works had resurfaced, the later Peripatetics were in a better position to philosophize and Aristotelize, but they were frequently reduced to guesswork on account of the many errors in the texts. Tyrannion made this even worse in his Roman edition by using bad copyists and making no collations.

It is clear here that Strabo too is not speaking on the basis of a personal comparison of lost and preserved Aristotelian writings. Düring rightly assumes that Strabo made use of Andronicus' introduction to his edition, which professed to be more scientific and reliable than the previous ones.⁷² Strabo's story suggests that Aristotle's authentic writings were left untouched from about 300 to 100 BC and were then rediscovered. This already raises problems about the durability of the material used. It is usually assumed that texts were lost unless they were renewed every fifty years.

It seems that Strabo's source, too, had no firsthand information about the content of the *exoterikoi logoi*. From the remark that the ancient

⁷⁰ Strabo, 13.1.54.

⁷¹ Strabo uses here the striking expression: θέσεις ληκυθίζειν.

⁷² I. Düring, *op. cit.* 429.

Peripatetics merely 'declaimed commonplaces',⁷³ we may perhaps infer that Andronicus already characterized the difference between the *Corpus* and the *exoterikoi logoi* as being that the latter proceeded from *endoxa* and offered no 'proof', a characterization which we find in various later commentators. But we shall have to treat such statements with reserve, since it may well be that, like the remarks about the poor quality of the editions by Apellicon and Tyrannion, they merely served to promote Andronicus' edition as the only scientific edition of Aristotle's serious works.

Plutarch

Plutarch of Chaeronea also mentions significantly different levels between the various forms of Aristotle's teaching and writing. But in his biography of Alexander the Great he talks about this in the context of romantic stories about the great Macedonian conqueror.⁷⁴ He recounts how Aristotle became private tutor to prince Alexander, and how this special pupil was not only trained in ethical and political discourse, but was also admitted to the higher, arcane teachings which they (*sc.* the Peripatetics) called 'lectures' (*akroatikas*) and 'speculative' (*epoptikas*) and kept secret from the masses. Alexander is said to have been so ambitious that, on hearing that Aristotle had published some of these lectures, he wrote a letter from Asia reproaching Aristotle for this. But Aristotle reassured him by replying that even in a written form these lectures were only comprehensible to those advanced in philosophy. Plutarch adds that they were particularly referring to the *Metaphysics*.

Aulus Gellius reports that this exchange of letters between Alexander and Aristotle could be found in Andronicus.⁷⁵ Düring believes that these letters too were produced by Andronicus himself, and that even if he derived them from elsewhere, he used them in the introduction to his edition of the *Corpus* to substantiate his own theory of a distinction between lectures for 'beginners' and 'advanced students'.⁷⁶

A remarkable assumption in the story about Aristotle and Alexander is that long before his second Athenian period Aristotle had already given lectures for the initiated, as reproduced in the treatises of the *Corpus*. Both letters moreover assume some kind of *ekdosis* of certain parts of the *Corpus*, perhaps even of the *Metaphysics*, during Aristotle's lifetime.

The fabrications of Andronicus are best explained by assuming that Aristotle did in fact draw a fundamental distinction between the kind of cognitive activity in which man studies visible reality with the help of his

⁷³ I. Düring explains this expression by referring to Cic., *Or.* 14.46, where the study of *loci (topoi)* is said to be necessary for the arguing of *theseis* in a dialectical sparring match.

⁷⁴ Plu., *Alex.* 7-8.

⁷⁵ Gell. 20.5.

⁷⁶ I. Düring, *op. cit.* 286.

natural reason and another kind in which visible reality is transcended and cognition is directed toward the supra-physical. The final goal of this cognition is the transcending of human discursive reasoning itself in an intuitive process of contemplation and enlightenment.⁷⁷

But presumably this distinction was employed by Aristotle both in his published writings and in his lectures. In order to enhance the status of the *Corpus* which he rediscovered, however, Andronicus may have suggested that the above distinction was identical with that between the *exoterikoi logoi* and the treatises of the *Corpus*!

Hippolytus

The distinction between *exoterikoi* and *esoterikoi* found in Hippolytus indicates not two kinds of writings, but two categories of pupils, namely of Pythagoras, who confided his more complete teachings to the latter category. The *exoterikoi* were initiated less fully.⁷⁸

It would seem that Andronicus' view of the procedure in Aristotle's school has here been projected back onto the school of Pythagoras. Curiously, however, Hippolytus makes no mention of such a distinction in his discussion of Aristotle's philosophy.⁷⁹

Ammonius

At the beginning of his commentary on the *Categoriae*, the Neoplatonic commentator on Aristotle's work, Ammonius, discusses the division of Aristotle's writings.⁸⁰ After distinguishing between 'dialogic' works and works written from Aristotle's own point of view (*autoprosopa*), he continues:⁸¹

The dialogic writings are also called 'exoteric', the writings from his own point of view 'doctrinal discourses' or 'lectures'. It needs to be investigated why they are so called. Some say that the dialogues were also called 'exoteric' because in them he does not advance his own views, but as it were develops the subjects under discussion by proceeding from [the viewpoint of] other people. But this view is incorrect. For they were called 'exoteric' because they were written for people with only limited powers of comprehension, so that the philosopher aimed at comprehensible language and not at conclusive arguments, proceeding on the basis of generally accepted opinions; by contrast, he wrote his 'lectures' so that they would be followed by the serious and

⁷⁷ For this meaning of *epoptikon*, see esp. Plu., *Is. et Os.* 77 382e; Qu., *Conviv.* 8.2.1 718d; Clem.Al., *Strom.* 1.28 176.2; Greg. Naz., *Or.* 10 110D. For the origin of this term, Düring rightly refers to Pl., *Symp.* 210a; *Phdr.* 250c. He fails to recognize, however, that at this level there can no longer be 'discussions', but only 'contemplation' and 'intuition'.

⁷⁸ Hipp., *Haer.* (ed. M. Marcovich) 1.2.4 and 1.2.17.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 1.20.

⁸⁰ Ammon., *In Cat.* (C.I.A.G. 4.4; Berlin 1895) 3.20 ff.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 4.18-27 = I. Düring, *op. cit.* T 76k (p. 437).

wholly genuine lover of philosophy.

Düring notes that the view rejected here by Ammonius seems to have been defended by Alexander of Aphrodisias in his lost commentary on the *De anima*. Ammonius himself opted for the explanation put forward by Andronicus, who posited a difference in depth and stylistic refinement.⁸²

The starting-point of Ammonius' text is of course sound, namely that Aristotle's dialogic works contained large portions of text which do not represent his own views. But it is going one step too far to conclude that Aristotle's own views were altogether lacking in these dialogues. In Plato's dialogues, too, it is sometimes difficult to determine which point of view Plato would be prepared to defend, but we do know that Socrates is more likely to be the mouthpiece of his views than Protagoras and Kallimachos. In addition we know that Aristotle also wrote dialogues in which he personally takes part in the discussion, sometimes even as its leader.⁸³ It is really too elaborate to assume that he did not speak for himself there either. We must again bear the possibility in mind that such an idea was either a result of Andronicus' prevailing wish to present his edition as the rediscovery of Aristotle's true philosophy, or the consequence of the fact that the dialogues were no more available to him.

We would now like to show how various elements from the tradition can be combined in an entirely new hypothesis.

(a) Since the explanations of the term 'exoteric' do not appear until after Andronicus' edition, it is legitimate to assume that they were attempts to solve the problem of the references in the *Corpus* with no more information than is now available to us.

(b) On the basis of the subjects dealt with in the *exoterikoi logoi*, as we will discuss below, which included Plato's doctrine of Ideas and the debate over the Idea of the Good, we seem justified in considering that 'exoteric' was understood by Aristotle as: 'pertaining to the realities lying *outside Physis*'.

(c) That is to say that in these works Aristotle discussed the subjects which, according to his own philosophy of science, were not susceptible to treatment in a discursive, conclusive argumentation. For argumentation or proof is possible only on the basis of acceptance of the starting-points (*archai*).

(d) Thus, while the matters belonging to *Physis* and to the realm of common human experience can be discussed *scientifically* and with recourse to argumentation, a fundamentally different method is required to discuss that which transcends them. The only possibility is to compare positions and test their value by showing the various consequences for the interpretation of experiential reality. There can in fact be no better form for the debate with

⁸² I. Düring, *loc. cit.*

⁸³ See Cic., *Ep.* 13.19.4.

the Eleatics and Plato and his school than a dialectical discourse or dialogue. (e) Characteristic of the conflict between 'fundamentally' opposed views or 'paradigms' is that argumentation does play a role in it, but only as a 'retrospective argumentation' of positions assumed prior to the argument. (f) Such a discussion, however, in which it is impossible to prove conclusively that one is right and the opponent wrong, is not 'unscientific', but is actually basic for science.⁸⁴ And the fact that Aristotle always qualifies physics as a 'secondary' science implies his realization that the reliability of physics is anchored in a higher science, the science of principles. It becomes clear to Aristotle that 'science' consists of two components: strictly logical argumentation and the assumption of starting-points which cannot themselves be demonstrated. (g) Thus the method of enquiry based on 'accepted opinions' (*endoxa*) is not only relevant for the practice of the rhetorician. This 'dialectical' method is also the only method which can be used at the highest level of scientific research. To this extent the content of the *Topics* is not without importance for Aristotle's theory of science. From a systematic point of view, in fact, it is quite possible to argue that this work is more fundamental than the *Analytics*.

Olympiodorus closely follows Ammonius, but adds a few details here and there.⁸⁵ Interestingly, he states that Alexander of Aphrodisias argued that Aristotle had not presented his own views in the *exoterika*, since the immortality of the soul was 'cried out' in the dialogues, and this was not in line with Aristotle's views. We are not convinced by Düring's suggestion that Olympiodorus' statement is based on a misunderstanding, in the sense that a 'current opinion' discussed in (for example) the *Eudemus* was subsequently ascribed to Aristotle.⁸⁶

7. *The opposition between physica and exotica in the Asclepius of the Corpus Hermeticum*

In connection with the above, we wish to mention a striking distinction between different kinds of writings drawn in the *Asclepius* of the *Corpus Hermeticum*. In the introductory dialogue of this tractate, Hermes says to Asclepius: 'we remember that many writings were dedicated by us to him [Ammon], just as we dedicated numerous *physica* and a large number of

⁸⁴ Interesting in this connection is a passage in Justin Martyr, *Dial.* (ed. J. C. M. van Winden) 7.2, where it is said of the Old Testament prophets: 'they did not compose their discourses with the aid of arguments, since their reliability as witnesses of the truth transcended all argumentation'.

⁸⁵ Olymp. *Proll.* (C.I.A.G. 12.1; Berlin 1902) 7.5-24. Cf. I. Düring, *op. cit.* 438.

⁸⁶ I. Düring, *op. cit.* 438-439.

been committed to writing or released (for instance Aristotle's lectures in the Peripatos).

The variants are thus:

(1a) in circulation in an intimate circle, i.e. of the members of the school community;

(1b) in circulation in a wider circle, i.e. available for the entire reading public.

(2) *Logoi* concerning *ta enkyklia*.

According to the meaning which we assign to *ta enkyklia*, we get the following variants:

(2a) *logoi* concerning *general*, non-specialist subjects;

(2b) *logoi* concerning the substances which move in a circular orbit, that is to say, concerning the fifth element and all that consists of it or participates in it;

(2c) *logoi* concerning all that is subject to cyclical processes (either of movement, or of generation and dissolution);

(2d) *logoi* concerning all that is enclosed within the circle of the furthest celestial sphere, that is to say, concerning the entire realm of *Physis* and human experience.

We add the following comments on the possibilities summed up above.

(1a) would leave open the possibility of a contrast with *exoterikoi logoi*, which could then be taken to mean: '*logoi* circulated outside the school circle'. As far as we know, however, this interpretation has never been considered. If during a lecture Aristotle refers to certain writings for further details, it is much more natural to assume that these are writings which have been released normally for *ekdosis*, so that the public can take cognizance of Aristotle's philosophical views. '*Logoi* in circulation' will in fact have to be taken in sense (1b). That would carry the connotation of 'addressed and available to a wide public', also in the sense of 'popularizing', 'popular'. But there would be no meaningful contrast with *exoterikoi logoi*.

The possibility outlined in (2a), '*logoi* concerning general, non-specialist subjects', might be considered for the passage in *EN* 1.3, but is less obvious for the text in *Cael.* 1.9. And there would be no clear contrast with *exoterikoi logoi*.

On the other hand, (2b) '*logoi* concerning the substances which move in a circular orbit' could be considered for *Cael.* 1.9, but is less probable in *EN* 1.3.

(2c) would contrast the eternal, immutable supralunary realm and the sublunary region of generation and dissolution with that which transcends Nature and is not subject to any temporal process. But the term *enkyklios* would not in itself be in clear contrast with *exoterikos*.

Such a contrast would, however, be present in sense (2d), namely if we are to interpret the '*logoi* concerning *ta enkyklia*' as '*logoi* concerning all

that is enclosed within the circle of the furthest celestial sphere'. (By analogy, *exoterikoi logoi* could then mean: 'logoi concerning that which belongs *outside* the furthest celestial sphere'.) This interpretation allows for a difference in the accessibility and difficulty of the *enkyklioi logoi* compared with the *exoterikoi logoi*, since the sphere of natural reality and sense-perceptible experience is more accessible and knowable for mortals than the reality which transcends nature.

Possibility (2d) fits *EN* 1.3, in so far as the theoretical life cannot be adequately talked about without discussing the reality of the transcendent *Nous*. It can also be considered for *Cael.* 1.9, since Aristotle plainly regards the immutability of the divine as the subject of physics.

The exoterikoi logoi

After looking at the references to the *enkyklioi logoi*, we shall now also check the references to the *exoterikoi logoi* to see which themes they may have dealt with. Subsequently, we shall again consider a number of possible meanings for this term.

EN 1.13 1102a26-28

At the end of book 1 of the *EN*, Aristotle states that *eudaimonia* is an activity of the soul. Therefore the soul also belongs to the study of ethics, to the extent which is sufficient for the question under discussion.⁹⁹ He then continues as follows: λέγεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις ἀρκούντως ἓνια, καὶ χρηστέον αὐτοῖς· οἷον τὸ μὲν ἄλογον αὐτῆς εἶναι, τὸ δὲ λόγον ἔχον.¹⁰⁰ 'Some things have been said about it [i.e. about the soul], adequately enough, in the *exoterikoi logoi* too, and we must use these. For instance, that one part of the soul is irrational, another part rational.'

In the first place we can observe that the psychology referred to here is *not* the psychology of the *De anima*. But it will not do to claim, as J. Burnet does, that this psychology cannot be Aristotle's. For one thing, Aristotle clearly makes this psychology the basis of his further discussions in the *EN*. But we also find this 'simple' psychology in a number of other texts which have been related to Aristotle's lost works.¹⁰¹ For his lectures on ethics

⁹⁹ Arist., *EN* 1.13 1102a23: θεωρητέον δὴ καὶ τῷ πολιτικῷ περὶ ψυχῆς, θεωρητέον δὲ τούτων χάριν, καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον ἱκανῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὰ ζητούμενα.

¹⁰⁰ *EN* 1.13 1102a26-28. Cf. J. Burnet, *op. cit.*: 'extraneous discussions', with the explanation: 'extraneous to the Aristotelian school', for 'Ar. himself did not believe in parts of the soul at all' (!); W. D. Ross, *op. cit.* 'in the discussions outside our school'; H. G. Apostle, *op. cit.* 'in public writings', with the explanation: 'a more literal translation would be "outside writings" and perhaps these writings were Aristotle's and were meant for the public'.

¹⁰¹ E.g. *Protr.* fr. 6 Ross, Düring B 60; cf. also *Philos.* fr. 27b Ross, where pathetic

Aristotle apparently considers knowledge of other, previously published writings necessary. These seem to have developed a psychology which is more in line with that of Plato's *Phaedrus*, *Timaeus*, and *Laws* (though without being identical) than with that of the *De anima*.

EN 6.4 1140a1-3

At another point in the *EN*, Aristotle says that he need not explain in detail the distinction between 'making' (*poiesis*) and 'acting' (*praxis*), because he can refer for this to the *exoterikoi logoi*.¹⁰²

We are concerned here with a philosophical distinction which no other philosopher elaborated and employed so systematically as Aristotle. It is also closely related to Aristotle's polemic against Plato's theology of the world-creating Demiurge. In this debate, Aristotle had exclusively assigned the activity of *theoria* to the *nous*, the activity of *praxis* to the *psyche*, and the activity of *poiesis* to the *empsychon soma*. This passage, therefore, cannot possibly refer to current writings or discussions by other philosophers. Here too we must see that Aristotle is presupposing familiarity with his own published writings, which he refers to as *exoterikoi logoi*.

Metaph. M 1 1076a28

In the *Metaphysics* we find a reference to *exoterikoi logoi* in book M. Aristotle starts by remarking that the enquiry about the substance of visible things has been concluded; and that the enquiry proper now addresses the question of whether, besides the visible substances, there is also an unmoved and eternal substance.¹⁰³ In this context the views of other thinkers who assumed a division between visible reality and a non-sensible reality will also pass under review, such as the Pythagoreanizing Realists and the Realism of Plato's theory of Ideas. The latter subject will only be dealt with for the sake of completeness: τεθρύληται γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν λόγων.¹⁰⁴ 'For most part of this subject has been exhaustively discussed in the *exoterikoi logoi*'.¹⁰⁵

As far as the theory of Ideas is concerned, no one doubts that Aristotle

and intellectual functions are explicitly assigned to the soul.

¹⁰² EN 6.4 1140a1-3: τοῦ δ' ἐνδεχομένου ἄλλως ἔχειν ἔστι τι καὶ ποιητὸν καὶ πρακτὸν· ἕτερον δ' ἔστι ποιήσις καὶ πρᾶξις (πιστεύομεν δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις).

¹⁰³ Arist., *Metaph.* M 1 1076a11.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 1076a27-28.

¹⁰⁵ Τεθρύληται need not be 'disparaging', as H. Diels, *art. cit.* 488 and F. Dirlmeier, *Ar. Nik. Eth.* 275 think. It can certainly mean 'discussed down to the smallest details, exhaustively'. Cf. Arist., *Eudemus* fr. 6 Ross, where ὃ ἐκ πολλῶν ἐτῶν περιφέρεται θρυλούμενον also means: 'that which is very well-known', which is then taken up in a positive sense.

wrote works now lost which entered into it deeply (*De Philosophia, De Ideis, De Bono*). And it seems unlikely that Aristotle, who owes much of his philosophical reputation to his opposition of Plato's theory of Ideas, would refer for a detailed discussion of this subject to writings or discussions by others. On the other hand, the refutation of the theory of Ideas in all its facets is hardly a suitable subject for a popular treatise, witness the complexity of *Metaphysics* A 9.

Although Aristotle himself utterly rejects the theory of the 'separateness' of Ideas or mathematical Forms, he deals with these theories in the context of an enquiry into the possible existence of supra-physical substances, since the people whose teachings he is about to discuss do regard these substances as falling outside visible reality. Aristotle had more than once indicated that such an enquiry was typically the task of another, more fundamental mode of discussion than that of physics.¹⁰⁶ Just as Aristotle in the *Corpus* conducted this discussion in above all the '*Meta-physics*', he may have conducted it in his published writings in works which, on account of this special theme, were designated as *exoterikoi logoi*.

EE 2.1 1218b32 and 1.8 1217b20-23

Our enquiry will also have to take account of two passages from the *EE*. We start with *EE* 2.1, where it is said that a distinction must be made between *bona externa* and *bona animae* and that the latter are more valuable. This distinction had also been made in the *exoterikoi logoi*.¹⁰⁷ For it was explained there that insight and *arete* and pleasure are matters belonging to the soul, matters which separately or in combination constitute the highest goal for everyone. And it was also explained that some of the matters of the soul are habitual and potential, but that others are activities or processes. In the discussion of the subject of *arete*, all this will have to be taken for granted.

We are here again concerned with well-known, specifically Aristotelian distinctions which must have been discussed on more than one occasion in his lost writings. There is certainly no reason to think that Aristotle is

¹⁰⁶ Cf. *Cael.* 3.1 298b19-20; *Metaph.* A 1 1069b34-35.

¹⁰⁷ *EE* 2.1 1218b32-34. Cf. H. Grant, *The Ethics of Ar.* (1885; repr. New York 1973) 403 ff.: 'Eudemus [!] says that we make this distinction even when speaking popularly, "for all men consider either thought, virtue or pleasure, to be an end-in-itself"; J. Solomon, *Eud. Eth.* (Oxford 1913): 'this distinction we make even in our popular discussions'; H. Rackham, *Ar., The Eud. Eth.* (London 1935): 'as we class them even in the extraneous discourses'; F. Dirlmeier, *Ar., Werke* vol. 7 (Berlin 1969): 'entsprechend einer von uns auch in den exoterischen Schriften getroffenen Unterscheidung', with the explanation that the use of the first person rules out a reference to a popular, extra-Peripatetic writing, as H. Diels would have it; J. L. Ackrill, *op. cit.* (1973): 'even in our popular discussions'; M. Woods, *Ar.'s Eud. Eth.* (Oxford 1982): 'according to a distinction made also in the external discussions'.

referring to discussions by other people.

Things are more complicated in *EE* 1.8. In his enquiry into the 'highest good', Aristotle has run up against the Platonic doctrine of the Idea of the Good, which according to Plato is 'separate' (*choriste*) from all that 'participates' in it. Aristotle notes that this subject should properly speaking be dealt with in another kind of discourse, which will necessarily have a more logical character.¹⁰⁸ But here he briefly recapitulates his criticism of this Platonic theorem: 'To say that there is an Idea of the Good or of anything is abstract and idle. This matter has been discussed in many ways, both in the *exoterikoi logoi* and in the *logoi kata philosophian*'.¹⁰⁹ Here too, precisely where the criticism of the Ideas is concerned, it must be considered unlikely that Aristotle would refer to someone else's writings. But the question of course arises: which *two* kinds of writings can be meant? Again the opinions of the various modern commentators and translators are divided.¹¹⁰

If it is assumed that the *Corpus Aristotelicum* as we have it was not released for publication by Aristotle during his lifetime, it would be fundamentally wrong, in our opinion, to accept that Aristotle is referring here on the one hand to writings released for publication and on the other to unpublished lectures, which would moreover have to be rated higher in terms of philosophical quality. However, there is no objection to supposing that Aristotle distinguished groups or parts in his published work. In view of the themes apparently dealt with in them, it is possible that he is referring

¹⁰⁸ Arist., *EE* 1.8 1217b1-19.

¹⁰⁹ Arist., *EE* 1.8 1217b20-23: τὸ εἶναι ἰδέαν μὴ μόνον ἀγαθοῦ ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλου ὁποῦν λέγεται λογικῶς καὶ κενῶς· ἐπέσκειται δὲ πολλοῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ τρόποις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν.

¹¹⁰ Cf. H. Grant, *op. cit.* (1885) 401 ff.: two classes of opinions and arguments about a subject, the popular and the philosophical; J. Solomon, *op. cit.*: 'both in our popular and in our philosophical discussions'; W. Jaeger, *Aristotle* 256 held that *hoi kata philosophian* here would have to refer to Aristotle's 'formal lectures' in metaphysics, as we find in the homonymous *Metaphysics* in the *Corpus*. But he fails to provide solid arguments for this view. Cf. further H. Rackham, *op. cit.*: 'both in the extraneous discourses and in those on philosophical lines'; F. Dirlmeier, *op. cit.*: 'sowohl in den exoterischen wie in den nach strenger Methode verfahrenen Schriften', with the explanation that 'exoteric writings' not only includes the *De philosophia*, but also the *De Ideis* and *De Bono* and even discussions by outsiders. According to R. Stark, *op. cit.* (1972) 50 f., the manner of phrasing excludes the possibility that 'exoteric writings' refers to the work *De philosophia*. Rather this passage seems to him to indicate that the *De philosophia* had not yet been written. J. L. Ackrill, *op. cit.* (1973): 'both in our popular and in our philosophic discussions'; M. Woods, *op. cit.* (1982): 'both in the external discussions and in the work *On Philosophy*' (!). I. Düring, *Aristoteles* (Heidelberg 1966) 556 claims without sound reasons: 'Dieser präzise Ausdruck gestattet m.E. nur eine Deutung, nämlich dasz die einen "nicht-wissenschaftlich", die anderen "streng wissenschaftlich" sind. Aus ἔξω geht hervor, dasz er auf Schriften oder Argumente verweist, die ausserhalb des eigentlichen Schulbetriebes und ausserhalb der φιλοσοφία d.h. der Wissenschaft liegen'.

here on the one hand to writings which discussed, on a highly abstract level and on the basis of purely analytical or a priori reasoning, the possible existence of realities *outside* the visible cosmos; and on the other hand to writings like the *De philosophia* which not only debated Plato's theory of Ideas, but also talked about intra-cosmic reality and human existence.¹¹¹

By way of clarification, we might compare the two kinds of writings alluded to by Aristotle with Plato's *Parmenides* and *Sophistes* on the one hand, and his *Phaedo*, *Phaedrus*, and *Timaeus* on the other.

Politica

Logoi exoterikoi are also mentioned a few times in the *Politica*. The first reference occurs in book 3.6 1278b30-32. In his enquiry into the various forms of government, Aristotle says that it is first necessary to establish why society should be organized into a state and what forms of rule (*arche*) there are in relation to the individual human being and to the state.¹¹² After talking about the why and wherefore of the state, he continues: 'It is also easy to distinguish the various kinds of rule. For we have often defined these in the *exoterikoi logoi* as well'.¹¹³ The first person plural used by Aristotle in this passage again seems to indicate that he is referring to writings by himself. Only those who, like H. Grant and H. Diels, approach this passage with a certain presupposition about the 'superseded' or 'popular' character of the published writings, will be inclined to think of works or discussions by others.

At the same time there is not much more to be inferred from this passage, besides the fact that Aristotle discussed the various forms of *arche* in his published oeuvre. It appears from *Pol.* 1.5, however, that Aristotle not only regarded the relations between master and slave, parent and child, or man

¹¹¹ It is quite generally assumed that reference to this dialogue is made in the *Corpus* in *An.* 1.2 404b19 and *Phys.* 2.2 194a36. In both cases the preposition *peri* is used.

¹¹² *Pol.* 3.6 1278b15-17.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 1278b30-32: ἀλλὰ μὲν καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς γε τοὺς λεγομένους τρόπους ῥᾶδιον διελεῖν· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις διοριζόμεθα περὶ αὐτῶν πολλάκις. Cf. J. H. von Kirchmann, *Arist. Politik* (Leipzig 1880): 'in meinen gemeinverständlichen Vorträgen'; H. Grant, *The Ethics of Ar.* (1885) 405 f. rejects the possibility of a reference to dialogues here. For Ar. wrote his dialogues (if he wrote them at all) in his youth 'and had left them far behind, both in thought and manner, when he came to compose his systematic philosophy'. By contrast, W. L. Newman, *The Politics of Ar.* (Oxford 1887; repr. 1950), following E. Zeller, thinks it probable 'that Ar. here also refers to writings of his own of a popular kind (possibly to the πολιτικός and the Π. βασιλείας)'. B. Gowett, *The Works of Ar.* vol 10 (Oxford 1921): 'in discussions outside the school'; O. Gigon, *Arist. Politik* (Zurich 1955; repr. 1971): 'in den publizierten Schriften', with the explanation: 'in einem Dialoge, doch wohl demjenigen "Über die Gerechtigkeit"'; J. Aubonnet, *Ar., Politique* (Paris 1960): 'dans nos ouvrages destinés au public'; R. Robinson, *Ar.'s Politics books 3 and 4* (Oxford 1962): 'in our popular works'.

and beast as forms of *arche*, but also assumed *arche* relations within the individual. In man there is a relation between body and soul in which ideally the soul, being more highly qualified, rules over the body. Aristotle even thinks that an analogous distinction can be made within inanimate things. And he attaches a teleological argument to this: that which is higher and which rules is the end and purpose of that which is inferior. In such a comprehensive discussion of the theme of *arche*, Aristotle will have finally arrived at man's *nous* as the centre of purpose for everything belonging to man's existence,¹¹⁴ and at the transcendent *Nous* as the final and governing principle for everything belonging to *Physis*.

Plato's great discourse in the *Republic* on the government of the state had culminated in his theory about the world of Ideas and the Idea of the Good as its governing principle. And in the *Politicus* he had set human statesmanship against the backdrop of a discussion about the activity of the great divine world ruler Kronos. In Aristotle too, the theme of 'rulership' is indissolubly connected with the theme of world government. In *Metaphysics* A he vigorously rejects the idea of a democratic world government (πολυκοιρανίη) and stipulates instead: εἷς κοίρανος. The government of the cosmos must be a *monarchia*.¹¹⁵ This important subject must have been treated at length in his lost works as well. That is made clear by, among other things, a text in Cicero,¹¹⁶ where a distinction is drawn between the *Nous* as highest deity and 'another divine entity' who as *praefectus mundi* rules over and is responsible for the motion of the cosmos.¹¹⁷ In our opinion, this passage recalls Aristotle's distinction between the perfectly transcendent god Zeus and the subordinate world archon Kronos, the Titan, who displays tyrannical features as a result of his *pathe*, which can only be kept under control through the 'bonds' imposed by Zeus. Just as Plato, in his description of the perfect ruler, necessarily spoke about the perfect philosopher, and thus about perfect *knowledge*, including contemplation of the Idea of the Good, so Aristotle will have discussed the perfect type of government in the context of his systematic distinction between *theoria* and *praxis* and between the *energeiai* of the *nous* and of the *psyche*.

The *exoterikoi logoi* are mentioned again in *Pol.* 7.1, and knowledge of them is again assumed to be necessary. In this case the subject which they dealt with is that of 'the most excellent life'.¹¹⁸ The discussion of the

¹¹⁴ Such an argument is for instance found in Iamb., *Protr.* 7 (41.15-43.25 Pistelli) = Arist., *Protr.* 6 Ross; B 59-70 Düring.

¹¹⁵ Arist., *Metaph.* A 10 1076a1-4.

¹¹⁶ Cic., *N.D.* 1.13.33 = Arist., *Philos.* fr. 26 Ross.

¹¹⁷ *Loc. cit.*: 'alium quendam praeficit mundo eique eas partes tribuit ut replicatione quadam mundi motum regat atque tueatur'. On this text see Chapter 14 below.

¹¹⁸ *Pol.* 7.1 1323a19-23: διὸ δεῖ πρῶτον ὁμολογεῖσθαι τίς ὁ πᾶσιν ὡς εἰπεῖν αἰρετώτατος βίος ... νομίσαντας οὖν ἱκανῶς πολλὰ λέγεσθαι καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς

question of 'what is most desirable for man' is so frequently attested for various lost works by Aristotle that only a Procrustean systematism can lead to the conclusion that 'discussions outside the school'¹¹⁹ are concerned here.

Besides the two passages mentioned, there is another text in the *Politics* which draws attention to the theme of rulership (*arche*) in its various facets and then remarks in passing that an *arche* ('governing principle'), e.g. of *harmonia*, can even be discerned in inanimate things. This subject, however, is perhaps more suited to a 'more exoteric enquiry'.¹²⁰ In itself it is quite possible that Aristotle is only indicating that the subject in question cannot be suitably dealt with here. But it is at least striking that precisely in 3.6 this theme was indicated by Aristotle as having been frequently dealt with in his *exoterikoi logoi*. We must in fact consider the possibility that Aristotle is saying here: this subject is perhaps more suited to an exoteric enquiry, that is to say, to an enquiry in which the things of *Nature* are examined from a more external point of view. In that case this passage would have the same purport as the one we quoted from *Cael.* 3.1, where it is said that the discussion of that which falls outside the realm of generation and even of motion more properly belongs to 'another and higher enquiry than physics'.¹²¹

Physics 4.10 217b30-32

One mention of *exoterikoi logoi* remains, namely in *Phys.* 4.10. This text has played an important part in the debate, because it can be interpreted in such a way that assumption of a reference to published writings by Aristotle seems totally superfluous. Starting from this text, H. Diels, among others,

ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης ζωῆς, καὶ νῦν χρηστέον αὐτοῖς. Cf. E. Walford, *The Politics and Economics of Ar.* (London 1853): 'in our popular discourses', with the explanation: 'He refers to *Rhetor.* I 5'; J. H. von Kirchmann, *op. cit.* (1880): 'in meinen gemeinverständlichen Vorträgen'; H. Grant, *op. cit.* (1885) 406 f., following J. Bernays, supposes a reference to the *Nerinthus* or the *Protrepticus*. B. Jowett, *The Politics of Ar.* (Oxford 1885): 'popular writings in general' by Aristotle or others; W. L. Newman, *The Politics of Ar.* (Oxford 1887): 'in the non-scientific inquiries'; B. Jowett, *The Works of Ar.* vol. 10 (Oxford 1921): 'in discussions outside the school'; H. Rackham, *Ar., Politics* (London 1932): 'in extraneous discourses'; O. Gigon, *op. cit.*: 'in den publizierten Schriften'; J. Tricot, *Ar., La Politique* (Paris 1962): 'dans les discussions exotériques', with the explanation: 'il s'agit sans doute, comme le veut W. Jaeger, d'une référence au *Protreptique*'.

¹¹⁹ B. Jowett, *The Works of Ar.* vol 10.

¹²⁰ Arist., *Pol.* 1.5 1254a32-34: καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς μὴ μετέχουσι ζωῆς ἔστι τις ἀρχή, οἷον ἁρμονίας. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἴσως ἐξωτερικωτέρας ἔστι σκέψεως. Cf. J. H. von Kirchmann, *op. cit.* (1880): 'einer nicht hierher gehörenden Untersuchung'; B. Jowett, *op. cit.* (1885): 'somewhat foreign to the present subject'; *idem* (1921): 'But we are wandering from the subject'. Thus too the other translators consulted by us.

¹²¹ Arist., *Cael.* 3.1 298b19-20: τὸ γὰρ εἶναι ἅττα τῶν ὄντων ἀγένητα καὶ ὅλως ἀκίνητα μᾶλλον ἐστὶν ἐτέρας καὶ προτέρας ἢ τῆς φυσικῆς σκέψεως.

emphatically denied the necessity of linking up the other references to *exoterikoi logoi* with available writings.

In the passage concerned, Aristotle introduces a new subject, namely 'Time', and remarks: 'In the first place it is good to consider the problems involved with the aid of the *exoterikoi logoi* as well, whether Time belongs to the substances or to the non-substances; next, what its nature is'.¹²² Now it is a fact that the following section¹²³ discusses these problems in a large number of facets. But the question is what conclusion can be drawn from this. Certainly one can say that what Aristotle states to be the content of the *exoterikoi logoi* is explained in the continuation of *Phys.* 4.10, and that therefore this part of *Phys.* 4 must be identical with the *exoterikoi logoi*. But this is not at all necessary. It is equally possible that Aristotle is providing the content, possibly abridged, of a discussion which he had already published elsewhere, and to which he refers. On the basis of *Phys.* 4.10 alone, this question cannot be decided.¹²⁴

In any case it is natural to suppose that in his lost oeuvre Aristotle dealt at length with the problem of time and eternity/supratemporality. Since Plato had given such a prominent position to this problem in the *Timaeus*, Aristotle, given his criticism of this central dialogue, could not avoid the issue. And for him too it was very important to make clear that there is a substance which is not 'enclosed in time'. It may well be that Aristotle, who expressly relates the sense of time to the soul or the '*nous* of the soul' in *Phys.* 4.14,¹²⁵ related Time to the cosmic god Kronos and the substance of

¹²² Arist., *Phys.* 4.10 217b30-32: πρῶτον δὲ καλῶς ἔχει διαπορῆσαι περὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ διὰ τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν λόγων, πότερον τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν ἢ τῶν μὴ ὄντων. εἶτα τίς ἡ φύσις αὐτοῦ. Cf. R. P. Hardie, R. K. Gaye, *The Works of Ar.* vol. 2 (Oxford 1930): 'making use of the current arguments'. According to W. D. Ross, *Ar. Physics* (Oxford 1936), the preposition *dia* indicates that discussions outside the Peripatos are meant. Ross adds, however, that Aristotle had often developed these discussions in his dialogues as well. H. Carteron, *Ar., Physique* (Paris 1952): 'dans une examination exotérique'; P. Moraux, *Le Dialogue "Sur la justice"* (Paris-Louvain 1957) 19: the reference here is merely to 'raisonnements', 'arguments', not to his dialogues; Ph. H. Wicksteed, F. M. Cornford, *Ar., The Physics* (London 1963): 'It will be well to begin with the questions which general reflections suggest'; H. G. Apostle, *Ar.'s Physics* (London 1969): 'by using the common arguments also', with the explanation: 'An alternative to "common" is "popular". These may be arguments which Ar. used in his dialogues or before general audiences'. H. Wagner, *Ar., Physikvorlesung* (Berlin 1972): 'auch in Gestalt der weniger strengen Überlegungen'; W. Wieland, R. Bubner, *Geschichte der Philos., Antike* vol. 1 (Stuttgart 1978): 'auch vermittelt der gewöhnlich vorgebrachten Gründe'; E. Hussey, *Ar.'s Physics* (Oxford 1983): 'using the untechnical arguments as well', with the explanation: 'Apparently a reference to a corpus of introductory lectures or dialogues or arguments on philosophical subjects'.

¹²³ *Phys.* 4.10 217b32-218a30.

¹²⁴ We note, however, that the survey of problems can hardly be called 'popular' or 'popularizing'. The simplest explanation for the telegram style of chapter 10, too, is that a detailed exposition by Aristotle was assumed to be familiar.

¹²⁵ Arist., *Phys.* 4.14 223a25-26.

the celestial element in his lost work, and by contrast affirmed the supratemporality of the perfectly pure *Nous*, which is not connected with *psyche* or a celestial element.

Again there are two basic possibilities with regard to the *exoterikoi logoi*. The term *exoterikos* might indicate something (1) about the target group of the *logoi* in question or the circle in which they were current; (2) or about the content of these *logoi*. Theoretically we could go on to distinguish the following positions:

(1a) 'Released for publication'; in this case the term stands in contrast to other discourses not prepared for publication by Aristotle.

(1b) 'Addressed to the outside world'; in this sense the term is often taken to be synonymous with 'popularizing', 'philosophical in a non-technical way'.

(1c) 'Discussions by people belonging to the outside world'.

For sense (2) the following views are to be considered:

(2a) '*Logoi* about matters falling outside the subject under discussion'.

(2b) '*Logoi* about that which is outside the external celestial sphere' or about all extra-physical reality.

Again we assume that certainty about which option is right cannot be achieved. But we should make the following considerations.

Variant (1c) of sense (1) will have to be jettisoned, because there is no sound reason why we should not think of writings by Aristotle, once the *EE* has been accepted as Aristotelian.

The *Corpus* provides no indications for sense (1b). On the contrary, the *Corpus* underlines that the *exoterikoi logoi* are important for people deeply interested in philosophical subjects. And several of the themes which they dealt with cannot possibly be called 'popular' or 'philosophical in a non-technical way'.

The only remaining possibility in the first category, therefore, is the very neutral sense (1a). An objection, however, is that the term in this sense is virtually synonymous with the terms *enkyklioi logoi* and *ekdedomenoi logoi*.

As far as sense (2) is concerned, variant (2a) breaks down on those cases in which the subject referred to is obviously relevant to the matter at hand. By contrast, variant (2b) deserves serious consideration, both because it allows a contrast with the term *enkyklioi logoi*, and because it matches up with what Aristotle himself says about the content of the *exoterikoi logoi*.

9. Conclusions

In our view, therefore, it can legitimately be argued – though certainty on this point seems beyond reach – that the terms *enkyklioi logoi* and

exoterikoi logoi used by Aristotle in the *Corpus* were directly related to the most fundamental distinction in his ontology, namely the distinction between *intra*-cosmic reality and *extra*-cosmic reality.

Furthermore, given the importance of the motifs of 'imprisonment' and 'liberation' in Aristotle's lost works, we think it is possible that he assumed a difference in level between both kinds of *logoi*, corresponding with two levels of 'liberation' of the human *nous*.¹²⁶ In the Aristotelian system of thought, it is natural to suppose that the *enkyklioi logoi* stood closer to common human experience and were less abstract than the *exoterikoi logoi*. A didactic hierarchy can therefore be assumed, according to which the study of the *enkyklioi logoi* was considered a necessary introduction or preliminary training before the more abstract and 'logical' subject matter of the *exoterikoi logoi* could be successfully absorbed. In relation to the philosophy of visible reality and its phenomena, the study of Nature's transcendent principles, culminating in theology, will always have had a higher status and level of difficulty.

10. *The notion of enkyklios paideia anchored in the systematics of Aristotle's lost work*

It seems that our investigation of the terms 'exoteric' and 'encyclic' may be instrumental in illuminating the background of a notion which became very important in the Hellenistic and medieval periods. We are referring to the notion of *enkyklios paideia* and its Latin equivalent, the *artes liberales*. In 1965 L.M. de Rijk published a significant study on this key notion in European culture.¹²⁷ In his view, the explanation of the origin of this notion depends essentially on an answer to the crucial question: 'what does the element κύκλος mean in the compositum ἐγκύκλιος?'.¹²⁸ In his broad examination of this question, De Rijk concludes by a process of elimination that the only possible meanings of *enkyklios* in combination with *paideia* are: 'circular', 'round', 'in a chorus', 'in a circuit'.¹²⁹ He finally traces back its origin to the ancient Pythagoreans. They supposedly incorporated the ancient Greek cultural tradition of song and choric dance into their ideal of

¹²⁶ This view is perhaps substantiated by a passage in Epicurus, *Sententiae* (*Gnomologium Vaticanum* fr. 58 Bailey), where he urges his pupils to free themselves from the prison of *ta enkyklia kai politika*.

¹²⁷ L. M. de Rijk, 'Ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία. A study of its original meaning', *Vivarium* 3 (1965) 24-93. See also Fr. Kühnert, *Allgemeinbildung und Fachbildung in der Antike* (Berlin 1961); M. P. Nilsson, *Die Hellenistische Schule* (Munich 1955); A. I. Stückelberger, *Senecas 88 Brief über Wert und Unwert der freien Künste* (Heidelberg 1965). A. Dihle, 'Philosophie - Fachwissenschaft - Allgemeinbildung' in *Aspects de la Philosophie hellénistique*, Entretiens Hardt 32 (Genève 1986) 185-231.

¹²⁸ *Art. cit.* 27.

¹²⁹ *Art. cit.* 39.

a 'musical attitude to life'. Through their influence the notions of μουσική and χορεία παιδεύσεις presumably acquired a central significance in Plato too, where they comprised a variety of activities and forms of knowledge. At the end of Plato's life, according to De Rijk, this 'choric education' even came to be considered identical with education *tout court*,¹³⁰ the sum of possibilities available to man for working his way toward *sophia*, the level of cognition which Plato expressly reserved for the gods.

De Rijk's explanation has not been generally accepted. One of its most important critics was the French scholar H. I. Marrou, author of the well-known *Histoire de l'Éducation dans l'antiquité*.¹³¹ At the fourth international conference for medieval philosophy, he held an opening address under the title: 'Les arts libéraux dans l'antiquité classique'.¹³² In it he first points out that a development took place in the fourth century BC by which all manual work, which was previously held in esteem, gradually came to be disqualified as inferior.¹³³ The term *artes liberales* has always carried the connotation of 'not belonging to the life of slaves and serfs'.

Marrou believes, however, that the term *artes liberales* is originally a Roman coinage. The term *technai eleutherai* was not current in Greek, and where it occurs, it may be an echo of the Latin expression.¹³⁴ The Greeks preferred to use the terms *technai logikai*, *semnai*, *sophai*, or *enkyklioι*. Marrou traces back the origin of such collective terms for a number of skills to the time of Isocrates and Plato. In very different ways, both emphasized the importance of both literary study and mathematical training.¹³⁵ Subsequently, at the end of the fourth century BC, a division occurred between what was then called the *enkyklia mathemata* and philosophy proper. This division is first seen in the work of Aristippus of Cyrene, according to Marrou. But Xenocrates too has statements to his name which point in this direction.¹³⁶

¹³⁰ *Art. cit.* 57-64. A push in this direction was given by H. Koller, 'Ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία', *Glotta* 34 (1955) 174-189, who derives the notion from the 'musical' training which was the result of the κύκλιος χορός of the free Attic citizens. But see De Rijk, *art. cit.* 40: 'Koller's view as a whole is not tenable indeed. Nevertheless Koller seems to be on the right path in linking up our term with pre-Platonic music'.

¹³¹ Paris 1948; 1958⁴. This work deals with the *enkyklios paideia* on p. 243 ff. The notion was already discussed by the author in his *St Augustin et la fin de la culture antique* (Paris 1937) 211-235.

¹³² *Actes du 4me Congrès International de Philosophie Médiévale* (Montreal-Paris 1969) 5-33.

¹³³ H. I. Marrou, *art. cit.* 8-10.

¹³⁴ *Art. cit.* 11.

¹³⁵ *Art. cit.* 12.

¹³⁶ *Art. cit.* 13. Cf. F. Kühnert, *op. cit.* 6 ff. For Aristippus, see *D.L.* 2.79. For Xenocrates, see the *Parall. Sacra profana* 2.13.22, p. 191 Meineke and 2.15.111, p. 205 Meineke = fr. 2 Heinze and fr. 56 and 57 M. Isnardi Parente. For Crantor, see Stobaeus 2.206.26. The comparison of the encyclical subjects and philosophy to the handmaids and Penelope on Ithaca is in fact already assigned to Aristotle by Elias, *Proll in Cat.* ch. 8.

Marrou translates *enkyklios paideia* as 'culture générale', but stresses that it cannot mean: 'every-day education, shared in by everybody', as De Rijk proposed.¹³⁷ Only those were introduced to this 'culture' who would go on to train themselves either in philosophy, rhetoric, medicine, or, with the Romans, in law. Marrou holds that *enkyklios* in combination with *paideia* has no connection with choric activities, as De Rijk suggested, but must be interpreted in the sense of 'regular', 'everyday', 'ordinary'.¹³⁸ The fact that later authors related it to a 'ring', a 'conclusive whole', can be misleading. The areas of knowledge of the *enkyklios paideia* form a hierarchic whole involving a step-by-step ascent rather than a circular composition.¹³⁹

The problem of the *artes liberales* is also the subject of a recent and extensive study by I. Hadot.¹⁴⁰ She had first established that prevailing views, in particular that of H. I. Marrou, were assumed and argued on weak grounds.¹⁴¹ This induced her to carry out a new enquiry both into the theories of the interrelationship of the sciences and into the educational practices of the classical and Hellenistic periods.

She vigorously opposes Marrou's claim that the seven sciences of the medieval *trivium* and *quadrivium* already constituted the basic training of the Hellenistic period.¹⁴² Not until Cicero, in his account of the views of the New Academy, do we find a first impulse toward what will later be the cycle of the seven 'liberal arts', according to Hadot.¹⁴³ And even then the education received by young men from affluent families still shows no clear signs of being influenced by the theories of the New Academy.¹⁴⁴ In particular the tuition of mathematical subjects is remarkably often absent.¹⁴⁵

Hadot devotes a separate chapter to the meaning and content of the notion of *enkyklios paideia*.¹⁴⁶ She does not relate it to Aristotle's *enkyklia philosophemata*, since in her opinion the latter refers to Aristotle's dialogues.¹⁴⁷ And a vulnerable point in her argument is her dismissal of five texts in late authors attributing notions such as *enkyklios paideia* to philosophers from the third century *before* Christ; she surmises that these late authors projected the term *enkyklios paideia* back onto the older thinkers.¹⁴⁸

¹³⁷ *Art. cit.* 16, with reference to L. M. de Rijk, *art. cit.* (1965) 26 and 36.

¹³⁸ H. I. Marrou, *art. cit.* 17.

¹³⁹ *Art. cit.* 18.

¹⁴⁰ I. Hadot, *Arts libéraux et philosophie dans la pensée antique* (Paris 1984).

¹⁴¹ *Op. cit.* 9.

¹⁴² *Op. cit.* 29.

¹⁴³ *Op. cit.* 51.

¹⁴⁴ *Op. cit.* 58.

¹⁴⁵ *Op. cit.* 58.

¹⁴⁶ *Op. cit.*, ch. 6 263 ff.

¹⁴⁷ *Op. cit.* 264.

¹⁴⁸ *Op. cit.* 264; 275. On these passages, cf. F. Kühnert, *op. cit.* 6 ff.

In her own analysis she concludes that the terms *enkyklios paideia* and *enkyklios disciplina* were not used to indicate 'ordinary education', but an 'integral group of studies interrelated by method and structure which has to be gone through and finished in order to have completed a full education'.¹⁴⁹

The weakest point in Hadot's argument, it seems to us, is that she fails to explain why in many cases, and very emphatically so in Philo of Alexandria,¹⁵⁰ the *enkyklios paideia* is seen as preparatory and incomplete without further education in a higher form of knowledge, i.e. wisdom or philosophy. This important aspect of the notion of *enkyklios paideia* hardly seems to point toward an origin in the tradition of the New Academy, which postulated that knowledge of the transcendent, in whatever form, was impossible. Rather this element in the meaning of *enkyklios paideia* seems to indicate an origin in the context of a philosophy in which knowledge of a transcendent reality was conceived as the ultimate goal of man's striving for knowledge.

We add that there may have been, of course, a gap between the theoretical ideal of a system of education and everyday practice. Moreover, the practice and theory of the preferred system of education will have been subject to changes, as influenced by changing views on the possibilities of human knowledge.

We note that the opinions of modern scholars are seriously divided on the meaning and origin of the concept of *enkyklios paideia*. One group holds that its original meaning is (a) 'general, ordinary, standard education'; others take it to be (b) 'a closely related body of studies constituting a complete scientific training'; and yet another group opts for the meaning: (c) 'general, *non-specialized* education preparing for higher, specialized studies'.¹⁵¹

This unsatisfactory situation is probably to be explained by the fact that the term is only found in texts which presuppose familiarity with it. Apparently no text has come down to us which provides a theoretical foundation for its usage.

We also note that the theory proposed by L. M. de Rijk is made vulnerable by the fact that the term *enkyklios* is never linked with *paideia* in the period before the end of the fourth century BC. Moreover, the term *enkyklios paideia* never denoted all the skills acquired in ordinary education.¹⁵² It always referred to a group of *scientific* activities forming

¹⁴⁹ *Op. cit.* 268.

¹⁵⁰ On Philo, see I. Hadot, *op. cit.* 282 ff.

¹⁵¹ Cf. *Philon d'Alexandrie, De congressu eruditionis gratia*, introd., transl., and notes by M. Alexandre (Paris 1967) 27 ff., esp. 31-32.

¹⁵² Cf. L. M. de Rijk, *art. cit.* 36: 'Never in Antiquity *enkyklios paideia* signified *every-day* education shared in by everybody'. He notes on p. 37 that Isocrates and Aristotle, when talking about the basic school education, never use the term *enkyklios paideia*.

part of the secondary education during the Hellenistic period.

In our view, as opposed to De Rijk's, the frequent connection of the *enkyklios paideia* with such terms as *choros*, *choreia*, and *mousike*, in particular in Philo of Alexandria,¹⁵³ can also be seen as resulting from the fact that the *enkyklios paideia* is part of the process of the soul's 'education', or up-bringing, and from the connection of this process with the themes of Plato's philosophical myth in the *Phaedrus*: education aims at bringing about the ascent of the soul. And in this process the phase of the *enkyklios paideia* is comparable with the level of the 'blessed contemplations and *diexodoi* within the celestial sphere' in the company of the cosmic gods, who are referred to in this context as a 'choir of gods'.¹⁵⁴ Against such a background it is easy to understand why the notion of *enkyklios paideia* always seems linked to the idea that its completion and culmination is only achieved in activities of an even higher order. The *enkyklios paideia* in Hellenism and the *artes liberales* in the Middle Ages do not comprise the whole gamut of sciences. There is a general notion that one or more sciences must continue and complete the *enkyklios paideia*. In Philo of Alexandria this science is actual *sophia*, as opposed to a complex of what could be called special disciplines.¹⁵⁵ In this way *ta enkyklia* can even come to connote matters belonging to a level at which one tarries to one's own detriment! Such a negative connotation is already found in Epicurus, who even uses the metaphor of the 'prison'.¹⁵⁶ According to Epicurus, apparently, those who make a too intensive study of the branches of science, without insight into reality as a whole, are kept as it were locked up in a prison (or a 'cave'). Starting from this distinction between two forms of human scientific activity, the Hellenistic Greek tradition could illustrate the value of the *enkyklia* in relation to actual philosophy by alluding to the depraved handmaids in Ulysses' palace and his faithful wife Penelope.¹⁵⁷ Philo illustrated the same difference in level by the figures of Hagar and Sarah.¹⁵⁸

It is not at all clear how the meaning of a concept which originally signified an all-round education in the whole curriculum of useful subjects could finally come to turn on the specific contrast with one very special

¹⁵³ Cf. Philo, *Post.* 137.

¹⁵⁴ Pl., *Phdr.* 247a.

¹⁵⁵ On Philo, see L. M. de Rijk, *art. cit.* 73 ff. In a comparable way, Diogenes Laertius makes a distinction between *theoria* and *enkyklia mathemata* in his doxography of Aristotle (5.31): βίων τε τριῶν ὄντων, θεωρητικοῦ, πρακτικοῦ, ἡδονικοῦ, τὸν θεωρητικὸν προέκρινεν. εὐχρηστα δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐγκύκλια μαθήματα πρὸς ἀρετῆς ἀνάληψιν.

¹⁵⁶ Epicur., *Sent. (Gnomologicum Vaticanum* fr. 58 Bailey), where Epicurus calls on his pupils to tear themselves away ἐκ τοῦ περὶ τὰ ἐγκύκλια καὶ πολιτικά δεσμωτηρίου.

¹⁵⁷ Cf. F. H. Colson in Philo, with an Engl. transl. (Loeb, London 1929) vol. 1 xvi n.(f) and F. Kühnert, *op. cit.* 6 ff.

¹⁵⁸ Cf. the texts listed by L. M. de Rijk, *op. cit.* 77.

science or form of knowledge.

We shall have to conclude that the term *enkyklios paideia* cannot be adequately explained without the influence of Plato's *Phaedrus*, although Plato himself did not use it. Epicurus, however, does seem to have been familiar with the term. That might give us reason to suspect that the notion of *enkyklios paideia* is a product of Aristotle's reflections on the theory of science. And the great importance which Philo of Alexandria attaches to the notion is then easily explained as being due to the influence of Aristotle's lost writings.¹⁵⁹

Aristotle subscribes to a view in which providing for the first necessities of life and occupying oneself with the matters learnt in primary education are regarded as 'necessary' (*anankaia*). At the level where the necessities of life have been provided for, there is room for the arts which contribute to leisure and the 'good life',¹⁶⁰ and for all those forms of knowledge which, since they do not aim at profit, are appropriate to the 'free man'.¹⁶¹ In his system of thought, finally, Aristotle distinguishes between all those forms of knowledge whose object is Nature or whatever is derived from natural reality through abstraction and the very special, superhuman, and divine form of knowledge which does not have natural reality as its object and whose subject is not 'bound' by sense and corporeality.

We would like to advance the hypothesis, therefore, that the notion of the *enkyklios paideia* is a product of philosophical reflection on kinds of knowledge in relation to kinds of objects of knowledge, as laid down in the lost writings of Aristotle. The introduction of this notion may well have been linked there to the distinction which Aristotle did make in any case, i.e. between *enkyklioi logoi* and *exoterikoi logoi*, if we assume that *enkyklios* and *exoterikos* in this combination refer not to the target group of these

¹⁵⁹ Remarkable is the passage in Philo, *Gig.* 60, where he distinguishes three kinds of people: those of the earth, those of the heavenly region, and those of God. The first are led by the pursuit of physical pleasure. The 'men of heaven' are the practitioners of *technai* and of science and knowledge. 'For the heavenly element in us, namely our *nous*, devotes itself to *ta enkyklia* and to all the other arts together, hardening and sharpening itself by an intensive training in the intelligible. But the 'men of God' are priests and prophets, .. who have raised themselves above the visible to the intelligible world ...' The transition from 'man of heaven' to 'man of God' is expressed by Philo as the transition symbolically indicated in the changing of the name 'Abram' to 'Abraham', e.g. in the immediately following section *Gig.* 62-63. The motif of Abraham's change of name is also found in *Cher.* 4 ff. and in *Mutr.* 66-76.

¹⁶⁰ Cf. Arist., *Metaph.* A 2 982b22 ff.

¹⁶¹ Cf. Arist., *Metaph.* A 2 982b25-28. In the context of the opening chapters of the *Metaph.*, Aristotle also develops the notion of *sophia* as the mistress of the other sciences, who are her handmaids, A 2 982a16-17; 982b10 and especially B 2 996b10-12. Another important text in this connection is Iamb., *Protr.* 9 (52.16-54.5 Pistelli) = Arist., *Protr.* fr. 12 Ross; B 42-43 Düring, where the 'free life' is associated with the isles of the blessed and is characterized as the condition in which one need only occupy oneself with those sciences which are studied purely for their intrinsic value.

logoi but to their content. In this view, the *enkyklioi logoi* comprised all sciences concerning the natural reality 'surrounding' us and whatever is derived from it through abstraction. And the *exoterikoi logoi* dealt with the matters related to *ta exo* and with those themes which Plato reserved for dialectic and Aristotle for an 'earlier, higher, and more logical science than physics', a science which deals with the *archai*, the *principia*, and which cannot therefore be deductive and demonstrative.¹⁶² This distinction was no doubt geared to a difference in the level of difficulty, seen from the viewpoint of man who stands at the beginning of the road to knowledge. Aristotle will have regarded the study of experiential reality in all its aspects as a necessary preliminary training for insight into metaphysical reality. The elements discussed above are best integrated, therefore, if we assume that in his lost writings Aristotle described the process of man's striving for knowledge in metaphors of 'liberation', 'purification', 'initiation', 'ascent', and 'enlightenment', following and transforming what Plato had said about this process in his dialogues the *Phaedo*, the *Phaedrus*, and the *Republic*.

Aristotle saw man in his everyday existence as a 'natural' being, a being belonging to and enclosed by *Physis*, and endowed with a 'natural' rational faculty. As such, man is occupied by, bound to, and oriented toward the 'surrounding' reality of ordinary, everyday experience. But as such, man is also in many respects 'unfree'¹⁶³ and 'is as susceptible to those things which are by nature most evident as the eyes of bats to daylight'.¹⁶⁴ The road to liberation indicated by Aristotle is a road involving various stages. The first of these is that of detaching oneself from the needs of the body and abandoning the quest for the satisfaction of urges and passions. For this, it is necessary to see that corporeality forms a galling bond and hindrance for the body. Next, it must be recognized that the Titanic passions are an obscuring factor in the pursuit of pure cognition. To reach this insight, man will have to address himself to the scientific study of all 'surrounding' reality, i.e. whatever presents itself to him in *Physis*, which is enclosed by the furthest celestial sphere. This is the indispensable phase of the systematic acquisition of knowledge about *ta enkyklia*.

Ideally, however, this study, in particular because it continually searches for *causes*, will prepare man for the insight that everything belonging to 'natural' reality is 'bound' to matter; and that for its discursive activity natural reason too is 'bound' to sensory perception and images. In this way man will be able to open his mind to an intuition of a supreme, perfectly transcendent, and perfectly free reality, a reality *outside* the sphere of nature, from which perspective man's 'natural' condition must be called 'unnatural'. Precisely the greatest philosophers like Parmenides and Plato had an inkling of this reality of *ta exo*, and they tried to convey something of

¹⁶² Cf. Arist., *Top.* 1.2.

¹⁶³ Arist., *Metaph.* A 2 982b29.

¹⁶⁴ Arist., *Metaph.* α 1 993b9.

it, even though the earthly, 'natural' mortal is structurally incapable of doing so, as long as he has not transcended his human condition.

CHAPTER TWELVE

MANTEIA IN ARISTOTLE, *DE CAELO* 2.1

1. Introduction

In chapters 1 to 11 we used Tertullian's statement about a dreaming god Kronos in Aristotle in order to gain a better insight into the philosophical content of Aristotle's lost works. The following chapters will try to show that the resulting view of Aristotle's lost oeuvre can help to explain certain passages in the surviving *Corpus* and some details in the doxographical tradition about Aristotle. We shall discuss *De caelo* 2.1 (ch.12), *De philosophia* fr.13 (ch.13), *De philosophia* fr.26 (ch.14) and *Eudemus* fr.11 (ch.15).

These chapters are planned in such a way that they may be read as separate essays. As a result, they sometimes repeat matters already dealt with in chapters 1 to 11.

Aristotle *De Caelo* II 1 contains a remarkable final passage mentioning ἡ μαντεία ἢ περὶ τὸν θεόν.¹ The current interpretation of this passage, according to which it refers to human convictions about the blessed condition of god, seems implausible to us. We propose the hypothesis that *manteia* here concerns the knowledge received by the cosmic celestials through the influence of the supreme, transcendent god.

Before proceeding further, we note that, according to many scholars, this chapter occupies a special position in the *De Caelo*. Compared with the dry and highly technical explanations in the last chapters of book I, it seems pervaded by a quite different spirit. The style is polished and shows a certain discursiveness and redundancy, suggesting origins in one of Aristotle's dialogues. The chapter has very commonly been linked to the *De Philosophia*.² According to W. Jaeger, the final section makes clear that the

¹ *Cael.* II 1, 284b3.

² Cf. P. Moraux, *Aristote Du Ciel* (Paris 1965) lxxxvi-lxxxvii. Cf. also F. Blass, *Aristotelisches RhM* 30 (1875) 500ff.; W. Jaeger, *Aristotle* 303-306; F. Solmsen, *Aristotle's system of the physical world* (Ithaca 1960) 292; I. Düring, *Aristoteles* (Heidelberg 1966) 363ff.; B. Effe, *Studien* (Munich 1970) 132 with n.21. R. Walzer and M. Untersteiner include the whole chapter as a fragment (nos. 29 and 30 respectively) of the *Philos.* L. Elders, *Aristotle's cosmology; a commentary on the De Caelo* (Assen 1966) 175ff. notes (a) the absence of hiatus, which does occur in the preceding chapters; (b) the careful, balanced construction of the sentences (e.g. 284a2ff.); (c) the frequency of hendiadys (b29, a1, a4, a11); (d) the use of poetic terms in 284a32, a11, 284a34, 284a35, a14, a3, and a17, (e) parallelisms; chiasmic word-order; hyperbaton (284a27).

themes dealt with here were originally embedded in a religious and metaphysical context.³

2. The structure of *De Caelo* II 1

Chapter II 1 of the *De Caelo* has the following structure:

- (a) 283b26 - 284a2 The heavens in their entirety must, on the basis of the preceding arguments, be one as well as ungenerated and imperishable.
- (b) 284a2 - 284a13 This claim supports ancient traditions according to which the gods live in the only part of the cosmos not subject to death.
- (c) 284a14 - 284a18 Apart from the heavens being ungenerated and imperishable, they must also be thought of as 'free from any discomfort belonging to the condition of mortality' and as 'not knowing *ponos*'.
- (d) 284a18 - 284a35 Therefore those mythical or philosophical views must be rejected which are at odds with the Aristotelian doctrine of the celestial sphere and the natural fifth element of which it is composed.
- (e) 284a35 - 284b5 The doctrine of the fifth natural element as substance of the celestial sphere is the only doctrine which, without leading to contradictions, is both appropriate to the doctrine of the world's eternity and in harmony with τῇ μαντείᾳ τῇ περὶ τὸν θεόν.⁴

3. Proposed interpretations

In his *Index* H. Bonitz refers s.v. manteia to two places where the word must mean *divinatio*: knowledge conveyed to man by superhuman beings.⁵ Only then does he mention *De Caelo* II 1 284b3, for which he chooses the translation *opinio*, referring us to the meanings which he has given of the verb *manteuesthai*.⁶ He does note, however, that C. Prantl preferred the

The reason for the presence of such textual passages displaying striking stylistic divergencies is seldom discussed. Did Aristotle, in preparing the text of his lectures, include integral parts of his published works to remind his audience of them and to emphasize the consistency between his argument and the writings already known? But stylistic variation of this kind during one and the same lecture is hardly probable, since it would tend to have a ridiculous effect. Nor does it seem likely that Aristotle would rearrange his own notes with scissors and glue in order to add bits of old text.

³ W. Jaeger, *op. cit.* 306.

⁴ *Cael.* II 1, 284a35-b4: εἰ δὴ, καθάπερ εἶπομεν, ἐνδέχεται τὸν εἰρημένον ἔχειν τρόπον περὶ τῆς πρώτης φορᾶς, οὐ μόνον αὐτοῦ περὶ τῆς αἰδιότητος οὕτως ὑπολαβεῖν ἐμμελέστερον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ μαντείᾳ τῇ περὶ τὸν θεὸν μόνως ἂν ἔχοιμεν οὕτως ὁμολογουμένως ἀποφαίνεσθαι συμφώνους λόγους.

⁵ *HA* VIII 18, 601b2 and fr.12, 1475b41 (= *Philos.* fr.12a Ross).

⁶ H. Bonitz, *Index* 445b. For μαντεύεσθαι he lists the meanings 'oraculum consulere'; 'vaticinari'; 'susplicari'; 'divinare'.

translation *vaticinatio* for the word *manteia* in 284b3.⁷

Bonitz's translation follows the ancient commentator Simplicius, who explains *manteia* as follows: τὴν κοινὴν ταύτην ἔννοιαν, ἣν ἔχομεν περὶ τῆς ἀπονίας καὶ μακαριότητος τοῦ θεοῦ.⁸ Simplicius means that in all (normal, reasonable) people the notion is present that the gods are free of cares and blessed.

More or less the same line is taken by modern scholars and interpreters. Thus we find in J. L. Stocks: 'a theory consistent with popular divinations of the divine nature';⁹ W. K. C. Guthrie: 'a consistent account and one which fits in with our premonitions of divinity';¹⁰ J. Tricot: 'une théorie en accord avec la divination sur la nature divine';¹¹ P. Moraux: 'des théories qui, de l'avis général, s'accordent tout à fait avec l'intuition que l'on a de Dieu'.¹² L. Elders follows Guthrie, but adds: 'For Aristotle there are two sources of religious knowledge, viz. the inner experience of the soul and the observation of heavenly phenomena'.¹³

Only O. Longo's translation departs appreciably from the interpretations just given: 'soltanto in questo modo noi potremo professare delle teorie che s'accordino con quanto la scienza oracolare ci dice sul divino'.¹⁴ But his

⁷ *Aristoteles, Vier Bücher über das Himmelgebaude und zwei Bücher über Entstehen und Vergehen*, griechisch und deutsch und mit sacherklärenden Anmerkungen herausgeg. von C. Prantl (Leipzig 1857) III: 'welche zugestandnermaszen mit der den Gott betreffenden heiligen Kunde in Einklang sind'.

⁸ *Simp. In Cael.* II 1,2 (382,28 ed. I. L. Heiberg): μαντείαν δὲ ἐκάλεσε τὴν κοινὴν ταύτην ἔννοιαν ἣν ἔχομεν περὶ τῆς ἀπονίας καὶ μακαριότητος τοῦ θεοῦ, ὅτι κρειττόνως ἢ κατὰ ἀπόδειξιν ἐνυπάρχουσα βεβαιωτάτη καὶ ἀμετάπειστός ἐστιν· τοιαῦται γὰρ αἱ μαντεῖαι κατὰ θεῖαν γνῶσιν ὑπὲρ πᾶσαν ἀπόδειξιν προερχόμεναι μετὰ πίστεως ἀμεταθέτου.

⁹ *The works of Aristotle* transl. into English, vol. II (Oxford 1930) n.3: 'By "divination" (μαντεία) Aristotle means, not any religious practice of prophecy or the like, but simply the inspired guesses of common sense', with reference to Simplicius.

¹⁰ *Aristotle On the Heavens*, with an Engl. transl. (London 1939) 135.

¹¹ *Aristote Traité du Ciel* trad. et notes (Paris 1949) 67 with n.1: 'Aristote entend non pas la mantique proprement dite, mais le sentiment populaire, expression de la conscience collective, sur l'impassibilité et la béatitude de la divinité'.

¹² *Aristote Du Ciel* texte établi et traduit (Paris 1965) 56 and introd. lxxxvi-lxxxix.

¹³ L. Elders, *Aristotle's cosmology; a Commentary on the De Caelo* (Assen) 182. The author refers to *Philos.* fr.12a (Ross), where τοὺς ἐνθουσιασμοὺς καὶ τὰς μαντείας is spoken of precisely in connection with the 'inner experience of the soul' mentioned. We shall have to return to this text later. A variation on this view is found in W. Jaeger, *Aristotle* 159 n.1. He takes *manteia peri ton theon* to mean 'the inner sense of God ... which rests on immediate feeling'. 'Presumably it was Plato who first took the notion of inner divination (μαντεύεσθαι) which the poets were already using in the sense of the presentiment of external events, and stamped it with the philosophical meaning of a divination not of the future but of deep and hidden affinities. Aristotle then applied it for the first time to the problem of faith and knowledge...'; cf. *ibid.*, 305: 'popular divinations of the divine nature'.

¹⁴ *Aristotele De Caelo* introd., testo critico, trad. e note (Florence 1962) 109.

translation seems to identify *manteia* with *mantike technike*.

4. *Objections to the standard interpretations*

In spite of the strong scholarly consensus, there are evident objections to the tradition of interpretation just outlined. The most important is that *manteia* must be given a meaning ('generally accepted opinion', 'surmise', 'assumption') for which no parallel can be found in Aristotle's oeuvre. Indeed, it is highly exceptional in the Greek literature of this period as a whole. The meaning 'prophecy', 'prophetic powers' is so predominant that even in those few Platonic passages where *manteia* seems to be used in a looser sense,¹⁵ Plato may well be suggesting the 'daemonic' qualities of Socrates or his partners in discussion. There is no basis for the assumption that *manteia* might mean 'a reasonable conviction'. These lexical considerations by themselves should make us look for an interpretation of 284b3 in which *manteia* might mean 'prophecy', 'prophetic explanation'.

To the above-mentioned objection we might perhaps add that, if Aristotle is referring to a generally held conviction concerning the carefree and blessed state of the deity, it is most peculiar that precisely the content of this conviction is left unspecified, so that the reader must identify it from the context.

A closer analysis shows, however, that Simplicius' commentary is above all unsound because it neglects to observe a distinction which Aristotle himself makes emphatically. In bracketing together *aponia* and *makariotes* as typical attributes of the deity, Simplicius fails to make a differentiation essential to Aristotle's philosophical system. For when Aristotle says in *EN* X 8 that 'of the gods we assume most of all that they are blessed and happy', he adds the explanation: 'For which *praxeis* should we attribute to them?'¹⁶ Slightly further on he remarks that everything to do with actions is 'small' and 'unworthy of the gods'.¹⁷ This agrees entirely with his conclusion that *eudaimonia* in the proper sense can only be associated with the contemplative life.¹⁸

But in the *De Caelo* it is made quite clear that the celestial sphere as a whole and its various spheres individually are also active in the 'practical' sense. Therefore they do not attain the good without performing one or more *praxeis*.¹⁹ As long as it is not proved beyond question that the passage

¹⁵ Pl., *Alc.* I 127e; *Laws* II 694c; *Philb.* 66b.

¹⁶ *EN* X 8, 1178b8: τοὺς θεοὺς γὰρ μάλιστα ὑπειλήφμεν μακαρίους καὶ εὐδαίμονας εἶναι· πράξεις δὲ ποίας ἀπονείμει χρεῶν αὐτοῖς;

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 1178b17.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ *Cael.* II 12. 292a20: δεῖ δ' ὥς μετεχόντων ὑπολαμβάνειν πράξεως καὶ ζωῆς· οὕτω γὰρ οὐδὲν δόξει παράλογον εἶναι τὸ συμβαῖνον. ἔοικε γὰρ τῷ μὲν ἄριστα

cited in *De Caelo* II 12 cannot be reconciled with *De Caelo* II 1, we shall have to proceed from the assumption that both parts of that work are governed by the same systematics. And thus we shall also have to assume that Aristotle has, with precision, assigned a level of 'well-being' to the celestial sphere which, it is true, surpasses by far that of ordinary mortals, but which is by no means interchangeable with that of the metaphysical deity. Certainly, the heavenly sphere is *apathes* and *aponos*,²⁰ but it is not positively identified as *makarios* and *eudaimoon*. In short, it is hardly likely that an assumption which other Aristotelian statements show to be *wrong* is regarded by Aristotle as a reliable conviction held by all people.

Next, it must be noted that *manteia* nowhere else means insight or information concerning divine beings, but always states something about the condition of mortals in the past, present or future. Moreover, *peri* followed by an accusative indicating the subject or the content of *manteia* is an irregular construction. In such cases Greek uses *peri* followed by a genitive.²¹ Rather it seems that *peri* + accusative draws a wider circle around a given topic, in order to indicate both a certain subject and matters related to it.²²

Finally, the standard interpretation makes the train of thought in chapter II 1 seem unnecessarily muddled. Aristotle frequently distinguishes between

ἔχοντι ὑπάρχειν τὸ εὖ ἄνευ πράξεως, τῷ δ' ἐγγύτατα διὰ ὀλίγης καὶ μιᾶς ...

²⁰ *Cael.* II 1, 284a14-15.

²¹ Arist., *Rh.* III 17, 1418a24: 'Επιμενίδης ὁ Κρής (ἐκεῖνος γὰρ περὶ τῶν ἐσομένων οὐκ ἔμαντεύετο, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν γεγονότων μὲν ἀδήλων δὲ) ... According to Sextus Emp., *Math.* 3 (*Phys.* 1) 20-23 (= Arist. *Philos.* fr.12a Ross), Aristotle held that the notion of gods (ἐννοίαν θεῶν) comes to exist in man on account of certain psychic phenomena and the contemplation of the celestial beings. On account of psychic phenomena διὰ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ὑπνοῖς γινομένους ταύτης ἐνθουσιασμούς καὶ τὰς μαντείας. Apparently, Aristotle cited an example from Homer: Πεποιήκε γὰρ τὸν μὲν Πάτροκλον ἐν τῷ ἀναιρεῖσθαι προαγορεύοντα περὶ τῆς 'Εκτορος ἀναιρέσεως, τὸν δ' 'Εκτορα περὶ τῆς 'Αχιλλέως τελευτῆς. Cf. also the passage in Plu. *De facie* 942a on the island of Kronos: τοὺς δὲ δαίμονας ἐκεῖνους περιέπειν καὶ θεραπεύειν τὸν Κρόνον, ..., καὶ πολλὰ μὲν ἀφ' ἐαυτῶν μαντικούς ὄντας προλέγειν τὰ δὲ μέγιστα καὶ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων ὡς ὄνειρατα τοῦ Κρόνου κατίοντας ἐξαγγέλλειν. Pl., *Laws* XI 914a. I know no instance of *manteia peri* in the sense of 'oracular knowledge about' followed by an accusative, even though grammars do not usually distinguish between *peri* followed by a genitive or accusative.

²² Cf. Hdt. II 49: τὰ περὶ τὸν Διόνυσον, 'the cult of Dionysus and all things connected therewith'. Stephanus Byzantius, s.v. Ἄγρα· τὰ μικρὰ μυστήρια ..., μῖμημα τῶν περὶ τὸν Διόνυσον. D. L. III 63: ... σοφίαν ἡγεῖται εἶναι [sc. Plato] τὴν τῶν νοητῶν καὶ ὄντως ὄντων ἐπιστήμην, ἣν φησι περὶ θεὸν καὶ ψυχὴν σώματος κεχωρισμένην. Plu., *Qu. Conviv.* IX 14, 746c: ἡ θάλασσα, τῆς περὶ θεοὺς ἐπιστήμης καὶ θεᾶς ἡγεμὼν οὖσα. Corp. Herm. XII 23: οὔτε μέγεθος οὔτε τόπος οὔτε ποιότης οὔτε σχῆμα οὔτε χρόνος περὶ τὸν θεόν ἐστὶ. πᾶν γὰρ ἐστὶ ... Cf., by way of contrast, the two texts in Olympiodorus, *Phd.* 6 par.13, which we shall deal with further on: τὴν μαντείαν τὴν περὶ [= 'at the approach of'] τὸν θάνατον and 1 par.6: Πάτροκλος μαντικὸς γεγονώς περὶ τὴν τελευτήν.

views *supported by argument* and *current views* held by all or most people. Where possible, he shows that the two correspond and reinforce one another. An instance of this is readily found in *De Caelo* I 3.²³ Aristotle has just argued that the celestial sphere must be composed of a natural element which by nature moves in an eternal circular orbit and which is imperishable and unchangeable. He continues: 'the experience of reality is in agreement with this theory. All men have an assumption about the gods, and all assign the highest place to that which is divine, and they do so, of course, because they consider the immortal gods to be associated with immortal reality'. Aristotle's conclusion in *De Caelo* II 1 is similar: the argumentation in favour of the universe's eternity and the refutation of alternative scientific theories agrees with the ancient tradition that there is an immortal and divine reality in perpetual movement.²⁴ And he refers to what was said in I 3: 'The heavens and the position on high were assigned by the ancients to the gods, as being the only imperishable place'.²⁵ But then Aristotle returns to the *scientific* argument and observes: 'The preceding *argument* demonstrates that the heavenly place is imperishable and ungenerated, but also that it is not susceptible to any discomfort belonging to the condition of mortality, moreover, that it does not know toil ...'.²⁶ Here, therefore, Aristotle introduces *a new consequence of the philosophical exposition* on the celestial element: the assumption that the movement of the celestial element is a natural movement entails that this element does not suffer from the discomforts of the mortal condition and does not know toil.

He goes on to discuss views diametrically opposed to this one. Both the mythical tradition of Atlas the sky-bearer and the philosophical theories of Empedocles and Plato imply, according to Aristotle, *ponos* for the celestial sphere inasmuch as it would be prevented from pursuing its natural course.²⁷ Aristotle heavily underlines how objectionable such theories are by comparing the condition which they ascribe to the heavens to that of Ixion, who, imprisoned in the nether world and bound to his revolving wheel, must suffer eternal pain.²⁸ The condition of the celestial sphere

²³ *Cael.* I 3, 270b4: ἔοικε δ' ὅ τε λόγος τοῖς φαινόμενοις μαρτυρεῖν καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα τῷ λόγῳ ...

²⁴ *Cael.* II 1, 284a2-5.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 284a11.

²⁶ *Cael.* II 1, 284a13: ὁ δὲ νῦν μαρτυρεῖ λόγος ὡς ἄφθαρτος καὶ ἀγέννητος, ἔτι δ' ἀπαθὴς πάσης θνητῆς δυσχερείας ἐστίν, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἄκονος ...

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 284a18-35. Cf. the very similar passage in *An.* I 3, 407a34-b11 which, as 406b26 makes clear, forms part of a critique of Pl. *Tim.*

²⁸ An interesting comparison can be made with Philo Al., *Aet.* 47, where he argues against the Stoic idea that the celestial beings too will perish: ἔδει γὰρ ἡ μύδρους διακύρους ἀποφύνασθαι καθάπερ ἔνιοι τῶν οἷα περὶ δεσμωτηρίου φλυαρούντων τοῦ σύμπαντος οὐρανοῦ. Cf. *Somn.* I 22. This notion of the physical universe as a 'prison' is familiar from Xenocrates, fr.19 (Heinze) which explains the

would thus be as pitiful and miserable as that of earthly mortals, whom Aristotle elsewhere compares to the prisoners that were tied onto corpses by Etrurian pirates.²⁹

After such an argument it would be strange, to say the least, if Aristotle were to refer to a 'generally held conviction' concerning the effortlessness and bliss of the deity, as Simplicius suggests.

5. *Divination in Aristotle*

Nevertheless, the text as it stands in the *De Caelo* offers no other keys for interpreting the passage in question. We may consider, however, that according to many scholars *De Caelo* II 1 also functioned in another context, namely in one of Aristotle's lost writings.³⁰ In addition we may assume that those who listened to Aristotle's lectures '*De Caelo*' were acquainted with his lost writings. This justifies us in thinking that the *manteia* passage must be seen against a background which is different from what the *De Caelo* alone might lead us to expect.

It appears that, in trying to find a different interpretation for our text in *De Caelo* II 1, we are severely handicapped by the loss of Aristotle's dialogical writings. But we are also set back by the curiously virulent prejudice which has made Aristotle into a philosopher with strikingly modern ideas separating him from his contemporaries. It is the prejudice most clearly expressed by W. Jaeger, whose views on the development of Aristotle's thought it has wholly determined.³¹ It is the same prejudice which, even after Jaeger's views have been dismissed,³² survives in the notion that Aristotle's lost works must be assigned to an early date and must have contained views which the philosopher abandoned and rejected in later life. According to Jaeger, Aristotle started out as a pupil and follower of Plato, then developed, by way of a first independent, strongly speculative and theological phase, towards a final phase in which 'purely scientific', empirical research was his main interest. This theory also assumes that Aristotle paid more and more attention to 'natural phenomena' and that, conversely, his interest in the 'supernatural' and myths declined. *Divination* too came to be valued less and less by Aristotle, it is supposed.³³

Platonic notion of *phroua* (*Phd.* 62b). It is also found in *Plo., Enn.* IV 8 (6) 1.33 and 3.4 and in *Procl., In Tim.* I 333.26.

²⁹ *Arist., Protr.* 10b (Ross); B 107 (Düring).

³⁰ See above, n.2.

³¹ See chapter 10.1 above.

³² Cf. H. Flashar, 'Aristoteles' in *Die Philosophie der Antike*, vol.3, herausgeg. von H. Flashar (Basel/Stuttgart 1983): 'heute ... ein breiter Konsens darüber ..., dass die Ergebnisse Jaegers im Gesamtkonzept wie in viele Einzelheiten als verfehlt anzusehen sind'.

³³ See the authors mentioned in n.57.

But this prejudice is in conflict with the information about Aristotle's views which tradition has handed down to us. From this information it becomes clear that Aristotle allowed for the transference of knowledge to mortals by superhuman beings, and that he explicitly recognized man's potential for acquiring such knowledge. Here we should moreover be aware that Aristotle was not a modern positivist for whom divination belonged to 'supernatural phenomena' defying scientific analysis. On the contrary, Aristotle classified mantic phenomena as *natural* phenomena, albeit belonging to the 'daemonic' realm of Nature.³⁴

In dealing with our present subject, it is useful to make a distinction between (a) institutional, cultic divination and (b) individual, private cases of divination. Next one might also distinguish between the various ways in which mantic knowledge reaches man. Countless manuals on the different kinds of divination were compiled in the Hellenistic period. Evidently, the flourishing of literature on this subject is to be explained by the fact that in general the ancients took divination seriously.

It is equally clear that the philosopher who accepts the possibility of divination in whatever form must account for the nature of such phenomena.

Now we know that Aristotle referred more than once to the institutional divination practised in, for instance, Delphi and Delos as a matter to which serious consideration was given.³⁵ No principled rejection of it is found in his work.³⁶

Next, we have references to divination by a person regularly functioning as a seer or *mantis*.³⁷ Lastly, Aristotle speaks about the incidental cases in

³⁴ On Aristotle's demonology, cf. M. Detienne, *La notion de Daïmôn dans le Pythagorisme ancien* (Paris 1963) 146ff. and Ph. Merlan in *C.H.L.G.E.M.Ph.* (Cambridge 1970) 34 with n.1 and H. B. Gottschalk, *Heraclides of Pontus* (Oxford 1980) 98.

³⁵ Cf. *HA* III 20, 522a17: τῷ ἐν Λήμνῳ ἀνεΐλεν ὁ θεὸς μαντευομένην ἐπίκτησιν ἔσεσθαι κτημάτων. Athenaeus, VII 296^c (= Arist., fr.490 Rose³): 'Ἀρ. δ' ἐν τῇ Δηλίων πολιτείᾳ (Γλαῦκόν φησι τὸν θαλάττιον δαίμονα) ἐν Δήλῳ κατοικήσαντα μετὰ τῶν Νηρηίδων τοῖς θέλουσι μαντεύεσθαι. *Schol. in Ar. Lysistr.* 1153 (= Arist., fr.395 Rose³): 'Ἀρ. φησὶ ... χρησμὸν γενέσθαι τοῖς Λάκῳσιν καταλύειν τὴν τυραννίδα, τῆς Πυθίας ... συνεχῶς τοῦτο χρώσης αὐτοῖς μαντευομένοις ... *Schol. vet.* (cod. Marc. 476) *ad Lycophr. Alex.* 799 (p.143 Kinkel) (= Arist., fr.508 Rose³): 'Ἀρ. φησὶ ἐν Ἰθακησίῳ πολιτείᾳ Εὐρύτῳ ἔθνος εἶναι τῆς Αἰτωλίας ὀνομασθὲν ἀπὸ Εὐρύτῳ, παρ' οἷς εἶναι μαντεῖον Ὀδυσσεύς.

³⁶ But we do find it in later authors, e.g. *Or. Cels.* VII 3: δυνατόν μὲν ἡμῖν συνάγουσιν ἀπὸ Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ τῶν τὰ τοῦ Περιπάτου φιλοσοφούντων οὐκ ὀλίγα εἰπεῖν εἰς ἀνατροπὴν τοῦ περὶ τῆς Πυθίας καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν χρηστηρίων λόγου, and VIII 45. Cf. also Euseb. *P.E.* IV 2.13. 136A-B and IV 3.14. 139D.

³⁷ Cf. *Rh.* III 17, 1418a23: ὁ ἐπιστητὸν ἤδη καὶ τοῖς μάντεσιν, ὡς ἔφη Ἐπιμενίδης ὁ Κρής (ἐκεῖνος γὰρ περὶ τῶν ἐσομένων οὐκ ἔμαντεύετο, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν γεγονότων μὲν ἀδήλων δὲ). Also belonging to this category are the *manteis* of whom it

which superhuman knowledge is acquired. The latter category comprises in the first place all direct contacts between a mortal and a daemon. Such a situation is described in Aristotle's account of the meeting between Midas and Silenus.³⁸ But Aristotle wrote about the mantic value of dreams too, most notably in the dialogue 'On the soul', in which the prophetic dream of Eudemus occupied an important position.³⁹ Aristotle seems to have ascribed a similar experience to another figure, in Arabian tradition referred to as a Greek king.⁴⁰ We should also mention that Tertullian, without any reservations, describes Aristotle as believing in the prophetic nature of dreams. It is in this connection that Aristotle appears to have spoken about a 'dreaming Kronos'.⁴¹ And in Greek literature at large, according to J. H. Waszink, we find a 'dreaming Kronos' exclusively in contexts where his function is that of dream-oracle.⁴²

Finally, we know that Aristotle spoke favourably about the prophetic value of words uttered by individuals when they are about to die. He is supposed to have cited the celebrated examples of Patroclus and Hector.⁴³

If the above information about Aristotle is correct, we shall have to conclude that the Stagirite's views are in line with those of nearly all his contemporaries, including Plato and other members of the Academy, such as Xenocrates and Heraclides Ponticus.⁴⁴ There is no tradition of antiquity which records that Aristotle had exceptional ideas about divination and the daemonic.

6. Aristotle's explanation of mantic phenomena according to Sextus Empiricus

Earlier on we mentioned a text in Sextus Empiricus stating that Aristotle

is said in *Cael.* II 2, 285a4 that they qualify certain phenomena as 'right-hand' ('favourable') or 'left-hand' ('unfavourable'), according to whether those phenomena occur on the seer's right-hand or left-hand side. One thinks here of ornithomancers, but astrologers might be considered too.

³⁸ Arist., *Eudemus* fr.6 (Ross).

³⁹ *Ibid.*, fr.1 (Ross).

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, fr.11 (Ross). See Chapter 15 below.

⁴¹ Cf. Tert., *An.* 46 (= Arist., *Protr.* fr.20 Ross).

⁴² See Chapter 3 above.

⁴³ Sextus Emp., *Math.* 3 (*Phys.* 1) 20-23 (= Arist., *Philos.* fr.12a Ross).

⁴⁴ On divination in Plato, see *Apol.* 22d8; 21c1; 21a4; 29a3; 33c5; *Def.* 414b2; b3; *Symp.* 202e7; 206b8; *Phdr.* 257c8; *Laws* I 642d7; VII 792d3; VI 772d1; VIII 828a2; IX 914a; *Epin.* 985c3; 988a3; *Phd.* 111b8; *Tim.* 71a7ff. On oneiromancy, cf. R. G. A. van Lieshout, *Greeks on Dreams* (Utrecht 1980), esp.131: 'The value of dreams as a method of acquiring knowledge of any kind is nearly always accepted'. Of the period before Aristotle the author declares: 'With the exception of Xenophanes ... no philosopher or scholar ... rejects the dream out of hand as a source of information' (p.136).

accepted the phenomenon of divination and explained it in a certain way.⁴⁵ We shall now have to discuss this text further. According to Sextus, Aristotle indicated two sources responsible for the notion of gods in people. Although Sextus uses the expression 'notion of gods', the exposition itself only leads to the inference of a single 'divine being' or 'deity'. The two sources reputedly mentioned by Aristotle are: (a) certain experiences of the human soul; (b) contemplation of the heavens and the earth and all they reveal to man. Both categories of phenomena, according to Aristotle, lead to the conclusion that there must be something of a *higher order* than both the soul and the heavenly bodies.

It appears that, for Aristotle, the psychic phenomena which may result in a notion of the divine were 'the ecstatic experiences and mantic powers of the soul during sleep'⁴⁶ and shortly before death. Aristotle explained this striking change in the capacity of the soul by stating that, during sleep and before death, the soul regains its own nature because it is left to itself.⁴⁷ The text in Sextus gives us no reason to assume that Aristotle thought every dream to have mantic significance, but it does make clear that the Stagirite accepted without reserve the possibility that *in certain cases* a certain kind of human soul establishes contact with a superhuman sphere and in this way acquires a knowledge about human life which lies beyond man's ordinary condition. We have to do here with a view in which Aristotle saw the soul of man in his earthly condition as 'unfree in many respects',⁴⁸ as 'bound' to the perishable body.⁴⁹ It is the condition in which man suffers hardship (*ponos*), in which he is subject to and preoccupied with the difficulties inherent in human existence, so that he must remain destitute of perfect *phronesis*.⁵⁰

Now it is important to ask what Sextus means by the 'own nature' of the

⁴⁵ Sextus Emp., *Math.* 3 (*Phys.* 1) 20-23 (= Arist., *Philos.* fr.12a Ross): 'Ἀρ. δὲ ἀπὸ δυεῖν ἀρχῶν ἔννοιαν θεῶν ἔλεγε γεγονέναι ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀπὸ τε τῶν περὶ ψυχὴν συμβαινόντων καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν μετεώρων. ἀλλ' ἀπὸ μὲν τῶν περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν συμβαινόντων διὰ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις γινόμενους ταύτης ἐνθουσιασμοὺς καὶ τὰς μαντείας. ὅταν γάρ, φησιν, ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ καθ' αὐτὴν γένηται ἡ ψυχὴ, τότε τὴν ἴδιον ἀπολαβοῦσα φύσιν προμαντεύεται τε καὶ προαγορεύει τὰ μέλλοντα. τοιαύτη δὲ ἐστὶ καὶ ἐν τῷ κατὰ τὸν θάνατον χωρίζεσθαι τῶν σωμάτων. ἀποδέχεται γοῦν καὶ τὸν ποιητὴν Ὅμηρον ὡς τοῦτο παρατηρήσαντα.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, ἀπὸ μὲν τῶν περὶ ψυχὴν συμβαινόντων διὰ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις γινόμενους ταύτης ἐνθουσιασμοὺς καὶ τὰς μαντείας.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, ὅταν γάρ, φησιν, ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ καθ' αὐτὴν γένηται ἡ ψυχὴ, τότε τὴν ἴδιον ἀπολαβοῦσα φύσιν προμαντεύεται and ἐν τῷ κατὰ τὸν θάνατον χωρίζεσθαι τῶν σωμάτων.

⁴⁸ Cf. *Metaph.* A 2, 982b29: πολλαχῇ γὰρ ἡ φύσις δούλη τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐστίν.

⁴⁹ Cf. the image of the 'binding' of prisoners by Etrurian pirates in Arist., *Protr.* fr.10b (Ross); B 107 (Düring).

⁵⁰ In sharp contrast with, for instance, the condition of the celestial sphere, which is in no way connected with the sublunary sphere and which can therefore be qualified as ἀπαθὴς πάσης θνητῆς δυσχερείας (*Cael.* II 1, 284a14), as ἄκρονος (a15), and therefore not ἄσυχλος and not deprived of πάσης ῥαστώνης ἔμφορος (a31-32).

soul. It is possible that Aristotle, following Plato, presented the soul as the opposite of the *somata* constituting the mortal body and qualified it as *asomatos*. In that case he was thinking along the same lines as Plato in his great dialogue 'On the Soul' (*Phaedo*), where the theme of death as 'liberation' is also accorded a central place.

However, there is a strong tradition recording that Aristotle's lost writings developed a theory in which the soul consists of a very special, divine fifth element, the same element of which the celestial beings are made.⁵¹ That element too is entirely distinct from the constituent parts of earthly bodies. It has nothing in common with the four elements, it is imperishable and ungenerated and cannot change into something else, since it has no *hule* in common with other *somata*. But notwithstanding that very special nature, it is a *soma* and, what is more, a *soma* belonging to *Physis*.

At any rate it seems legitimate to consider the possibility that the soul's 'own nature' mentioned by Sextus Empiricus does not refer to the nature of an *asomaton* in the Platonic sense, but to the nature of a substance composed of the fifth element, free from the obstruction caused by direct contact with the perishable sphere. In that case Sextus is saying that, according to Aristotle, the human soul gains mantic powers when it resumes its original condition, *in which it is of the same nature and the same essence as the celestial beings*.

One might add that, if human souls acquire knowledge of the future when they acquire the condition of the celestials, this implies that the celestials too know the future, as wholly agrees with their divine nature. At the same time this also paves the way for prediction of the future by contemplation of the celestial movements. In Pythagoreanism and the Old Academy the new geometrical approach to astronomy, by its deification of the heavenly bodies, led to a new and positive interest in astrology, which before that time had been regarded as Chaldean and exotic.⁵²

⁵¹ Cf. the texts collected in *Philos.* fr.27 (Ross). In fr.27d (Cic. *Tusc.* I 26.65-27.66) one of the reasons adduced to account for this special element is that in the four earthly elements 'nihil inest ... quod et praeterita teneat et futura provideat et complecti possit praesentia. Quae sola divina sunt, nec invenietur umquam unde ad hominem venire possint nisi a deo'. For a defence of the value of these testimonies, cf. Ch. Lefèvre, "'Quinta natura" et psychologie aristotélicienne' in *RPhL* 69 (1971) 13-39.

⁵² See F. Boll, C. Bezold, W. Gundel, *Stern Glaube und Sterndeutung; Die Geschichte und das Wesen der Astrologie* (Darmstadt 1917; 1974⁶) 19ff. It is really quite remarkable that Aristotle's theory regarding the great influence of the cosmic (celestial) gods on the sublunary sphere could provide the doctrinary basis for astrological preoccupations, and that philosophy in the period immediately after Aristotle shows a sharp increase of such preoccupations, but that hardly a trace of them is to be found in his preserved works.

7. Did Aristotle's attitude to oneiromancy change?

In the foregoing sections we sketched the consistent and lucid oneirology which various indirect sources attribute to Aristotle. This will now have to be compared with what Aristotle says about the significance of dreams in his preserved works, and in particular in his treatise *De divinatione per somnum*, which is devoted to that subject.

First we must repeat that there are neither direct nor indirect indications that Aristotle considered all dreams to be 'mantic'. Of course he combined the view that dreams *may* have mantic value with the conviction that 'most dreams are empty'.⁵³ Most likely, *detachment and liberation* of the soul was for Aristotle a crucial factor in the acquisition of mantic powers.⁵⁴

Now the most striking text in the treatise referred to is the statement that dreams are not *θεόπεμπτα* (sent by God).⁵⁵ But Aristotle emphasizes in the same breath that dreams should nevertheless be located in the *daemonic* sphere. Dreams are certainly 'natural' phenomena for Aristotle, but not in a flat, positivistic sense. In his view, 'natural' phenomena include the daemonic sphere, and within that sphere, the category of *superhuman* phenomena.⁵⁶ Prophetic dreams also counted as 'natural phenomena' in the lost works, where Aristotle supposedly related them to the soul's 'own nature'; they counted as 'natural phenomena' inasmuch as the fifth element, assumed to be the substance of the soul, was reckoned to be a part of *Physis*.

Likewise we can be sure that the lost works too did not consider dreams to be 'sent by (the metaphysical, transcendent) god'. On the other hand, as we pointed out, the text cited from the *Div.Somn.* locates dreams in the daemonic sphere far superior to man's transient condition. In any case there are no grounds for assuming a profound opposition between the *Div.Somn.*

⁵³ Cf. *Protr.* fr.9 (Ross); B 101 (Düring). In a previous article, 'Aristotle's *Eudemus* and *Protrepticus*: are they really two different works?' *Dionysius* 8 (1984) 45-51, we argued that this passage need not be at odds with the positive valuation of (some) dreams. A. H. M. Kessels, *Studies on the dream in Greek literature*, (Utrecht 1973) 106, likewise states that 'all dreams which are told to the full in these poems [i.e. the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*] are supposed to come from the gods ... or the dead. On the other hand, this does not exclude the possibility that there may have been certain dreams that did not have any divine origin'.

⁵⁴ The idea that there are gradations in the purity of the soul is also found in Plu., *De facie* 945a-b (and in Augustine, *Ord.* II, ix, 26).

⁵⁵ *Div. somn.* 2, 463b13: *θεόπεμπτα μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὰ ἐνύπνια, οὐδὲ γέγονε τούτου χάριν (δαιμόνια μὲντοι ἢ γὰρ φύσις δαιμονία, ἀλλ' οὐ θεία).*

⁵⁶ Cf. M. Detienne, *La notion de Daimôn dans le Pythagorisme ancien* (Paris 1963) 46, who translates the above-mentioned text as follows: '[Les songs] ne sont pas envoyés par les dieux, mais bien par les démons...'. See further pp.140-168. His position is strongly supported by Ph. Merlan *art.cit.* 33-34 and n.1: 'In Plato and in the Academy, including Aristotle, interest in demons had always existed.'

and what tradition tells us about Aristotle's lost writings.⁵⁷

8. *Solutions for the λόγους συμφώνους τῇ μαντεία τῇ περὶ τὸν θεόν.*

We have now established that the current interpretation of the final passage in *De Caelo* II 1 meets with serious objections. In the first place, the word *manteia* is given a generalized meaning without parallel in Aristotle's work. Secondly, the current interpretation, from Simplicius onwards, disregards the context of the passage in question and ignores the important Aristotelian distinction between the perfect contemplation and *eudaimonia* of the transcendent deity and the effortless, goal-directed activity and productivity of the celestial gods who are part of *Physis*. Finally, the accepted reading depends on an unusual grammatical construction: *peri* followed by the accusative case would have to denote what the *manteia* is about. Instead, we argued that in both Aristotle's lost dialogical works and his other writings the term *manteia* is used in the sense of 'oracular knowledge', knowledge of superhuman origin. Keeping these considerations in mind, we shall now investigate the possibility of finding alternative explanations for the final passage in *De Caelo* II 1.

8.1 *Corruption of the text?*

First we must consider whether the text in our chapter may be corrupt at a crucial point. It is true that there is no such indication in the manuscript tradition, which for our passage merely mentions the variant readings τῶν

⁵⁷ W. Jaeger, *Aristotle* 162 with n.1, did assume a profound opposition, which he explained to be a result of development in the Stagirite's thought. Cf. also F. Pfeffer, *Studien zur Mantik in der Philosophie der Antike* (Meisenheim am Glan 1976) 61: 'In seiner frühen Schrift Π. φιλοσοφίας hatte Aristoteles die Traumantik mit Hilfe pythagorisierender Vorstellungen erklärt: Im Schlaf löst sich die Seele vom Körper und kommt in Kontakt mit dem Göttlichen' (with reference to *Philos.* fr.12a Ross). 'In seinen späteren Schriften erklärt er alle Träume psychologisch: Traumvorstellungen beruhen auf rein innerseelischen Vorgängen; eine göttliche Einwirkung ist nicht anzunehmen'. Cf. p.4: 'Die Haltung des Aristoteles läuft in den meisten seiner Ausführungen auf eine rationalisierende Erklärung mantischer Phänomene hinaus; göttliches Mitwirken wird abgelehnt. Dies bedeutet im Grunde eine Ablehnung der Mantik'. Here it should be objected that Aristotle explained mantic phenomena 'psychologically' in his lost writings too and that prophetic dreams will not have been called θεόπεμματα there either. Quite wrongly, Pfeffer makes Aristotle into someone who, virtually on his own, rejected ideas which Pfeffer himself agrees were commonplace in Plato's time (cf. *op. cit.* 9; see also Ph. Merlan, *art. cit.* 1970, 33-35). That is why Pfeffer has to twist his arguments in order to explain that Peripatetics like Dikearchus and Cratippus are traditionally assigned views which seem to be wholly in line with those of Aristotle in the *Philos.*; cf. *op. cit.* 62 with quotation from Cic., *Div. ad Brut.* I 70 and II 100.

θεῶν and τῶν θείων instead of τὸν θεόν. These readings can only be explained as corrections made by copyists who felt uneasy about the accusative case after *peri* and wished to 'regularize' the text by reading a genitive.

In our opinion, however, there is a remarkable text from the late-classical tradition which allows us at least to consider the possibility of a corruption. The text in question is found in Olympiodorus' commentary on Plato's *Phaedo*. Commenting on the Platonic passage where Socrates remarks that the highest knowledge is only attainable for the-soul-on-its-own, and thus only 'when the deity himself has freed us' (i.e. from the body),⁵⁸ Olympiodorus adds the following remark: 'by 'god' he means Dionysus here, because it is he who presides over life and death; over life on account of the Titans, over death *on account of the mantic powers associated with death*' (διὰ τὴν μαντείαν τὴν περὶ τὸν θάνατον).⁵⁹ The reference to the Titans is explained in the same commentary by the remark that Dionysus is the god of individuation because in the Orphic myth he is torn apart by the Titans.⁶⁰ Further on Dionysus is again said to preside over life and death; over death 'because wine enthuses and because prior to death we become more susceptible to *enthousiasmos*, as is clear from the fact that in Homer Patroclus acquires prophetic powers when nearing death'.⁶¹ Referring to the now familiar text in Sextus Empiricus,⁶² L. G. Westerink notes that this passage from Olympiodorus represents Dionysian ecstasy, prophetic inspiration, and death as merely three different ways in which the soul can become separated from the visible world. All three belong to the domain of Dionysus Lyseus (the 'liberator').⁶³ In yet a third passage Dionysus is called the cause of life and death: 'of death because he presides over the *manteia* which does not admit of *phantasia*'.⁶⁴

Of course we must realize that Olympiodorus is a late Neoplatonist.

⁵⁸ Pl., *Phd.* 67a6. The use of κάθαρος (2x), καθαρῶς (2x), and καθαρεύω in 66d-67b will have carried a religious connotation for the Greek reader too.

⁵⁹ Olymp., *In Phd.* 6 par.13 (ed. L. G. Westerink, *The Greek commentaries on Plato's Phaedo*, vol.I, Amsterdam 1976, 103): θεὸν ἐνταῦθα καλεῖ τὸν Διόνυσον, διότι οὗτος ἔφορος καὶ ζωῆς καὶ θανάτου, ζωῆς μὲν διὰ τοὺς Τιτᾶνας, θανάτου δὲ διὰ τὴν μαντείαν τὴν περὶ τὸν θάνατον.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 1 par.5.9ff (ed. Westerink p.45).

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 1 par.6.1-5 (ed. Westerink p.47): καὶ γενέσεως ἄλλως ἔφορός ἐστιν ὁ Διόνυσος, διότι καὶ ζωῆς καὶ τελευτῆς· ζωῆς μὲν γὰρ ἔφορος, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τῆς γενέσεως, τελευτῆς δέ, διότι ἐνθουσιᾶν ὁ οἶνος ποιεῖ καὶ περὶ τὴν τελευτὴν δὲ ἐνθουσιαστικώτεροι γινόμεθα, ὡς δηλοῖ ὁ παρ' Ὁμήρῳ Πάτροκλος μαντικός γεγονός περὶ τὴν τελευτὴν.

⁶² Sextus Emp., *Math.* 3 (*Phys.* 1) 20-23 (= Arist., *Philos.* fr.12a1 Ross). Cf. Cic., *Div. ad Brut.* 1.30.63 (= Arist., *Philos.* fr.12a2 Ross), where Aristotle is assigned the view that the soul near death acquires mantic powers, with citation of the same Homeric example.

⁶³ L. G. Westerink, *op. cit.* 46-47.

⁶⁴ Olymp., *In Phd.* 7 par.10.14-17.

Nevertheless, there are several reasons for considering a relation between his text and Aristotle, *De Caelo* II 1.

(a) The idea that the soul near death acquires mantic powers is, as we have seen, attributed to Aristotle by Sextus Empiricus, who uses the same example from Homer.

(b) There are various indications that in his dialogue *Eudemus* or *On the soul* Aristotle borrowed intensively from Orphic traditions and topics. Valuable analyses have been contributed here by G. Méautis and J. Brunschwig.⁶⁵ The appearance of the daemon Silenus in the dialogue, the companion of Dionysus, and his 'revelation' about man's lack of freedom in his earthly condition, these are clearly connected with the Orphic theology concerning Dionysus. Likewise the topic of the 'dreaming Kronos'⁶⁶ is best seen in relation to Orphic tradition.⁶⁷ It is quite possible, in fact, that in the *Eudemus* Aristotle drew up a scheme involving several levels of 'liberation' and 'purification', correlate to the acquisition of various levels of knowledge.

(c) In such a scheme the first phase of 'liberation' would be the deposition of coarse materiality and somatic nature and the assumption of a pure psychic condition. Aristotle appears to have attributed this state to the heavenly beings too. Their knowledge, as is appropriate to imperishable, sempiternal beings, must include insight into the past and the future. But over and above this level Aristotle must also have distinguished the pure noetic condition of all transcendent, metaphysical beings. To these he would have attributed a knowledge which is not temporally qualified.

(d) In this scheme the acquisition of mantic knowledge during sleep or before death is presumably seen as the result of a process in which man's perishable nature is transformed into an imperishable, eternal nature on the level of the heavenly gods.⁶⁸

(e) As we have seen, chapter II 1 of the *De Caelo* discusses the celestial spheres and the divine fifth element and emphasizes that this element is free of the limitations imposed upon the condition of mortal beings.

(f) Various scholars, we noted, have posited a close relationship between

⁶⁵ Cf. G. Méautis, 'L'Orphisme dans l'*Eudème* d'Aristote' *REA* 57 (1955) 254-266. J. Brunschwig, 'Aristote et les pirates Tyrrhéniens (à propos des fragments 60 Rose du *Protreptique*)' *RPFE* 88 (1963) 171-190.

⁶⁶ Tert., *An.* 46 (= Arist. *Protr.* fr.20 Ross).

⁶⁷ It is worth noting that, according to Damascius, Xenocrates too explained the passage on the *phroua* in Pl., *Phd.* 62b by referring to the Orphic tradition, fr.20 (Heinze): Τῆ-τανική ἐστὶ καὶ εἰς Διόνυσον ἀποκορυφούται. Cf. L. G. Westerink, *op.cit.* 8.

⁶⁸ Cf. the Ciceronian testimonies about the fifth element as substance of the celestial beings and the human soul, included under Aristotle, *Philos.* fr.27a-d (Ross). Several scholars have argued that these texts originally belonged to the *Eudemus*. E.g. O. Gigon, 'Prolegomena to an edition of the *Eudemus*' in I. Düring and G. E. L. Owen (eds.), *Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-fourth century* (Göteborg 1960) 23; A. Grilli, 'Cicerone e l'*Eudemo*' *PP* 17 (1962) 98ff.; H. J. Easterling, '*Quinta natura*' *MH* 21 (1964) 79-80.

this chapter and Aristotle's lost works.

In our opinion, all these considerations lend credence to the suggestion that *De Caelo* II 1, 284b3 should be amended to τῇ μαντείᾳ τῇ περὶ τὸν θάνατον. The corruption of the text may easily have been caused by a copyist who did not understand the phrase περὶ τὸν θάνατον.

However, there are two obvious objections to this solution. In the first place, familiarity with another, lost work is absolutely indispensable to an understanding of the passage thus construed. Secondly, we would have to assume a serious break in Aristotle's train of thought at this point. For the context of *De Caelo* II 1 does not make clear why the subject of Aristotle's argument should suddenly shift from the condition of the celestials to that of earthly mortals and their potential to acquire the condition of those divine beings. And since the textual tradition provides no indication of corruption, we can only accept such a solution when all other possibilities have been exhausted. To our mind, that is not the case.

8.2 *An ancient logos from Orphic theology as manteia?*

If, then, we retain the text as it has been handed down to us, we shall have to ask what meaningful interpretation can be given to τῇ μαντείᾳ τῇ περὶ τὸν θεόν. First of all we shall consider whether the meaning '*manteia about god*' is possible in the sense of 'revelation' or 'inspired knowledge' about god. A hint in that direction might be found in the ἀρχαίους καὶ μάλιστα πατρίους ἡμῶν ... λόγους mentioned earlier on in the chapter.⁶⁹ The reference is to an ancient ancestral tradition according to which there is an imperishable, divine principle, in perpetual movement, that causes the beginning and end of all other movements.⁷⁰ Plato, citing a παλαιὸς λόγος, refers to the same tradition in book IV of his *Laws*.⁷¹ And this

⁶⁹ *Cael.* II 1, 284a2.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 284a2-11. Cf. also *Metaph.* A 8, 1074b1-13, where the ancient poets are said to have already handed down, in a mythical form, the tradition that the celestial beings are gods and that the whole of nature is surrounded by divinity. This piece of information is, to say the least, peculiar, for Aristotle emphatically includes the planets in his argument, whereas the ancient mythical poets paid no separate attention to these. The difficulty can be solved if one may assume that Aristotle is thinking of an allegorical explanation of the myth concerning Kronos and the Titans, an explanation which Xenocrates (fr.19 and 20 Heinze) seems also to have used.

⁷¹ Pl., *Laws* IV 715e7: ὁ μὲν δὴ θεός, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος, ἀρχὴν τε καὶ τελευτὴν καὶ μέσα τῶν ὄντων ἀπάντων ἔχων, εὐθείᾳ περαίνει κατὰ φύσιν περιπορευόμενος· τῷ δὲ αἰεὶ συνέπεται δίκη τῶν ἀπολειπομένων τοῦ θείου νόμου τιμωρός. (The preceding part 713a *sqq.* is taken up by the mythical narration of how the god Kronos created a perfect human society by appointing *daimones* as supervisors and rulers over the people.)

Platonic passage is in turn cited in the *De Mundo*.⁷² In the latter treatise we also find part of an Orphic poem which may well represent the *παλαιὸς λόγος* in question.⁷³ Inasmuch as such Orphic poems might be considered products of inspired poets and 'theologians', they may have been referred to by the word *manteia*.

8.3 *The revelation of the daemon Silenus as manteia?*

We should also consider the possibility that our text refers to another 'revelation' concerning the nature of the deity. One recalls here the figure of the daemon Silenus, who in the dialogue 'On the Soul' revealed the miserable condition of earthly mortals to king Midas. Various modern authors have noted that these pronouncements on the ills of sublunary existence must have been complemented by a story about beings living in greater glory and bliss. Such a story may have featured the beings who inhabit 'the isles of the blessed' or the 'isles of Kronos'.⁷⁴

8.4 *Manteia not 'about god' but 'around god'*

The problem with both these interpretations is that they fail to explain why *περὶ τὸν θεόν* was used rather than *περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ* or *περὶ τῶν θεῶν*. Moreover, the context in *De Caelo* II 1 offers no occasion for a concluding remark in such a vein. Finally, the passage would remain exceptional in speaking of a *manteia* about god. For in all known instances mantic pronouncements are concerned with the condition of mortals in the past, present, or (usually) future.⁷⁵

⁷² *Mu.* 7, 401b26.

⁷³ *Mu.* 7, 401a27-29: Διὸ καὶ ἐν τοῖς Ὀρφικοῖς οὐ κακῶς λέγεται· "Ζεὺς κεφαλὴ, Ζεὺς μέσσα, Διὸς δ' ἐκ πάντα τέτυκται". On the evidence of the Derveni papyrus found in 1962, this poem must date from the 5th century; it is already commented on in the papyrus, which dates back to around 400 B.C. Cf. G. Reale, *Aristotele Trattato sul cosmo per Alessandro* (Naples 1974) 273. In other places Plato also cited the Orphic tradition as a *παλαιὸς λόγος*: *Phd.* 70c5; *Phdr.* 240c1; *Ep.* VII 335a3.

⁷⁴ R. Walzer, *Aristotelis fragmenta in usum scholarum* (Florence 1934) n.2 on fr.13 of the *Eudemus*; J. H. Waszink, 'Traces of Aristotle's lost dialogues in Tertullian' *VC* 1 (1947) 139ff.; O. Gigon, 'Prolegomena to an edition of the *Eudemus*' in I. Düring and G. E. L. Owen (eds.), *Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-fourth century* (Göteborg 1960) 24; *id.*, *Hermes* 87 (1959) 161; A. P. Bos, 'Aristotle's *Eudemus* and *Protrepticus*: are they really two different works?', *Dionysius* 8 (1984) 43-44.

⁷⁵ The mantic information which Eudemus received in his dream concerned the death of Alexander of Pherae, the recovery of Eudemus, and his 'return' after five years (*Eudemus* fr.1 Ross); the mantic knowledge of the 'Greek king' concerned the deaths of contemporaries and the dates of future earthquakes and tidal waves (*Eudemus* fr.11 Ross); the mantic pronouncements referred to in *Philos.* fr.12a (Ross) concerned the

It is necessary, therefore, to consider still another interpretation, one in which the text mentioning *manteia* and the preceding part of the *De Caelo* are clearly related to each another.

We already noted that in section 284a14-35 Aristotle attributes precisely those qualities to the celestial sphere which Sextus Empiricus, in what is taken to be a fragment of the *De Philosophia*,⁷⁶ regards as essential to the possibility of divination. The celestial sphere consists of ether, i.e. the same substance of which the human soul is made, according to Aristotle's lost writings. It is free of all discomforts adhering to the mortal condition, since it has no contact with sublunary *somata*.⁷⁷ It is free of toil and pain, and enjoys the *otium* necessary for a life given to knowledge of the truth. Not so in other theories about the toiling sky-bearer Atlas, about the whirling rotation of celestial fire (Empedocles), or about the World-soul (Plato); such theories attribute conditions to the heavenly sphere which prevent it from reaching a level of knowledge superior to that of miserable mortals.

Now another important doctrine in Aristotle's cosmology entails that the celestial gods are executors of the divine masterplan for nature. In *Metaph.* A 10 they are compared to the free members of a *familia* who share in the plans of the master, unlike the slaves and cattle.⁷⁸ In the treatise *De Mundo* they are imagined in the role of bodyguards, ministers, viceroys to the Persian sovereign, executors of the will of the divine king. Essential to this role of the celestials is that they share knowledge of the masterplan for reality which the supreme deity has thought out. It is this knowledge upon which the cosmic order is based. And this knowledge is also a necessary condition for knowledge of the future and its communication to mortals.

A crucial question, however, is in what way Aristotle related the knowledge possessed by the supreme, metaphysical god to the dependent knowledge possessed by the celestial beings. Communication, it would appear, is necessarily a mutual process. And in fact the communication between gods and men through intermediate beings (*daimones*) is presented as a mutual process by Plato. In the *Symposium* he calls Eros a 'great *daimoon*' and qualifies 'the daemonic' as that which conveys human prayers and offerings to the gods and divine orders and rewards to human beings.⁷⁹

deaths of Hector and Achilles. Cf. also the Platonic *Def.* 414b2, where *manteia* is defined as a 'certain knowledge which is not grounded in argumentation and which indicates an action beforehand'.

⁷⁶ Arist. *Philos.* fr.12a (Ross).

⁷⁷ Sextus Emp. speaks about the κατὰ τὸν θάνατον χωρίζεσθαι τῶν σωμάτων of the soul. In *Cael.* I 3, 269b14 Aristotle had said that the fifth element is a *sooma*: 'παρὰ τὰ σώματα τὰ δεῦρο καὶ περὶ ἡμᾶς ἕτερον κεχωρισμένον'.

⁷⁸ *Metaph.* A 10, 1075a16-23. Cf. *John* 15:15.

⁷⁹ Pl., *Symp.* 202d-e: Δαίμων μέγας, ὃ Σωκράτης· καὶ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον μεταξύ ἐστὶ θεοῦ τε καὶ θνητοῦ. Τίνα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δύναμιν ἔχον; Ἑρμηνεῖον καὶ διαπορθμεῖον θεοῖς τὰ παρ' ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἀνθρώποις τὰ παρὰ θεῶν, τῶν μὲν τὰς δεήσεις καὶ θυσίας, τῶν δὲ τὰς ἐπιτάξεις τε καὶ ἀμοιβὰς τῶν θυσιῶν, ἐν μέσῳ

'The daemonic controls all *mantike* and all priestly offices with regard to offerings, consecrations, conjurations, all *manteia* and sorcery'.⁸⁰

But here we must take account of the fact that Aristotle's theology differs on a decisive point from that of Plato. Aristotle emphatically denies the supreme deity any *actio ad extra*. Analyzing kinetic processes in Nature, Aristotle ends up with the notion of the supreme deity as Unmoved Mover, who does not move by imparting movement, but by 'provoking' movement: κινεῖ ὡς ἐρώμενον.⁸¹ Likewise Aristotle's analysis of cognitive processes in the natural sphere appears to culminate in the supreme deity as the ultimate basis of all knowledge; this deity does not cause knowledge by imparting it through active 'enlightenment', but by 'provoking' it in a mind which has reached the appropriate disposition through orientation towards the deity.⁸² God is the cause of all order in Nature because god is the cause of all perfect knowledge of that order in the celestial beings inasmuch as god is their *causa finalis*. Only thus can Aristotle attribute solely the activity of *theoria* to the transcendent deity and assign all *praxis* as a provident, orderly *praxis* to the cosmic beings of imperishable stature.

De Caelo II 1 is a text, therefore, in which Aristotle makes clear that the condition of the celestial beings excludes any obstruction of cognitive powers such as mortals experience. Moreover, we know that Aristotle holds these beings to possess knowledge of the divine masterplan for Nature, which they carry out without any activity in their direction on the part of the supreme god. In the light of these considerations we feel justified in suggesting that, at the end of *De Caelo* II 1, Aristotle is saying this: my theory about a 'natural', special fifth element as substance of the heavenly spheres is so much more cogent than, for instance, Plato's theory about the World-soul because it guarantees the eternity of the world. But at the same time it is the only theory consistent and in harmony with τῇ μαντείᾳ τῇ περὶ τὸν θεόν, that is to say, consistent with the mantic activity *around god*.⁸³ Mantic knowledge arises in the celestial beings 'around god' in the same way that a haystack catches fire through heating of the hay; the divine knowledge of the transcendent god is its necessary condition. But the flaming up of this mantic knowledge is still a 'natural' process, in Aristotle's eyes, and not the result of a 'supernatural' intervention.

δὲ ὃν ἀμφοτέρων συμπληροῖ, ὥστε τὸ πᾶν αὐτὸ αὐτῷ συνδεδέσθαι. Cf. *Phd.* 111b; *Symp.* 188b-d; *Plt.* 290c; *Epin.* 984e; 985b-c.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 202e: διὰ τούτου καὶ ἡ μαντικὴ πᾶσα χωρεῖ καὶ ἡ τῶν ἱερέων τέχνη τῶν τε περὶ τὰς θυσίας καὶ τελετὰς καὶ τὰς ἐπιδὰς καὶ τὴν μαντείαν πᾶσαν καὶ γοητείαν.

⁸¹ *Metaph.* A 7, 1072b3.

⁸² Cf. *An.* III 5 and V. Kal, *On intuition and discursive reasoning in Aristotle* (Leiden 1988) 84-109.

⁸³ In that case, therefore, *peri* plus accusative is taken in a spatial sense. Cf. *Simp.*, *In Cael.* II 1 (375.13): "Ἀτλας εἰς μὲν ἐστὶ καὶ αὐτὸς τῶν περὶ τὸν Διόνυσον Τιτάνων.

In our opinion, therefore, the final remark in *De Caelo* II 1 assigns an intermediary role to the celestial element, the role which Plato assigned to daemons. The celestials possess knowledge that lies beyond the ordinary knowledge of mortals; such knowledge, however, being knowledge about matters in the temporal sphere, is of a lower order than the knowledge possessed by the transcendent, metaphysical deity. While this theory enables Aristotle to accommodate the popular belief, firmly entrenched in Greek culture, that mantic phenomena are a source of superhuman information, yet he has chosen his words so carefully that no intervention need be assumed on the part of the supreme deity as initiator of mantic activity in beings of a lower order. In this view the celestial gods reveal knowledge about the whole of reality as bounded by the celestial sphere (and time). On the one hand, they reveal the future to *manteis* specialized in astrology, in that their paths and positions have an impact on terrestrial events.⁸⁴ On the other hand, their superhuman knowledge is made known to mortals through the intermediation of daemons or through the ecstatic experiences of individual souls.

It is clear, however, that, in broaching the subject of *manteia*, Aristotle threatens to move far away from his main concerns in *De Caelo* I and II. That is why he cuts himself short and winds up with the remark in 284b5.⁸⁵

Thus interpreted, the text in *De Caelo* II 1 has a meaning strikingly similar to that of the Kronos myth in Plutarch's *De facie in orbe lunae*. As we already pointed out, a connection with the relevant text in Plutarch runs through fragment 20 of the *Protrepticus*, where a dreaming Kronos is mentioned. The text in *De facie* (941ff.) too mentions divination by daemons and Kronos himself. The latter is said to communicate the most important predictions in his capacity of dream-oracle. His prescience depends on participation in the divine council of Zeus. What appears to be essential here is that mantic knowledge is not acquired by an action on the part of Zeus, but by *the removal of an obstruction on the part of Kronos*, that is to say by the pacification of his titanic, i.e. emotional, nature. Just as the removal of the obstruction which the material body forms for the soul

⁸⁴ Cf. the *manteis* which are mentioned in *Cael.* II 2, 285a4 and which one might link up with the Pythagorean tradition. Elsewhere Aristotle mentions without comment that Thales, on the basis of his *astrologia*, 'observed' a good olive harvest six months in advance (*Pol.* I 17, 1259a10). Later Plotinus too gives a serious answer to the question: πόθεν οὖν καὶ τὰ χεῖρω μάντεις προλέγουσι καὶ εἰς τὴν τοῦ παντὸς φορὰν ὁρῶντες πρὸς ταῖς ἄλλαις μαντείαις προλέγουσι ταῦτα; (*Enn.* III 3 (48) 6.1-3; II 3 (52) 1).

⁸⁵ *Cael.* II 1, 284b5: ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν τοιοῦτων λόγων ἄλις ἔστω τὸ νῦν. A comparable breaking-off at a point where the proper limits of physics are in danger of being exceeded is found in *GA* III 11, 761b23: ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλλος ἂν εἴη λόγος. In *EN* I 3, 1096a3 we find something similar, and the reason given there is that the subject was already discussed in the lost writings. Cf. I 13, 1102b11.

implies that the soul starts to regain its mantic potential, so the removal of the obstruction which (any remaining) irrationality forms for the mind means that the mind regains its divine nature and takes part in the divine contemplation of the transcendent god Zeus.

But the bondage of Kronos is not an unnatural bondage, as that of Ixion or the prisoners whom Etrurian pirates bound onto corpses. Both aspects of his condition are 'natural', just as both waking and sleeping are natural states of a living being, if different in quality. Beings with the status of Kronos and his daemons potentially possess the *noësis* of Zeus on account of their nature, which is free from the obstructions of the mortal condition. It is thus that around Zeus the mantic activity of the cosmic beings with their ethereal nature is generated.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

ARISTOTLE ON 'PEOPLE IN A CAVE' DE PHILOSOPHIA FR.13A ROSS

In this chapter we will discuss some aspects of a well-known text which Cicero attributes to Aristotle. In doing so, we shall be able to show to what large extent the interpretation of a given fragment depends on intuitions about the context in which the text can be given a meaningful place.¹ Different intuitions are sometimes 'proved' or at least made plausible by means of one and the same text, although they are not as such based on the text.

Our example is the text about 'the affluent cave-dwellers' found in Cicero's *De Natura Deorum* II, 37. 95-97 and generally assigned to Aristotle's dialogue *De Philosophia*.² The text in Cicero reads as follows:

Praeclare ergo Aristoteles si essent, inquit, qui sub terra semper habitavissent bonis et inlustribus domiciliis quae essent ornata signis atque picturis instructaque rebus iis omnibus quibus abundant ii qui beati putantur, nec tamen exissent unquam supra terram, acceperissent autem fama et auditione esse quoddam numen et vim deorum, deinde aliquo tempore patefactis terrae faucibus ex illis abditis sedibus evadere in haec loca quae nos incolimus atque exire potuissent, cum repente terram et maria caelumque vidissent, nubium magnitudinem ventorumque vim cognovissent aspexissentque solem eiusque cum magnitudinem pulchritudinemque tum etiam efficientiam cognovissent quod is diem efficeret toto caelo luce diffusa, cum autem terras nox opacasset tum caelum totum cernerent astris distinctum et ornatum lunaeque luminum varietatem tum crescentis tum senescentis eorumque omnium ortus et occasus atque in omni aeternitate ratos immutabilesque cursus: quae cum viderent, profecto et esse deos et haec tanta opera deorum esse arbitrantur. Atque haec quidem ille.

In the translation of W. D. Ross:

Great was the saying of Aristotle: 'Suppose there were men who had lived always

¹ On the problem of hermeneutic circularity, cf. J. Pépin, *Théologie cosmique et théologie chrétienne* (Paris 1964) 7. For a penetrating critique of the modern tendency to set highly specialized research above attempts at synthesis, see B. Dumoulin, *Recherches sur le premier Aristote* (Paris 1981) 9 and 146-147.

² V. Rose, *op.cit.* (1886³) fr.12; R. Walzer, *Aristotelis fragmenta in usum scholarum* (Florence 1934) fr.13; W. D. Ross, *Aristotle, Select Fragments* (Oxford 1952) fr.13a, *Aristoteles, Die Lehrschriften*, herausgeg., übertragen und ... erläutert von P. Gohlke, *Fragmente* (Paderborn 1960) 27-27; M. Untersteiner, *Aristotele Della Filosofia* (Rome 1963); *Aristotle, The revised Oxford translation* by J. Barnes 2 vols (Princeton 1984) 2.2392. Cf. also W. Jaeger, *Aristotle* (1948²) 163-164; E. Berti, *La filosofia del primo Aristotele* (Padua 1962); A. H. Chroust, *Aristotle, New light on his life and some of his lost works* 2 vols (London 1973) 2.159.

underground, in good and well-lighted dwellings, adorned with statues and pictures, and furnished with everything in which those who are thought happy abound. Suppose, however, that they had never gone above ground, but had learned by report and hearsay that there is a divine authority and power. Suppose that then, at some time, the jaws of the earth opened, and they were able to escape and make their way from those hidden dwellings into these regions which we inhabit. When they suddenly saw earth and seas and sky, when they learned the grandeur of clouds and the power of winds, when they saw the sun and learned his grandeur and beauty and the power shown in his filling the sky with light and making day; when, again, night darkened the lands and they saw the whole sky picked out and adorned with stars, and the varying lights of the moon as it waxes and wanes, and the risings and settings of all these bodies, and their course settled and immutable to all eternity; when they saw those things, most certainly they would have judged both that there are gods and that these great works are the works of gods.' Thus far Aristotle.

1. *Questions raised by the text*

For purposes of orientation we shall formulate a number of questions which arise in relation to this passage and which scholars have answered with a considerable measure of agreement, although the text itself offers no firm basis for such a consensus.

1. In the first place: what argument is Aristotle trying to support with the comparison of the affluent cave-dwellers? Is he trying to prove that

(1a) the gods exist, or that

(1b) the celestial beings such as the sun and the moon and the planets are gods?

2. The second question is of great importance with regard to Aristotle's lost works: assuming that Aristotle is concerned with a theological issue, how should we conceive the theology adhered to by Aristotle at this point?

(2a) As a purely 'cosmic theology', in which the divine is presented as part of the system of the cosmos, or

(2b) as a 'double theology', in which recognition of the divinity of the celestial beings is merely a *first step* toward insight into the perfect divinity of the metaphysical, transcendent god?

3. In the third place, one notices at a first reading of the text that Aristotle's comparison is a conscious imitation of, but also departure from, Plato's famous allegory of the 'people in a cave' (*Republic* VII). This, of course, raises the question: what is the point of Aristotle's transformation of the Platonic model? Is he concerned

(3a) to emphasize the reality of the celestial region and thus reevaluate *Physis* in opposition to Plato's doctrine of Ideas? Or

(3b) to postulate the eternity of the celestial region, as part of his opposition to the Platonic doctrine of the createdness of the cosmos, in a polemic against the cosmogony of the *Timaeus*?

4. In the fourth place we should ask ourselves: in what context would such

an argumentation most likely fit?

(4a) Should we assign the fragment to the *De Philosophia* because gods and divine activity are mentioned or

(4b) should the themes of limited freedom and 'reversal of perspective' make us consider a relationship with Aristotle's dialogue *Eudemus*?

5. The last question to suggest itself is: how did Aristotle conceive the celestial region?

(5a) Was he already using his own theory of the divine fifth element as distinct from the four sublunary elements? Or

(5b) had the idea of a *quinta essentia*, a special element as part of the celestial region, not yet emerged and did Aristotle still see the celestial beings as fiery masses propelled by an immaterial soul, as they are described in Plato's *Timaeus*?

Here we anticipate in noting that since W. Jaeger the questions (1a), (2a), (3a), (4a), and (5a) have generally been answered in the affirmative.³ It is obvious, however, that such decisions cannot be based on the relevant text alone, but depend on the combination of this text with other texts. Our own argument will result in a preference for the positions (1b), (2b), (3b), (4b), and (5a).

In view of the importance of the above questions, it would seem natural to discuss in succession the arguments decisive for their resolution. The fragmentary nature of the material forms an obstruction, however. We are therefore forced to take a roundabout route. And although it seems likely that our text formed part of the treatise *De Philosophia*, since we know for a fact that this work dealt with theology⁴ and with *principia*,⁵ we shall not commit ourselves beforehand to this attribution, but we shall first search for thematic similarities with other texts deriving from Aristotle's lost works.

³ Cf. W. Jaeger, *op.cit.* (1948²) 138; E. Berti, *La filosofia del primo Aristotele* (Padua 1962) 349; M. Untersteiner, *op.cit.* (Rome 1963) 175; C. J. de Vogel, 'Did Aristotle ever accept Plato's theory of transcendent Ideas?' *AGPh* 47 (1965) 216-298, repr. in *Philosophia* I (Assen 1970) 295-330, esp. 324-325. With regard to the problem discussed in question (5), however, D. E. Hahm, 'The fifth element in Aristotle's *De Philosophia*: a critical re-examination', *JHS* 102 (1982) 60-74 has argued that initially Aristotle, like Plato, considered the celestial bodies to be made of fire. See on that chapter 9.4 above.

⁴ That is made clear by Cicero's quotation in *ND* I 13 33 from 'the third book of the *De Philosophia*' (= Arist., *Philos.* fr.26 Ross).

⁵ Cf. D.L. I *Proem* 8 (= *Philos.* fr.6 Ross) with reference to the first book of the *De Philosophia*.

2. *Thematic connections with other fragments from the lost works*

2.1 *Technè and physis*

The affluent cave-dwellers of whom Cicero speaks live permanently in accommodations decorated with statues and paintings and fitted with all manner of luxuries. They have no knowledge of *nature* and the natural environment. Their condition strikes us as being almost modern, even futuristic. They live in purely 'artificial' surroundings, the product of human *technè*. For Aristotle, however, this is not heaven on earth, the realm of freedom, but an underworld situation. These beings will have noticed the beauty and purposiveness of the objects which surround them in such abundance. But likewise they must have observed that the products of human craft and artistry have their limitations.

According to Aristotle, a wide gap divides all objects of human artistry from the sphere of the celestial beings. This gap is in fact unbridgeable, and Aristotle lays the charge of grave impiety upon those who consider the entire cosmos, the sun, moon, planets, and stars, to be the product of 'handicraft'. Their view must be abhorrent and dreadful to man, for they subject the whole cosmos to demolition, just as a house may be ruined by a storm, by the ravages of time, or by faults in its construction.⁶

Our text maintains the specific Aristotelian view of the celestial region in speaking about 'the risings and settings of all these bodies and their courses settled and immutable to all eternity'.

The affluent cave-dwellers, when finally passing from their artificial existence to the contemplation of nature and the celestial spheres, will immediately realize that they are in the presence of a purposiveness and beauty which belongs to a wholly different order. This beauty and purposiveness enjoys *eternity*, to which human products cannot attain. At best human agents can try to imitate nature on a small scale.⁷ A magnificent palace or a painting forces the observer to conclude that it was made purposefully by a competent craftsman. And this craftsman is a *human being*. But his product is doomed to destruction. On the other hand, whoever regards the tides of the sea and the blowing of the trade-winds and the changing of the seasons must conclude that they were caused by a rational, purposeful agent. And this cause *cannot be a human being*. For these phenomena possess an eternal constancy. They cannot be anything but the products of gods. And therefore the celestial beings must be gods!⁸

⁶ Philo, *Aet.* 10-11 (= Arist., *Philos.* fr.18 Ross). Cf. Cic., *Lucullus* 38.119 (Plasberg) (= Arist., *Philos.* fr.20), where the Stoics are opposed by the Aristotelian argument that the cosmos cannot have had a beginning, because no power can bring about the motion and processes of change which occur in it.

⁷ Cf. Iamb., *Protr.* 9 (49.3-52.16 Pistelli) (= Arist. *Protr.* 11 Ross; B 13 Düring).

⁸ It is our opinion, therefore, that *quae in quae cum viderent* refers to the sun, the moon, and the stars and that these celestial beings are concluded to be divine beings on account

Thus interpreted the textual fragment is an argument in favour of the divinity of the celestial beings.⁹ Moreover, it offers a parallel for the argumentation in favour of the divinity of the superlunary part of the cosmos which is found in *De Caelo* I 2-3. There Aristotle emphatically relates the divinity of the fifth element to its ungenerated and imperishable being.¹⁰

2.2 'Change of perspective'

'Change of perspective' is one of the motifs used by Aristotle in this text. That motif has been developed and avidly exploited in the philosophical tradition. Thus Parmenides described mortals who follow and rely upon the testimony of their senses as miserable beings who wander about in the pitch-darkness of a kind of underworld; standing far above these is the individual who puts his faith in reason (*logos*), the man of knowledge who has seen the light and dwells with the goddess of Truth. Plato embroidered upon that pattern in his allegory of the Cave. And the 'reversal of values' which in his view should accompany this change of perspective had already been expounded in his dialogue *Phaedo*, which makes clear that life-on-earth is to be considered 'a being held in custody'¹¹ and a form of 'death', while dying is presented as a 'liberation' and the start of 'true life'. In the myth of the *Phaedo* Plato had also described the perspective of a 'heavenly earth' from which the condition of sublunary mortals would appear to be no more

of their *efficientia* and that *haec tanta*, i.e. the natural things 'in our world' (cf. *haec loca quae nos incolimus*) are products of divine beings, namely the celestial gods mentioned earlier on. All *poiësis* in the cosmos is attributed by Aristotle to the celestial gods; cf. Olymp., in *Phd.* 180.22-23 (Norvin) (= Arist. *Philos.* fr.22 Ross). Cf. M. Untersteiner, *op.cit.* 180-181. The cave-dwellers could hardly conclude that the sun, the moon, and the stars are *opera deorum*! (When the author of the *De mundo* speaks of *theou erga*, ch.6, 399b23-25, he is referring to the phenomena which take place in the skies, the seas, and on earth. Moreover, the context makes clear that this *poiësis* is an 'indirect', 'intermediated' *poiësis*, through the intervention of the celestial beings). On the other hand we do have reason to suppose that Aristotle also spoke about the cause of the eternal order which is manifest in the heavenly spheres. Cf. Sextus Emp., *Math.* 3 (*Phys.* 1) 20-23 (= *Philos.* fr.12a Ross); *Math.* 9 (*Phys.* 1) 26-27 (= *Philos.* fr.12b Ross); Philo, *Leg.* 3, 32.97-99 (= *Philos.* fr.13b Ross) and *Praem.* 7.41-43 (= *Philos.* fr.13c Ross).

⁹ As far as that is concerned, therefore, fr.13a would be above all in agreement with the two other passages in Cic., *ND* 2.15.42 and 2.16.44, included under *Arist.*, *Philos.* fr.21 Ross.

¹⁰ *Cael.* I 3, 270a12-25; 270b9-11. Cf. the remarkable article by F. F. Repellini, 'Il *De Caelo* di Aristotele come risposta 'dialettica' al *Timeo*', *RSF* 35 (1980) 99-126, esp. 109-111.

¹¹ Pl., *Phd.* 62b. We follow the interpretation of P. Boyancé, 'Note sur la *phroua* platonicienne', *RPh* 37 (1963) 7-11 (cf. his article in *REA* 50 (1948) 218-226), who shows that Xenocrates already took the relevant phrase to mean 'in custody'. We cannot go along with the attempts of J. and G. Roux, 'A propos de Platon: réflexions en marge du *Phédon* (62b) et du *Banquet*', *RPh* 35 (1961) 207-210 and of R. Ferwerda, *Hermes* 113 (1985) 275-276 to arrive at a less 'negative' interpretation.

impressive than that of frogs around a pool.¹²

Such a perspective obviously has much to offer: it beckons us with the promise of unknown, surprising, eminently appealing vistas. But this kind of expedient also poses a structural problem: what mortal is capable of acquiring this perspective in order to communicate it to others?

Greek philosophy usually left this question unanswered, but indicated, by describing it in *myths*, that such a perspective could only be acquired on a meta-level. Sometimes an attempt is even made to 'prove' the superhuman origins of a given myth.¹³

Certainly Aristotle too made use of this mode of expression. He used it with consummate skill in the *Eudemus* or *On the Soul*, where he worked out his own answer to Plato's *Phaedo*, which also deals with 'the (immortality of the) soul'¹⁴.

2.3 'Imprisonment'

There is, also the motif of imprisonment and liberation, which seems to establish a link between our text and other fragments of lost works. This motif too was already used in an artistic way by Plato and later appropriated by Aristotle, who transformed rather than imitated the Platonic concept.¹⁵

Imprisonment is the recurring theme of Plato's *Phaedo*. This work describes Socrates' death in prison at the end of a day during which his friends, who are free to go where they please, have visited him and talked with him. In the course of their conversations they discuss the Orphic notion of life on earth as a life 'in custody' and death as a liberation of the soul from the constrictions and bonds of the body. The dissolution of the body is understood as the road towards the soul's release, and the friends who remain behind do not in the end weep for Socrates' death, but for themselves.

In a highly skilful and characteristic manner Aristotle played with the same motifs of imprisonment and liberation in his *Eudemus*. He seems to have emphasized the galling bond of earthly corporeality by comparing the human condition with that of prisoners tied to corpses by Etrurian pirates.¹⁶ And he introduced the demigod Silenus (whom Plato had compared to Socrates in *Symposium* 215a) as the prisoner of greedy king Midas, who was unaware how much he himself was a prisoner to his thirst for gold.¹⁷ Silenus was presented as being much the freer of the two. He is the faithful

¹² Pl., *Phd.* 109b. Cf. P. M. Schuhl, *La fabulation platonicienne* (Paris 1947) 45-58.

¹³ Cf. the role of the Heliads and the goddess of Truth in Parmenides, *Prooimium* (D.K. fr.B 1); of Er the Pamphylian who returned from the dead in Pl., *Rep.* X 614bff.; of Empedotimos in Heraclid. Pont., *Peri psychés* fr.93 (F. Wehrli).

¹⁴ For more details see Chapter 8.9 above.

¹⁵ Cf. H. J. Drossaart Lulofs, *De ogen van Lynkeus* (Leiden 1967) 14-19.

¹⁶ *Protr.* fr.10b Ross; B 106-107 Düring.

¹⁷ Plu., *Consol. ad Apoll.* 115b-e (= Arist. *Eudemus* fr.6 Ross).

companion of the liberating god Dionysus, who as a child had broken the fetters with which he had been bound (again by Etrurian pirates!).¹⁸ It is in fact Silenus who offers the mortal Midas an insight into his miserable condition. He announces that man is an exile on earth, and that only death can end his exile. Silenus thus provides the background to the story of Eudemus' dream about his 'return home', which apparently should be read as the return of the soul from its exile or imprisonment in the perishable body.¹⁹

The theme of imprisonment was therefore developed by Aristotle

(1) in relation to *mortals*: (a) the individual human being proved to be bound to his perishable body. (b) The figure of king Midas was presented as being the 'prisoner' of his own cravings. (c) The image of the affluent subterraneans signified the condition of those who were blind to the perfect efficiency and divinity of the celestial region.

(2) Next, 'imprisonment' was mentioned in relation to the *daemon* Silenus.

(3) Finally, Aristotle seems to have spoken of imprisonment at an even higher level, namely in relation to a 'captive god', the divine world archon Kronos.²⁰

In the foregoing chapters we have suggested that, in order to understand what Aristotle meant to indicate by his 'dreaming Kronos' figure, we must note that Plato too introduced the god Kronos in his *Politicus*, a dialogue discussing the qualities which a (good) ruler must possess. Halfway through the dialogue Socrates embarks on a mythical narration about world government. In it Kronos is presented as the world archon who sometimes determines the motion of the cosmos and the course of affairs himself (the image Plato uses here is that of rolling up a ball hanging on a string), after which he withdraws and allows the world to move in the other direction until it hovers on the brink of chaos and ruin. Then Kronos intervenes again.²¹

For Plato, Kronos is the cosmic equivalent of the philosopher-archon whom he described in the *Republic* as the ideal ruler of human society.²² For the philosopher-king unites two sharply distinct activities, namely the activity of contemplation (*theoria*) and the activity of rulership (*praxis*). Plato gave expression to this in his allegory of the Cave by saying that the philosopher is he who has transcended the shadowy existence of the prisoners in the Cave and has learned to view the earthly, human condition from a superhuman perspective, but who must be *forced* to return and

¹⁸ Cf. J. Brunschwig, 'Aristote et les pirates tyrrhéniens; à propos des fragments 60 Rose du *Protreptique*', *RPFE* 88 (1963) 187.

¹⁹ Arist. *Eudemus* fr.1 Ross. Cf. G. Méautis, 'L'Orphisme dans l'*Eudème* d'Aristote', *REA* 59 (1955) 258ff.

²⁰ See Chapter 4.3, 6.5, 8.6 and 9.1 above.

²¹ Pl., *Plt.* 269c4-d5.

²² Pl., *Rep.* V 473c11ff.; VII 519c8ff.

descend to the people in the Cave in order to take charge over them.²³

Judging by the way that Aristotle appears to have played with Platonic motifs, it is natural to conclude that the difference between Aristotle's Kronos and the Kronos in Plato's *Politicus* reflects some kind of controversy between the pupil and the teacher. In the first place, we concluded that Aristotle presented the god Kronos as a dreaming god because he assigned him to a *lower* position than Plato had done.

Next we developed further assumptions about Aristotle's motives for calling Kronos a 'dreaming Kronos'. The most fundamental opposition between Aristotle and Plato was Aristotle's rejection of the Platonic view that the supreme god is not only active in contemplation, but also in ordering and creating the world. The debate between these two masters of Greek philosophy came to hinge upon the figure of the Demiurge or World-maker as portrayed by Plato in his *Timaeus*. Aristotle argued that creation of the world must imply an element of 'mutability' in the notion of 'god', inasmuch as the transition from chaos to order, if effected by a divine entity, necessarily implies a transition from non-ordering to ordering activity on the part of this deity.²⁴

The consequence for Aristotle was a double theology which sharply distinguished between a transcendent, metaphysical, purely contemplative deity, and a divine part of this cosmos itself, the sphere of the divine fifth element and the celestial gods, the sun, moon, planets, and stars. This double theology, which, in order to safeguard a pure conception of god, denies the supreme deity any participation in cosmic reality, brings about a separation between the highest level of cognition (of the metaphysical deity) and the government of the world. (This separation had also been made by Plato, but had in a certain sense been resolved by positing, within a dialectical scheme, a personal union between both agents.) Aristotle rejects the Platonic ideal that the philosopher should be king and has no illusions that kings would be competent rulers if they were philosophers. He prefers the idea of a human society in which the sovereign rules the state, but is receptive to the counsel of a philosopher.²⁵

²³ *Ibid.*, VII 519c8ff.

²⁴ Arist. *Cael.* I 10, 280a7-9 in relation to Pl., *Tim.* 30a5. Traces of Aristotle's criticism as expressed in his lost writings can be found in *Philos.* fr.19c and 18 Ross. Cf. J. Pépin, *Théologie cosmique* 257ff. and B. Effe, *Studien* 23 ff.

²⁵ Cf. Them. *Or.* 107c-d (= Arist. *Peri Basileias* fr.2 Ross). It is noteworthy that Aristotle thus in fact creates a situation in which, ideally, the king carries out what the philosopher has thought out. To that extent Aristotle places the philosopher *above* the king, analogous to the subordination of the *psychè* to the *nous*. Cf. *Metaph.* A 10, 1076a4: οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίῃ· εἰς κοίρανος. The Homeric passage referring to king Agamemnon is here applied by Aristotle to the transcendent, purely contemplative deity! In *Mu.* 6, 398a10ff. the supreme deity is compared to the Persian *megas basileus* (great king) who is served by the satraps and viceroys of the provinces. In conflict with Greek political tradition, Aristotle wishes to invest the king with executive power only

So far we have only discussed a 'dreaming Kronos'. But the subject of this section was the motif of imprisonment. Now, from our analysis of the story on the 'dreaming Kronos' in Plutarch's myth in the *De facie in orbe lunae* we concluded that already Aristotle must have presented Kronos as being a prisoner and bound. In Plutarch's myth the theme of imprisonment and liberation played a central role too. He develops it by presenting dying as the 'first death', that is to say, the deposition of man's earthly, bodily nature and thus the 'liberation' of the soul.²⁶ Next, he discusses a slower, 'second death', in which the *nous* casts off the covering of the soul. This death is the liberation of the purely spiritual principle in man.²⁷ The entire myth of Plutarch's *De facie* seems to be an elaboration of Plato's *Phaedrus*, where the dualism of body and soul has been replaced by the trichotomy of body, soul, and mind. The shining cave where Kronos is held prisoner is not only strongly reminiscent of the Cave in Plato's *Republic*, as we said earlier on, but also of the aperture in the celestial dome through which, according to Plato's *Phaedrus*,²⁸ the perfect souls pass in order to make contact with the world of *noëta*.

In the myth of Plutarch's *De facie*, Kronos is imprisoned by Zeus and the primitive giant Briareus is appointed his guard in order to ensure 'custody'.²⁹ The word used there for 'custody', *phroura*, reminds us directly of Plato's *Phaedo*, where Socrates refers to the 'secret tradition' according to which people are beings placed in custody by the gods.³⁰ But it also makes clear what development has taken place with respect to the *Phaedo*: in the concept which presents the celestial gods as the Titans (who must remain devoid of supreme divine glory), the motif of 'custody' is doubled and the Orphic notion appealed to by Plato acquires an extra dimension: only Zeus, the metaphysical, purely contemplative god, is truly free. Subordinate to him, though to some extent also enjoying the freedom of gods, are the celestial gods and all other beings that move in the celestial sphere. In contrast, 'human nature is in many respects unfree',³¹ on account of its earthly materiality as well as its psychical bondage.

In this train of thought one recognizes a remarkably clear relation to and transformation of Plato's *Phaedo*, resulting in a glorification of purely

and put legislature in the hands of the philosopher! It is no wonder, therefore, that Philo of Alexandria, expressing a comparable relation between *Nous* and *Logos*, prefers to use the image of king and architect (*Opif.* 17ff), in which the *basileus kai hēgemoon* stands for the *Nous*.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 943a-b.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ Pl., *Phdr.* 247b.

²⁹ Plu., *De facie* 26, 941a (we follow the text of H. Cherniss, 1957).

³⁰ Pl., *Phd.* 62b3-4. (Athenag., *Leg.* 6 attributes this idea to Philolaus, whom Plato mentions slightly earlier on in *Phd.* 61d and e).

³¹ Arist., *Metaph.* A 2, 982b29: πολλαχῇ γὰρ ἡ φύσις δούλη τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐστί...

contemplative activity. For in this context the terms 'prison' and 'unfreedom' are not the expression of a profound pessimism, but the consequence of a radical spiritualization. Prof. H. J. Drossaart Lulofs once indicated a strong spiritualism as the reason why human, earthly existence is devaluated in Aristotle's *Eudemus*.³² It seems likely that, in his macrocosmology, the same spiritualism led Aristotle to posit, in a mythical context and with a radical reversal of perspective, that however impressive and majestic the order of the celestial region may be, this sphere too must be transcended. For it is the sphere of continual motion and temporality, and it belongs to the executors of the divine plan, whose knowledge of this plan is merely derivative; as such it must be transcended into the sphere of the supreme, metaphysical deity.

3. *Conclusions*

Our point of departure was a text about affluent cave-dwellers attributed to Aristotle by Cicero. We noted that it was possible to establish a number of important connections between this text and various other fragments of lost works by Aristotle. Our text discusses the important distinction between human *technè* and cosmic *physis* and the qualitative difference between these two. It employs the characteristic motif of the reversal of perspective found in numerous fragments of Aristotle's lost works and strikingly absent in the treatises of the *Corpus*. And we saw that the confinement of the cave-dwellers matches a number of other texts in which Aristotle talks about 'imprisonment' and the necessity of 'liberation'.

We think that this 'roundabout route' may ultimately be more productive than a strictly philological enquiry limited to an analysis of the textual data. In this case we have tried to supply a model of an overall structure in which the texts discussed by us can be given a meaningful place. We see this overall structure as a view of man which regards him as imprisoned in his corporeality and materiality and craving for possessions and goods. A first step toward his liberation is the dawning of insight into the divinity and purposefulness of the nature around and above him. The scientific study of *Physis* raises him above the condition of enslaved, unfree humanity. But a second step is taken when man also perceives the corporeality and changeability of the visible celestial gods in their toilless existence. He can then become aware of a foundation of all natural reality which is itself non-corporeal and metaphysical. Ideally, man's study of natural reality must finally be replaced by knowledge of the reality outside *Physis*.

The most prominent features of the general framework sketched here are

³² H. J. Drossaart Lulofs, *De ogen van Lynkeus* 19: 'These lines of thought should not be termed pessimistic or negativistic: rather they form a necessary contrast with a one-sided spiritualism' (our translation). Cf. p.21.

that:

- (a) it is independent of the Platonic conception, but at the same time closely related to it;
- (b) it shares all the main distinctions with the Aristotelian conception familiar to us from the *Corpus Aristotelicum*;
- (c) it differs radically from that conception mainly in that it seems not to have viewed human life from the common, mortal perspective, but to have corrected the latter from a superior perspective disclosed by an intermediary being of superhuman status.

Clearly, for whoever is prepared to consider it, such a conception of Aristotle's lost work throws new light on the text about the 'affluent cave-dwellers'.

- (1) In this new interpretation, the story about the cave-dwellers must have served to support the argument that the celestial beings such as the sun, moon, and planets are gods.
- (2) If our hypothesis of a 'double theology' in Aristotle's lost work is correct, however, the same divine beings must have been presented as subordinate and ontologically inferior to a higher, purely metaphysical deity, whose perfect knowledge they only possess in a less perfect form.
- (3) In that case the point of our text was not a mere revaluation of the visible world at the expense of Plato's intelligible reality, but the rehabilitation of the supralunary part of reality as an ungenerated and imperishable reality, against Plato's theory of the createdness of the visible cosmos.
- (4) Because of the thematical connections which we established between our text and passages attributed with some certainty to Aristotle's dialogue *Eudemus* or *On the soul*, it is reasonable to claim that our text may as justly be assigned to the latter dialogue as to the *De Philosophia*. The dialogue *Eudemus* or *On the soul* will not only have dealt with the individual souls, but also with the World-soul of Plato's *Timaeus* and Aristotle's alternative for it.³³
- (5) In virtue of the view formulated under point (3), we think it must be assumed that Aristotle did not combine the doctrine of the eternity of the celestial beings with a theory about their composition of earth and fire as set out in Plato's *Timaeus*, but with his own, new theory of the divine, eternal, fifth element.

³³ It is worth mentioning that, on p.163 of his book *Aristotle* (London 1948²), W. Jaeger attributes the relevant passage from Cicero to the third book of the *De Philosophia*, whereas earlier on (p.30) he appears to assign the same passage to the *Eudemus*.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

A DOUBLE THEOLOGY IN ARISTOTLE DE PHILOSOPHIA FR. 26 ROSS

1. *Epicurean criticism of Aristotle's theology*

Of the entire collection of fragments and testimonies related to lost writings of Aristotle, none has provoked so much comment and such heated controversy as the passage in Cicero's *De natura deorum* 1.13.33.¹ In this passage an Epicurean, Velleius, sharply criticizes the philosophical conception found, according to him, in the third book of Aristotle's *De philosophia*.²

W. D. Ross has translated the passage as follows:³

Aristotle, in the third book of his work *On Philosophy*, creates much confusion through dissenting from his master Plato. For now he ascribes all divinity to mind, now he says the world itself is a god, now he sets another god over the world and ascribes to him the role of ruling and preserving the movement of the world by a sort of backward rotation. Then he says the heat of the heavens is a god, not realizing that the heavens are a part of the world, which he has himself elsewhere called a god. But how can the divine sense-perception which he ascribes to the heavens be preserved in a movement so speedy? Where, again, are all the gods of popular belief, if we count the heavens, too, as a god? And when he himself demands that God be without a body, he deprives him of all sense-perception, and even of foresight. Moreover, how can the world move if it lacks a body, and how, if it is always moving itself, can it be calm and blessed?

A long line of scholars has studied this text and commented on it. But their

¹ Cic., *ND* 1.13.33 = Arist., *Philos.* fr. 26 Ross: 'Aristotelesque in tertio de philosophia libro multa turbat a magistro suo Platone dissentiens. Modo enim menti tribuit omnem divinitatem, modo mundum ipsum deum dicit esse, modo alium quendam praeficit mundo eique eas partes tribuit ut replicatione quadam mundi motum regat atque tueatur. Tum caeli ardorem deum dicit esse, non intellegens caelum mundi esse partem, quem alio loco ipse designavit deum. Quo modo autem caeli divinus ille sensus in celeritate tanta conservari potest? Ubi deinde illi tot dii, si numeramus etiam caelum deum? Cum autem sine corpore idem vult esse deum, omni illum sensu privat, etiam prudentia. Quo porro modo mundus moveri carens corpore, aut quo modo semper se movens esse quietus et beatus potest?'

² Cf. M. Untersteiner, *Aristotele Della Filosofia*, introd., text, transl., and exeget. comm. (Rome 1963) 255 ff.; E. Berti, *La filosofia del primo Aristotele* (Padua 1962) 375 ff.; J. Pépin, *Théologie cosmique et théologie chrétienne* (Paris 1964) 136 ff.

³ *The works of Aristotle transl. into English* (Oxford 1952) 12.97. J. Barnes, *The complete works of Aristotle* (Princeton 1984) 2.2396 only translates the referential part and omits the critical part.

opinions are so deeply divided that no generally accepted explanation can be offered on the basis of the information adduced in the discussion hitherto.

There is, however, a consensus on the overall division of the text.

1. In the first place it is clear that the Epicurean reproaches Aristotle for the complete confusion of his (philosophical) theology.
2. In the second place he notes a difference of opinion between Aristotle and his teacher Plato. There is a complication here, in that the most reliable manuscripts read *uno* instead of *suo*.⁴
3. Confusion is caused by the fact that Aristotle seems to have spoken in four different ways about 'god' and 'divinity'. According to the text, he used the word 'god' or 'divinity' in relation to:
 - (a) the mind;
 - (b) the cosmos;
 - (c) another figure;
 - (d) the substance of the heavenly region.⁵
4. Finally, Velleius triumphantly demonstrates the internal contradictions and complete absurdity of the theological system outlined.

2. Main points in the modern debate

W. Jaeger

It was again W. Jaeger who really got the debate going on this fragment.⁶ In the *De philosophia*, according to Jaeger, Aristotle, after his earliest Platonizing phase, emerged for the first time with a philosophical conception which differed radically from that of Plato. 'The God to whom the world is subordinated is the transcendental unmoved mover, who guides the world as its final cause, by reason of the perfection of his pure thought. This is the original nucleus of Aristotelian metaphysics.'⁷

Moreover, Aristotle is supposed to have developed his doctrine of the fifth, celestial element in this dialogue, and with it his theory that the world is ungenerated and imperishable.⁸ The Epicurean's claim that Aristotle also called the world divine is based on a misinterpretation, in Jaeger's view: by the 'cosmos' Aristotle must have meant the celestial sphere.⁹

⁴ *Loc. cit.*: 'Aristotelesque in tertio de philosophia libro multa turbat a magistro uno Plato dissentiens'. For the textual tradition and proposed emendations, see M. Untersteiner, *op. cit.* 255 f. See also section 4.2 below.

⁵ In Cicero's text: (1) modo enim menti tribuit omnem divinitatem; (2) modo mundum ipsum deum dicit esse; (3) modo alium quendam praeficit mundo eique eas partes tribuit ut replicatione quadam mundi motum regat atque tueatur; (4) tum caeli ardorem deum dicit esse.

⁶ W. Jaeger, *Aristoteles* (Berlin 1923); Engl. transl. (Oxford 1934, 1948²) 138 ff.

⁷ *Op. cit.* 139. Jaeger, therefore, identifies the *alius quidam* with the *mens*.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 140.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 139. B. Effe, *Studien* (Munich 1970) 159 n.10 rejects this suggestion.

H. von Arnim

One of the most important proposals to correct Jaeger's scheme for the development of Aristotle's philosophy was the theory that Aristotle had become so anti-Platonic in his first independent phase that his rejection of Plato's world of transcendent Ideas resulted in a form of *immanentist philosophy*. His theology in this period supposedly became a purely *cosmic theology*. The doctrine of a transcendent Unmoved Mover was not developed until later. This theory was forcibly argued by H. von Arnim.¹⁰ And an important part in it was played by his interpretation of Velleius' speech in our text from Cicero.

Von Arnim is convinced that the term *replicatio* cannot refer to the influence which the Unmoved Mover exercises as *causa finalis* on nature as a whole. He thinks it stands for ἀνακύκλησις, which can only be taken to indicate the 'rückläufige' movement of the planetary spheres. The *alius quidam* of the text is not identical with the *mens* and we can infer from the text that in the *De philosophia* Aristotle distinguished between the Mind of the external celestial sphere as the highest divine entity and the subordinate region of the planets, which is characterized by a rotation running counter to the furthest sphere.¹¹

In view of his interpretation, Von Arnim naturally has problems with Velleius' statement that Aristotle conceives god as a being *sine corpore*. He cannot accept the interpretation 'immaterial'.¹²

W. K. C. Guthrie

Von Arnim's line of thought is pursued by W. K. C. Guthrie.¹³ Jaeger was too hasty in concluding that the doctrine of the Unmoved Mover was expounded in the *De philosophia*.¹⁴ And Guthrie draws the conclusion that Aristotle's first independent phase must have been a purely materialistic one.¹⁵ The doctrine of the Unmoved Mover was not developed until later, but did respond, it seems, to an inner need felt by the philosopher, for 'whatever Aristotle's temperament may have been, it was not that of a

¹⁰ H. von Arnim, 'Die Entstehung der Gotteslehre des Aristoteles', *SB.Akad. W.Wien*, 212.5 (1931) 3-80; repr. under the title 'Die Entwicklung der Aristotelischen Gotteslehre' in F. P. Hager, *Metaphysik und Theologie des Aristoteles* (Darmstadt 1969) 1-74.

¹¹ *Op. cit.* 3-7; repr. 1-4. According to Von Arnim, Aristotle still entertained a purely cosmic theology while writing the *De caelo*, in which the movement of the celestial sphere was conceived as a self-movement. Only later were passages added mentioning the theory of the Unmoved Mover, *op. cit.* 8 ff.; repr. 6 ff. For a long time I also adhered to this theory about Aristotle's development.

¹² *Op. cit.* 7; repr. 4-5.

¹³ W. K. C. Guthrie, 'The development of Aristotle's theology', *CQ* 27 (1933) 162-172 and 28 (1934) 90-98.

¹⁴ *Art. cit.* 164.

¹⁵ *Art. cit.* 169.

materialist'.¹⁶ According to Guthrie, however, this addition did not have far-reaching consequences for the existing structure of Aristotle's philosophy.¹⁷

J. Moreau

The French scholar J. Moreau prefers to speak of 'un véritable hylozoïsme' in connection with Aristotle's *De philosophia*.¹⁸ He considers this characteristic of its psychology, in which Aristotle must have regarded the fifth element as the substance of the soul; and of its theology, since the deity in the *De philosophia* was not yet a metaphysical deity.

In his interpretation of fr. 26, however, he corrects Von Arnim by identifying the *alius quidam* with the sphere of the fixed stars. This external sphere governs the movement of the world by a 'révolution inverse'.¹⁹ The Greek term ἀνείλιξις which Moreau mentions here establishes a link with the myth of Kronos the world archon in Plato's *Politicus*.²⁰

H. Cherniss

A new direction to the discussion was given by a perceptive contribution of H. Cherniss in an Appendix to his book *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy*.²¹ His attack is particularly aimed at the theory that the original form of Aristotle's new doctrine of the fifth element necessarily presented this heavenly element as independent, and that it rules out the possibility of an Unmoved Mover. He concludes that fr. 26 of the *De philosophia* posits as the highest deity an immaterial *Nous* which is the final cause of all nature. A subordinate divine entity must be assumed who, in a way that is not quite clear, causes the retrograde movement of the planets.²²

J. Pépin

Even after Cherniss there proved to be room for new hypotheses. In his impressive study *Théologie cosmique et théologie chrétienne*, J. Pépin made an extensive analysis of the identifiable remains of Aristotle's *De philosophia*.²³ For him too, the mysterious *alius quidam* is the crux of

¹⁶ *Art. cit.* 169. In his *Aristotle On the Heavens* (London 1939) xxxii n. Guthrie in fact corrects himself somewhat: 'I consider my earlier assertion of a materialist stage in Aristotle's thought to have been too positive in expression'.

¹⁷ *Art. cit.* 171.

¹⁸ J. Moreau, *L'âme du monde de Platon aux Stoiciens* (Paris 1939; repr. Hildesheim 1965) 122.

¹⁹ *Op. cit.* 118.

²⁰ Pl., *Plt.* 270d3; 286b. The connection of *replicatio* with this passage had already been made by W. Theiler, *Zur Geschichte der teleologischen Naturbetrachtung bis auf Aristoteles* (Zurich 1925; repr. Berlin 1965) 84 n.1.

²¹ Baltimore 1944; repr. New York 1962, Appendix 10, 581-602, esp. 591 ff.

²² *Op. cit.* 595.

²³ Paris 1964, 135-172 and 216 ff.

Cicero's text. He thinks the connection of *replicatio* with ἀνείλιξις and ἀνακύκλησις is relevant, but points out that Plato's conception in the *Politicus* differs essentially from that of the *De philosophia*, since Plato only talks about a single god.²⁴ Like Cherniss, he dismisses Moreau's view that the sphere of the fixed stars brings about the movement of the planets by a retrograde revolution, because it is clear from the *Corpus* that this movement is in the same direction, though at a different speed.²⁵

But he gives short shrift to Cherniss's view as well, since Velleius cannot have meant to say that the sphere of the fixed stars governs and maintains the motion of the cosmos by means of the retrograde motion of the planets.²⁶

Pépin then comes up with a somewhat curious solution. While maintaining the connection of *replicatio* with the term ἀνείλιξις in Plato's *Politicus*, he proposes to give it a different meaning, namely that of a circular motion in general, without the implication of a change in the direction of rotation.²⁷ In this way, *replicatio* can easily be taken in the sense proposed by Moreau, as the movement of the sphere of the fixed stars.

Here, however, Pépin adds a very special qualification. He argues that reliable indications suggest that Aristotle developed the notion of a hyper-cosmic ether, i.e. an ethereal sphere which lies even farther than the sphere of the fixed stars. This is supposedly referred to by the words *aliū quendam ... tueatur*.²⁸

B. Effe

In B. Effe's monograph on the main aspects of Aristotle's *De philosophia*, the speech of Velleius is left to the very last.²⁹ The passage contains so many problems, according to Effe, that first a reconstruction of the dialogue must be made on the basis of other data, so that with the aid of this reconstruction the intentions of the Epicurean criticism can be investigated. Now in other parts of his study Effe argues that the *De philosophia* talked about god as the ordering principle of the cosmos and as pure mind.³⁰ For him, this theology is clearly indicated by Velleius' words *menti tribuit omnem divinitatem*. With Pépin, Effe also assumes that *replicatio*, as the equivalent of ἀνείλιξις, can simply be taken as 'circular motion', but unlike Pépin he concludes that the *aliū quidam* must therefore be identical with the Unmoved Mover (the *deus-mens*), which as *causa finalis* brings about the rotation of the furthest

²⁴ *Op. cit.* 154.

²⁵ *Op. cit.* 155.

²⁶ *Op. cit.* 155.

²⁷ *Op. cit.* 156.

²⁸ *Op. cit.* 156 f.; 163; 170.

²⁹ B. Effe, *op. cit.* (n.9) 157 ff.

³⁰ *Op. cit.* 74.

celestial sphere.³¹

B. Dumoulin

Finally, we mention the view of B. Dumoulin set out in a recent study on various important lost works by Aristotle.³² In the first place this author infers from Velleius' way of summarizing, which he also uses in his critical account of other thinkers from the non-materialistic tradition, that the god who governs the world in the *De philosophia* must have been emphatically distinguished from the world itself.³³ In this god Dumoulin sees the transcendent Unmoved Mover. The *replicatio* caused by this god is not something like a 'contrary movement', but is 'le double mouvement du ciel (le mouvement du ciel des fixes d'Est en Ouest, et le mouvement des planètes d'Ouest en Est)'. Thus Dumoulin thinks the words *replicatione quadam* should be translated as: 'par un mouvement qui revient en quelque sort sur lui-même'.³⁴

Naturally Dumoulin also identifies the *mens* and the *alius quidam* with one another.

3. Critical remarks on the modern debate

The various problems raised by fr. 26 of the *De philosophia* are not all equally weighty. By far the most important is the question of Aristotle's philosophical position. Did he embrace a metaphysical theology in this dialogue, as familiar from the writings in the *Corpus*, or was his theology still a purely cosmic, immanent theology, without any transcendent god?

Von Arnim and his followers were of course right to criticize Jaeger's overhasty identification of the *alius quidam* with the transcendent Unmoved Mover. But this is not to say that the defenders of a 'cosmic theology' have won the day. The most recent authors again accept a metaphysical theology for the *De philosophia*.

Von Arnim himself was too quick in concluding that *replicatio* obviously stood for the 'counter-movement' of the planets. For the movement of the planets cannot rightly be described as responsible for the order and continuity of the *mundi motum*, since in the same text *mundus* stands for the 'cosmos as a whole' or possibly 'the heavenly region' (including the sphere of the fixed stars).

In view of the fact that no writing in the *Corpus* displays a purely cosmic theology either, and that such a writing can at most be 'reconstructed' by

³¹ *Op. cit.* 161.

³² B. Dumoulin, *Recherches sur le premier Aristote (Eudème, de la Philosophie, Protreptique)* (Paris 1981) 44-52.

³³ *Op. cit.* 47.

³⁴ *Op. cit.* 50.

regarding parts of the *De caelo* as later additions, we have to conclude that here too a preconception about the development of Aristotle's thought has dominated the interpretation of the text.

Scholars who wish to avoid Von Arnim's problem by taking a different view of the movement caused by the *alius quidam* are forced to give a rather strained explanation of *replicatio*, as if Cicero had no other, more current ways of indicating a 'circular motion' (such as '*conversio*'). Sometimes they go so far as to interpret *replicatio* as a 'double movement'.

In effect, Pépin also accepts a cosmic theology for Aristotle's *De philosophia*. But at the same time his highly curious notion of a 'hyper-cosmic ether' takes him in the direction of the opponents.

In turn, the recent champions of a metaphysical theology in the *De philosophia* are forced to identify the *mens* with the *alius quidam*, against the apparent purport of Velleius' speech.

4. *Is there an alternative?*

Given this unsatisfactory situation, do we have to accept that the finer drift of Velleius' speech must remain unclear to us, or can we attempt to interpret it on the basis of an entirely new approach? We would like to sketch such a new approach by connecting parts of Cicero's text with other texts by classical authors, texts which make it possible to form a new conception of the speech's content. We shall concentrate on the following three elements:

- (1) *alius quidam*;
- (2) *a magistro suo Platone dissentiens*; and
- (3) *replicatio*.

And we shall conclude that the words of Velleius, to speak with H. Cherniss, are based on 'a myth, the significance of which could not even be guessed without knowledge of their context'.³⁵ At the same time we shall have to heed this author's word of caution: 'All interpretations of "fragments" of the *περὶ φιλοσοφίας* must be conjectural'.³⁶

4.1 *The alius quidam*

We start by noting that the text, if read without the benefit of extra information, states that Aristotle awarded divinity exclusively to the *Nous*; and that besides he qualified the world, another figure, and the *caeli ardor* as 'gods'. At first sight this statement seems to suggest that none of the four entities mentioned is identical with any of the others. This is plausible in the case of the *nous*, the cosmos, and the *caeli ardor*. It also seems a natural

³⁵ H. Cherniss, *op. cit.* 592.

³⁶ *Loc. cit.*

assumption in the case of the *alius quidam*. Secondly, one can suppose that the ascription of *omnem divinitatem* to the *Nous* and the bare characterization of the other entities as *deus* involves a subtle difference in our text just as in *ND* 1.14.37 where Cleanthes is discussed. No doubt the *Nous* would also be typified as *deus*, but perhaps *omnem divinitatem* would not be assigned to the *mundus*, the *alius quidam*, and the *caeli ardor*.

In the second place, it should be noted that the *alius quidam* acts as *rector mundi* and is responsible for the continuity of the cosmic movement. As such this figure recalls the world archon Kronos in the myth of Plato's *Politicus*. However, Plato's myth only talks about Kronos as world archon. It is true that he is served by his subaltern gods/daemons in the execution of world government per region. But Plato leaves no room for a deity of equal or even higher status than Kronos. There is, however, a periodicity in the activity assigned to Kronos: sometimes he is actively occupied with ruling the world; other times he withdraws, together with the daemons that surround and serve him.³⁷ What does he do during such periods? Only one answer is possible in the Platonic system: if the world archon is not occupied with the government of the world, he is engaged in contemplation. This is how Plato presented it in his *Phaedrus* myth and in his *Timaeus*. And it is also the dialectical pattern in his description of the ideal philosopher-king.³⁸

In Aristotle's *De philosophia*, however, apparently there was not just a single deity, who rules the world, but at least one other as well. And we are told that this other god was awarded divinity even more exclusively and was characterized specifically as *Nous*.

The activity of government was always classified by Aristotle as belonging to the sphere of *praxis* and was sharply distinguished from *theoretical* activity. It may be assumed, therefore, that the two activities of *theoria* and *praxis* which Plato had joined in a dialectical unity and a personal union were *separated* by Aristotle in the *De philosophia* and assigned to two distinct divine entities. His main motive for doing so, it would seem, was to exempt the supreme divine principle from any trace of changeability, in order to arrive at a theology free of contradictions. This was also the reason for his criticism of Plato's myth of the divine Demiurge, a criticism which he set out at length in the same *De philosophia*.³⁹ Aristotle held that the distinction between philosophical and governing activities should also be applied to human society: he replaced Plato's ideal of the philosopher-king by the ideal of the sovereign who closely follows the advice of a philosopher.⁴⁰

Now in other texts by Aristotle it is clear that he sees contemplation as the activity of the *Nous*. By contrast, *praxis* is typical of beings possessing a

³⁷ Pl., *Plt.* 272e.

³⁸ Cf. Pl., *Phdr.* 246e-247e; *Tim.* 42e5-6 and *Rep.* 7 519c-520a.

³⁹ Cf. Arist., *Philos.* fr. 18; 19 Ross.

⁴⁰ Themist., *Or.* 107c-d = Arist., Π. βασιλείας fr. 2 Ross.

(rational) *soul*. It seems, therefore, that Velleius' words can be interpreted in the sense that Aristotle awarded the highest degree of divinity to the purely contemplative and perfect *Nous*; and that he distinguished another divine being, the World-soul, to which he assigned the role of guaranteeing the movement and order of the world.

The separation of these two divine entities naturally raises the question of their relationship. We shall have to speak about this later. But nothing in the text itself seems to gainsay such a distinction.

The consequence of this distinction is that the divine world archon, who in Plato's *Politicus*, in the figure of Kronos, appeared to be the highest deity, is *subordinated* in Aristotle's *De philosophia* to a higher divine being.

Having arrived at this point, we may ask: can it be that Aristotle too gave his divine world ruler or World-soul the name of the old leader of the Titans, Kronos? Should we assume this from Tertullian's remark that Aristotle at some point talked about a 'dreaming Kronos'?⁴¹ In that case we would have another example of the subtle way that Aristotle adopted and transformed motifs from Plato's dialogues, even when polemicizing against his teacher.⁴² The fact that the qualification 'dreaming' suggests the idea of a higher, vigilant deity favours such an identification.

If these connections may be assumed, then the words of Velleius would also be an abstract account of a philosophical myth which Aristotle used as a kind of counterpart to Plato's myth in the *Politicus* (and the *Timaeus*). For the Epicurean, Aristotle too would count as a narrator of *futiles commenticiasque sententias*. He reckons Aristotle, like Plato and the Stoics, among the philosophers who 'do not reason but dream'.⁴³ This philosophical myth would then also have to be seen as the source of the motif of the 'sleeping World-soul' which surfaces in the Hellenistic period.⁴⁴

4.2 *A magistro suo Platone dissentiens*

If the foregoing argument is correct, it follows that the *De philosophia* propounded a double theology in which a god, qualified as world ruler, was subordinated to a transcendent, metaphysical, purely contemplative *Nous*. As a cosmic god, the former must have been bound to the celestial sphere and thus to the substance of the special fifth element. The difference in divine quality between both beings must therefore have been explained by the fact that the cosmic god *belonged to the cosmos* and was *psychically qualified*, or in other words was bound to an ethereal *soma*. In his ability to participate in the highest intellectuality he corresponds to the highest *Nous*,

⁴¹ Tert., *An.* 46.10 = Arist., *Protr.* fr. 20 Ross.

⁴² See in particular H. J. Drossaart Lulofs, *De ogen van Lynkeus* (Leiden 1967) 16-18.

⁴³ Cic., *ND* 1.8.18 and *Rep.* 6.3.3.

⁴⁴ Cf. Chapter 9.3 above.

but in his connection with *psyche* he has undergone a degradation with regard to the supreme divinity.

Indeed, the Epicurean clearly has good reason to posit that there is *dissensus* between Aristotle and his teacher Plato. We find in Plato neither the concept of a purely contemplative *mens*, nor the notion of a world ruler subordinate to it, nor the notion of a special, divine element, the ether. And in fact we argued that they were specifically developed by Aristotle in his polemic against Plato. The text as read by Ross, *a magistro suo Platone dissentiens*, is therefore entirely clear and without complications. A problem, however, is that *suo* is only found in a usually inferior manuscript tradition. A number of manuscripts of good quality read *uno* at this point. One handwriting moreover puts *uno* behind rather than before *Platone*.⁴⁵ This variant raises problems, since it is not natural to assume a 'correction' of the uncomplicated text *a magistro suo Platone dissentiens* by a copyist who thought he knew better than his example. If the text originally read *uno*, however, it is easy to understand that a scribe may have been puzzled.

We can start by establishing that *uno* between *magistro* and *Platone* produces no satisfactory sense. If *uno* is to be considered at all, it must be connected with *dissentiens*: 'disagreeing on one matter'. We would therefore have to accept the position of *uno* after *Platone* in ms. M, or suppose that *Platone* is an old gloss added by a pedantic scribe, since Cicero would not have thought it necessary to mention the name of Aristotle's *magister*. One notes that in itself the juxtaposition of *multa turbat* and *uno dissentiens* has a certain rhetorical appeal.

Now in Cicero's writings *dissentire* is usually followed by the preposition *de*. Nevertheless there is one place in which we find an ablative without a preposition.⁴⁶ A decision about whether *uno* is acceptable will therefore have to be based on a consideration of linguistic factors and of the possible meaning which the statement would have. For we are not convinced by the verdict of A. S. Pease: '*uno* gives no satisfactory sense here'. At the same time we cannot agree with A. J. Festugière, who thought that only the theory of the fifth element as substance of the celestial sphere was indicated as being fundamentally new with regard to Plato's views.⁴⁷

Rather we want to point out that all the aspects of Aristotle's theology mentioned by Velleius can be seen as consequences of one all-important point of dissent between him and Plato, namely a disagreement on the

⁴⁵ See A. S. Pease, *M.T. Ciceronis De natura deorum* (Cambridge 1955) 1.240. The reading *uno* in the manuscripts ACPNOBF was rejected by O. Plasberg (Leipzig 1908). He was followed by W. Jaeger, *Aristotle* 140 n.2; W. D. Ross, *Ar. Fragm. Sel.* 94; M. Untersteiner, *op. cit.* and B. Effe, *Studien* 158 n.7.

⁴⁶ Cic., *Acad.* 2.5.15: 'Peripateticos et Academicos ... a quibus Stoici ipsi verbis magis quam sententiis dissenserunt'.

⁴⁷ A. J. Festugière, *La révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste* (Paris 1949) 2.243 n.1; so too J. Pépin, *op. cit.* (1964) 137 n.1 and 140, followed by us in A. P. Bos, *Providentia divina; the theme of divine pronoiā in Plato and Aristotle* (Assen 1976) n.89.

essence of the *nous* and the *psyche*. Aristotle seems to have reproached Plato for linking the functions of contemplation and *praxis* with each other in the macrocosmology as well as the microcosmology, and for thus creating an internal antinomy. For in this way Plato was forced to make his supreme divine principle productive, world-creating, and world-ordering, besides contemplative. In doing so, Plato accepted a form of changeability on the highest ontic level. This problem led Aristotle to draw a distinction between a purely contemplative supreme *Nous* and an ordering and moving *World-soul*. As a result, the cosmos as a whole was presented as being ungenerated and imperishable. And directly connected with this is his introduction of the theory of the divine celestial element. In this way the four aspects of the theology of the *De philosophia* mentioned by Velleius can be understood as naturally resulting from a single radical point of disagreement between Aristotle and Plato.

Interestingly, the Christian author Hippolytus is also familiar with a tradition in which the differences of opinion between Plato and Aristotle are presented as culminating in a single point, namely the doctrine of the soul.⁴⁸ In his psychology Aristotle took a step in a direction already indicated by Plato: he assigned the psychic to *Physis* and the cosmos – to the divine part of *Physis*, it is true, but not to the sphere of reality supremely characterized by divinity and unchangeability, i.e. the sphere of the transcendent *Nous* outside the realm of nature.

In view of the foregoing, we think it quite possible that the Epicurean criticism expressed by Velleius proceeded from a single point of disagreement between Aristotle and his teacher. The reading *uno dissentiens* cannot therefore be simply brushed aside.

4.3 *Replicatione quadam*

Finally, we shall have to ask whether the above theory about the background of Velleius' critical speech can help to explain the mysterious words *replicatione quadam*.

The first thing to note is that the term *replicatio* cannot refer to the purely intellectual activity of the transcendent *Nous*. It must refer to an activity which mediates between the contemplative activity of the transcendent *Nous* and the variety of Nature's dynamic processes. And we may assume here that Aristotle accepted an analogy with the mediation which the *psyche* carries out in the individual human being between the intellectual activity of the human *nous* and the processes and movements of the human body.

⁴⁸ Hipp., *Haer.* 1.20.3. For this remarkable position, compare also Hermias, *Irrisio* 2.3 and Chapter 9.2 above. Although Aristotle did assume the eternity and imperishability of the celestial element in his lost works, there too he apparently attributed eternity in the proper, individual sense only to the *nous*. Cf. Themist., *In An.* 106.29-107.5 = Arist., *Eudemus* fr. 2 Ross; Olymp., *In Phd.* 124.18-20 (Norvin).

If Aristotle in fact connected the *replicatio* with the Titanic god Kronos as symbolic representative of the World-soul, hypotheses can be developed in two directions. In the first case, *replicatio* can be interpreted in the sense of the 'unrolling' or 'development' of something which is rolled up or wound up. Secondly, the meaning 'reflection', 'mirroring' can be considered.

(a) *Replicatio* = 'unrolling', 'development'?

First we shall review the possibility that Aristotle, in his myth about a world archon Kronos, introduced a contrast between a phase in which the irrational *pathe* hold sway over Kronos' intellectual powers and another phase in which the *pathe* have been silenced and are dominated by the superior power of the mind.

Such a contrast seems aimed at in the description of the god Kronos in Plutarch's *De facie*,⁴⁹ although an objection here is that the exact text cannot be determined. Moreover, such a periodicity in Kronos' condition can easily be linked to Aristotle's theory of cosmic catastrophes.⁵⁰

Replicatio could thus refer to one of these two contrasting phases of tension and relaxation, and presumably to the phase in which the typically 'psychic' rules over the pure intellect. This phase was probably presented as a loss of concentration and unity, of connection between pure intelligible Forms and the order of space, time and number. Through the movement of the cosmos which it brings about, the dynamism of the World-soul 'develops' in time that which is united in the transcendent *Nous*. In such a train of thought, a close relationship with the Kronos myth of Plato's *Politicus* can be maintained. Using the image of a reel of thread, linked to an eye attached higher up,⁵¹ this myth describes the process toward unity and harmony of the cosmos as the rolling up of the reel by the world archon Kronos, and the evolution toward chaos and disharmony as the unwinding of the reel in the opposite direction (ἀνακύκλησις, ἀνείλιξις), after Kronos has let go of the reel, i.e. has withdrawn from the government of the cosmos. In Latin texts using forms of *replicare* the sense 'to unroll' is applicable more than once.⁵²

In this connection it is remarkable that in the *Corpus* Aristotle also uses the image of wound-up ropes or strings which cause a certain movement by being unwound. And he uses this image as a model of the way that the soul

⁴⁹ Plu., *De facie* 942a in the text as read by H. Cherniss (Loeb C.L.).

⁵⁰ See Chapter 9.5 above.

⁵¹ Cf. P. M. Schuhl, 'Sur le mythe du *Politique*', *RMM* 39 (1932) 47-58.

⁵² Cf. J. Pépin, *op. cit.* 156 with n.1 and the examples mentioned there: Chalcid., *In Tim.* 105 173.12-14: 'Imago igitur demum aevi tempus est manentis in suo statu. Tempus porro minime manens, immo progrediens semper et replicabile'. Augustine, *Sermo* 280.1.1 (*P.L.* 38.1281): 'anniversaria replicatione'; Claud. Mar. Victor, *in Gen.* 3.37 (ed. Schenkl = *C.S.E.L.* 16.1) 465: 'replicabitur annus'.

functions as motor of the body.⁵³ In the *De motu anim.* Aristotle compares the muscles, whose condition is governed by psychic processes registered by the vital *pneuma*, with the strings of a winding mechanism. Once the strings have been wound up or tightened, and as soon as a catch has been removed, the automaton starts to move as a result of the unwinding of the strings.⁵⁴ One might consider the possibility that Aristotle represented the double movement of the motor of the world by the double condition of the World-soul or Kronos. We suggest that in that case the term *replicatio* in Cicero refers to the phase of unwinding or 'development' in time of what is united in thought.⁵⁵ And this would again be an example of Aristotle's creative transformation of Platonic themes. In the *Politicus* Plato uses the ancient Kronos myth to describe the twofold condition of the divine *Nous*, namely a condition of self-sufficiency and a condition of being orientated, not to itself, but to an outside world. Aristotle appropriated this theme, but used it to make a typical correction: in his conception Kronos is not the *Nous* who winds and unrolls, but the World-soul who 'gets wound up' and 'relaxes'. In the course of time, through the dynamics of the celestial spheres, that which is united in the divine thought of Zeus comes to 'develop', just as a spring which is coiled is kept together until it 'develops' in a process of unwinding.

(b) *Replication* = 'reflection', 'mirroring'?

But there is another direction in which our conjectures might go. Our identification of the *alius quidam* with the 'dreaming Kronos' mentioned by Tertullian entails that this cosmic figure as symbol of the World-soul is subordinate to a supreme god Zeus, who transcends the cosmos and is characterized as ever-vigilant and ever-active in contemplation. What, then, is their relationship?

In his lost oeuvre Aristotle indicated that there is a relation between these two levels of reality which does not exist between the transcendent *Nous* and the sublunary: so much can be inferred from the repeated assertions that Aristotle confined god's 'providence' to the region of the supralunary spheres of heaven.⁵⁶ But this says nothing further about the specific nature

⁵³ Arist., *MA*. 6-8; cf. the commentary of M. C. Nussbaum (Harvard 1978).

⁵⁴ *MA* 7 701b2 ff. It is remarkable that the image of the movement of the automaton is applied macrocosmically in *Mu.* 6 398b13-16: τοῦτο ἦν τὸ θεϊότατον, τὸ μετὰ ῥαστώνης καὶ ἀπλῆς κινήσεως παντοδαπὰς ἀποτελεῖν ἰδέας, ὥσπερ ἀμέλει δρῶσιν οἱ μεγαλότεχνοι, διὰ μιᾶς ὀργάνου σχαστηρίας πολλὰς καὶ ποικίλας ἐνεργείας ἀποτελοῦντες.

⁵⁵ Cf. also the use of 'replicare' in Cic., *Divin.* 1.56.127: 'non enim illa quae futura sunt, subito existunt, sed est quasi rudentis explicatio sic traductio temporis nihil novi efficientis et primum quidque replicantis'; in the translation of W. A. Falconer (Loeb C.L.): 'the evolution of time is like the unwinding of a cable; it creates nothing new and only unfolds each event in its order'.

⁵⁶ Aëtius, 2.3; Stobaeus, 1.21.6; Tatian, *Orat.* 2; Athenag., *Leg.* 25; Hipp., *Haer.* 1.20, 22 and 7.14; Clem.Al., *Protr.* 5.66; *Strom.* 5.14, etc.

of that relation. Nor should we be too quick in concluding that in his lost work Aristotle assumed an *actio ad extra* of the supreme deity on the cosmos which he went on to reject in the work known to us. For as we surmised above, Aristotle introduced the distinction between *Nous* and World-soul precisely in order to guarantee the self-sufficiency and complete self-identity of the highest divine principle.

Is it possible to interpret the relation between Zeus and Kronos in a way which does not imply an *actio ad extra* of the highest principle? Here we should consider the information indicating that in his lost work Aristotle repeatedly used the motif of sleeping and dreaming to explain the phenomenon that mortals acquire superhuman knowledge, *mantic* knowledge. According to Sextus Empiricus, Aristotle held that sleep loosens the bond with which the body fetters the human soul, so that the soul regains its own nature. Through the removal of unnatural obstructions, the human soul manifests itself as possessing by nature a higher kind of knowledge such as daemons and gods presumably possess.

Now Tertullian's remark about the 'dreaming Kronos' in Aristotle is also found in a passage where he talks about the reliability of prophetic dreams. He makes his remark after listing a long series of pagan authors who accepted the mantic nature of dreams. We shall therefore have to assume that, in the Aristotelian context to which Tertullian refers, Kronos too was presented as a dreamer of *mantic* dreams.

In this context it is significant that two other Greek passages discussing a sleeping Kronos call sleep the means by which Kronos participates in 'the most perfect vision'⁵⁷ and 'the divine counsel of Zeus'.⁵⁸ The latter passage in Plutarch also mentions that Kronos' *pathe* must be calmed before his royal and pure *nous* acquires knowledge of the counsel of Zeus, in order to mediate it to *daimones*. This passage too carefully avoids speaking of any action by Zeus directed at Kronos. In his cave Kronos, bound by the chains of sleep, participates in the cognition of the truly free Zeus through a change which takes place within himself.

But is the knowledge acquired by Kronos on a par with that of Zeus? It is possible that Aristotle assumed a difference in level between the knowledge acquired by the *nous* of the World-soul and the knowledge of the transcendent *Nous*.

Here it seems legitimate to digress briefly on a striking theory found in the Arabian author Al-Farabi (± 870-950 AD) and discussed by R. Walzer in an article in 1957.⁵⁹ Al-Farabi described mantic activity as a natural

⁵⁷ *Corp. Herm.* 10.5.

⁵⁸ Plu., *De facie* 942a.

⁵⁹ R. Walzer, 'Al-Farabi's theory of prophecy and divination', *JHS* 77 (1957) 142-148. This article was drawn to my attention by H. Daiber, 'Prophetie und Ethik bei Farabi (gest. 339/950)' in *L'homme et son univers au Moyen Age*, Actes du 7e congrès intern. de philos. médiév. 1982, ed. by Ch. Wenin (Louvain 1986) 2.729-753 and *id.*, 'The

activity of the soul, not as a condition of being possessed by supernatural powers. The mantic faculty supports the rational faculty and is as such an indispensable element of the whole man. Walzer sees a parallel between this view and that of Plato and Sextus Empiricus' statement about Aristotle.⁶⁰ According to Al-Farabi, the *phantasia* is the seat of mantic activity. The *phantasia* is on the one hand the place where impressions (τύποι, τυπώσεις) are formed as a result of sense-perception. On the other hand it is also capable of activity by itself in which it is not dependent on sense-perception.⁶¹ In particular this activity takes place in sleep and during dreams, but in exceptional cases it also occurs while the subject is awake. It is called a kind of 'imitation' (μίμησις).⁶² This imitation may concern matters of man's physical existence. But the *phantasia* can also be creatively occupied with realities of a higher order, matters which are supplied by the mind.

Great prophets and seers, according to Al-Farabi, are people of superior quality whose *phantasia* is particularly strong. At the same time their *phantasia* is supplied with material by a particularly strong intellect which has reached the highest metaphysical knowledge of which mortal beings are capable.⁶³ Their *phantasia* reproduces through 'imitation' the abstract intelligibilia of the *nous* in sensible symbols.⁶⁴

Walzer gives many details about the theory. He also notes that there are differences compared with Aristotle's views as we know them.⁶⁵ And he carefully tries to point out influences from the period between Al-Farabi and Aristotle.⁶⁶ It is certainly not possible to indicate the exact relationship of Al-Farabi's theory to the views in Aristotle's lost oeuvre. But perhaps it is legitimate to hypothesize that authentic traces of Aristotle's lost work may be found in this Arabian philosopher. In his lost work Aristotle had assigned an important role to mantic phenomena, and on the basis of what we read in

ruler as philosopher. A new interpretation of Al-Farabi's view', *KNAkad.W afd. Letterk.*, n.s. 49.4 (1986) 133-149.

⁶⁰ *Art. cit.* 142 with reference to *Pl., Tim.* 72a; *Phdr.* 248d; *Rep.* 9 571c, and *Arist., Philos.* fr. 12a Ross.

⁶¹ R. Walzer, *art. cit.* 143 f.; cf. H. Daiber, 'Prophetie und Ethik' 730 ff.

⁶² R. Walzer, *art. cit.* 144.

⁶³ *Art. cit.* 146.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ *Art. cit.* 146: 'Aristotle's cautious attitude towards phenomena of this kind seems to be abandoned (it was evidently not appreciated in late Greek philosophy)'.

⁶⁶ H. Daiber, 'The ruler as philosopher' 6, 'Prophetie und Ethik' 729-741 judges that Al-Farabi's theory of prophecy through *mimesis*, for which no parallels are found in preserved Greek texts, is not a product of Peripatetic (Alexander of Aphrodisias) and Middle-Platonic notions, but an independent combination of scattered Aristotelian thoughts made by Al-Farabi himself: 'wer .. eine verlorene Griechische Quelle postulieren wollte, unterschätzt die Selbständigkeit eines islamischen Philosophen vom Formate Farabi's', p. 737.

the Kronos myth of Plutarch's *De facie* we have good reason to believe that he also considered *manteia* a significant factor in the transmission of the content of the transcendent divine *Nous* to the cosmic World-soul.⁶⁷

On the basis of the information in Al-Farabi we may also assume that this relationship was presented by Aristotle as a participation by the *nous* of the World-soul in the transcendent *Nous*, with as a result an influx of intelligibilia in the *phantasia* of the World-soul, resulting in turn in a *mimesis* of the intelligibilia in the *phantasia*.⁶⁸

It might be considered that the term *replicatio* used by Velleius is meant to be a Latin rendition of this 'reflection' or 'mirroring' of the intelligibilia of the transcendent *Nous* in the *phantasia* of the World-soul.

⁶⁷ See on this Chapter 12 above.

⁶⁸ We can also consider the possibility here that Aristotle used Platonic motifs in describing the 'dreaming Kronos' in his 'Cave'. In that case Aristotle may have spoken about the images projected in the *phantasia* of the World-soul in terms such as Plato used in his 'Allegory of the Cave'.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

IS THE 'GREEK KING' IN ARISTOTLE, EUDEMUS FR. 11 (ROSS) ENDYMION OF ELIS?

1. A fragment from one of Aristotle's lost writings in an Arabian treatise

One of the treatises written by the Arabian philosopher Al-Kindi (died after 870 AD) contains a rather long passage which, according to his own words, goes back to Aristotle.¹ The passage has become more widely known after being analyzed by R. Walzer in a paper published in 1973.² Because no account with a similar content can be found in any of Aristotle's surviving works, scholars have concluded that it must derive from one of his lost writings. In the translation of W. D. Ross the text runs as follows:³

Aristotle tells of the Greek king whose soul was caught up in ecstasy, and who for many days remained neither alive nor dead. When he came to himself, he told the bystanders of various things in the invisible world, and related what he had seen – souls, forms and angels; he gave the proofs of this by foretelling to all of his acquaintances how long each of them would live. All he had said was put to the proof, and no one exceeded the span of life that he had assigned. He prophesied, too, that after a year a chasm would open in the country of Elis, and after two years a flood would occur in another place; and everything happened as he had said. Aristotle asserts that the reason for this was that his soul had acquired this knowledge just because it had been near to leaving his body and had been in a certain way separated from it, and

¹ Al-Kindi, cod. Taimuriyye Falsafa 55.

² R. Walzer, 'Un frammento nuovo di Aristotele', *SIFC* n.s. 14 (1937) 125-137. In it he gives the (somewhat corrected) translation by G. Furlani, 'Una risala di al-Kindi sull' anima', *Riv. trim. di studi filos. e religiosi* 3 (1922) 50-63: 'Aristotele racconta il fatto di quel re greco la cui anima fu rapita in estasi e che per molti giorni restò nè vivo nè morto. Quando tornò in sè, istruì la gente intorno alle varie cose del mondo invisibile (o: alle varie specie della scienza dell' invisibile?) e raccontò quello che aveva veduto, anime, forme e angeli; e diede le prove di ciò (ossia della verità delle sue affermazioni) predicando a tutti quanti i suoi famigliari quanto avrebbe vissuto ciascuno di essi. Fattosi l'esperimento di tutto quanto aveva detto, nessuno oltrepassò la misura di vita che egli gli aveva assegnata. Predisse inoltre che si sarebbe aperto un baratro nel paese degli Elei dopo un anno e che vi sarebbe un' inondazione in un altro luogo dopo due anni: e ogni cosa avvenne secondo egli aveva detto. - Aristotele afferma che la ragione di ciò è che la sua anima apprese quella scienza appunto perchè era stata prossima ad abbandonare il corpo e si era in un certo modo separata da esso, e per questo aveva veduto ciò. Quanto maggiori meraviglie del mondo superiore del 'regno' avrebbe dunque vedute, se avesse realmente abbandonato il corpo'. Walzer's article was reprinted in *Greek into Arabic; Essays on Islamic Philosophy* (Oxford 1962, 1963²) 38-47.

³ *The Works of Aristotle, transl. into English*, vol. 12 (Oxford 1953) 23.

so had seen what it had seen. How much greater marvels of the upper world of the kingdom would it have seen then, if it had really left his body!⁴

Since Walzer various other scholars have occupied themselves with the exegesis and evaluation of this text; we shall make grateful use of their contributions.⁵ Taking our cue from two articles by J. H. Waszink on remnants of Aristotle's lost dialogues⁶ and in particular from an inaugural address delivered by Prof. H. J. Drossaart Lulofs,⁷ we shall offer suggestions on the possible setting of the text and its connections with various aspects of Aristotelian thought.

⁴ This text in Al-Kindi is also discussed at length by K. Gaiser, 'Ein Gespräch mit König Philipp: zum "Eudemos" des Aristoteles' in *Aristoteles, Werk und Wirkung*, vol. 1 (Berlin 1985) 478 ff., who gives a new German translation on the basis of information supplied by J. van Ess (Tübingen): 'Aristoteles erzählt von dem griechischen König, dessen Seele in den Himmel aufgenommen wurde und der viele Tage in diesem Zustand blieb: wieder lebend noch tot. *Jedesmal, wenn er wieder zu Kräften kam*, erzählte er den Leuten seiner Umgebung von verschiedenen Dingen in der unsichtbaren Welt und berichtete, was er gesehen hatte: Seelen, Formen (Ideen) und *Götter*. Er gab den Beweis dafür, indem er den Leuten seiner Umgebung insgesamt voraussagte, wie lange jeder einzelne von ihnen leben würde. Alles, was er sagte, bestätigte sich; und keiner überschritt die Spanne des Lebens, die er angegeben hatte. Er prophezeite auch, dass nach einem Jahr ein Erdsplatt (eine Bodensenkung) eintreten würde im Land Elis (?) und dass nach zwei Jahren eine Flut sich ereignen würde an einem anderen Ort; und alles traf ein, wie er es gesagt hatte. Aristoteles behauptet, der Grund hierfür sei der gewesen, dass seine Seele dieses Wissen erworben habe, weil sie eben nahe daran war, seinen Körper zu verlassen und schon in gewisser Weise von ihm getrennt war und so gesehen hatte, was sie gesehen hatte. *Wie denn erst, wenn sie wirklich den Körper verlassen hätte? Dann hätte sie die Wunder des höchsten Himmelreiches gesehen.*' (I have italicized whatever differs from W. D. Ross's translation.) Prof. H. Daiber of the Free University in Amsterdam has informed me that two Indian manuscripts studied by him (Migash, Univ. coll. 32, 56 r-v, written 1615 AD) and Rampur 2993 (19th century) p. 239 support Walzer's text and the translation 'whose soul was taken up to a high place', which presumably means: 'whose soul was caught up in ecstasy'. They also support the more precise German translation 'jedesmal, wenn...'. Where Ross translates 'had acquired this knowledge', these Indian mss. have a text which is rendered more precisely by 'had received knowledge of this world'.

⁵ J. H. Waszink, *art.* (1947; see note 6 below) 144; E. Berti, *La filosofia del primo Aristotele* (Florence 1962) 435; C. J. de Vogel, 'Did Aristotle ever accept Plato's theory of transcendent Ideas?', *AGPh* 47 (1965) 278, repr. in *ead.*, *Philosophia I Studies in Greek Philosophy* (Assen 1970) 316-317; but according to her the text cannot derive from Aristotle; B. Effe, *Studien* (Munich 1970) 87-88 arrives at a derivation from the dialogue *De philosophia*, but from a part which does not expound Aristotle's own views! A. H. Chroust, 'Who is Al-Kindi's "Greek king" (Fr. 11 Ross) of Aristotle's *Eudemos*?', *MS* 50 (1972/73) 379-381; J. Bidez, F. Cumont, *Les Mages hellénisés* vol. 1 (Paris 1938) 247 reject outright an origin in Aristotle, because in their opinion the text shows signs of an interest in astrology.

⁶ J. H. Waszink, 'Traces of Aristotle's lost dialogues in Tertullian', *VC* 1 (1947) 137-149; *id.*, 'The dreaming Kronos in the Corpus Hermeticum', *AIPhO* 10 (1950) 639-653.

⁷ H. J. Drossaart Lulofs, *De ogen van Lynkeus* (Leiden 1967).

2. *Can the text be safely attributed to Aristotle?*

A preliminary question is whether we can rely on Al-Kindi's statement that the information concerned here derives from Aristotle. Should we not be aware that such a bizarre story can easily be assigned to a number of authors, and that Arabian authors were eager to attribute all kinds of things to Aristotle? We do certainly think that if there were solid grounds for doubting an Aristotelian origin, it would not be hard to supply plausible reasons for Al-Kindi's attribution. In that case one could point out, as C. J. de Vogel has done, that what the Arabian philosophers held to be Aristotelian philosophy was in fact a curious mixture of Neoplatonism and Aristotelianism.⁸ And that in the tradition 'paradoxa' were freely assigned to different authors.

In this case, however, we think that no such solid reasons for doubt can be supplied. On the contrary, the fragment agrees remarkably well with other things that we know about Aristotle's lost writings, and therefore it is right, methodologically speaking, to trust the tradition. Moreover, other indications seem to support the attribution to Aristotle. In the first place, there is the mention of a combined landslide and tidal wave. Although the details in Al-Kindi show that this cannot refer to the much-discussed tidal wave and earthquake which sunk Helice and destroyed Burra in Achaia on the Peloponnesus in 373 BC,⁹ yet it is equally obvious that the event in question was remarkably similar and that, in view of Aristotle's evident interest in that catastrophe, he may well have incorporated such an event in a mythical context.

In the second place, there is no compelling reason why 'the upper world of the kingdom' should be identified with the *hyperouranios topos* of Plato's *Phaedrus*,¹⁰ if only because the soul of the Greek king is said to have seen 'souls, forms, and angels, but *not* 'the upper part of the kingdom', since it had not permanently left the body! And the contemplation of 'Forms' need not in itself imply that an entirely Platonic position is being adopted by the author.¹¹ For the 'Forms' are mentioned alongside with 'souls' and 'angels', and are revealed to a soul which has clearly not yet reached the height of its powers. In fact, a much more natural interpretation of the passage would identify the 'kingdom' with the cosmos or *Physis* as a whole, and see the separation of the 'lower' and 'upper' parts of the kingdom as the separation of the sublunary and supralunary parts of the cosmos, the domain of the

⁸ C. J. de Vogel, *art. cit.* (n.5) 278.

⁹ On this event, see Arist., *Meteor.* 1.6 342b2 ff.; cf. 1.7 344b34 and 2.8 368b7. See also *Mu.* 4 396a20-21.

¹⁰ This is maintained by R. Walzer, *art. cit.* (1963²) 44.

¹¹ As again in R. Walzer, *ibid.*

earthly elements on the one hand and the realm of the ethereal celestial spheres on the other.

In that case we can identify the 'invisible world' with Hades or *Aïdes*, as it has been customary to do since the early Pythagorean tradition. Here we must realize that Hades was located in the area between the earth and the moon, the moon in fact being its extreme boundary.¹² The distinction between the sublunary and supralunary spheres plays an important role in this explanation, therefore, and in our opinion again strongly suggests an Aristotelian derivation.

We might even go a step further by pointing out how typically Aristotelian rather than Platonic it is that the 'trip' of the 'high' soul is nevertheless an *intracosmic* trip. The rejection of a reality of separate Ideas entailed the rejection of a 'hyper-ouranic' world of Ideas! But knowledge of the 'Forms' as knowledge of universals, the basis of *techne* and *episteme*, was thought highly of by Aristotle too. He was, however, necessarily forced to present the acquisition of knowledge of the Forms as intracosmic, in line with the author of the *De mundo* who describes philosophy as the striving towards 'contemplation of all that is', but who makes the soul, guided by the intellect, traverse the whole system of *Physis* for that purpose.¹³ The presentation of the essence of philosophy in that chapter of the *De mundo* is typically anti-Platonic,¹⁴ and follows consistently from Aristotle's rejection of a world of separate Ideas and, in that connection, of the theory of recollection.

We think that the positive indications just cited easily outweigh any temptation to doubt the Aristotelian origin of Al-Kindi's information.

3. *The ecstatic experience*

Al-Kindi's information concerns the ecstatic experience of a Greek king. For days this king had been in a state in which it was difficult to tell whether he was alive or dead. Externally he showed no signs of life. At the same time the effects of death could not be perceived either. Aristotle himself had interpreted this state by means of an anthropology which presented the body and the soul as two (relatively) independent entities: the ecstatic experience

¹² Cf. Plu., *De facie* 27 942e-f (cf. H. Cherniss, *ad loc.* note d); 943c; 943e. A difference in level between Hades and the 'isles of the blessed' also features in Arist., *Protr.* fr. 12 Ross; B 43 Düring.

¹³ *Mu.* 1 391a1-b2. The authenticity of this writing is denied by a majority of modern scholars, but since G. Reale's edition, *Aristotele, Trattato sul cosmo per Alessandro* (Naples 1974), a majority does accept that the work shows no clear doctrinal deviations from recognized Aristotelian positions! Cf. J. Moreau, *REA* 77 (1975) 273.

¹⁴ Cf. A. Preus's review of G. Reale (1974) in *JHP* 14 (1976) 479. Cf. A. P. Bos, 'Greek philosophical theology and the *De mundo*' in Th.G. Sinnige (ed.), *On and off the beaten track; Studies in the history of Platonism* (Nijmegen 1986) 13 ff.

was explained as a typical 'borderline experience', a situation of 'near death' or 'apparent death'; the soul of the Greek king had to some extent detached itself from the body, but not so completely as to cause death and bodily decomposition. In this condition the king's soul acquired knowledge not possessed by ordinary mortals. This implies that Aristotle presented the mortal body in such a way that it prevents the soul from actualizing a potential which *in itself* it could possess. The condition of earthly mortals was therefore presented by Aristotle as one in which the presence of the soul protects the body against decomposition and ensures that it functions properly; but in this condition the soul itself is *obstructed* in its operations by the tie with the body, and restricted in its acquisition of knowledge.

4. *The soul's mantic powers*

Characteristically, the soul of the Greek king in the condition described acquires *mantic powers*. It is given reliable information about the life span of mortals and about natural phenomena that will occur in the future. This kind of knowledge, typically involving matters in the *temporal* sphere, was regarded by Greek culture as the prerogative of the daemonic realm. During its ecstatic experience the soul of the Greek king gained (or regained) a daemonic condition. In that condition it was able to converse with other 'souls' and with *daimones*.¹⁵ Al-Kindi's statement thus strongly confirms information supplied by Sextus Empiricus, according to which Aristotle accepted that the human soul, during sleep and when near (earthly) death, could acquire mantic powers as a result of the looser bond between the perishable body and the soul.¹⁶

5. *The imperfect liberation of the Greek king's soul*

As far as we know, no particular attention has been paid to the last lines of Al-Kindi's passage: 'How much greater marvels of the upper world of the kingdom would it have seen then, if it had really left his [perishable] body!'.

¹⁵ Cf. R. Walzer, *art. cit.* (1963²) 40; 44-45. Cf. Clem. Al., *Strom.* 6.6.53.2-3 = Arist. fr. 193 Rose³: 'and Aristotle says all men have divine beings which accompany them at the time of their incarnation' (transl. W. D. Ross). This text is incorporated by W. D. Ross in *De Pythagoragis* fr. 3; O. Gigon, 'Prolegomena to an edition of the *Eudemus*' in *Aristotle and Plato in the mid-fourth century* (Göteborg 1960) 28 assigns it to the *Eudemus*.

¹⁶ Sextus Emp., *Math.* 3 (*Phys.* 1) 20-23 = Arist., *Philos.* fr. 12a Ross. According to Cic., *Tusc.* 1.26.65-27.66 (= Arist., *Philos.* fr. 27d Ross), the fact that the human soul 'et praeterita teneat et futura provideat et complecti possit praesentia, quae sola divina sunt' was for Aristotle proof that the substance of the soul is divine and radically different from the terrestrial elements.

These lines seem to indicate that the fact that the bond of the soul with the king's earthly body had not been permanently severed had the concomitant effect of preventing the soul from ascending to the highest regions of the 'kingdom' and acquiring the highest order of knowledge. If we may regard this as a 'hard' fact, it seems natural to assume that what is being referred to here is the distinction between knowledge of temporal matters and of non-temporal matters, i.e. the transcendent principles and necessary causes of all natural reality. In that case the passage in question appears to point towards two levels of psychic liberation corresponding to two levels of the soul's 'ascent'. As long as there are still (minimal) ties with the (earthly) body, the soul cannot ascend so far that it reaches the supreme levels to which it *in principle* has access. Now in Aristotelian cosmology the lunar sphere forms a qualitative boundary between the sublunary regions of changeable and perishable beings and the celestial spheres of the eternal divine beings. For the moment, therefore, we can establish that the mythical context from which the Al-Kindi fragment seems to derive described the soul of the Greek king as moving independently of the body in the region between the earth and the moon; but this soul had not ascended to the supralunary spheres.

We might add that the relevant text in Sextus Empiricus can also be explained more fully in this manner. There are two ways in which people arrive at a notion of gods, according to Aristotle. The first of these infers, on the basis of the soul's mantic powers, the existence of something divine which in itself resembles the soul and possesses *episteme* in the highest measure. The other infers, through contemplation of the *meteora*, the existence of a god who is the cause of movement and order in the heavenly regions. This second way necessarily points to a transcendent, metaphysical deity as the cause of all movement, including that of the exterior celestial sphere. The first way must therefore be understood as follows: the higher degree of knowledge acquired by the soul when the bond with the body is loosened implies that there is a being which resembles the soul in its higher degree of knowledge, but which transcends that level through a form of knowledge superior to mantic knowledge. The knowledge referred to here must be knowledge of the timeless principles of all Nature.¹⁷ On the basis of this agreement between the texts in Al-Kindi and Sextus Empiricus, we suggest that both be regarded as echoes of the same Aristotelian discussion and therefore related to the same lost writing.

6. *To which Aristotelian writing does this fragment thematically belong?*

Here we must pause to ask which of Aristotle's lost works known to us

¹⁷ *Loc. cit.*: 'men came to suspect the existence of something divine, of something in itself akin to the soul and of all things most knowledgeable' (transl. J. Barnes).

links up best with the account of the Greek king's experience. Obviously, one can point out that the themes of life and death and of the soul's liberation are ideally suited to a treatise *On the soul*. Such a work is indeed mentioned in the bibliographical lists among a number of dialogues. In addition, there are indications that the same writing was also referred to by the title *Eudemus*.¹⁸ Various scholars have in fact included the text among other fragments related to that work.¹⁹

We should not forget, however, that many uncertainties are involved in the attribution of fragments and testimonies to various lost works by Aristotle. For this reason we shall have to investigate possible relationships with fragments from other lost works. In particular, various texts from the *De philosophia* have also been assigned to the *Eudemus*. And elsewhere we have asked whether the *Protrepticus* and the *Eudemus* were in fact separate works, or perhaps the proper name and generic title of one and the same writing.²⁰ In that case we shall also have to consider texts attributed to the *Protrepticus*.

At any rate such themes as life and death, imprisonment and liberation of the soul, degrees of knowledge and levels of perfection can be accommodated in all three writings.

7. Can the 'Greek king' be identified?

Of course modern scholars have tried to identify the 'Greek king' referred to in the text.

1. *Eudemus*?

The first figure to come to mind is the Eudemus who gave his name to the dialogue *On the soul*. He is said to have predicted the death of the cruel tyrant Alexander of Pherae. Likewise he foresaw his own recovery from an almost fatal illness and his 'return home' after a period of five years.²¹ This, as it turned out, was a reference to his death before the walls of Syracuse, while opposing the regime of another tyrant.²² Eudemus obtained this

¹⁸ Plu., *Mor. (Consol. ad Apollon.)* 115b-e = *Eudemus* fr. 6 Ross; Simp., in *An.* 221.20-33 = *Eudemus* fr. 8 Ross.

¹⁹ R. Walzer, *art. cit.* (1963²) 45; W. D. Ross, *Ar. Fragm. Selecta* (Oxford 1955) 23; E. Berti, *op. cit.* 435. B. Dumoulin, *Recherches sur le premier Aristote (Eudème; de la Philosophie; Protreptique)* (Paris 1981) 92; B. Effe, *op. cit.* 87-88 opts for an origin in the *Philos.*

²⁰ A. P. Bos, 'Aristotle's *Eudemus* and *Protrepticus*: are they really two different works?', *Dionysius* 8 (1984) 19-51.

²¹ Cic., *Divin.* 1.25.53 = *Eudemus* fr. 1 Ross.

²² P. Siwek, 'La clairvoyance parapsychique dans le système d'Aristote', *Sophia* 29 (1961) 298 claims without any justification that Eudemus (of Cyprus) fought at Syracuse 'pour délivrer sa patrie'. It must be assumed that Eudemus took part in Dio's campaign to

knowledge during an illness which was so severe that all attendant doctors feared for his life.

Thus there are remarkable similarities in the details of the stories about Eudemus and the 'Greek king'.²³ Nevertheless, the differences are decisive:

(a) Cicero says only that Eudemus was a *familiaris* of Aristotle. Nothing indicates that he might have been a king.²⁴

(b) The point of the story about Eudemus, namely that his 'return home' should be understood as a return to the 'heavenly home', is absent in Al-Kindi.

(c) From the point of view of narrative technique, it seems improbable that Eudemus' mantic knowledge comprised more than the three matters mentioned by Cicero (recovery from illness; death of the tyrant; return of the soul).

(d) Greek literature always maintained a clear distinction between ecstatic experiences (Shamanistic experiences) and serious illnesses.

(e) Cicero mentions connections between Eudemus and Cyprus, (Athens,) Pherae, Macedonia, Syracuse. But there is no trace of a link with Elis.

2. *Midas?*

In the *Eudemus* one king in any case played an important role: the legendary Phrygian king Midas. A meeting is described between him and the daemon Silenus, whom he has captured. But this meeting seems situated in ordinary reality. Our information contains no indication of an ecstatic experience on Midas' part. Moreover, it is difficult to link to him the prediction of an earthquake in Elis.

3. *Hermotimos?*

B. Effe and A. H. Chroust have recently proposed an identification of the 'Greek king' with Hermotimos of Klazomenai.²⁵ We know that he is said to have had ecstatic experiences.²⁶ Moreover, he was probably mentioned in Aristotle's *Protrepticus*.²⁷ But nothing at all is known about his being a king

drive out Dionysius II.

²³ P. M. Huby, 'The paranormal in the works of Aristotle and his circle', *Apeiron* 13 (1979) 55 regards the story as 'either a garbled version of Eudemus' dream itself ... or another case of the same kind'.

²⁴ But if the above-cited hypothesis about the identity of the *Eudemus* and the *Protr.* is sound, one should consider that there may have been a relation between Eudemus of Cyprus and king Themison of Cyprus to whom the *Protr.* was dedicated; see Stobaeus 4.32.21 = *Protr.* fr. 1 Ross; A 1; B 1 Düring.

²⁵ B. Effe, *op. cit.* 87-88; A. H. Chroust, *art. cit.* 380; K. Gaiser, *art. cit.* (n.4) 479 with n.43. The two traditions had already been compared by J. H. Waszink, *art. cit.* (1947) 143. He did not, however, propose identification of the two.

²⁶ Tert. An. 44.1-3; 43.12; 2.3.

²⁷ Cf. Iamb., *Protr.* 8 (48.17 Pistelli). This text is usually assigned to the remnants of Arist., *Protr.* fr. 10c Ross; B 110 Düring. On the other hand, O. Gigon, *art. cit.* (1960)

or of royal blood. And perhaps Elis is too far away from Klazomenai, even for someone whose range of vision has been extended by daemonic forces!

4. *Kronos?*

To complete this list of eligible candidates for identification, we have to mention another 'king' who plays a role in a lost Aristotelian writing. But his candidature cannot be taken seriously either. We are referring to Kronos, the former 'king of gods and men'. In Tertullian, *De anima* 46.10, we are given the puzzling information that somewhere Aristotle spoke about a dreaming Kronos. If we follow the trail indicated by J. H. Waszink,²⁸ it will be observed that the 'dreams of Kronos' occur only in a story about the *mantic* activity which Kronos carries out while 'bound' by Zeus with the 'fetters of sleep'.

However, since the 'Greek king' in Al-Kindi must in any case have been a mortal, the figure of Kronos is out of the question.

8. *Was the 'Greek king' perhaps a king of Elis?*

Until now we have paid little attention to the Greek king's prediction of natural disasters which were soon to follow. It is remarkable, however, that the Arabian text, which does not mention the name of the king, does happen to mention the location of the landslide, whereas the tidal wave is vaguely said to have taken place 'somewhere else'. In our opinion, this justifies the question whether perhaps the landslide was so precisely pinpointed because the landslide occurred in the Greek king's own country!²⁹ Should we perhaps be looking for a *king of Elis*?³⁰

If we consider this question seriously, we must be struck by the curious coincidence that there is in fact one well-known Greek king who

(a) was king of Elis;

(b) was associated with a prolonged state which seemed halfway between life and death;

28, 31 held that Iamb., *Protr.* 47.7-48.21 derives in its entirety from the *Eudemus*. Waszink, *art. cit.* (1947) 143 concluded that Hermotimos must also have featured in the historical survey of book 1 of the *Philos.*, as in *Metaph.* A 3 984b15-20.

²⁸ See Chapter 3 above.

²⁹ The localization in Elis means that the reference cannot be to the much-discussed earthquake and tidal wave which in 373 BC had sunk the town of Helice and destroyed Burra in Achaia on the Peloponnesus. Aristotle talks about this event in *Meteor.* 1.6 342b2 ff.; cf. 1.7 344b34 and 2.8 368b7. Indications of the impression which the catastrophe made can be found in *Mu.* 4 396a20-21; Philo, *Aet.* 140; Seneca, *Q.N.* 6.23.4 and 7.5.4-5.

³⁰ R. Walzer, *art. cit.* (1963²) 39 n.11 observes further that the Arabic also allows the translation 'nel paese di 'Ελλάς', but rejects this possibility on account of the directly subsequent reference to another region, presumably also Greek.

(c) plays a role in Aristotle's surviving work in a rather remarkable context;

(d) is also mentioned in Plato's dialogue *Phaedo* or *On the soul*, from which Aristotle borrowed many themes for his own *Eudemus* or *On the soul*;

(e) traditionally had a relationship with the lunar goddess Selene, and thus access to suprahuman knowledge.

It will be clear by now that we are thinking of *Endymion*.

Traditionally, Endymion is the youth who outshone all his contemporaries in physical beauty and thus became the lover of a goddess, the moon goddess.³¹ Hesiod had already written that Zeus gave Endymion permission to determine his own time of death. Perhaps Hesiod also said that Zeus took Endymion with him to heaven, but removed him from the home of the gods and sent him to Hades after he had fallen in love with Hera.³² The scholiast on Apollonius Rhodius mentions a number of other ancient poets who had sung of Endymion. It is possible that the poet Sappho, who had sung of the love of the moon goddess, chose the location of Mount Latmos in Caria.³³ In what form Aristotle used the Endymion motif is very hard to determine. Traces of this use are possibly found in Apollodorus, who writes: 'Of Kalyke and Aethlios a son was born, Endymion, who led the Aeolians out of Thessaly and was the founder of Elis. Some say that he was sired by Zeus and that Selene fell in love with him for his exceptional beauty. And Zeus allowed him to choose whatever he liked most. His choice was to sleep everlastingly without dying or growing older.'³⁴

The connection made here with Thessaly, which also featured in the story about Eudemus, will have to be left as it stands. But the remarkable thing in this passage is that it presents Endymion as a man who is allowed a choice. This choice was presumably presented by Aristotle as a wrong choice, made by Endymion because he fails to see what is truly good. That is why he loses the chance of attaining true *eudaimonia*.³⁵ Endymion is thus an evident

³¹ According to a scholium (A) on *Il.* 11.688, Aristotle mentioned Endymion somewhere as the father of Eurypyle, on whom Poseidon had sired a son called Eleios who became the founder of the town of Elis as well as the father of Epeios, the forefather of the Epeians (fr. 639 Rose³). Endymion is sometimes called the founder of the Olympic games, which links up with the legend that the moon goddess bore him fifty daughters, Pausanias 5.1.4. H. J. Rose (*Oxf. Class. Dict. s.v.*) sees this as a reference to the fifty months of an Olympiad.

³² *Scholia in Apoll. Rhodium* 4.57-58.

³³ *Ibid.*; according to Hesychius, Aristophanes called Endymion a Carian.

³⁴ Apollodorus, *Biblioth.* 1.7.50.

³⁵ But there is also the story that, after admittance to the home of the gods, Endymion's passion turned towards the goddess Hera, and that for punishment he was forced to return from his position of supreme glory to lower regions, *Schol. in Apoll. Rhod.* 4.57-58. In that case Endymion is the man who, even while enjoying supreme divine bliss, relapses into unhappiness because he has insufficient control over his passions.

counterpart of king Midas, who played a central role in Aristotle's *Eudemus* or *On the soul*. He too lost the opportunity to be happy, the difference being that Midas sought happiness in *bona externa*. And it was finally the daemon Silenus who revealed to him that happiness is unattainable for mortals so miserably attached to sublunary reality!³⁶ It is conceivable that, prior to his fatal decision and while being courted by the moon goddess, Endymion went into ecstasy as described by Al-Kindi, and in this way gained his extraordinary knowledge of future events.³⁷

9. *Endymion as the representative of a human type in EN 10.8*

Although we have good reasons for assuming that Al-Kindi's text goes back to Aristotle's lost works, it is worth mentioning that the figure of Endymion also features in the surviving *Corpus*, and in a remarkable context at that. At the end of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, where he draws his final conclusions about man's 'highest good', Aristotle states that perfect happiness consists in theoretical, contemplative activity. He cites the gods as being blessed and happy to the highest degree. For they are not hampered by the need for practical activity. Nor do they remain on a level where they possess *theoria* merely *potentially*, without actually achieving it.³⁸ However, there are beings whose condition is not as unmixed and pure as that of the gods: beings of an inferior order who do have the *potential* to contemplate, but do *not* continually *actualize* this potential. Aristotle then records the profound misery of Endymion,³⁹ who potentially possesses but never actually achieves true contemplation, bound as he is in a deep sleep.

We note that Endymion typifies here an existence of great splendour, vastly superior to the ills of sublunary existence, but nevertheless devoid of real happiness. His heavenly joys, however attractive in the eyes of miserable mortals, are *false* joys, according to Aristotle.

³⁶ Aristotle, *Eudemus* fr. 6 Ross.

³⁷ Cf. Plu., *Numa* 4 and the tradition in *Schol. in Apoll. Rhod.* 4.57-58, where Endymion's sense of justice is praised.

³⁸ Arist., *EN* 10.8 1178b7-19. Cf. O. Gigon, *art. cit.* 28: 'It is an acknowledged fact that the description of the philosophical life in the tenth book of the *N.E.* is dependent on the *Protrepticus* ...'.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 1178b18-20: 'Still, everyone supposes that they [*sc.* the gods] *live* and therefore that they are active; we cannot suppose them to sleep like Endymion' (transl. W. D. Ross, J. O. Urmson; my italics). Cf. 1.3 1095b32-96a4, where a discussion of this theme is cut short with the words: 'But enough of this; for the subject has been sufficiently treated even ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις'. See also *EE* 1.5 1216a3.

10. *The Endymion motif in a lost work by Aristotle*

Now such a brief mention of Endymion in one of the surviving works is enough to make us wonder whether the author is casually referring to a theme which he assumes to be familiar from one of his published dialogues.⁴⁰ And in fact various features of the Endymion figure make it likely that he played a role in one of the lost works. We wish shortly to indicate these features, to the extent that they are now clear to us.

1. We already observed that Endymion is also (briefly) mentioned in Plato's dialogue *Phaedo* or *On the soul*.⁴¹ Now Aristotle clearly wrote his own *Eudemus* or *On the soul* in close connection and in sharp contrast with his teacher's famous dialogue. At the same time he also took into account ideas about the soul which Plato had developed in the *Phaedrus* and the *Timaeus* (particularly about the World-soul). In the *Eudemus*, therefore, Aristotle expounds his own views on man and the human soul in a sustained dialogue with his teacher. H. J. Drossaart Lulofs has convincingly demonstrated how imaginatively Aristotle here uses and transforms sundry themes and motifs from Plato's work.⁴²

2. We already pointed out the important similarity between king Endymion and king Midas, who in a literal quotation from the *Eudemus* appears in conversation with Silenus.⁴³ Both typify a *wrong existential choice* with disastrous consequences, because neither can see what is truly good or most desirable; the difference being that Midas seeks happiness in material wealth, and Endymion in fulfilment of the desire instilled by his passions.

3. As a *sleeping* beauty, Endymion also fits remarkably well into the *Eudemus*, for at least two other stories about sleeping and dreaming are connected with this writing.⁴⁴ We already drew attention to the prophetic dream received by Eudemus himself.⁴⁵ In addition we mentioned the dreaming Kronos motif⁴⁶ which H. J. Drossaart Lulofs, following O. Gigon, linked to the *Eudemus*.⁴⁷

4. Endymion's 'bond of sleep' is likewise a motif that blends well into the overarching themes of imprisonment and liberation in the *Eudemus*. And

⁴⁰ As is the case with Midas, *Pol.* 1.9 1257b15 and *Eudemus* fr. 6 Ross; Hermotimos, *Protr.* fr. 10c Ross; B 110 Düring and *Metaph.* A 3 984b19; and Sardanapalus, *Protr.* fr. 16 Ross and *EN* 1.3 1095b22, *EE* 1.5 1216a16.

⁴¹ *Pl., Phd.* 72c1.

⁴² H. J. Drossaart Lulofs, *op. cit.* 14-18. Cf. O. Gigon, *art. cit.* 29: 'Aristotle would not have been a Greek had he not wanted to compete with his illustrious teacher in the hope of surpassing him'.

⁴³ *Plu., Mor.* 115b-e = *Arist., Eudemus* fr. 6 Ross.

⁴⁴ Cf. H. J. Drossaart Lulofs, *op. cit.* 33 n.55.

⁴⁵ *Cic., Div.* 1.25.33 = *Eudemus* fr. 1 Ross.

⁴⁶ *Arist., Protr.* fr. 20 Ross.

⁴⁷ H. J. Drossaart Lulofs, *loc. cit.*; O. Gigon, *art. cit.* 26; J. H. Waszink, *art. cit.* (1947) 147 presumed derivation from the *Protr.*

here too Aristotle took his cue from Plato. The latter had presented Socrates as a prisoner in the *Phaedo*, but at the same time as one who is 'truly free'. And he had described human beings as beings 'in custody'. Similarly, Aristotle had introduced Silenus (whom Plato in *Symp.* 215a had compared with Socrates!) as a revelator of true insight, but also as a 'prisoner' of king Midas, who was unaware how he himself was a prisoner to his thirst for gold.⁴⁸ In contrast, Silenus seems a prisoner, but is in fact truly free; he is the faithful companion of the liberating god Dionysus, who already as a child had broken the fetters with which Etrurian pirates had bound him.⁴⁹ Aristotle had described human existence on earth too by referring to the fate of prisoners tied onto corpses by Etrurian pirates.⁵⁰ The dreaming Kronos which Aristotle portrayed in the *Eudemus*, finally, is by tradition the Titan god conquered and imprisoned by Zeus. In the only other place where this motif of Kronos the dreamer is elaborated, sleep is called the everlasting bond with which Zeus has bound Kronos.⁵¹

5. The theme of the sleeping Endymion's great *beauty*, in fatal contrast with his lack of insight into the 'truly good', is easily combined with the motif of Alcibiades' beauty, which would assume an aspect of repulsive hideousness for someone capable of seeing with 'the eyes of Lynkeus'.⁵² Here too Aristotle wishes to make his readers aware of the 'optical' difference resulting from the different perspectives of perfectly divine beings and miserable mortals, whose nature is 'in many respects unfree'.⁵³

6. In the next section we shall also follow the traces of the Endymion motif in later authors. We anticipate here by noting that Plutarch presents Endymion's soul as unstable and incapable of detaching itself from the sphere of the moon, because in his dreams Endymion relives the memories of his love life on earth. Such an account may well have been linked to an Aristotelian theory referred to by Proclus. According to this theory, the soul which enters the body has no recollection of its pre-existence, whereas the soul which is liberated from the body does retain the memories of its

⁴⁸ Arist., *Eudemus* fr. 6 Ross. Cf. H. J. Drossaart Lulofs, *op. cit.* 17.

⁴⁹ J. Brunschwig, 'Aristote et les pirates tyrrhéniens; A propos des frs. 60 Rose du *Protreptique*', *RPFE* 88 (1963) 176; cf. 187-188.

⁵⁰ Cf. Iamb., *Protr.* 8 (47.21-48.9 Pistelli) = Arist., *Protr.* fr. 10b Ross; B 106, 107 Düring. But the text has been assigned to the *Eudemus* by O. Gigon, *art. cit.* 28 and J. Brunschwig, *art. cit.* 189.

⁵¹ Plu., *De facie* 941f.

⁵² Cf. Boëth., *Consol.* 3.8: 'Quod si, ut Aristoteles ait, Lyncei oculis homines uterentur, ut eorum visus obstantia penetraret, nonne introspectis visceribus illud Alcibiadis superficie pulcherrimum corpus turpissimum videretur?' = *Protr.* 10a Ross. Cf. Iamb., *Protr.* 8 (47.5-21). O. Gigon, *art. cit.* 28 assigned this passage too to the *Eudemus*; likewise H. Flashar, 'Platon und Aristoteles im Protreptikos des Iamblichus', *AGPh* 47 (1965) 71-73, followed by H. J. Drossaart Lulofs, *op. cit.* 8.

⁵³ Arist., *Metaph.* A 2 982b29.

existence on earth.⁵⁴

11. *Later traces of the Endymion motif from a lost work by Aristotle*

We have already discussed the connection between the Endymion motif and Plato's *Phaedo* and the links with other motifs from Aristotle's *Eudemus*. We must now also draw attention to Endymion's presence in later authors, all of whom were possibly influenced by Aristotle's *Eudemus*. We mention Cicero's *Tusculanae disputationes*, Tertullian's *De anima*, and Plutarch's *De facie in orbe lunae*.

The speaker in Cicero's *Tusc. disp.* argues that fear of death is ungrounded.⁵⁵ In defending this proposition, he uses the stock arguments of materialism and adopts an ironic style reminiscent of the way Velleius voices the Epicurean point of view in the *De natura deorum*.⁵⁶ He mentions Endymion as a mortal whose name is associated with the most fantastic myths. And it is clear from the context that these myths concerned the fate of souls detached from their terrestrial bodies. For the speaker observes: 'Do you happen to think that he [Endymion] is concerned about the pains of the moon [during a lunar eclipse], which has sunk him into a deep sleep, so that she might kiss him in his sleep?' The tense situation involved in the eclipse of the moon by the earth's shadow also occurs in Plutarch's *De facie*, in a strongly eschatological context. There the moon is said to be in a hurry to move out of the earth's shadow because the souls of the good exhort her with loud voices. They are in distress, since in this phase they cannot hear the harmony of the celestial spheres.⁵⁷ This should probably be connected with Plutarch's remarks further on about the instability which threatens to suck souls away from the moon, when they are no longer restrained by the magical or hypnotic powers of the moon itself. Plutarch mentions Endymion as an example of this kind of soul.⁵⁸ On the one hand, therefore, Cicero appears to point us in the direction of an eschatological mythology. On the other hand his text links up with Aristotle, *EN* 10.8, inasmuch as he observes that no one would like to live as Endymion does, nor would anybody wish this kind of existence on any of his relatives.

⁵⁴ Procl., in *Remp.* 2.349.13-26 Kroll = Arist., *Eudemus* fr. 5 Ross.

⁵⁵ Cic., *Tusc.* 1.38.92: 'Quam [sc. mortem] qui leviolem faciunt, somni simillimam volunt esse, quasi vero quisquam ita nonaginta annos velit vivere, ut, cum sexaginta confecerit, reliquos dormiat: ne sui quidem id velint, non modo ipse. Endymion vero, si fabulas audire volumus, ut nescio quando in Latmo obdormivit, qui est mons Cariae, nondum, opinor, est experrectus. Num igitur eum curare censes, cum Luna labore, a qua consopitus putatur, ut eum dormientem oscularetur?'

⁵⁶ Cic., *ND* 1.8.18 ff.

⁵⁷ Plu., *De facie* 29 944a; also 942e.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 945a-b.

Tertullian in the *De anima* speaks only briefly about *Endymiones*.⁵⁹ He puts the latter in a Stoic context and seems to refer to the tradition that Zeus himself delighted in the beauty of Endymion. We merely note that Tertullian's remarks occur in a work that stands in the tradition of speculation 'on the soul', and that in this work we also encountered the 'dreaming Kronos' item⁶⁰, as well as the statements about the ecstasy of Hermotimos of Klazomenai.⁶¹

In Plutarch Endymion features in the 'revelation of the stranger' about the nature of man and the fate of souls after death. The stranger talks about the beings who survive as a compound of soul and intellect after departing from their earthly bodies and who reach the abodes of souls on the moon. Their objective, he says, is to depose the soul's covering and survive, truly free, as pure *nous*. For some souls this process is quicker than for others. It is quick for souls who on earth led a quiet, deliberate, philosophical existence, far from the turmoil of politics and the cares of everyday life.⁶² These souls are contrasted with those who led a life of politics and affairs, or who loved and lived passionately. Some of these souls stay on the moon, incapable of ascending to a higher level; their condition is a sleep in which they see the memories of their earthly existence as dream images, like the soul of Endymion.⁶³

There are various connections between this complex narrative in Plutarch and Aristotle.

(a) The 'revelation of the stranger' evidently parallels the 'revelation of Silenus' about the nature of man in the *Eudemus*.

(b) Plutarch's 'revelation of the stranger' also contains the story about the 'dreaming Kronos', likewise bound by Zeus with the bonds of sleep. But the crucial difference between Endymion and Kronos is that Kronos' passions are pacified during sleep, so that his intellect does succeed in making contact with the divine knowledge of Zeus.⁶⁴

(c) In Plutarch Endymion's soul achieves only a preliminary level of happiness, not the ultimate level; this shows similarities with the text in Al-Kindi from which we took our point of departure.

⁵⁹ Tert., *An.* 55.4: 'Sed in aethere dormitio nostra cum puerariis Platonis aut in aere cum Ario aut circa lunam cum Endymionibus Stoicorum?'. See also *An.* 63 and P. Boyancé, 'Les "Endymions" de Varron', *REA* 41 (1939) 319-324.

⁶⁰ *Op. cit.*, 46.10.

⁶¹ *Op. cit.* 44.1.

⁶² Plu., *De facie* 30 945a.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 945a-b.

⁶⁴ Plu., *De facie* 942a.

12. *Dreaming and waking; appearance and reality and the reversal of perspective in eschatological literature*

Our point of departure was a text in Al-Kindi mentioning a 'Greek king' who, during an ecstatic experience, obtained exact and reliable information about events in the world of man and sublunary nature. We tried to indicate the possibility of connecting this text with Aristotle's *Eudemus*, where a dream received by Eudemus also proved prophetic in an exact and detailed way. An interesting circumstance here was that at a salient point the meaning of the dream had been wrongly interpreted (Eudemus' 'return home'). To the same work we related the figure of the dreaming Kronos, and at Waszink's suggestion clarified this motif with the aid of Plutarch's *De facie*. In Plutarch the dreams of Kronos are mantic and oracular: in his sleep, after his passions have subsided, Kronos gains insight into the plans thought out by Zeus. In his capacity of dream oracle he then conveys these plans to the *daimones* around him, who follow his directions about the government of the world. Finally, we also saw in Plutarch that Endymion's soul, while remaining in the lunar sphere and thus far from the abode of the supreme divine beings, receives dreams. But in this his happiness is typically imperfect, since these dreams conjure up non-actual (and also false) joys.

This complex of themes can easily be related to a text which has also been attributed to Aristotle and which deals with the question of what is truly desirable. The point of the text turns out to be a warm recommendation of the philosophical life devoted to cultivation of the mind. This text, from Iamblichus' *Protrepticus*, has been regarded by many scholars as a fragment (perhaps transmitted indirectly) of Aristotle's *Protrepticus*.⁶⁵ The author stresses that nothing is as valuable as a life of *phronesis*. That is the basic reason why nobody would want forever to be a child or drunk, however glorious boyhood may be and however pleasant a good symposium. In the same way we say that sleeping is very pleasant, but not supremely desirable, not even if we assume that all enjoyments are available to the sleeper. Here too a condition like that of Endymion is sketched. Crucial is the *reality value* of enjoyments, with which we can link up the opposition 'true' and 'untrue' used in the text. A dream is always untrue, an 'image' of reality. True reality is of a different order.

We are confronted here with a typical facet of ancient protreptic and eschatological literature: the reversal of perspective accompanied by the *Umwertung aller Werte*. From this perspective, the situation of earthly mortals can only be regarded as the 'sleep of death' in the realm of Hades. This situation has been transcended by those who sleep 'the sleep of the just', the beings in the celestial spheres. But although these beings have been

⁶⁵ Iamb., *Protr.* 8 (45.21-46.7 Pistelli) = Arist., *Protr.* fr. 9 Ross; B 100, 101 Düring.

liberated from the perishable body, yet their condition is not entirely perfect. They are still enthralled by their psychical condition, and are either imprisoned and sucked down by their passions, like Endymion, or are in the process of restoring a royal and divine nature by a complete regulation of Titanic passions, like Kronos. Higher still and more perfect, however, is the condition of Zeus. He represents real life, the perfect knowledge of true reality. For the activity of the *Nous* is (real) life!⁶⁶

At the same time we should bear in mind that each level implies a superior form of knowledge with respect to the lower levels. Therefore the text in Iamblichus cannot be used to show that its author rejects the prophetic nature of dreams.⁶⁷

13. Aristotle's alternative: liberation and awakening

Finally, we want to conclude our exposition with some general remarks on Aristotle's *Eudemus* or *On the soul*. Aristotle apparently felt the need to write a work 'On the soul', that is to say, on the theme to which Plato devoted his important dialogue the *Phaedo*, but which he also discussed at length in the *Republic*, the *Phaedrus*, and the *Timaeus*. Certainly, as far as literary form and the use of various motifs is concerned, Aristotle appears to have written an interesting work which closely links up and subtly contrasts with Plato's *Phaedo*. But what about Aristotle's philosophical position in relation to Plato? It has frequently been claimed that in the *Eudemus* this position must have been almost entirely Platonic,⁶⁸ contrary to Aristotle's later writings.

However, we should like to point out that in *De caelo* 2.1, which is often thought to derive from a lost writing, Aristotle also joins issue with Plato's doctrine of the soul, in this case the doctrine of the world soul in the *Timaeus*, and that he does so in a context in which his own doctrine of the natural fifth element is presented as the only possible alternative to the Platonic position. In the same context he blames Plato's views for implying that the condition of the celestial beings is as miserable as that of Ixion on his

⁶⁶ Cf. Arist., *Metaph.* A 7 1072b27.

⁶⁷ As in the views of I. Düring, *Aristotle's Protrepticus; an attempt at reconstruction* (Göteborg 1961) 259 and B. Effe, *op. cit.* 82 ff. See Chapter 12.7 above.

⁶⁸ R. Walzer, *art. cit.* (1963²) 41: 'Vediamo dunque di nuovo il giovane Aristotele interamente dipendente dalle dottrine platoniche riguardo alla vita autonoma dell' anima umana'; and 44: 'Non può esservi dubbio che le "forme" siano le idee platoniche la cui presenza nell' *Eudemo* ... vien così di nuove confermata' and 'Il "mondo superiore del regno" (I.15) corrisponderebbe allora al τόπος ὑπερουράνιος di Platone'. We think it more likely that the 'mondo superiore del regno' should be identified with the sphere of the divine, fifth element which, being the Aristotelian substitution for the Platonic World-soul, is also characterized as the τόπος τῶν εἰδῶν.

revolving wheel.⁶⁹ Here the very motif of bondage and imprisonment is used to attack *Plato's own theory of the soul!*

Aristotle must already have introduced his doctrine of a fifth, divine element in a lost writing, and specifically in a discussion of psychology: that much appears from the texts in Cicero, which have often been traced back to Aristotle's *De philosophia*, but which O. Gigon has assigned to the *Eudemus*.⁷⁰

Our suggestion here is that in his study 'On the soul' Aristotle proceeded from Platonic notions about the imprisonment of the human soul, about the earthly, perishable body as the 'tomb' of the soul, a place of horror and corruption, and about human existence as a life 'in custody' under the surveillance of divine beings.⁷¹ But this opposition of the material body and the immaterial soul raised a cosmo-psychological problem, since by implication the World-soul and the souls of the celestial beings would be doomed to exist eternally in a condition as unnatural and miserable as that of Ixion. To solve this problem, Aristotle proposed an alternative which did make it possible to present the condition of the celestial beings and other supra-human beings as 'natural'. While describing the condition of perishable mortals as 'unnatural', awaiting 'liberation',⁷² he presented the state of the liberated souls ambivalently: it is true that their condition is one of eternal effortlessness and ease, but their souls are also prone to be overcome by passions, and sleep. Aristotle, consequently, designated the *nous* as the pure essence of the liberated soul, as distinct from the emotional, passional soul-substance. Only when the hold of emotions and passions on the soul is loosened, can man's real essence, the *nous*, 'awake'.

Philosophy is in this conception the means by which man is first *liberated* from the galling bond of the perishable body, and subsequently *awakened* to the knowledge of the eternal and immutable principles, the knowledge which God himself possesses continuously and perfectly.

⁶⁹ Arist., *Cael.* 2.1 284a29-35.

⁷⁰ See Chapter 9.4 above.

⁷¹ Cf. Pl., *Phd.* 62b.

⁷² Cf. his comparison of human existence to that of the prisoners of Etrurian pirates, tied alive onto corpses, Iamb., *Protr.* 8 (47.21-48.9 Pistelli) = Arist., *Protr.* fr. 10b Ross; B 106-107 Düring.

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